Chamberlain’s book explores universal basic income (UBI), which he calls unconditional basic income, as a potential step on the way from a “work society,” in which individual gainful employment is placed at the center of citizenship and community membership, to a post-work community in which the wellbeing of others is valued over individual achievements. Undoing Work, Rethinking Community focuses primarily on the UK and the US, moving through a detailed discussion of the place of work in contemporary life and politics, as well as more recent changes that have witnessed a gradual erosion of worker’s rights and stability, contending that the current overvaluation of work undermines freedom, equality, and justice. It then outlines a potential role for UBI in Chamberlain’s vision of the transition away from the work society, along with guidance for UBI advocates who share similar priorities with regard to shifting the conversation from its focus on encouraging employment. Finally, it sketches the theoretical beginnings of a “post-work” community.
Employment in Politics and the Meaning of Citizenship
Chamberlain begins by touching on the centrality of work and employment as a right and citizen’s obligation to the campaign rhetoric on both sides of the US 2016 election. Beyond America, he also points out 2011 UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s focus on employment as a solution to riots through the words “work is at the heart of our society.” In his very first pages, Chamberlain outlines his central contention: that citizenship and social participation are conditional upon employment and that those who are not able (or do not desire) to pursue employment for any reason, be it ability, other priorities or means of subsistence, family responsibilities, etc., are marginalized and configured as social pariahs or “freeloaders” rather than good citizens. In essence, he argues that society itself is currently understood to be the product of collective labour, and thus the work society values work ethic, the independence it permits, and the full citizenship or social participation made possible by said independence.
Interestingly, Chamberlain traces a brief history of types of “dependence” that used to be considered socially permissible or positive (that of a wife, for example, or the elderly) but have become more and more suspect, such that one must demonstrate the reason for one’s dependence (i.e., in the case of pregnancy, disability, or other inability to work) or show that one has paid one’s dues (in the case of the elderly) or is preparing oneself for employment (in the case of youth in school).
Undoing Work outlines the roots of the work society in history and political theory and examines several of the key arguments that connect work to citizenship. For example, the idea that individuals exist outside of society but collectively create society with their labour implies, in turn, that a lack of gainful employment is necessarily anti-social. This can be tied to a kind of apocalyptic, chaotic rhetoric, saying that unemployment will lead to social unrest and disintegration (as in David Cameron’s focus on employment in response to social unrest).
Studio portrait of James Chamberlain
(photo by Beth Wynn / Mississippi State University)
The “Work Society” Limits Freedom and Demands Increasing Flexibility
What is the problem with this social emphasis on everyone “pulling their weight”? Chamberlain argues that it limits the freedom to act according to one’s own “values, needs, and desires,” (10) when a person needs to take any or all employment available. Freedom is also limited when all of one’s time is occupied by making money with no opportunity to spend time on activities that don’t have a price put upon them. Furthermore, the increase in information technology has begun to dissolve the boundaries between work and the remainder of life. Importantly, restrictions to freedom do not fall equally upon a population, with regard to access to greater varieties and qualities of employment: “One can understand justice as equality of freedom or, more specifically, the equal ability of all members of society in ways that reflect their own ends” (12).
In his third chapter, Chamberlain discusses the idea of increasing flexibility of employment, from Reagan and Thatcher to the gig economy and the increase in remote work. Flexibility is a double-edged sword. Half of it entails deregulation, erosion of support for workers, increased precarity in terms of employment and compensation, dissolution of work–life boundaries, lack of collective bargaining, and other employer-friendly policies. Many qualities of flexibility can also be worker-friendly, however: flexible scheduling and the dissolution of work–life boundaries may allow a person to work from home or on their own time, or it may ask them to devote significant quantities of their life to work without any additional compensation. At least there are solutions available to offer support to those remote working away from the office so that they can receive additional training and mentorship from wherever they may be and still progress in their careers. Without the support, those working from home may quickly find themselves without motivation and disassociated from their work colleagues. Companies have begun to look at ways to combat this by finding virtual team building activities such as the ones you can see at BreakoutIQ. This is in the hopes of instilling a sense of comradeship between co-workers.
UBI: Undoing or Supporting Employment?
If our jobs are becoming increasingly flexible and precarious, allowing us to participate socially in a complete manner and support ourselves as independent citizens less and less, then UBI is one way to fill that gap and allow people to continue to find meaningful employment: however, it is just this argument for UBI that Chamberlain finds suspect. In Undoing Work, UBI is established as a partial solution to many of the aforementioned issues, a very important stop-gap permitting what he claims is actually required, which is to dismantle the work society and the social value of employment.
Chamberlain identifies an ideological disjuncture within the UBI movement, between advocates who say that UBI will support employment and advocates who contend that supporting employment is beside the point. This is echoed in the works reviewed by BIEN, as emerging UBI research and economic simulations define different metrics for success, and many of them are focused on employment rates rather than health indicators or other measurements associated solely with wellbeing. Undoing Work places UBI proponents on a spectrum from a full commitment to the work society to the preference for freedom from employment/right and ability to refuse employment. However, Chamberlain acknowledges that some who have argued for UBI’s positive impact on employment rates have done so for the sake of expediency. In other words, supporting a truly Unconditional BI may necessarily be politically precarious due to its promise to give “something for nothing.”
Chamberlain then contends that UBI’s implementation and effects depend upon the ideologies of social participation and citizenship by which it is surrounded. Whether or not a UBI recipient lives in Chamberlain’s “work society” will have a significant impact on a basic income’s ability to transform their lives for the better.
To highlight his point, Chamberlain contrasts UBI with workfare/unemployment and means-tested benefits, examining the differences between the administrative goal of re-integrating a person into the workforce and UBI. An implementation of the latter without a corresponding ideological shift may simply result in social forces creating the same stigmas against and marginalization of those who appear not to be contributing in a normative manner. In other words, without a cultural change in the value of work, people receiving UBI will still feel the pressure to take jobs regardless of interest or aptitude. From the perspective of a reader perennially curious about the intercultural differences in UBI implementation around the world, this is an interesting and important point, though it is beyond this book’s purview to speculate about the international differences that might be seen in UBI implementation depending on each country or region’s ideological variations.
