



Basic Income, Labour Automation and Migration - An Approach from a Republican Perspective

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Abstract

This research uses a normative approach to examine the relationship between basic income and migration. The decisive variable is the effect of labour automation, which increases economic insecurities globally, leaving some nation states in a position to cope with this and others not. The insecurities will increase migratory pressures on one hand but also justify the introduction of basic income on a nation state level on the other.

The normative guideline is the republican conception of freedom as non-domination. This is used to justify a basic income, analyse how labour automation creates dominating structures and how borders dominate migrants seeking to move to countries which introduce a basic income.

The result is that nation states that introduce a basic income to counter internal domination through labour automation, also have to look outside of their nation state. The imposition of borders in order to keep a basic income sustainable as well as labour automation itself, establish a form of domination over less developed countries and thus demand international regulation.

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List of Acronyms

BGE	Bündnis Grundeinkommen
BI	Basic Income
BIEN	Basic Income Earth Network
BVerfG	Bundesverfassungsgericht
DIW	Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
EU	European Union
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei
ILO	International Labour Organization
IFR	International Federation of Robotics
MNC	Multinational Corporation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PFD	Permanent Fund Dividend
UBI	Universal Basic Income
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
WEF	World Economic Forum
WSI	Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut

1. Introduction

Labour automation is a growing threat to jobs worldwide. The advancements in artificial intelligence, machine learning and robotics increasingly enable machines to execute complex tasks and be more flexible in doing so. Moreover, prices of these technologies are falling. This increases productivity of industries but puts jobs of millions of workers at risk around the world as their tasks will be replaced by machines.¹ Best-selling publications have taken on discussing labour automation's effects on employment (see Ford, 2015; Avent, 2016). Universal Basic Income (UBI)², defined as "a periodic cash payment unconditionally delivered to all on an individual basis, without means-test or work requirement" (BIEN, 2016), has been discussed in the public debate as a way to counter the increasing threat of labour automation on economic security (Clifford, 2016).

This research will argue that the debate neglects the global scope of labour automation as it occurs in developed as well as in developing countries. If jobs are significantly reduced and some states cannot react properly as with the implementation of a BI, people might want to migrate to those that do react. This raises questions on how to deal with the tensions created between a freedom enhancing BI and the potential increase of borders in order to keep a BI sustainable within a country. This paper aims to contribute to the literature on BI and migration, by analysing the effects of labour automation. This has not yet been done within the scholarship, and as argued here will have substantial impacts on countries.

In order to do so this research is structured as follows. Firstly, the chosen methodology will be discussed. Next, the issues related to labour automation will be debated, explaining why introducing a BI would be a justified reaction. The latter will then be defined and its philosophical premises will shortly be discussed to establish support for the neo-republican³ position on BI. Subsequently, it will be established why it is most likely that a BI will be implemented at the national instead of the supranational level.

Then, labour automation will be discussed regarding its different effects in developing and developed countries, and its potential to increase migratory pressures in the former as well as reinforce unequal power structures between the two. Migration pressures arise, as developing countries are rather unlikely to introduce a BI, thus, BI introducing countries become a viable alternative to move to. By consulting the academic literature on BI and migration, it becomes apparent that scholars advance border restrictions as a way to make a

¹ Optimists believe labour automation can potentially create new jobs in new industries. However, here the focus is on the negative aspects (Brynjolfsson et al., 2014a: ch.10, 15).

² Here also called basic income (BI).

³ In future only republican, even though the focus is kept on Pettit's (1999) neo-republican account.

BI sustainable. This poses a dilemma as, on one hand, freedom is enhanced through BI and, on the other, reduced through border restrictions. This will be elucidated by using normative literature on migration. Hereby, Germany, which is expected to be highly affected by labour automation in future years, will be used as a hypothetical example to illustrate how a developed country can deal with these issues. The last part concludes and proposes further research.

2. Methodological Procedure

To answer the dilemma outlined above, normative migration literature will be used to establish what a nation state should do, whilst implementing a BI, to mitigate the tensions resulting from increased restrictions on immigration. This appears to be the most appropriate approach to answer the question about the competing moral claims that outsiders and insiders of a nation state have regarding the effects of labour automation. On one side, it appears to increase the freedom of people within the nation state, but, on the other, it also reduces the freedom of those seeking to migrate, as potential borders reduce their chances to live a good life. Thus, the moral responsibilities of nation states need to be taken into account, through a normative debate about BI, labour automation and migration.

Further, the hypothetical scenario of a BI in Germany is justified as a fully universal BI has not yet been implemented on a nation state level. Only several small-scale pilot projects have been carried out.⁴ Consequently, no empirical data exist on how BI and migration interact with each other (Boso & Vancea, 2012:9).

