by Guy Standing | May 9, 2024 | Featured
Find the Chinese translation here for Guy Standing’s talk in China. The original English of the talk can be found below.
Throughout history, capitalism has evolved, changing character and changing the class structure defining each era. The changes in the 20th century can be understood by reference to what Karl Polanyi called the Great Transformation. Briefly, in his formulation, in the 19th century, mainly in Britain, there was an initial period in the evolution of industrial capitalism that was dominated by financial capital, in which old systems of distribution, regulation and social protection were dismantled, in what we would call the pursuit of a ‘free market economy’.
In Polanyi’s terminology, this was a period in which the economy was ‘dis-embedded’ from society, that is, out of control by civilising social forces. As a result, inequalities and economic insecurities multiplied until there was a systemic crisis, and in his words ‘a threat of the annihilation of civilisation’. This manifested itself in the Great Depression, and the rise of fascism and a dehumanised form of state socialism in the Soviet Union.
After the Second World War, there was an era in which the capitalistic economy was re-embedded in society through what is usually called welfare state capitalism, led by countries of western Europe, and welfare capitalism, mainly in the USA. There were many distinctive features of this period of capitalism, which we will not discuss here. However, most relevant for the narrative of this presentation, it was a period in which capital made concessions to the main working class, the proletariat.
It was the era of a brief triumph of social democracy. In return for accepting capital’s right to manage and control the accumulation process, the state pursued policies that shared the gains from economic growth between capital and labour while partially decommodifying labour. The state provided labour-based security, and a broadening array of non-wage state benefits, while capital provided non-wage enterprise benefits to employees. What should be called the social income of workers shifted steadily away from the money wage, as the value of non-wage benefits rose. As we know, similar policies were part of Leninism in the Soviet Union and the danwei ‘iron rice bowl’ policy in the China of the 1950s and 1960s.
The proletariat under capitalism were, in effect, provided with labour-based security against what are called contingency risks, such as unemployment, accidents and illness, and lifetime hazards, such as maternity and old-age. But this security was made strictly conditional on the performance of labour and the willingness to perform labour, or being a dependent person on somebody performing labour. So, it was really fictitious labour decommodification. If you did not provide full-time labour, you had no security, or what you had was determined by being dependent on a wage labourer.
Two problems became acute in the 1970s. Because the money wage had fallen to being a low percentage of total labour remuneration, there was no incentive to perform labour productively. This reached extreme form in the Soviet Union, in which workers had a joke, ‘They pretend to pay us, we pretend to work.’
The second problem was devastating for industrialised capitalistic economies. The welfare state capitalism model had in effect taken labour out of international trade. Countries producing competitive manufacturing commodities had similar levels of labour costs, with similar non-wage benefits, while developing economies had very low labour costs but were producing mainly complementary primary goods. That meant labour costs were not a major factor in international trade. But in the 1970s, this changed dramatically, with the emergence of export-oriented ‘newly industrialising countries’ (NICs), mainly in south-east Asia. For that and other reasons, welfare state capitalism experienced acute crisis. The embedded phase of Polanyi’s Great Transformation collapsed.
This led to the neo-liberal economics revolution, led by economists known as ‘the Chicago school’. Once again, advocates of capitalism were in ascendancy, advocating a ‘free market economy’, but really supporting financial capital and stronger state regulation of labour, designed to weaken the bargaining position of workers and to lower their social income. It was a period of labour re-commodification, in which non-wage benefits and social services were cut and in which social democratic political parties lost power.
But, as argued in my books, the ‘free market’ neo-liberalism was only a transitional phase. By the 1990s, financial capital was firmly in control, and a form of capitalism emerged that was the opposite of what the neo-liberals claimed they wanted. It is best described as global rentier capitalism. It was the triumph of private property rights, in which more and more of the income flowed to the owners of property – physical assets, financial assets and so-called intellectual property.
This new system came into full effect in 1994, when an international agreement was reached called TRIPS, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property. This globalised the US system of intellectual property rights. It marked the hegemonic pinnacle of the United States. At that time, China was not included. It only joined the World Trade Organisation in 2001, after which China rapidly expanded as a rentier state, soon filing more patents and other forms of intellectual property rights, giving monopolistic profits to leading corporations and financial capital.
The point of most relevance to this lecture is that globalised rentier capitalism meant that more and more income flowed to property owners and less and less flowed to those who performed labour and work. Real wages stagnated or fell in industrialised capitalistic countries and income and wealth inequalities rose all over the world. Making all that worse was that governments gave huge subsidies and tax breaks to their major corporations to increase their competitiveness in export markets.
