Basic Income and Capability Approach:
On Recognition and Deconstruction for Difference

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1. Introduction

In this paper, I try to argue what kind of welfare systems facilitates cultural justice more effectively. I limit my argument mainly to normative deliberation, especially to Nancy Fraser’s work and Amartya Sen’s work.

First of all, I outline what the term cultural justice means in this paper, because this term is slightly vague. Secondly, I trace how normative theories have been thought to treat such cultural justice, mainly relied on Nancy Fraser’s framework. Thirdly I develop her insight for evolutional political economy for recognition and redistribution. Fourth, Basic Income proposal, it is argued, is one of welfare systems which facilitate recognition and deconstruction for difference. Fifth, I resist Fraser’s critique against Sen, and show how Sen’s work about identity is compatible with Fraser’s (and my) framework.

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.2. Demand for recognition of cultural identities

The term culture itself is used to mean the customs and beliefs, art, way of life and social organization of a particular group. This particular group is not exclusively meant an ethnicity or national group. In the literatures of development or theories of justice, however, it is sometimes equated with an ethnicity group. When the term “multiculturalism” is used, this tendency is more apparent. Although this usage of the term culture might have many merits, I use this term in broader sense in this paper: in my usage, particular group might be of course ethnicity group, but also might be group formed by other boundaries, like gender, disability, or sexuality, so on.

This usage is influenced by several academic traditions. First, recent discussions about culture in philosophy have made the term “recognition” quite popular. This term connotes this broader usage, and I shall briefly explain this term soon. Second, social theory after the linguistic turn focuses “social construction”. This “constructionist” view open to broader usage of culture, contrasted against “essentialist” view of culture that the group which consists culture is solid, given and non-problematic, Third, cultural studies have changed tradition of academic left that exclusively focus on material substructure, and have focused superstructure. This school strongly influenced the rise of subaltern studies and post-colonialist literatures and in this case, the term “cultural” is supposed to mean broader sense.

Let me back to the term recognition. The revival of this Hegelian term in modern political philosophy owes Axel Honneth, Charles Taylor and Nancy Fraser. Honneth’s “The Struggle for Recognition” reconceptualizes this term in order to articulate struggle for emancipation of disadvantaged groups. Whereas those groups which Honneth mentions at are Proletarian in general, Taylor connects the term directly to struggle over identity and difference, or multiculturalism.

A number of strands in contemporary politics turn on the need, sometimes the demand, for recognition. … [T]he demand comes to the fore in a number of ways in today’s politics, on behalf of minority or "subaltern" groups, in some forms of feminism and in what is today called the politics of multiculturalism (Taylor 1992: p.25).

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3 See Butler(1990) for example of this analysis for gender identity.
4 Stuart Hall is a representative example of the authors of the studies I mention here.
Fraser clarifies this concept contrasted to redistribution, both in philosophy and in social science. Philosophically, theory of recognition is supposed to rectify the shortcoming that theory of redistribution (i.e. theories of distributive justice) cannot take recognition seriously, in her framework. The examples of theorists of distributive justice are Karl Marx, John Ralwls, Ronald Dworkin, and Amartya Sen. Fraser insists that they cannot treat cultural justice properly. I do not enter the dispute whether her conclusion is plausible, but will go back to the issue in Sen’s case later section. In social science, traditionally social struggles are understood in terms of struggle against economic inequality or exploitation. It is still effective view, but it cannot cover properly current social struggles. They are also struggles against cultural misrecognition (Fraser 1997).

.3. The Redistribution-Recognition Dilemma and Beyond

Fraser’s claim, however, is not that theory of recognition should replace theory of redistribution in philosophy, nor that politics of recognition should replace politics of redistribution in social science (nor in the real world). Fraser acknowledges how recognition and redistribution are deeply “intertwined”(Fraser 1997, p.15). Her purpose to distinguish recognition and redistribution is to point out and to analyze some dilemma that current social struggles encounter, and is to suggest the way we could go beyond the dilemma.

The dilemma, which is called by her “the redistribution-recognition dilemma”(Fraser 1997, p.13), happens as follows. To simultaneously pursue redistribution and recognition can create a contradictory situation. To win equal distribution of resources, oppressed and disadvantaged minority groups are often forced to claim that they are "the same" as the majority. For example, in order to obtain the equal qualification for entrance examinations to universities in Japan, High schools privately run by ethnic minority groups must insist that their educational system is the same as that of public schools strictly adhering to the guidelines of the ministry of Education, Culture, and Science. Likewise, to obtain the equal opportunity for work, women have to claim they are as capable of working as men. This kind of situation will contradict the demand for difference recognition.