A more radical implementation of UBI may in fact encourage people to shape new “purposes,” voluntary or collectively informed but not necessarily rewarded or validated by a wage. Indeed, if work is as essential to a valuable and meaningful life as its proponents suggest, Chamberlain suggests that it is unlikely that UBI recipients (i.e., all of us) will simply give up any kind of occupation or responsibility.
The Post-Work Society
The final chapters of the book examine visions of a post-work society. Chamberlain suggests that many contemporary visions of post-capitalism (e.g., André Gorz’s work, or Hardt and Negri’s Empire) have not in fact theorized a real “post-work” society because they remain centred upon community-oriented production and reproduction: they still see the common/society as produced by some form of work or labour, and participation in their post-capitalist models is still frequently predicated upon social contribution conceptualized as labour.
A real post-work society, argues Chamberlain, means that membership in one’s community must not be connected to work (paid or unpaid). Rather, he suggests a vision of community that is predicated upon concern for the wellbeing of others but does not then turn around and stigmatize or marginalize community members who do not appear to share similar concerns.
One key part of this is that we should not view individuals as things that can be separated from a community or society (or accordingly marginalized as “non-contributors”). Rather, a community is in its fundamental form made up of interconnected relationships that have little to do with labour.
Chamberlain argues that the tendency to think about this kind of community as encouraging “freeloading” is an intuitive response from those of us who have grown up valuing employment so highly. Accordingly, Chamberlain provides some insightful advice for UBI advocates, suggesting that arguments for UBI should be focused on collective well-being rather than employment potential, shaped in a way that does not encourage critics to jump straight to criticisms about giving “something for nothing.”
Chamberlain’s vision for a post-work society is outlined in terms of what it must not be. The lack of a fuller picture is understandable given the magnitude, impossibility, and perhaps unsuitability of attempting this task theoretically (a challenge he acknowledges). Despite this, the last few pages of the book cite reasons for hope of a transition: the prevalence of conversations about UBI, minimum wage movements, and economic cooperatives, as some examples.
A reader may wonder if none of the smaller communities established within and regardless of political boundaries, including economic or social cooperatives, faith-based communities, secular or intentional communities, families, or Indigenous or ethnicity-based communities, already value interpersonal wellbeing more highly than labour and, accordingly, exhibit unique social economies. While it is sensibly out of the book’s scope to conduct an international comparison of work ideologies, Chamberlain’s focus on national discourse feels relevant and interesting but also general and totalizing, spoken from the “voice” of the work society without exploring the diversity that may be occurring within a nation or testing its borders on local scales. However, overall, Chamberlain’s Undoing Work, Rethinking Community is a considered and valuable critique of the role of employment in life, politics, and UBI policy and discourse. His discussion of increasing precarity, demand for flexibility, and the lack of freedom that employment often delivers despite independence’s promises to the contrary will strike home for many readers.
Using experimental and quasi-experimental evaluations of large scale UTCs in SSA, conducted in collaboration with the Transfer Project, which sees the participation of UNICEF, FAO, The University of North Carolina, national governments and local research partners, the paper collects evidence regarding six common misconceptions about UTCs and refutes them: 1) UTCs induce higher spending on alcohol or tobacco; 2) UTCs are fully consumed (rather than invested); 3) UTCs create dependency (reduce participation in productive work); 4) UTCs targeted to households with young children increase fertility; 5) UTCs lead to negative community-level economic impacts (including price distortion and inflation); 6) UTCs are fiscally unsustainable.
1) UTCs induce higher spending on alcohol or tobacco
A common argument against UTCs is that they would lead to spending on superfluous goods, as alcohol, tobacco, or drugs, which are sometimes called “compensatory bads”.
The argument is largely based upon anecdotal evidence, spurring from the fear that cash would be administered improperly and wasted, and would lead to the prioritization of in-kind transfers. The paper found that as the household expenditure allocated on food and other items increased, spending on alcohol and tobacco didn’t.
2) UTCs are fully consumed (rather than invested)
Being transfers unconditional, the fear may arise that they are immediately consumed, and that they do not stimulate longer term planning and investment in productive activities and human capital.
Noticing that the cash transfers were administered in locations where the populations is well below the poverty line, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that much of the transfer is used to cover basic needs, which in turns ensures the maintenance and a form of stimulus to human capital development.
Even as the role of direct expenditure is substantial, the paper finds that UTCs have positive effects on the productivity indicators chosen as representative of investments, stimulating crop and livestock activities.
3) UTCs create dependency (reduce participation in productive work)
A common perception that is based upon the longstanding discourse on welfare dependency, fears that gave birth to the concept of workfare in the sixties and that grew under Reaganism and Thatcherism.
The idea is that poor families receiving cash transfers would become lazy and lose the incentive to work, when it isn’t laziness in the first place to create poverty. The allegations of welfare dependency thus stem from a sort of moral high ground, the implication being that poverty is somehow “deserved” and that the poor are not willing to work in order to better their condition once they receive the transfer.
We have seen formerly that UTCs influence investments, it is thus certain that they do affect household decision making in labor allocation, i.e. how receivers participate to the labor market; but labor force participation rate as exemplified by the chosen indicators showed no significant impact of transfers on labor supply.
4) UTCs targeted to households with young children increase fertility
Policymakers often sustain that Cash Transfers conditional to motherhood and having young children will have the unintended effect of increasing fertility rates.
The concern is even more severe for SSA, the last region to start experiencing the demographic transition.
Given that Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) are the instrument of choice to foster higher fertility rates in OECD countries, the implications for their application look unavoidable; nonetheless the study found no instance in which a government UCTs increased fertility in SSA. Rather, the evidence suggests that UTCs have in some instances increased birth spacing and delayed pregnancies among young women.
5) UTCs lead to negative community-level economic impacts (including price distortion and inflation)
This fear stems from the idea that isolated cash injections would have a one-sided effect and only stimulate the demand side, whilst having no impact on the supply side. This would lead to detrimental effects, namely price distortion and inflation, devaluating the transfer and affecting also non-beneficiaries, which would find themselves facing higher prices.
The study found no evidence of inflationary effects, which can be explained by three factors: the relatively small share of UTCs beneficiaries (20% of the households); the sum of the transfer, which while substantial for the poor recipient it’s just a tiny proportion of the total cash flow of the community; the supply side is elastic, and there is enough market inter-connectivity for production to match increases in demand.
Theory suggests that UTC could be used to overcome market failures, functioning as a stimulus to pro-poor productivity and having net positive impact on local economies. Positive spillovers should manifest and affect non-beneficiaries, as a result of the stimulus to aggregate demand.