…and the class structure changed
Meanwhile, due to globalisation, an ongoing technological revolution and neoliberal labour and social policies, a new globalised class structure took shape. Every configuration of capitalism produces a new class structure, and it is a mistake of some Marxists to portray the class structure in dualistic terms, as if classes and the class structure are the same today as they were in Marx’s time in the 19th century.
A class can be defined in terms of three dimensions – distinctive relations of production, distinctive relations of distribution and distinctive relations to the state. Bearing that in mind, we may briefly describe the global class structure under rentier capitalism.
In descending order of average income and state power, at the top is the plutocracy, made up of a tiny number of billionaires, making most of their vast income from forms of property. Below them is an elite, mainly in managerial positions, but also gaining from property. Then there is a small group of independent self-employed, which I call proficians, making a lot of money but living insecurely. Then, there is a larger salariat – those with salaried employment, occupational pensions, houses and shares.
These four groups are defined in detail in my books. The crucial points for this lecture are that, first, all are recipients of rentier income, and second, all are objectively and emotionally detached from existing welfare states. They do not gain much from social policies and do not expect to need them. It is often overlooked that the salariat, as well as the plutocracy and elite, have done very well during the rentier capitalism era, gaining in particular from asset price inflation. The new class structure is not the “1% versus the 99%”, as too many commentators have claimed.
All this means that those top strata – perhaps accounting for 25% of the population in most countries – have little inclination to defend wages, labour standards or state benefits, unless they are driven by fear of losing their privileges as a result of a revolt from disadvantaged majority below them in the structure.
Below those groups in the evolving class structure is the old proletariat, for whom social democratic political parties and labour unions were built, and whose interests were advanced globally by the International Labour Organisation. The key points here for this discourse are that, first, the proletariat was subject to proletarianization, that is, habituated to the disciplines of stable full-time labour, and second, they experienced fictitious decommodification, in that the money wage shrank as a share of social income, with more non-wage benefits giving them labour security. As stated earlier, it was not real decommodification, since they were obliged to sell labour (effort and time) in order to obtain those entitlements, or be married to someone prepared to do so.
For the proletariat, the norm was and is to be in a stable full-time job. They were induced to have a form of false consciousness. Their political representatives wanted as many people as possible in full-time labour. They romanticised being in a job, promising Full Employment, and quietly resorting to what is known as ‘workfare’, that is, by denying benefits to anybody not providing labour. As socialists, they conveniently forgot that being in a job is being in a position of subordination, and failed to recall Marx’s depiction of labour in jobs as ‘active alienation’.
The norm of the proletariat’s relations of production was employment security, not occupational security, in that they have had to do what activity they are told to so. They have been exploited in workplaces and in labour time. As for their relations of distribution, those in the proletariat were never rent-recipients, having no income from property. But as a norm they were also not structurally exploited by rent mechanisms.
This leads to the emerging mass class of rentier capitalism, the precariat. This is not an ‘under-class’, which is a category cut off from society. The precariat’s distinctive relations of production include having unstable, insecure labour, having to do a lot of work that is not labour, including work for the state, having no occupational or organisational narrative to give to themselves, and being exploited and oppressed off workplaces and outside labour time as much as within them.
Many are being drawn into what in the economics literature is called ‘platform capitalism’, as ‘concierge’ workers or as ‘cloud taskers’, controlled and manipulated by apps and other labour brokers. Above all, they are being habituated to precariatisation – the opposite of proletarianisation, that is, pressured to accept and adapt to a life of unstable labour without a secure occupational identity. The nearest equivalent in China is the vivid idea of ‘the ant tribe’.
The precariat’s relations of distribution are distinctive. First, they must try to survive solely on low, volatile and uncertain money wages, with few if any non-wage benefits or assured state benefits. Second, they are systematically subject to exploitation by rental mechanisms, living constantly on the edge of unsustainable debt. The insecurity they experience is unlike that of the proletariat, being characterised by chronic uncertainty and fragility in the context of unpredictable but common shocks to their lives.
That is bad enough. However, it is the distinctive relations to the state that most define the precariat. The primary antagonist of the precariat is the state, rather than capital directly. The reality is that they are losing or not gaining the rights and entitlements of citizens. Above all, they are reduced to being supplicants, dependent on the discretionary benevolence of landlords, employers, parents, charities and strangers, hoping they will show them pity. The etymological root of precariousness, from the Latin, is ‘to obtain by prayer’. The precariat are almost like beggars; they must rely on people’s charity. They have no secure rights, and so experience constant insecurities.