Even when difference recognition is pursued for equal redistribution, there will be cases where the majority remains the same, while the minority is unilaterally rated as inferior. This type of recognition, first, may justify the inequality of distribution.
Second, even if redistribution actually takes place, it will be attached with stigma. This form of recognition has a risk of leading to the relief given to them as an outcome without questioning the social cause of producing the minority. In this case, the politics of recognition reproduces and perpetuates the dominant norm that produces the minority. Such results are not what the claim of recognition set out to accomplish.

As far as the gender issue is concerned, this dilemma corresponds to the tension between "equality feminism" and "difference feminism." Similar dilemmas exist in all the problems that separate minorities from the majority, not only with respect to gender but also with regard to other issues such as disability and sexuality.

Then how could we avoid or go beyond such a dilemma? Fraser distinguishes transformative remedy from affirmative remedy, and advocates the former in both redistribution and recognition. For redistribution, the affirmative remedy is represented by “the liberal welfare state”, which does “surface reallocations of existing goods to existing groups; supports group differentiation; can generate misrecognition.” The alternative, transformative remedy for malredistribution is represented by “socialism”, which could be “deep restructuring of relations of production; blurs group differentiation; can help remedy some forms of misrecognition (Fraser 1997, p.27).” For recognition, the affirmative remedy is represented by “mainstream multiculturalism”, which does “surface reallocations of respect to existing identities of existing groups; supports group differentiations.” The alternative, transformative remedy for misrecognition is called by her “deconstruction,” which could be “deep restructuring of relations of recognition; destabilizes group differentiation (Fraser 1997, p.27).” Her distinction on recognition corresponds with distinction between essentialism and constructionism in social theory and cultural studies.

.4. Evolutional political economy for recognition and redistribution

I tried to connect the Fraser’s suggestion I have just summarized above, to Evolutional Political Economy or Social Economics (Yamamori 2000). Let me explain it briefly here. The Fraser’s solution is to make the boundary fluid. It urges us to focus not on static outcomes, but on dynamic processes of redistribution and recognition. Figure 1 represents these dynamic processes.
First, I consider the "market" as the space of redistribution. Now imagine the market as a game where goods are exchanged, as Neoclassical Economists think, though the real market is not so simple. We can locate three stages to intervene in the redistribution process, the entrance (opportunity), the game, and the exit (outcome). The familiar norm to justify the intervention is that of "national minimum" or "social citizenship." It does not logically define where we should intervene, but the existing interventions based on this norm are mainly at the exit. If this game (market) itself were sacred and absolute, it would be unjust to intervene in its process at any stage. Libertarians such as Robert Nozick might make such a contention (Nozick 1974). The characteristic of this game is that if some players lose the game or cannot enter the game because of lack of products to sell, then they must not only drop out of the game but also must die. It is for this reason that Friedrich von Hayek justified minimum intervention in the exit in order to avoid player's demise. Taking this game more seriously, however, it is unfair if the conditions of the players at the entrance are unequal, because the inequality at the entrance would entail the inequality at the exit. It is, therefore, necessary to insure equality at the entrance. This idea is expressed in the norms of "equal opportunity" and in the normative theories of Rawls and Sen.

Secondly, I examine "communication" as the space of recognition. Now imagine "communication" as a game where identity is mutually recognized, as Jürgen Habermas thinks (Habermas 1981), though real communication is not so simple. The influential normative arguments to justify "recognition" are "multiculturalism," "difference feminism," and the theories of Taylor or Carol Gilligan (Taylor 1992, Gilligan 1981). In these essentialist arguments, the game is considered as given and unproblematic. They focus their attention on "recognition" only at the exit stage. These arguments share a common problem with the major paradigm of ignoring "recognition." They do not even think that the game exists, and hold in common a characteristic of not paying attention to the game. The identity at the exit, regrettably, is not always supportive and unproblematic, because usually the conditions at the entrance are not equal. Some players have more discourse resources including advantages of social norms than others. Inequality at the entrance will have a considerable effect to inequality at the exit. "Constructionism" as I noted above, takes note of this factor.

In both redistribution and recognition, interventions at the exit tend to fix boundaries. Public assistance is an intervention at the exit to the market. In contrast with the policy of entrance intervention such as "Basic Income," which I will argue at the next section, this social policy draws a line to separate "independent" citizens from
"dependent" welfare recipients, leading to reinforcement of boundaries. Another example is the affirmative action, a policy of intervention at both market entrance and communication exit. While this policy has a lot of positive effects on redistribution, it too, tends to fix boundaries in terms of recognition.

From what has been said above, I conclude that intervention at the entrance or in the game itself is indispensable in order to overcome boundaries. This is not to deny the importance of intervention at the exit. The normative theories of Rawls and Sen justify intervention at the entrance but do not intervene in the game itself. As we intervene in the market and communication game, we must realize that the game is neither a natural nor an unchangeable institution.