Local economy simulations indicate that UTCs generates positive effects on the local economy, with every dollar injected in the economy via the transfer causing nominal multiplier effects ranging from 1.27 in Malawi to 2.52 in Ethiopia.
6) UTCs are fiscally unsustainable
Once UTCs end their experimentation phase and are institutionalized, there is diffused concern that the administrative costs are too high. The fear is that the medium or long-term maintenance of the programs is fiscally unsustainable, and supposedly high administrative costs have been cited as one of the main reasons for not adopting UTCs.
The cost-transfer ratio (CTR) is the indicator generally used to measure the cost-efficiency of the programs. The CTR depends largely on the time at which it is measured; at the beginning of the programs there are large, fixed, start-up costs which weigh heavily on the ratio, representing a large part of the total costs in the first period. The start-up costs combine with the lack of economies of scale, which require times to be attained.
Using estimates of the CTRs for the programs of the Transfer Project, accounting for the scale-up effects and correcting for the start-up, lump sum costs, the study found that cash transfers at scale as a percentage of current spending and GDP are feasible and fully within the cost considerations of any national government. The expenditure for UTCs as a percentage of general government expenditures would have an average of 4.4 percent across countries, but could decrease of the 37% if the program was limited to the rural areas.
“…we have drawn on cross-country evaluation data to summarize evidence on six common perceptions that we believe hold back political acceptance of such programs. While the political context is such that these perceptions will need to be tested in each specific program in order to be fully internalized, we hope that the growing body of evidence, including that presented inthis paper, will permit more evidence-based rather than ideologically-based debates around cash transfers in LMICs”
Roberto Ciccarelli (journalist, writer and member of the Basic Income Italy) has published an article on the proposal of the Italian government’s citizenship income.In the article Ciccarelli talks about the poverty benefit misleadingly called a “citizenship income”, proposed by M5Star government. “What has been included in the soon-to-be-approved budget law” he says “is nothing but a sham and a deliberate misuse of words”. A real “citizenship income” is not tied to an obligation to work and has nothing to do with the “disciplining and punishment of beneficiaries which prominently feature in this M5S-Lega version of “workfare,” which apes the worst features of the Hartz IV German system”. “This benefit”, Ciccarelli writes, “doesn’t have any of the traits of universality, justice, equitability and unconditionality. It is neither a “universal income” nor a “citizenship income.” It is a workforce reintegration benefit of last resort for the unemployed, temporary workers and the poor, part of the authoritarian turn of the welfare state aimed at the creation of one or more parallel labor markets”. Ciccarelli also recalls that “They are talking about a new category of so-called “citizenship crime,” with up to six years in prison in case of fraud. The benefit will be tied to eight hours of unpaid work per week, to compulsory training. The duration of the benefit is also unclear and uncertain. It was said at first that after the first twelve months, the so-called “income” would gradually diminish to zero”.
Ciccarelli also writes that “The idea of this “income”— as repeatedly explained by Pasquale Tridico, an advisor to Di Maio — in just a short time, the person in “absolute poverty” will start buying “Italian products,” will get employed (in a permanent position, Tridico seems to imagine—not in small temporary jobs, as is most likely), and will contribute to the “wealth of the nation.””
The many problems of the M5S proposal, however, should not divert the attention from the political fight that has been waged over the past five years, a confrontation which has naturally intensified during the election campaign ahead of the latest 4th of March elections.
Ciccarelli also speaks about “the Democratic Party fighting against the proposal that has been (grossly misleadingly) called a “universal income.” Disingenuously pretending to believe the dishonest characterization of their own proposal by the Five Stars themselves, Renzi and his followers have spent at least four years attacking the very principle of an income that would be provided to all without asking them to do any work in return”.
What the M5S was actually proposing was not a universal income at all, but a significant extension of the “social inclusion income” (REI), a flagship proposal of the Democratic Party, approved during the 2013-2018 legislature.
Ciccarelli concludes that “A universal income is truly needed—this fact is absolutely clear. This so-called “citizenship income,” and other schemes such as the French “universal working income,” are marred by the tension between giving people the possibility to choose how they live their own life and an authoritarian discourse of penalties and obligations. Welfarism clashes with dirigism: one is not allowed to sit on the couch all day, nor to take any break between unpaid community work and a training course. This project shows clearly the present tendency to demand a lot from those who have little in order to justify granting them a benefit of last resort that will not work towards overcoming poverty, but towards making the regime of full precarious employment a reality.”
More information at:
Roberto Ciccarelli, “The linguistic scam of Italy’s ‘citizenship income’”, Basic Income Network Italia, October 24th 2018
Since the new government led by Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) and Lega (the Italian extreme right-wing party) was formed, the proposal of a so-called “citizen income” in Italy has had much echo. First proposals go back to 2013, having been reported at the time.
This proposal is among the first programmatic points of the M5S and has been included in the “government contract“, among the goals to be achieved in this legislature. It has reverberated widely, and some confusion has been established. It has been suggested that basic income is in the pipe for Italy’s social policy, an idea inflated by some media reports. To that also contributed the reporting on the Livorno case, a small coastal town in Italy, in which a conditional to work type of basic income experiment has been conducted, having even been listed among the basic income experiments in the world at this time (year 2016).
To be clear, the M5S, even conceding the use of the term “citizen’s income” (a term coined in the 90s, by social movements and precarious workers, signifying “basic income”), is proposing a targeted to the poor minimum income scheme, conditional to work. This kind of policy has already been adopted, for many years, in the majority of European countries. The fact is that Italy is still one of the few European countries which doesn’t have experience with social support for those living below the poverty line. Moreover, European institutions have been asking for the introduction of at least economic support for the poor in Italy, which is one of the countries with the highest poverty rates in Europe.
The only social support for the poor up to this moment, in Italy, was introduced by the previous Gentiloni government, which has introduced a “minimum income for inclusion” intended for poor families. This support, however, is very conditional, and includes obligations for the whole family to accept any proposed work and a benefit that averages 130 € per month per person. In addition, only € 1.8 billion have been assigned to fund this social benefit, which covers only a small fraction of the families in need of assistance. The M5S proposal is similar, only the value is increased to around to 780 € per month per person.
The 5 Star Movement has developed, however, the hability to bring forth, in the Italian political debate, a theme that in many other European countries has already been settled with income support for the unemployed or the poor.