It is important to emphasise that the precariat is a class, in that capital and the state want it to exist as a functional part of the productive system. But below the precariat is a huge and growing lumpen-precariat, an ‘underclass’, consisting of millions of people living and dying in the streets prematurely, from social illnesses, opioids and suicidal depression. The underclass represents a threat to the precariat. It reminds them that unless they conform to the new norms, they could fall into an even worse existence.
The precariat is the core working class of the 21st century. But it is important to emphasise that the precariat is a class-in-the-making not yet a class-for-itself. What this means is that, whereas members of the precariat are conscious of the conditions that define themselves, they are not yet united in having a common vision of what type of transformed society they want. Indeed, the precariat consists of three groups.
The first can be called Atavists. These are people who came from old proletarian families or communities and who look back to a real or imaginary life of labour security. They tend to be relatively low-educated, and want to recover the Past. This group has tended to support neo-fascist or populist politicians, like Donald Trump, who promise to bring back some imaginary glorious Yesterday.
The second can be called Nostalgics. These are mostly migrants and racial minorities, who feel they do not have a home anywhere. They do not have a Present, a Here-and-Now. They will not support neo-fascists or populists, but feel and are dis-enfranchised, left out of society. There are a huge number of people in this group, and from time to time they indulge in ‘days of rage’.
The third faction in the precariat can be called Progressives. These are mainly the young and educated, who were promised a Future if they went to university or college, but who come out with no Future other than the prospect of persistent debt and uncertainty. They too will not support a neo-fascistic agenda. But across the world they are looking for a new Future.
It is this third group that could be the vanguard of a new progressive politics. The reason why they are a new dangerous class is that they do not identify with either capital or labour. They do not suffer from a false consciousness, of believing that an ideal situation is to be in full-time jobs. Of course, most do want jobs, out of necessity. But they see jobs as instrumental, not defining their lives, identities or aspirations. We must appreciate that the precariat are not just ‘victims’. They are also active and are seeking an alternative reality to what is the norm of today.
This is behind the new phenomenon in China and elsewhere of ‘lying flat’, simply not conforming to the norms imposed by capitalism, norms that say people should strive to be successful economically and should labour hard in the hope or expectation of upward social mobility. Political leaders must respond to the precariat’s sense of agency and their aspirations.
The Age of Uncertainty
The precariat is growing in size in the context of an unstable global economy, in which the main feature is unpredictable uncertainty. This is made more severe by a unique combination of historical forces. Capitalism has always been unstable, as Marx first made clear. But he could not have anticipated the way today’s rentier capitalism has coincided with a seismic technological revolution and an ecological crisis, in which financial crises, natural disasters and pandemics are increasingly widespread and global in character.
We are living in a transformational moment, a time of constant crisis, in which, to recall Karl Polanyi’s assessment of the 1920s, the world could either lurch into a dark night of authoritarianism, philistinism and neo-fascism or it could make a decisive turn into a new age of Enlightenment. At the moment, the first seems more likely. But it can be averted.
The key point on which to concentrate is that we are living in an age of chronic uncertainty, in which crises pile into one another, plunging masses of people in almost every country deeper into social and economic insecurity, impoverishment, stress and ill-health.
There was the financial crash of 2008, followed by more than a decade of ‘austerity’ in western countries (when state benefits and public social services were severely reduced), a series of six pandemics just since the beginning of the century culminating in Covid, with more to follow. And now a ‘cost-of-living’ crisis as inflation surges, exposing more people to unsustainable pressures. In the background are disgusting wars that are little more than neo-colonial land grabbing. If we are not scared by all that, we should be.
In 2007, a Lebanese-American financier Nassim Taleb coined the term ‘black swans’ to designate social and economic shocks that are rare, unpredictable and have devastating consequences. It was a good metaphor. Most swans are white; it is a shock to see a black one. However, today social and economic shocks are not rare at all. But they are uncertain in terms of when, where and why they occur and who will be adversely affected. As such, you and I cannot be confident that we will not be among the victims. Most people feel vulnerable.
There is something else too. It looks as if a growing proportion of the population will be affected by the shocks. It was predicted, for example, that two-thirds of the population of Britain would suffer from fuel-related hardship during the winter of 2022-2023, bringing more deaths and ill-health. That is what has happened, resulting in more homelessness, more queuing outside ‘food banks’ (places where food donations are given out to the poor) and more debt. And, of course, Britain is not alone. Everywhere, natural disasters, such as extreme weather events, hit numerous whole communities, and being in a job these days is far from a guarantee of escaping poverty or economic insecurity.