Additionally, labour automation has just recently come up in the academic debate and its effects are expected to increase over the next twenty years. Thus, it is an urgent matter that is worth exploring to understand what preparations ought to be made in order to deal with its negative impacts.

The leading normative concept will be the republican notion of freedom as non-domination that is used to justify the introduction of a BI and also plays an important role in the debate about borders and what responsibilities nation states have towards outsiders (Pettit, 1999; 2007; Raventós, 2007; Laborde, 2010). Given this focus, it is justified that the review of literature about migration and BI does not follow immediately but is preceded by a contextualisation to connect labour automation and BI and show how both may increase migratory pressures. What should be said about BI and migration here, however, is that the

⁴ The Swiss rejected a national BI in a referendum in 2016. For further BI schemes see Givedirectly (2017).

majority of scholars do not expect that BI would increase migration in the first place as family ties and jobs are more important reasons to choose the destination to move to (Boso & Vancea, 2012). Given the threat of labour automation, however, jobs are likely to be reduced around the world, thus the reasons to move might change, challenging the scholarly perception so far.

3. Labour Automation and Basic Income

This section will show that labour automation is highly likely to be one of the major contributors to increased economic insecurity across the world. Consequently, the introduction of a BI becomes a viable policy option.

3.1. A Justification for Basic Income

Lacking a clear definition, automation is defined as “the use of machines or computers instead of people to do a job, especially in a factory or office” (Cambridge Business English Dictionary, 2017). The key point here is that human labour is replaced. Historically, automation was limited to tasks that involved a certain routine (Autor & Dorn, 2013:1558-1559). However, recent technological development is making it possible for non-routine tasks to be performed by machines (World Bank, 2016:22). The advancements of highly complex algorithms, being able to ‘understand’ the patterns of non-routine cognitive tasks, and the progress in robotics, contribute to changes in the organisation of work “across industries and occupations” (Frey & Osborne, 2017:268). This is especially the case for low-skilled, low-cognitive, non-routine jobs, as many are made obsolete (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2011:ch.3; Frey & Osborne, 2017:258-261). Demands for these technologies are growing, as they are progressively cheaper to produce (Frey & Osborne, 2017:255-258).

Table 1 provides an overview of studies on the threat of labour automation, clearly showing that it is a global phenomenon.⁵ The studies demonstrate that many jobs are at risk of being automated in the next 20 years.⁶ These developments put pressure on

⁵ In these studies, two different methodological approaches are applied. The first method, used by the majority of the studies, is based on the assumption that whole occupations can be automated, this is called the “occupation based approach” (Arntz et al., 2016:4). The second method looks at occupations in terms of the different functions that are needed for the occupation and which of these could be automated (Arntz et al., 2016:25). The latter approach concludes that it is not as often possible to automate whole occupations but rather a lot of functions attached to one occupation. If functions can be automated they can also be aligned in a way that minimises the interference of manual tasks, thus this task can be repeated faster and productivity increases without new labour (see Berriman & Hawksworth, 2017:32).

⁶ Risk defined as: occupations having a probability of above 70% to be replaced through automation (Pajarinen & Rouvinen, 2014:6).

administrations and governments to reduce the threat of unemployment. This is corroborated as the speed of technological progress appears to be faster than the time the educational systems require to equip people with skills that would allow them to either work together with the technologies or to develop them (Srnicek & Williams, 2015:ch. 5; Bland, 2016). Thus, a lot of citizens are likely to experience increasing economic insecurity as corporations producing the new technologies do not generate the same amount of jobs as they have done in the past (Srnicek & Williams, 2015:ch. 5; Spät, 2016).

Table 1: Overview of Labour Automation Studies

Author(s)	Country	Share of Jobs at Risk of Being Automated	Method of Study
Arntz et al. (2016)	OECD countries	9% on average Highest: Germany & Austria : 12% Lowest: Korea & Estonia: 6%	Task based approach
Berriman & Hawksworth (2017)	-	United Kingdom: 30% United States: 38% Germany : 35 % Japan: 21%	Task based approach
Bonin et al. (2015)	Germany	42%	Occupation based approach
Bowles (2014)	European Union member countries	54% on average with South and South-East countries affected the most	Occupation based approach
Brzeski & Burk (2015)	Germany	59%	Occupation based approach
Chang & Huynh (2016)	Cambodia Indonesia Philippines Thailand Viet Nam	56% on average Highest: VietNam: 70% Lowest: Thailand: 44%	Occupation based approach
Chui et al. (2016)	USA	45%	Occupation based approach
Dengler & Matthes (2015)	Germany	15%	Task based approach (specific focus on German labour market characteristics)