Social support in the shape of minimum income has suffered funding cuts across Europe, given the austerity measures of the past few years, with the introduction of severe restrictions which reduce accessibility and introduce more work conditions. The Hartz IV reforms in Germany and the Universal Credit in the United Kingdom are examples of this. Neverthleless, this is the kind of social support the 5 Star Movement is putting forth at the moment, with the “citizen’s income” proposal.
Luigi Di Maio (Photo credit: Andreas Solaro/AFP/Getty Images)
Luigi Di Maio, the current vice-prime minister and minister of labour, is quick to clarify what he means by “citizen’s income”: “those receiving this income will not stay on the couch doing nothing, but will be called on to accept any kind of work, and will be forced to work for the State for at least eight hours per week in the meanwhile”. This adds to a very common mindset of conditional support, based on the belief that people will remain inactive if they are given that chance. A belief grounded on a firm reciprocity work ethic (workfare), particularly remote from the idea of basic income.
The proposal, which provides an arguable light condition to work (a possibility to refuse work if it doesn’t align with the minimum income recipient expectations), has never been discussed in Parliament, even though it was brought into parliamentary committees.
The Movement of which Luigi Di Maio is a part of has made a legislative proposal for this conditional minimum income, but the actual parliamentary debate has not yet started. Part of this proposal is the financing of the policy with a quick-start of 2 billion € in two years, to setup a system of employment certers for ensuring that receipients are controlled in their way to find employment. Simultaneously, a proposal of an income Flat Tax of 15% has also been made, which has been associated with tax cuts, given the present day tax landscape in Italy.
However, there have been other proposals already delivered for Parliamentary discussion, such as the popular bill for the introduction of a guaranteed minimum income, presented in 2013. This bill was backed by over 170 associations, after a six-month social campaign, 250 public initiatives and more than 50 000 signatures collected.
There is no doubt that all this political activity has awakened the debate about guaranteed income, or a right to an income, and also about unconditional basic income. In fact, a series of political campaigns have begun in Italy, particularly thanks to movements of precarious workers, who demand a “guaranteed income immediately” and who took the streets with demonstrations in front of the institutional offices. They lined up in front of job centers, asking for a guaranteed income to be given to them “now”. Citizens movements concerning the right to proper housing and several labour unions, have also demonstrated their request for a guaranteed basic income in several events, while other groups such as the femininst movement “non una di meno” propose ideas such as the self-determination income, which is similar to an unconditional basic income.
It seems that 2017 has been a watershed year for the global basic income movement, as multiple governments and private research groups have independently conceived and launched experimental trials of basic income (and closely related policies). Several new experiments in North America and Europe represent the first such experiments in the developed world since the 1970s (when a negative income tax was tested in several cities in the United States and Canada), and the largest basic income trial ever designed is about to take place in Kenya.
At the same time, rumors of other experiments have appeared only to be revealed to have been premature, and sloppy and superficial media reports have obfuscated differences in the design and motivation of these disparate studies. This article reviews the latest information (as of October 2017) on the experiments that actually are being conducted (or well along the path) [1] [2].
The federal government of Finland is currently conducting an experiment of the effects of a basic income on unemployed citizens, which began in January 2017 and will conclude in December 2018. Prior to the launch of the Finnish experiment, the provincial government of Ontario had already announced its plans to test a type of unconditional income guarantee; at the time of this writing, it is currently enrolling participants in three areas of the province, who will receive an income guarantee for up to three years. In the Netherlands, another instigator of the recent interest in basic income experiments, municipal-level experiments have faced setbacks and changes in the quest to meet compliance with federal law; however, as of October, several cities have now launched experiments with the removal of conditions on social assistance benefits. The city of Barcelona has launched an experiment testing several potential reforms of its anti-poverty programs, including new social programs as well as unconditional cash payments. Proposals to test basic income at the municipal level have also lately gained considerable political support in Scotland.
In addition, two US-based non-profit organizations have completed pilot studies, and are preparing to launch privately funded basic income experiments on a large scale. After the Kenyan elections, the charity GiveDirectly plans to initiate a 12-year randomized controlled trial (RCT) testing the effects of universal basic income on villages in rural Kenya. Meanwhile, Silicon Valley’s Y Combinator Research has completed a feasibility study in Oakland, California, and is now finalizing the design of an RCT that is to involved 3,000 participants in two US states. (Edit: A privately funded trial in Stockton, California–announced around the same time this article was published–may soon join the list. However, the project is in its early planning stages, and few details have yet been determined.)
1. Finland’s “Perustulokokeilu” (Basic Income Experiment)
Status: Launched on January 1, 2017; in progress until December 2018.
In October 2015, the federal government of Finland formed a working group to research the design and implementation of a nationwide basic income experiment, described as a means to “find ways to reshape the social security system in response to changes in the labor market”.
One prevailing concern with existing systems of social security was the steep rate at which benefits are clawed back when beneficiaries receive a job, which has been hypothesized to discourage job-seeking. Additionally, those who gain employment on a short-term basis need to reapply for benefits after their position ends, often resulting in a gap in financial support. The latter has become a particular concern due to the increase in precarious work, such as temporary and contract positions (see, e.g., Marjukka Turunen’s presentation to Kela). Thus, the idea of unconditional basic income gained attention as a possible means to remove practical and psychological barriers that might currently deter unemployed Finns from looking for work.
After reviewing several design suggestions proposed by Kela, the Social Insurance Institution of Finland, the government settled on the program that was launched on January 1, 2017. The experimental group consists of 2,000 persons, who were randomly selected from Finns between the ages of 25 and 58 who had been receiving unemployment benefits from Kela in November 2016. (The remainder of the sample population, totaling around 175,000 individuals nationwide, constitutes the control group.)
These 2,000 participants are receiving unconditional monthly cash payments of €560 (about 590 USD), an amount insufficient to meet basic living expenses, but approximately equal to that provided by Finland’s existing programs of unemployment assistance.
In contrast to those who continue to receive Kela’s existing unemployment benefits, participants in the basic income pilot are not required to demonstrate that they are seeking employment, nor are they required to accept jobs offered to them, and those who do obtain work will continue to receive the full benefit.