Three deductions should flow from this bleak scenario. First, more rapid economic growth will not overcome the threats; it could merely accelerate global warming and the existential crisis. Second, the old social policies are not valid for tackling the new crises. Third, there is an unprecedented need to build societal Robustness (immunity to shocks) and societal Resilience (the ability to cope with and recover from shocks), based on a new income distribution system and a new social protection system. ‘Targeting’ assistance on a minority would be futile and inequitable, if only because it is a majority who are actually vulnerable.
This is the modern reality. Yet there is an awful hesitancy among politicians. It appears as if even nominally socialistic parties are sleepwalking into self-defeating timidity, bringing to mind Gramsci’s chilling aphorism written from prison in 1930:
‘The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.’
Appeasement is in the air. So-called leftish political parties criticise the plutocracy, and yet accept their largesse in the form of donations and media support. Their leaders take every opportunity to tell ‘business’ that it will be safe in their hands. In the west, the political landscape is occupied by social democratic ‘think tanks’, exuding respectability, seeking ‘relevance’ and eagerly expressing ‘moderation’, granting them continuing access to benevolent ‘donors’. Governments are reacting to events, not being prepared to control them.
There is a fear of the grand narrative or vision of the Future, and a willingness to play a game with rules set by the rulers, the financiers and the plutocracy. That must end.
Basic Income: Anchor of Freedom, Security and Eco-Socialism
So, in China and in all significant countries, it should be clear that the old income distribution system has broken down – the labour share of income has fallen, the precariat has grown and will become more restless, alienated, insecure and angry unless structural change takes place – and there will be more ecological and economic crises, and more pandemics.
It is a transformational moment. It is a time for a new Manifesto, not the old Communist Manifesto of 1848, but a Precariat Manifesto. There is no time in this lecture to consider all elements in such a Manifesto. I want to conclude by just considering one fundamental policy, which almost every country could afford. And I want to argue that its justification is philosophically grounded.
The proposal is that everybody in society should be provided by the state with a modest basic income, a monthly amount paid individually, without behavioural conditions, paid regardless of income, wealth, work status, marital status or gender. It should be paid equally to men and since the intention would be to give each resident citizen and equal ‘share’ of public wealth, strengthening social solidarity. The level of basic income would be set by a government-appointed but administratively independent council, and could be paid from a Commons Capital Fund, a form of sovereign wealth fund, as elaborated in my recent books.
There are three philosophical rationales for a basic income. The first is that it is a matter of common justice. The income and wealth of all of us in society are determined mainly by the contributions of many generations of our ancestors. But it is impossible to know whose ancestors contributed more or less. If we allow for the private inheritance of private wealth, as every society does, then we could see a basic income as a form of common dividend, a share of inherited public wealth.
In addition, all societies were built on the commons, which belong to all of us equally – the land, sea, seabed, the natural resources and the social amenities built by past generations. Karl Marx was radicalised in the 1840s not by anger at exploitation in capitalistic factories or mines but by seeing how the commons were being taken away from the peasants and other commoners.
In every country, over the centuries elites and commercial interests have taken the commons, depriving commoners of their heritage. The demand for a basic income is a demand for compensation for that deprivation.
A basic income would also be a matter of inter-generational justice. In every country there are areas where economic growth and capital accumulation have been more rapid than elsewhere. But often, areas of past growth become areas of decay and backwardness, whereas the wealth was taken elsewhere. An equal basic income paid to everybody across the country would equalise the gains and actually raise living standards in poorer areas relative to richer areas, reducing income inequality.
A basic income would also be an instrument of ecological justice. The rich cause far more pollution and greenhouse gas emissions than the poor. But the poor suffer much more from pollution, which damages health and living standards. Every country needs to raise taxes on carbon and fossil fuels more generally. This will only be politically feasible if it is guaranteed that the revenue is recycled as part of the basic income.
It would also be an instrument of what should be called compassion justice. Instead of reducing citizens to supplicants, relying on state charity in times of emergency or relying on other forms of charity, each citizen would have an equal economic right. In other words, a basic income would reduce the role of the state as charity provider, which should surely be an objective of any socialist.
A basic income would also be an instrument of work justice. Under capitalism and old-stye state socialism, only the performance of labour has been regarded as deserving of remuneration by a money wage. This is sexist and absurd. The performance of care work, done mostly by women, is just as productive – it is reproductive – and in ageing societies is becoming even more important as contributing to a Good Society. A basic income would encourage and reward care work and community work on which society depends.