Frey & Osborne (2017)	USA	47%	Occupation based approach
Manyika et al. (2017)	USA	5%	Task based approach
Pajarinen & Rouvinen (2014)	Finland	35.7%	Occupation based approach
World Bank (2016)	Developing countries	66%	Occupation based approach

Due to automation, robots will take over low-skilled and low-income jobs where a great amount of people work, and so it is the more vulnerable that will become unemployed rather than the small number of workers employed in non-routine, high-skilled and high-income jobs (Goos et al., 2009:62; Srnicek & Williams, 2015:ch.5). This job polarisation is furthermore accompanied by jobless recovery, where economies grow after a recession without increasing employment. Even if employment numbers rise after a recession, it is mostly due to people being pushed into precarious and low-skill occupations, contributing to increased insecurity and suppression of those employed in such conditions (Jaimovich & Siu, 2012:3-8; Srnicek & Williams, 2015: ch.5). This composition of labour markets, combined with the low chances that re-education will be sufficient to accommodate those affected by labour automation, increases the insecurity that individuals feel towards work as a social protection.

Additionally, the potential increase of unemployment puts pressures on social security systems, as welfare regimes are sustained through policies focused on keeping employment high, especially in Western corporatist welfare states such as Germany (Schierup, 2006:140-144). On an individual level, contemporary social policies increase economic insecurity through means testing and the imposition of conditions on the payment of social security benefits, such as work requirements or re-educational measures. This limits the freedom of individuals as they have to follow certain procedures and take on jobs that they do not want to do (Offe, 2008:5-9; Standing, 2017:84).

In (Western) societies that are increasingly threatened by automation and where social policies are not capable of dealing with this, BI is seen as a remedy to unemployment, increasing income inequality, and poverty (Raventós, 2007:ch.5; Standing, 2008:24–25 Boffey, 2015; Chapman, 2017). Its unconditionality and universality reduce the conditions imposed on individuals, and the necessity to work in order to receive economic security. ‘Universal’ means that BI is paid to all, without a means test, and ‘unconditional’ implies that it is independent of the employment status of a person (BIEN, 2017).

According to Michael Sandel, BI should not just be seen as a compensatory mechanism providing a payment in order to legitimise the automation of a job (WEF, 2017).

To a greater degree, it should be regarded as a means to create security and the ability for everyone to participate in the political discussion on automation and how it changes peoples' perceptions of occupations. Given labour automation and BI, one would be able to engage in occupations, e.g. community work, that are not located in classical wage-labour markets as work would no longer be necessary in order to subsist (Standing, 2017:60-61).

The size of the BI payment depends on what one's motivations are to endorse it (Standing, 2017:4). Here, it is understood as guaranteeing economic security, whilst still being embedded in a broader set of public policies like education and health that are also necessary to guarantee freedom (Standing, 2017:60).

3.2. Freedom and Basic Income

It appears that a "tremendous diversity among BI proponents" (Zwolinski, 2011:3) exists regarding their motivations to endorse it. The main normative argument for BI is its capacity to enhance freedom, as in contemporary societies many inequalities exist that limit the freedom of individuals (Van Parijs, 1997:1; Raventós, 2007:74; White, 2011:73). The most prominent support comes from the real-libertarian Philippe Van Parijs, who endorses BI as it enables "real freedom for all", where everyone would enjoy the right "to do whatever one might want to do" (1997:23). It is based in the (left)-libertarian tradition of self-ownership of one's body and labour, and the formal freedom of non-interference.⁷ But only through a BI people can follow their real intentions (Van Parijs, 1997:25). This is seen as "necessary *and* sufficient" in order to be free (Standing, 2017:60). Especially the access to real freedom for the least advantaged of a society should be maximised (Van Parijs, 1997:27; Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017:105). BI reduces economic insecurities, hence distributing freedom within a society to create equality (Van Parijs, 1997:24).

Another conception of freedom is the republican freedom from domination, which puts a focus on the role of institutions in guaranteeing freedom (Domenèch & Raventós, 2007:5-6; Standing, 2017:60). This will be developed further in the next section, and is seen as the major normative approach in this work, as it emphasises institutional settings that are also needed in order to enable freedom.

⁷ For a right-libertarian account of BI see Murray (2008), arguing for a BI to reduce the welfare state.

3.3. Basic Income as a Protection from Domination

Freedom in the republican approach is understood as an absence of domination and arbitrary interference by others (Pettit, 1999:5). What 'arbitrary' means is defined differently across the republican scholarship but can be summarised as the uncontrolled or unregulated exercise of power (Honohan & Hovdal-Moan, 2014:2; Ronzoni, 2017:189-190). Here, limitations of freedom can exist where no interference is occurring and interferences can occur that do not limit freedom, such as laws and regulations (Pettit, 1999:81; Pettit, 2007:4; Casassas & De Wispelaere, 2012:172). These interfere, but do not dominate, to guarantee that individuals can live together in a political community (Dagger, 2005:185; Laborde & Ronzoni, 2016:281).