The first payouts to experimental participants were distributed on January 9, 2016, and payments will continue through the end of the trial in December 2018. To avoid selection bias, participation was mandated for those chosen, and exit from the experiment is prohibited. However, the experiment has been designed to ensure that no participants will be placed in a worse financial position than they would have experienced under their previous benefits.
Labor supply effects are the main outcome of interest: the experiment will assess whether the final unemployment rates differ significantly between those individuals receiving the basic income and those receiving traditional employment benefits. Kela has also stated plans to examine difference in expenditure on medication, health care usage, and income variation.
To avoid observer effects, Kela aims to minimize interaction with experimental subjects during the duration of the trial, and will conduct no surveys or interviews of subjects until the experiment has concluded. Most analysis will be based on registry data that can be obtained without direct interaction with participants. No results of the experiment will be released prior to 2019, after the period of data collection has concluded. (Rumors of early results demonstrating a decrease in stress level were, in fact, based on a single anecdote voluntarily divulged to media.)
While many basic income supporters and “BI-curious” individuals have praised Finland’s initiative launching the first nationwide experiment of a basic income program, many activists have also expressed disappointment with the final design of the experiment, questioning its ability to produce useful results and even whether it should be called a “basic income” at all [3]. Particularly controversial have been the decisions to test only a “partial” basic income (i.e. an amount insufficient to meet basic living expenses), limit the target population to those who had previously been receiving unemployment benefits, and focus primarily on labor supply effects.
Research director Olli Kangas has recommended expansion of the experiment in future years in order to test different models of a basic income or broaden the target population. This, however, will depend on budgetary decisions of the federal government.
2. Ontario’s Basic Income (Guaranteed Minimum Income) Pilot
Status: Officially announced in April 2017; currently enrolling participants.
Before describing Ontario’s “Basic Income Pilot” (as the study is officially called) on BIEN’s website, a word about terminology is in order: in the Canadian context, the term ‘basic income’ is commonly used in a more expansive manner than the definition adopted by BIEN to refer to programs that guarantee minimum income, with no type of work requirement, for all members of society without any type of work conditions. This is more expansive that BIEN’s definition in that it omits the conditions that policy must provide payments to individuals(rather than households) and in an amount not dependent on additional earned income.
For example, Canadian writers and policymakers often use ‘basic income’ to refer to programs in which cash payments are not distributed universally, such as a negative income tax or top-up of low incomes. (In common Canadian terminology, the word ‘demogrant’ is used equivalently to BIEN’s use of ‘basic income’, and to refer to a sub-type of the programs that most Canadians call ‘basic income’.)
This clarification is important given that, in fact, Ontario’s experiment employs cash transfers that depend in their amount on both income and household status. Specifically, single participants will receive a guaranteed annual income of 16,989 CAD (€11,340), while couples will receive a minimum of 24,027 CAD (€16,038) per year (amounts pegged to 75% of the Low Income Measure or LIM, where the LIM is roughly 50% of area median income).
Moreover, the above amounts are the maximum payments; that is, they are the amounts that would be paid out to individuals and couples with no external income source. The amount of the benefit will be reduced by the amount of 50% of any earned income (e.g. if a single individual in the study receives 20,000 CAD per year in earned income, she will receive an additional 6,989 CAD per year through the pilot program, or 16,989 CAD less 10,000 CAD). This entails, for example, that single individuals will not receive any payment through program if their annual earned income rises above 48,054 CAD.
Additionally, only Ontarians with an annual income below a certain level (34,000 CAD for single individuals or 48,000 CAD for couples) are eligible to participate in the experiment. (In contrast to the experiments in Finland, the Netherlands, and Barcelona, the target population is not restricted to current welfare recipients; it is, however, restricted to the low-income population.)
Although the amount of the cash supplement depends on income and household status, it does not depend on employment status, participation in job-seeking activities, training, or any other prescribed activity, or proof of an inability to work (although individuals with disabilities can receive an additional amount of up to 500 CAD per month).
Compared to the Finnish government, the government of Ontario is less focused on employment effects in particular, and more interested in the ability of a guaranteed income program to reduce poverty, food insecurity, and mental and physical health problems caused or exacerbated by low or unstable income. This is one reason that, in the context of the Ontario experiment, it may be less significant that the cash benefit is clawed back with earned income; researchers and policymakers are less focused, if at all, on reducing or removing the “benefits cliff”. Meanwhile, poverty–the prevailing concern to Ontario–is not an issue motivating the trial in Finland.
Since June 2017, the Ontario government has been enrolling participants from the three regions chosen as sites for the experiment: the Hamilton, Brantford, and Brant County region, Thunder Bay and surrounding area, and the city of Lindsay.
Residents of these regions have been randomly selected to receive application packages, and are eligible to enroll if they are between the ages of 18 and 64 with income below the levels mentioned above. Unlike the situation in Finland, participation is voluntary, and participants may opt out of the experiment at any time.
At the time of this writing, 400 participants have been enrolled from Hamilton and Thunder Bay areas. The government intends to enroll at total of 2,000 participants from these two regions, in addition to 2,000 from Lindsay (where enrollment will begin later in the year).
Participants will be regularly surveyed about topics such as their health, employment, and housing situation. Those assigned to the control group will receive no cash benefit but will be administered the same surveys. A third-party research group will evaluate outcomes in a variety of areas, including food security, stress and anxiety, mental health, health and healthcare usage, housing stability, education and training, and employment and labor market participation.
The experiment will continue for three years after its launch, with payments distributed on a monthly basis, and results are expected to be reported to the public in 2020.
3. Dutch Social Assistance Experiments
Status: Two-year experiments have been launched in four cities in October 2017, after meeting compliance with federal legislation; a fifth will follow in December (Nijmegen), and two cities (Amsterdam and Utrecht) are discussing revisions necessary for legal compliance.
In contrast to the cases in Finland and Ontario, in which the national and provincial governments (respectively) have called for and overseen the implementation of the trial programs, social assistance experiments in the Netherlands have developed “from the bottom up”: municipal leaders and university researchers in several Dutch cities planned experiments to test the replacement of the nation’s “workfare” benefits with unconditional cash assistance, and sought permission to carry out these experiments under the auspices of the Participation Act.