The second ethical or philosophical justification for a basic income is that it would be an instrument for promoting freedom. Most social thinkers, not just Marxists, claim to be in favour of freedom. But freedom requires assured access to material resources. There are three forms of freedom that a basic income would strengthen.
First, there is what can be called libertarian freedom. This is the freedom that is what neo-liberals and other capitalist advocates emphasise – the freedom to choose. The trouble is that is meaningless or insulting if people are poor or chronically insecure, in which case they have to do whatever is necessary in order to survive. The freedom to say “No” to an exploitative employer or landlord can only exist if the person has access to material resources with which to survive.
Second, there is what should be called liberal freedom. This is more interesting for a Marxist. It is the freedom to be moral, the freedom to take decisions that one believes are morally consistent with one’s values and culture. Again, unless a person has basic income security, they cannot easily take the moral course of action. But the state should wish to strengthen its citizens capacity to be moral.
Third, a basic income would strengthen republican freedom. This is the freedom from arbitrary interventions in a person’s decision-making. A person is not free if she has to seek approval from a husband or father or other figure of authority, even if that person is a very benevolent person. A person is only really free if they can make decisions themselves, whether or not others approve.
So, a basic income would strengthen all three forms of freedom. It remains to consider the third ethical or philosophical justification for basic income. And this is perhaps the most distinctly relevance for our era. A basic income would promote basic security.
Basic security is a fundamental human need. It is also what economists call a public good, in that if one person has it, that does not deprive others from having it. Indeed, I would call it a superior public good, in that if everybody has basic security, the whole community is likely to gain.
But we should distinguish basic security from total security. If you are too secure, you are likely to become careless or indolent. What is needed is basic security so that you know that you will be able to survive even if you have an accident, an illness or make a mistake in your life. And psychologists have shown that unless a person has basic security, their mental capacity declines, their intelligence actually drops and their capacity to make rational decisions drops. Seen that way, it is unfair of the state to expect people to behave with a sense of social responsibility if its people are economically insecure. A basic income responds to all that.
And here we come to the crucial points of most relevance in this age of uncertainty. Throughout the 20th century, social policy was built on the presumption that the state would provide protection after an adverse event hit somebody, such as unemployment or an illness, for which a probability of it occurring could be calculated and a rough estimate of the likely cost could be calculated. But today every part of the world is struggling with chronic uncertainty. People live in fear, feeling a new shock will hit them and their community at any time, but not knowing in advance how it will affect them and if they will be able to cope and recover.
In such circumstances, we need a system of ex ante social protection, that is, a full guarantee that basic security will exist. A basic income is the only way to provide such protection. Of course, it is not sufficient in itself, but it is necessary as an anchor of a Good Society.
Besides the three philosophical justifications – justice, freedom and security – a basic income is also justifiable economically. It could provide an automatic macro-economic stabiliser, that is, it could be adjusted upwards in times of economic crisis and downwards in times of economic boom, or at least have a component that could be adjusted in that way.
And there is evidence of its positive effects from basic income experiments. This speaker has been fortunate enough to be able to help put into practice a policy in which he believes. Experiments, using independent objective methods, have been done in which thousands of peoples from very different types of community have been provided with basic incomes, with the results being monitored over several years. They have been done in countries as different as Canada, India, the USA, Spain and Kenya.
Everywhere the results have been broadly similar. Basic income results in improvements in health, particularly mental health. In low-income communities in particular, it results in better nutrition, most notably for young children. It results in improved attendance in school and fewer drop-outs from school. It has an emancipatory effect for women. And, contrary to critics, it results in an increase in work, not less, and in increased productivity in work. And it results in a reduction in income inequality, not just because the amount is proportionately more for low-income people but because it enables the lower-income people to increase their economic activity. Perhaps most encouragingly of all, if all members of a community are provided with basic incomes, that induces a strengthening of social solidarity.
Basic income is not a panacea. But it an imperative if society is to experience a reduction in all the ills of chronic economic and social uncertainty. In his speeches, President Xi has said dozens of times that income inequality must be reduced in China. In other parts of the world similar sentiments are expressed. Providing a basic income would be a powerful way of reducing the inequalities that could otherwise become explosive over the next decade. Let us promote it.
by Karl Widerquist | Sep 17, 2019 | Opinion, The Indepentarian
The Ethics and Economics of the Basic Income Guarantee (2005) edited by Karl Widerquist, Michael Anthony Lewis, and Steven Pressman, published by Publishing is availed in a free version at this link.