.5. Basic Income

In this section I argue for Basic Income in terms of Fraser’s solution (described in the section 3) and Evolutionary Political Economy of Recognition and Redistribution (described in the section 4). Basic Income is an unconditional guaranteed income for all. Philippe van Parijs defines it as “an income paid by a government, at a uniform level and at regular intervals, to each adult member of society.” It is paid “irrespective of whether the person is rich or poor, lives alone or with others, is willing to work or not.” The membership mentioned here is “not only citizens, but to all permanent residents (van Parijs 2001, p.5). There are three reasons why Basic Income (BI) is called “basic”: First, it is a basic platform which “[a]ny other income-whether in cash or in kind, from working or saving, from the market or the state-can lawfully be added to (van Parijs 2001, p.6).” Second, it helps to satisfy human “basic needs.” Third, it is an entitlement derived from “basic human rights.”

It is no need to explain more about BI in this conference, so let me move on the point how BI is assessed in terms of my argument in this paper. As redistribution aspect, i.e. in the game market, BI is obviously an intervention at the entrance. The “socialism”

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5 See Baker(1992). Demand for Basic Income in the claimants union movement in the U.K. based on this strong connection (Jordan 1973, Yamamori 2002). However, I have to note that van Parijs explicitly denies this connection between Basic Income and Basic Need (2001, p.6). This denial is relevant with his justification of BI in terms of his Real Libertarianism (van Parijs 1995). Whereas I have been strongly influenced by his works, and I think his justification is powerful and effective in the context of the dominance of Neo-Liberalism, I am not sure when he said BI is “a material foundation on which a life can firmly rest (2001, pp.5-6),” how far and irrelevant this level of “material foundation” could be from basic needs.
which Fraser recommends as transformative remedy is an intervention at the game itself. As I explained earlier, both interventions at the entrance and the game itself tend to facilitate making the boundary fluid, compared to interventions at the exit. So BI is also one of alternative transformative remedy, although Fraser did not mention about it.

As recognition aspect, I would like to pay attention to several features of BI contrasted to the traditional welfare state system. First, BI would be paid, not only to citizens but also permanent resident. It is paid irrespective whether she is poor or not, whether he has a will to work or not. All of these will make the boundary at issues (national identity, class identity, and identity of welfare dependency) fluid. Second, It would be paid not in household base, but in individual base. It has some potentiality that gender relation within household, although it is not automatically guaranteed. Third, social policies which intended to compensate to past discrimination to particular group, like affirmative action or positive discrimination might diminish in the strong version of BI (perhaps in Van Parijs version). Whereas those social policies are the compensation both of maldistribution and misrecognition at the exit of the game market and communication, BI is an intervention at the entrance of both games. So Basic Income is a good candidate of the welfare systems that can go beyond the redistribution-recognition dilemma.

.6. Sen on Identity

Let me go back to the issue whether Fraser’s negative conclusion about distributive theories are justified or not. For Sen’s case, it is controversial, not only because “Sen treats a ‘sense of self’ as relevant to the capability to function (Fraser 1997, p.33),” but also because his concept of capability itself detached from concentration on resource distribution like Rawls’ “social primary goods” or Dworkin’s “resource”. Indeed Ingrid Robeyns (2003) strongly argue against Fraser. Whereas Robeyns admits that Fraser’s intention to introduce recognition matter in the field of theory of justice, Robeyns criticizes that Fraser oversimplifies theories of distributive justice, and that it is wrong as far as Sen’s approach is concerned. She also concludes Fraser’s suggestion for alternative (Robeyns mention not transformative remedy I mentioned in this paper, but Participatory Parity I did not mentioned here) is “included in the capability approach, whereas the capability approach also points to some normative considerations of

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6 Robeyns (2000) calls attention that BI could be gender sensitive only when it would associate with other policy package which facilitate gender equality.
(mis-)recognition (Robeyns 2003, p.550).” I agree with Robeyns’ former claim, but here I will not enter whether her latter claim is justified or not. Instead, I remind her clear characterization of the capability approach as “framework”. She argues the capability approach is “an evaluative framework, not a fully specified theory (Robeyns 2001, p.3)”. Therefore it is “open” to diverse interpretations, so if we want further specifications of the approach, we need additional “explanatory theories (Robeyns 2004, p.1).” I would like to argue that Fraser’s theory (and my argument for evoulutional political economy for recognition and redistribution) can be such an explanatory theory, when we want to make the capability approach difference-sensitive.