This national law, passed in 2015, tightened conditions on the receipt of welfare benefits, with the goal of promoting reintegration into the labor market. For example, individuals are commonly required to complete five job applications per week, attend group meetings, and participate in training activities in order to continue to receive their benefits. However, the law also granted municipalities the opportunity to implement new forms of social assistance on a trial basis for up to two years–subject to certain constraints (to be discussed below). Hence, the Participation Act might be said to have provided both the impetus to experiment with basic income (as an alternative to its workfare-based to benefits) as well as the license to do. As will be seen, however, the conditions of this legislation have also effectively precluded the ability of researchers to test a truly unconditional and non-means-tested basic income.
The Dutch municipal experiments, like the Finnish experiment, were motivated in large part by concern about the ability of existing welfare programs to incentivize work. However, while the Finnish experiment focuses on the role of monetary incentives (e.g. the ability to retain cash benefits after taking a job), the Dutch experiments have also stressed individuals’ intrinsic motivation to work. For example, drawing upon work in behavioral economics, Utrecht University economists Loek Groot and Timo Verlaat have argued that coercing individuals to work, as in the case of the nation’s “workfare” programs, can undermine their intrinsic motivation to perform fulfilling work and make productive contributions to society.
Thus, although the Dutch municipal experiments are designed to investigate the effect of removing financial disincentives to work (reducing the withdrawal rate on means-tested benefits), as described below, the most discussed experimental intervention has been the removal of coercive reintegration requirements on welfare recipients.
Researchers at the Universities of Groningen, Tilburg, and Utrecht initially proposed to test a policy close to a basic income. However, research teams experienced setbacks in 2016 and 2017, as interaction with the national Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment made clear that the terms of compliance with the Participation Act would prohibit experimentation with a truly unconditional benefit.
For example, if an experiment involves the removal of work reintegration requirements on benefits, the Ministry mandates that municipal officials survey test subjects after six and twelve months to verify that they have made adequate effort to find employment: if any participants are determined not to have made adequate job-seeking efforts during this time, they are subject to dismissal from the experiment. The Ministry has also required that any experiment including a treatment group with relaxed conditions on the receipt of benefits also must include a treatment group with stricter conditions (such as more intense reintegration activities). Finally, the Participation Act caps the amount of earned income that participants are permitted to retain on top of their social assistance benefits at €199 per month, meaning that a completely non-withdrawable (non-means-tested) benefit cannot be tested.
Despite such setbacks and constraints, however, several municipalities have designed–and are beginning to launch–experiments that meet the conditions of the Participation Act.
On July 3, 2017, the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment granted permission to four municipal-level social assistance experiments–in Groningen (with the neighboring village of Ten Boer), Wageningen, Tilburg, and Deventer. An application from Nijmegen was also approved shortly thereafter. Meanwhile, discussions are ongoing in Amsterdam, where the city has so far refused to adopt the stricter conditions required by the Participation Act, and Utrecht, where an application to experiment was approved conditionally on revising a city law to meet compliance with the act (to be decided in December).
In each of the two-year experiments, participants will be (or have been) randomly selected from a pool of current social assistance beneficiaries, and assigned either to a control group or to one of several treatment groups.
As in Ontario’s experiment, but in contrast to Finland’s, participation is voluntary for those selected.
The experiments in Tilburg and Wageningen include three treatment groups: (1) a group with the removal of reintegration requirements, such as job application quotas and participation in training programs, on welfare benefits; (2) a group with a more intensive form of reintegration service for welfare recipients (as per the requirements of the Participation Act); (3) a group permitted to keep additional income earned on top of welfare benefits (subjects in this group may retain 50% of additional earned income, up to the mandated maximum of €199 per month, for the duration of the two-year experiment; under current policy, welfare beneficiaries are permitted to keep only 25% of additional income, and only for up to six months).
The Groningen / Ten Boer experiment includes a fourth treatment group, in which participants are permitted to choose to join any one of the three preceding groups.
The Nijmegen experiment, in contrast, will combine features of above treatment groups into two group. In one group, reintegration requirements will be removed; in the other, more intensive reintegration requirements will be implemented, but subjects will be allowed more autonomy and discretion in selecting reintegration activities (e.g. volunteer work, help obtain full-time work, or assistance for entrepreneurship). In both, subjects will be able to retain of 50% of additional income (up to the €199 maximum).
Researchers plan to examine outcomes such as health, stress level, subjective well-being, financial well-being (such as amount of debt), education, employment (including part-time and temporary employment), and participation in social and cultural life.
The experiments in Tilburg, Wageningen, and Deventer began at the start of October 2017, with Groningen / Ten Boer to follow at the end of the month. Nijmegen plans to launch its experiment in December.
Launched in October 2017, Barcelona’s B-MINCOME experiment is exploring several potential solutions to address poverty and social exclusion. The experiment is being conducted in Besòs area, the city’s poorest region, and, as in the above experiments, the target population consists of low-income individuals and households. As in the Finnish experiment and Dutch municipal experiments, participants are drawn from current recipients of social assistance benefits (in this case, Barcelona’s Municipal Social Services). Once again, although the program is thereby not a test of a truly “universal” benefit, this restriction is sensible in the context of the experiment, the main objective of which is to test the effectiveness of alternative anti-poverty programs.
A stratified random sample of 2,000 households was selected for the experiment, with 1,000 households assigned to the control group, and the other 1,000 assigned (at random) to one of ten treatment groups. (As in the Ontarian and Dutch experiments, but in contrast to the Finnish experiment, participation in the experiment was made voluntary for the selected households.)
All of the treatment groups will receive cash income supplements (called “Municipal Inclusion Support” or, in the Spanish acronym, “SMI”), but differ according to whether the SMI is accompanied by an additional social program and whether the SMI is means-tested. In general, the amount of the SMI will depend upon household composition and financial status, and is expected to range from €100 to €1,676 per month per household. A total of 550 households in the experiment will be assigned to participate in one of these four social programs, including an occupation and education program, a social and cooperative economy program, a guaranteed housing program, and a community participation program. The remaining 450 households will receive the SMI without any associated programs. Within this group, the receipt of the SMI is not conditional on work, willingness to work, or willingness to participate in any other type of program. Furthermore, for some of these 450 households, the SMI will not be means-tested.
Hence, although B-MINCOME is not only a test of basic income–it is also a test of the effectiveness of the additional social programs–it includes a trial of basic income. This is not coincidental: the project team contains several members of BIEN’s Spanish affiliate, Red Renta Básica, and consulted with representatives from Finland, Ontario, and Utrecht who have been involved with the design of the experiments in their respective regions (not to mention that its name refers to Manitoba’s well-known experiment with unconditional income guarantee, in the form of a negative income tax, in the 1970s).