This book available because most publishers allow authors and editors to post early version for free on their personal websites. That means it has lots of typos and other problems. But it’s a reasonable approximation of the final version. Please see the published version if you can. It’s available at university libraries.
Summary from 2005
This book is divided into four Parts. They cover the history of BIG, philosophical debates over the vision of society it represents, sociological and economic debates concerning its effects, and finally some practical proposals for a BIG in several countries.
The four chapters in Part One trace the history of the BIG proposal from its beginnings in the late eighteenth century to the present with special emphasis on the guaranteed income movement of the 1960s and 1970s in the United States.
Steven Pressman
In chapter 2, Fred Block and Margaret Somers examine the relationship between the welfare reform passed by the United States Congress in 1996 and Speenhamland, a British town that (in May 1795) decreed the poor were entitled to certain public assistance. As the program spread among English parishes, it generated a great deal of controversy. Critics argued that it provided relief to the able bodied, and thus reduced work effort and increased the local tax rates (to support the poor). Block and Somers revisit the Speenhamland episode. Drawing on four decades of recent scholarship, the authors show that Speenhamland policies could not have had the consequences attributed to them. They then seek to explain how the Speenhamland story became part of the accepted wisdom regarding public assistance to the poor and how it contributed to the 1996 welfare reform legislation in the United States. This argument has important consequences of BIG proposals, since it points out that income guarantees have not had negative consequences in the past and so they should not be rejected for this reason.
In chapter 3, economists John Cunliffe and Guido Erreygers focus on the historical antecedents of contemporary basic income proposals. Specifically, they focus on proposals put forth by the nineteenth century American writers Cornelius Blatchly, Thomas Skidmore, and Orestes Brownson. They argue that these writers may have been influenced by the ideas of Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine, American revolutionaries whose ideas about economic policy and distribution bear striking similarities to current basic income proposals.
Robert Harris gives an inside account, in chapter 4, of the politics behind the guaranteed income movement of the 1960s and 1970s. The movement grew out of dissatisfaction with the conditional welfare system that had been in place since the New Deal, which was failing to eliminate poverty either for workers or for people unable to work, and which was causing significant poverty traps. Many people on the left and right began to see the guaranteed income as a simpler and more effective system for both the working poor and those on social assistance. Nixon’s modified guaranteed income was overwhelmingly passed by the House of Representatives, but failed narrowly in the Senate thanks to opposition from both left and right and to lukewarm support from Nixon himself.
One offshoot of the guaranteed income movement was that five NIT experiments were conducted in the United States and Canada during the 1970s. These experiments divided a group of subjects into two groups. One group was part of a negative income tax plan; the other group was a control group that was subject to the regular United States income tax. The experiments were designed to measure the impact of NIT on labor force participation and marital dissolution in a rigorous scientific manner. These experiments were not only important for the basic income guarantee, but they were also the first large scale social experiments and had farreaching influence on policy research in a number of different areas. Some of the original scholars from the negative tax experiments reunite in chapter 5 to discuss their importance after 30 years. The panel members discuss the political reasons for setting up the experiments and their results. Although the results were largely positive, showing small workdisincentive effects and important effects on health, educational attainment, and well being, some politicians and pundits used the experimental findings to help quash the NIT.
Part Two examines the philosophical debate over BIG. The papers in this section of the book discuss various justifications for a BIG and compare the case for a BIG to the case for other types of income support plans.
In chapter 6, political theorist Almaz Zelleke examines political rights and BIG. Her concern is that social thinkers on both the right and left tend to agree that income policies should have work or social contribution requirements attached to them. After discussing and criticizing the arguments of thinkers such as Laurence Mead, Mickey Kaus, Anthony Atkinson and others who hold this view, she puts forth an alternative—the market should be regarded as a sphere of citizenship no less important than the polity. That is, the liberty that we grant to United States citizens is tied to the right to partake in the market as much as it is tied to the right to partake in politics. Thus, we should view income that lets people participate in the market as analogous to voting rights that let people take part in the political process. We grant people the right to vote and, likewise, the basic income should be viewed as a right to “vote” in the marketplace.
Philosopher Michael Howard’s article (chapter 7) is largely a discussion of the liberal neutrality principle associated with the philosopher John Rawls, and its relevance to the basic income debate. The neutrality principle roughly stipulates that an acceptable theory of justice cannot be biased toward any particular substantive conception of the good life. Howard’s thesis, presented with the argumentative and analytic skills philosophers are known for, is that any income policy that requires some contribution to society is biased toward those whose conception of the good life involves such contribution; a basic income isn’t biased in this way, rendering it the more just policy.