The capability approach could be difference-sensitive in several reasons. First, it moves informational basis from what person possess (goods) to what a person can do or can be (capabilities) (Sen 1980, 1992). It could focus the human diversity derived from differences which a person converts from goods to capabilities. Second, against utilitarianism, capability approach associates with disaggregated measure, not with sum-ranking (Sen 1982, 1992). It could focus the situation of minority groups. However, this sensitiveness is only possibility, so we need explanatory theory. Furthermore, the capability approach itself does not suggest directly what kind of social policy facilitates justice for recognition. So again we need additional theory or explanation. Then how could we justify Fraser’s theory as such additional one? I would like to argue that Sen’s work on need and identity suggests constructionist direction⁷, and that this direction is the same as Fraser’s direction.

Fraser’s analytical distinction between redistribution and recognition could be rephrased distinction need distribution and need interpretation (Fraser 1989). Sen’s capability approach primarily concerns need distribution, but there are some aspect of need interpretation. He places emphasis on the necessity for self-evaluation (Sen 1987, p.32) of capability and functionings. Self-evaluation is different from utility, and “self-evaluation is quintessentially an evaluative exercise, which none of the interpretations of utility in itself is. …… The issue of paternalism, when it does arise, must relate to the rejection of the person’s self-evaluation (rather than of utility) (Sen 1987, p.32).” In his capability approach, the extent to which one’s self-evaluation of her capability compromise prevailing perception of capability as social standards is by no means immediately apparent. It should therefore not be assumed that the debate over need-interpretation has thus far taken an entirely appropriate direction within the capability approach. Sen does, however, recognize that the process of need

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⁷ I already argued this elsewhere (Yamamori 2003), so the following argument was there in slightly different version.
interpretation itself takes place within a rather separate dimension from the narrow focus to need-distribution. Outside of the context of the capability approach, Sen notes:

The totality of the human predicament would be an undiscriminating basis for the social analysis of needs. There are many things that we might have good reason to value if they were feasible, maybe even immortality; yet we do not see them as needs. Our conception of needs relates to our analysis of the nature of deprivations, and also to our understanding of what can be done about them. Political rights, including freedom of expression and discussion, are not only pivotal in inducing political responses to economic needs, they are also central to the conceptualization of economic needs themselves (Sen, 1994: 36).

Sen has criticized the dichotomization of need and freedom (e.g. political rights, democracy). The strength of this claim lies first of all in the fact that it identifies the importance of an often-overlooked relevance: the relevance of freedom to respond to need fulfillment. I would like to pay attention to the relevance of freedom to define needs, in the context of this paper. This freedom and political rights that Sen points to could be interpreted as a freedom or right to participation in the public sphere (and the game communication, in terminology of section 4). One could also say that this stance gives careful concern to the concept of need as a social standard, and respect to the social construction of needs, thereby suggesting that need must take shape within processes of the public sphere. Furthermore, however, he asserts that the formalized rights and freedom to the public sphere have severe limitations. “It is important to acknowledge, however, the special difficulty of making a democracy take adequate notice of some types of deprivation, particularly the needs of minorities (Sen, 1994: 36).”

Sen doesn’t respond directly to this difficulty, however, he does seem to hint at one specific direction. He is wary of considering a single identity as a stable or solid entity. He insists that identity is not discovered, but rather, it is chosen by reason (Sen, 1998). In addition, the social norms that are the result of the social construction of need are not a primary point of theoretical departure. This concern of Sen becomes clear in the following statement: “[t]he prevailing perceptions of “normality” and “appropriateness” are quite central (Sen, 1999: 116) ” to some sort of question like gender inequality.

All of these arguments suggest constructionist direction. I called this Sen’s direction “constructive universalism (Yamamori 2003)”. Although it might be
epistemologically different from Fraser’s “deconstructionist” approach, it could still enable us to connect these two theories each other in order to evaluate social policies from some normative perspective.

.7. Concluding remarks

Let me briefly summarize the discussion above, in slightly different order. The capability approach developed by Sen could be sensitive to cultural justice or recognition of difference. The capability approach is just "framework", so theoretically it could associate with intermediate theory of recognition or cultural justice, but at the same time, it is not automatically guaranteed. I argue that Fraser’s analysis is suitable for such an intermediate theory, and propose a theoretical device for evolitional perspective of redistribution and recognition. It focuses that which stage of market process policy intervenes as remedy of redistribution, and which stage of communication process policy intervenes as remedy of recognition. Interventions at entrance stage of both processes are relatively effective. Basic income (BI) proposal is one possible way of such an intervention.

So we could say that BI proposal is not inconstant with Capability approach, although this approach does not directly suggest such a policy and does not exclude other policies.

References


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Figure 1
Three Stages of Redistribution and Recognition