To examine the impact of the cash transfers (SMI) and social program on poverty and social exclusion, researchers will examine a number of outcome variables, including labor market participation, food security, housing security, energy access, economic situation, education participation and attainment, community networks and participation, and health, happiness, and well-being. They will additionally investigate the question of whether the SMI reduces the administrative and bureaucratic responsibilities of social workers.
B-MINCOME is being administered by the Barcelona City Council, with consultation from five research organizations (the Young Foundation, the Institute of Governance and Public Policy at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, the Polytechnic University of Catalonia, the Catalan Institution for Evaluation of Public Policies, and NOVACT-International Institute for Non-Violent Action), and was awarded financial support by Urban Innovative Actions, an initiative of the European Commission formed to support projects investigating “innovative and creative solutions” in urban areas.
The leading political party in the City Council, the left-wing Barcelona en Comú, has expressed interest in implementing a municipal cash transfer program if results of the experiment prove favorable.
5. GiveDirectly’s Basic Income Experiment in Kenya
Status: Full experiment (consisting of 300 rural villages) planned to launch after the Kenyan election on October 26, 2017; pilot study running in one village since October 2016. [Update: Official launch occurred in November 2017.]
GiveDirectly, a US-based charitable organization, has been providing unconditional cash transfers to poor residents of Kenya and Uganda since 2009, when it was founded by a team of economists who had become interested in the hypothesis that cash transfers are the most effective means to combat extreme poverty. Since this time, its practice of delivering cash grants directly to those in need has proven efficient and effective, earning the organization recognition as one of GiveWell’s top charities.
In 2016, GiveDirectly announced a new ambition: the first long-term and large-scale randomized controlled trial (RCT) of universal basic income. The experiment will provide unconditional cash transfers to the residents of 120 villages, comprising more than 16,000 people in total, with some receiving payments for up to 12 years. This makes the experiment the largest of its type, in terms of the number of individuals who will receive assistance, as well as the longest in duration [4]. The cost of the experiment will amount to $3o million, most of which has been now raised by private donors.
In contrast to all experiments taking place in developed nations, GiveDirectly’s experiment examines the impact of programs that are indeed universal–that is, in which the unconditional cash transfers are distributed to all individuals residing in the villages where the program will be implemented [5].
Indeed, the experiment is designed as an RCT in which villages (not individuals or households) are the experimental units: 300 villages in rural Kenya will be randomly assigned to either the control group (comprising 100 villages), in which no cash transfers are given to any residents, or one of three treatment groups, in which all residents receive some form of unconditional cash transfer. In the first treatment group (comprising 40 villages), residents will receive cash payments of about 23 USD (€21)–roughly half of the average income in rural Kenya–every month for 12 years. In the second treatment group (80 villages), residents will receive monthly cash payments of the same amount, but only for two years. In the third treatment group, residents will receive a single lump-sum payment equal in amount to the two-year basic income (that is, about 276 USD).
As GiveDirectly explains on its website, “Comparing the first and second groups of villages will shed light on how important the guarantee of future transfers is for outcomes today (e.g. taking a risk like starting a business). The comparison between the second and third groups will let us understand how breaking up a given amount of money affects its impact.”
The organization further indicates that it will investigate outcomes including the following: “economic status (income, assets, standard of living), time use (work, education, leisure, community involvement), risk-taking (migrating, starting businesses), gender relations (especially female empowerment), [and] aspirations and outlook on life.”
An initial pilot study commenced in one village in October 2016, in which all 95 residents now receive monthly unconditional cash payments, which will continue in this village for 12 years. This preliminary study is intended to help experiments fine-tune the implementation of the full experiment, and is not itself to be included in the analysis of the full experiment. Because of this, GiveDirectly is making public much of its data that is collects from the pilot village (e.g. responses to a survey of participants). (It will not, however, publicize data as it is collected from villages that are part of the experiment.)
GiveDirectly expects to publish its first results one or two years after the experiment’s commencement.
6. Y Combinator’s plans for a United States experiment
Status: Completed feasibility study in Oakland; issued draft of research plan for randomized experiment (3,000 participants in total) in two US states.
In January 2016, Silicon Valley entrepreneur Sam Altman (president of the start-up incubator Y Combinator) announced his intention to fund a test of basic income in the United States. Like many tech entrepreneurs, Altman cited concerns about job loss due to automation in explaining his interest in basic income: “I’m fairly confident that at some point in the future, as technology continues to eliminate traditional jobs and massive new wealth gets created, we’re going to see some version of this at a national scale.” The experiment is now the main project of the non-profit arm of Altman’s company, YC Research.
Since the initial announcement, YC Research has hired social work and political science PhD Elizabeth Rhodes as Research Director and assembled a team of expert advisors. This research team has designed and implemented a feasibility study in Oakland, California [6], and is now working to finalize the design of its full-scale experiment.
According to a project proposal released in September 2017, Y Combinator has decided to design the experiment as a randomized controlled trial, with a target population of low-income young adults–specifically, adults aged 21 to 40 whose incomes fall below the area median–in two US states. (Researchers will employ a stratified sample to ensure adequate representation across race, gender, and income categories.)
On the tentative design, researchers will select a total of 3,000 participants, of which 1,000 will be randomly assigned to the treatment group–whose members will receive unconditional cash payments of 1,000 USD per month–and the remaining 2,000 to the control group. (Individuals in the control group will provide the same type of feedback and data to researchers but receive only a much smaller cash payment, tentatively set at 50 USD per month, for their participation.) As currently planned, some individuals will receive the cash payments for three years, others for five.
Y Combinator emphasizes that its interest is a “holistic approach to understanding the individual-level effects of basic income”, in contrast to many past and present experiments which have focused on the labor market impacts of unconditional cash payments (such as Finland’s experiment and the negative income tax experiments conducted in the US in the 1970s). Among these individual-level effects, the research group is particularly interested in time use, mental and physical health, subjective well-being, financial health, decision making and attitudes toward risk, as well as political and social attitudes. Furthermore, although individual-level effects will be the focus of the experiment, researchers also hope to examine spillover effects on recipients’ families, friends, and communities.