Michael A. Lewis
In chapter 8, Karl Widerquist defends basic income against the “exploitation objection,” which asserts that a basic income allows individuals to benefit from social cooperation without contributing to society, thereby exploiting those who do work. He specifically addresses Gijs van Donselaar’s version of this objection, and argues this objection has three critical flaws. First, the conclusion that a basic income is exploitive relies on holding the poor responsible for the level of scarcity in the world. Second, van Donselaar treats work rents differently than other rents. Third, van Donselaar’s definition of exploitation is unworkable in practice, and the connection between it and a case against basic income is weak.
In chapter 9, Michael A. Lewis enters the debate between basic income and the basic stake proposal put forth by Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstot. This proposal stipulates that a lump some of $80,000 be provided to each high school graduate at age 18 if the recipient plans to attend college or age 21 if she does not plan to do so. Lewis addresses the question of whether basic income or the stake is better at promoting freedom. He suggests that if one makes assumptions associated with rational choice theory it would seem that the stake is more freedom promoting. However, he goes on to argue that there appear to be pervasive patterns in decision making that might result in people allocating their stakes in ways they might later regret, and that a basic income might be more freedom promoting because it would constrain people’s ability to make such decisions.
While Part Two is philosophical in its orientation, Part Three is empirical. The papers in this section address questions concerning the real world impact of a BIG and its alternatives.
Steven Pressman, in chapter 10, addresses one of the key tradeoffs faced in a BIG plan—the lack of incentives to work hard and make more money that are likely to occur as a result of giving people a sum of money with no strings attached. Generating greater equity with a BIG will therefore also reduce economic efficiency. If these efficiency losses are large enough, reduced efficiency would constitute a good case against BIG. Using an international dataset that stretches back over 20 years (the Luxembourg Income Study), Pressman examines the tradeoff between equity and efficiency empirically. He finds negligible efficiency losses due to government redistribution efforts, and concludes that any efficiency-equity tradeoff is likely to be small (as long as redistribution efforts remain in their current range).
In chapter 11, economist James Bryan focuses on poverty reduction as a central goal of any income policy, but also attends to the effect such policies have on work incentives. Bryan looks at the extent to which the mid-1990s welfare reforms reduced poverty by focusing on trends in poverty before the reforms, from
1993–1995, and trends afterwards, from 1995–1996. He arrives at three conclusions: (1) poverty among families with children declined in the post-reform period but the rate of decrease was slower than during the pre-reform period, (2) among poor single-mother families there were reductions in disposable income, and (3) these reductions in disposable income were only partially offset by cash and in-kind programs such as the earned income tax credit (EITC) and food stamps. Bryan argues that a basic income guarantee could decrease poverty to a larger extent while creating smaller work disincentives than the current package of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), workfare, food stamps, and EITC programs. He attributes this to the high benefit reduction rate in current programs compared to the lower reduction rates that would obtain in basic income plans. From an economic point of view Bryan sees two arguments against the basic income. First, the volume of transfers needed to achieve an acceptable minimum income guarantee may be very high compared to more highly targeted programs. Second, to maintain work incentives for beneficiaries, the benefit reduction rate must be low. This would, in turn, create a small net donor population, thus requiring a high marginal tax rate and generating a larger work disincentive for this group.
In chapter 12, Thierry Laurent and Yannick L’Horty examine the work incentive problems of a basic income guarantee. They argue that most previous studies of the work incentive problem take a static approach. People are thought to balance just the income from working now against the income received now from a guaranteed income plan. However, Laurent and L’Horty note that there are also dynamic considerations. People with jobs today are likely to get promotions and higher pay in the future. So the real choice is a dynamic one, where individuals must balance both the short- and long-term benefits of work against the BIG. The authors then model labor force participation in an intertemporal framework, and use data from French labor market surveys to test their model. Their results show that there are differences between short-run back to work incentives and long-term problems. They also show that there is no obvious link between short- and long-run incentive problems. Finally, their results explain why some workers may have an incentive to accept jobs that do not pay, while others do not.
In chapter 13, Stephen Bouquin presents research results on the effects of tax-credit systems in Europe that use “in-work benefits,” which are meant to be combined with the wages of the working poor. He examines the labor market policies of three European countries that have been increasingly relying on inwork benefits, including the United Kingdom (Working Tax Credit, Income Support), France (Tax Credit), and Belgium (several policies). He finds evidence of what he calls the “Speenhamland effect” on wages. That is, in-work benefits can reduce real wages, as employers capture some or all of the benefits (intended for workers) by reducing the wages they pay. Through these effects, expenditures intended to benefit poor workers end up benefiting their employers. The existence of Speenhamland effects raises serious doubt for any policy based on forcing individuals into the paid labor market.
BIG also raises practical questions. How much would a BIG cost? How can it be financed? What is the optimal level of BIG, given tradeoffs between poverty reduction on the one hand, and costs and work disincentives on the other hand? Part Four, the final section of the book, contains chapters that examine the political prospects of BIG and chapters with nuts and bolts proposals for making basic income work in various countries around the world.
In chapter 14, Nicoli Nattrass and Jeremy Seeking discuss the possibility of implementing a BIG in South Africa. South Africa is the only country in the world with a major grassroots movement pushing for BIG, and it has a unique political and economic situation that make BIG politically feasible. The authors argue that BIG has been on the agenda because of the coincidence of four main factors. First, the country already has a system of public welfare that is unusually extensive in its coverage, unusually generous in its benefits and unusually redistributive in its effects. Second, poverty persists due to unemployment and the absence of subsistence agriculture, and there is little prospect of reducing poverty through job creation or land reform in the short- or medium-term. Third, the existence of an extensive system of private welfare, through remittances sent by employed workers to rural kin, means that it is in the interests of the powerful trade union movement to support a BIG. Fourth, the extent of inequality, paradoxically, makes it easier to finance a BIG based on redistribution from the rich to the poor.
Karl Widerquist, credit: Enno Schmidt
In chapter 15, Brazilian Senator Eduardo Suplicy discusses the movement for a BIG in Brazil. Suplicy and others have been pressing for BIG at the federal, state, and municipal level since the late 1980s. The measure was twice approved by the Brazilian Senate but languished until the Workers’ Party (of which both Suplicy and President Lula are members) took control of the presidency. Success was finally achieved in January 2004 when President Lula signed a basic income bill into law. The new law gives the executive wide authority to determine the timing of the phase-in, but it authorizes the gradual introduction of a small basic income guarantee within the next eight years.
In chapter 16, political scientist Yannick Vanderborght discusses recent debates over BIG in Belgium and the Netherlands. Reviewing the various arguments both for and against the basic income, he concludes that the supporters of a basic income have an uphill battle. Vanderborght views the main obstacle to the basic income in these two countries as the widely held belief that able-bodied recipients of income assistance should make some social contribution in return for assistance. He concludes with a discussion of the so-called “participation grant,” a policy that would provide a universal grant to all citizens or residents as long as they engaged in some socially beneficial pursuit. Such a pursuit does not necessarily mean one has to sell her or his labor. Thus, providing uncompensated (by the market) care for children, or for other friends or relatives, and a host of other “outside the market” activities would qualify. Vanderborght argues that such a policy might have a more promising future than the “pure” basic income.
In chapter 17, Derek Hum and Wayne Simpson provide some cost estimates for several possible Canadian BIG programs. Employing two different definitions of poverty, Hum and Simpson estimate that a BIG to eliminate poverty in Canada would cost between $141 billion and $176 billion (or around 15 percent of Canadian GDP). This, they believe, is too costly and would not be politically acceptable in Canada. They also provide estimates of alternative BIG plans that provide income guarantees below the Canadian poverty line. These programs would cost little more than current income transfer programs because they include a negative tax or claw back of the income guarantee. Hum and Simpson find that these programs would do much less to reduce poverty and the income shortfall facing the poor. They conclude by noting that there are many possibilities between these two extremes; these plans would not be very expensive, yet would be relatively effective in reducing poverty in Canada.
In chapter 18, Randall Bartlett, James Davies and Michael Hoy explore how to set up a negative income tax in the United Kingdom. Their goal was to formulate a set of programs with a guaranteed income and a single flat tax rate that collects the same amount of money as the existing United Kingdom progressive tax system. They then test whether their negative income tax is as progressive as the current United Kingdom tax and transfer system. Their findings are that it would be relatively easy to structure a negative income tax for the United Kingdom that is more equitable than the current system and that does not require high marginal tax rates.
The chapters in this book bring the debate over basic incomes into a contemporary and eclectic context. They provide many different perspectives to the BIG proposal in specific and to antipoverty policy in general. And they show that BIG is a feasible policy alternative.
The Ethics and Economics of the Basic Income Guarantee (2005) edited by Karl Widerquist, Michael Anthony Lewis, and Steven Pressman, published by Ashgate
A free version is available at this link.