While the research group has not finalized its choice of data sources and collection methods (see its project proposal for a discussion of possibilities currently under discussion), it plans to combine quantitative analysis with regular surveys and interviews. However, according to Rhodes, receipt of the cash payments will not be contingent on participation in surveys and interviews; payments will continue for the duration of the experiments even if recipients do not respond to requests for data and information.
To conduct the experiment, YC Research has partnered with the Center on Poverty and Inequality (CPI) at Stanford University. The research has been approved by Stanford’s Institutional Review Board for research involving human subjects. YC Research is also in the process of working with state and local governments to coordinate mechanisms for distributing payments without affecting recipients’ future eligibility for existing government benefits.
No specific launch date has been set for the experiment, as YC Research is still gathering feedback on its project proposal. However, at a plenary lecture at the 2017 BIEN Congress, Rhodes indicated that the research group hopes to commence the trial in early 2018.
7. Scotland’s plans for local experiments
Status: Government support pledged; preliminary reports in progress.
In November 2016, the Councils of Fife and Glasgow committed to investigate the feasibility of municipal-level basic income experiments. An important step forward occurred in February 2017, when the Glasgow City Council passed as a resolution to convene workshops on the financial, administrative, and constitutional feasibility of an experiment, partnering with the Royal Society of Arts (RSA), a British think tank responsible for a highly regarded report on potential for a basic income in the UK (“Creative Citizen, Creative State”).
Fife and Glasgow were later joined in their interest by North Ayrshire and Edinburgh.
In September 2017, the Scottish government announced its commitment to provide funding and support for basic income experiments in the four municipalities (see the RSA’s announcement), and RSA Scotland is now working with the government to prepare an initial report on the possibilities for an experiment in Glasgow.
No design decisions or prospective launch dates have yet been announced.
In general, the RSA and local authorities are attracted to basic income as a potential means to address poverty, precarious employment, economic insecurity, and the changing nature of work.
Notes
[1] The coverage of the present article is limited to projects that qualify as experiments in a social scientific sense. Thus, it does not include several projects that are sometimes listed–incorrectly–as “experiments” of basic income. Missing, for example, are lottery programs like Mein Grundeinkommen, as well as any pilot studies that lack a control group, such as the ReCitivas Institute’s pilot in Quatinga Velho and Eight’s two-year pilot study in Uganda (see “Some thoughts on basic income ‘experiments’” by Michael A Lewis).
Programs and policies such as Iran’s fuel subsidy reform and Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend are occasionally misconstrued in sentences like “Iran and Alaska have tested basic income”. These programs are also not experiments in the scientific sense, and thus omitted from inclusion in this article.
[2] Of course, no experiment can fully test the effects of a basic income, which, by definition, would guarantee cash stipends to all individuals in a community, and it would guarantee this support for life. Experiments, in contrast, are bound by their nature to be non-universal (since there must be a control group) and limited in duration. Furthermore, it is likely that additional changes to the taxation of benefit system, which are not captured in the experiments, would accompany the introduction of a basic income.
(In a forthcoming article, I will argue that, in the case of my own interest in basic income as a possible stimulus to long-term cultural change, the above facts preclude limited trials from having the capacity to produce usefully informative results.)
[3] According to many definitions, including those adopted by some of BIEN’s affiliates (although not BIEN itself), a “basic income” is a recurring payment sufficient to meet basic living expenses. On these definitions, it is indeed inaccurate to call describe the Finnish experiment a “basic income experiment” given €560 per month falls below average minimum monthly living expenses in Finland (although it might plausibly be called, as Kela sometimes more precisely describes it, a “partial basic income experiment”).
One may also raise concern regarding the universality of the program–or, rather, the lack thereof–given that a sample of adult recipients of unemployment benefits is clearly not representative of all Finns, and no “true” basic income (on any definition) would not be restricted only to the unemployed. One might alternatively say, however, that the Finnish experiment is indeed a test of a (partial) basic income, albeit one using a non-representative sample.
[4] In 2016, the Brazilian non-profit institute ReCivitas initiated a project, Basic Income Startup, which promises a “lifetime basic income” of 40 Reais (about 10 USD) per month to members of the village Quatinga Velho. The project targets volunteer recipients in areas where 40 Reais per month makes a significant impact on quality of life.
ReCivitas’s Basic Income Startup, however, is not an experiment (although occasionally miscategorized as one). Indeed, project founders have stated that they are already convinced that basic income is effective; their goal is not to test but to implement it.
[5] Previous trials of basic income and related policies have used saturation sites. Notably, Manitoba’s MINCOME experiments of the 1970s, which tested a type of minimum income guarantee in the form of a negative income tax, featured a saturation site in the town of the Dauphin.
The basic income experiment in Madhya Pradesh was also a saturation studym in which all members of the nine villages in the experimental group received monthly unconditional cash transfers (equal about one quarter of the median income in the state).
[6] Contrary to some misconceptions, the Oakland project was not itself an experiment. Its purpose was merely to test and fine-tune the mechanisms for conducting the experiment–such as the selection of participants, disbursement of funds, and collection of data–not to analyze the effects of unconditional cash transfers on recipients. The latter will be the goal of the project described in a newly released research proposal, and which has yet to be finalized and launched.
Addendum on Stockton, California (October 20, 2017)
Only a few days after this updated article was published, Michael Tubbs, Mayor of Stockton, California, announced his intention to carry out a pilot of basic income or guaranteed income in his city, the Stockton Economic Empowerment Demonstration (SEED).
The project will be privately funded, and has already received a $1 million SEED grant (if you will) from the Economic Security Project, a two-year initiative launched in December 2016 to fund basic income related projects in the United States.
At present, however, few details have been announced or decided.
According to its website, the project is “in the very early stages of development”.
Regarding the current state of the project, the site notes:
We will kick off the demonstration with a six-nine month design period that will prioritize community engagement and feedback. In that time period, we’ll identify research and storytelling partners […]. We will identify research priorities that complement existing research on unconditional cash transfers in the United States and invest in storytelling that honestly and authentically uplifts the experiences of recipients.
Thus, based on publicly available information, it is presently unclear when the project planned in Stockton will be launched, as well as what form it will take–including whether or not it will be an experiment (note the above emphasis on “storytelling” rather than comparison of data collected from control and treatment groups).
Basic Income News reporters will follow up with the conveners of the Stockton project, and provide more thorough, comprehensive and up-to-date information in a future stand-alone news article.