Two types of domination can be distinguished. One occurs within a principal-agent relationship. The classic example is the slave that is allowed to do whatever he/she wants, whilst still being dominated by the owner. The other form is systemic domination that occurs via structures and one's position in a system. Even if the slave appears to have all the freedom, the institution of slavery itself still limits his/her actions (Laborde, 2010:57). As everyone within a political community should experience non-domination, a republican polity should equally distribute freedom as non-domination (Iverson, 2010:35).

Domination is highly likely to occur when there is high socio-economic inequality amongst a political community, making it easy for the rich to be in control of the poor. Furthermore, these inequalities create feelings of humiliation and, more specifically, a loss of self-respect as one is vulnerable to abuses of power by the dominators (Laborde, 2010:52; Raventós, 2007:45). Given the high levels of economic insecurity that are induced by labour automation, as well as the restrictions imposed by contemporary welfare systems, such as means testing, individuals are very vulnerable to domination by either their employer or the state's social service agencies.

In order to protect the vulnerable of a society from being dominated, BI is appropriate as its universality and unconditionality help to create "egalitarian socio-economic arrangements" (Ronzoni, 2017:191), by providing "independence, material existence and [an] autonomous base" (Raventós, 2007:69) that is comparable to owning property, which is traditionally seen as a protection from vulnerability within the republican scholarship. Thus, the amount of the BI has to be above poverty level to guarantee a "substantial economic floor" (Casassas & Widerquist, 2016:288).

This reduces economic insecurity of individuals and dominating structures between e.g. earner and non-earner in a relationship or employer and employee, as socio-economic

power relationships are reconfigured through BI (Pateman, 2004:91; Raventós, 2007: ch. 3; Healy et al. 2013:117; Casassas & de Wispelaere, 2016:289).

Additionally, BI enables people to reflect on systemic structures of power by putting into question institutions, like the importance of having a job around which one's life is structured. This structure is also threatened by labour automation, thus BI is seen as a chance to re-organise society in order to follow one's dreams which might not be possible within a society focused on labour (Srincek & Williams, 2015: ch.6).

For freedom as non-domination to exist as envisaged by republican thinkers, institutional protections such as democratic control are essential. This is because through democratic participation, interferences are checked and thus legitimised through popular control (Raventós, 2007:48; Beckman & Rosenberg, 2017: no pagination; Ronzoni, 2017:189). BI would then also ensure the ability to participate in democratic decisions, as individuals would not be in dependency relationships that could influence their behaviour (Pettit, 2007:3-7; Raventós 2007:95; Laborde & Maynor, 2008:20).

Freedom as non-domination thus provides a moral justification for why one should support BI. Additionally, it should be used as an analytic tool to reflect on structures and relationships in order to detect and minimise domination, occurring either within a state or on the global level (Laborde, 2010:50). Before doing so, however, it needs to be established on which level BI is most likely to be implemented in order to understand where further domination might occur.

3.4. Justification for Basic Income on the National Level

This debate is not about what is normatively the best level to introduce BI but rather stresses that BI, having not yet been implemented anywhere in full scale, demands certain institutional settings to start with.

3.4.1. Global Level

Several ideas exist that endorse a global BI. It could, for example, be funded through a "global resource dividend" (Pogge, 1995:192-198) or from taxes (e.g. "Tobin Tax") imposed on internationally active corporations (Jordan & Düvell, 2003:140).

However, from a policy perspective, a globally distributed BI appears to be rather unrealistic as global governance solutions will be too limited and shallow to be sustainable (Keohane, 2001:3). This is because the attempt to levy welfare policies on a global level will

require an international income redistribution which demands the existence of a legitimate authority to collect global taxes/resource income and to redistribute these as BI (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017:227). This would be a highly complex process in which many different nations, cultures, levels of prosperity and interest would be involved (Dahl, 1999:26). An additional issue in the implementation of BI would be linked to the fact that, by definition, it has to be given directly to individuals. In authoritarian countries, ensuring that the payments would reach the individuals and reducing the intermediaries that could interfere with a straight transfer from the global to the individual level, could be a major difficulty.

3.4.2. Regional Level

Mady Delvaux-Stehres, member of the European Parliament, has brought up BI on a European level in order to be prepared for the technological changes to come (Bulman, 2017). Rising poverty and extreme inequality within the EU would make BI a fitting policy tool to create a socially more equal Europe (Milevska, 2014; OECD, 2017:7-11). BI would come handy, as other means of inequality reduction within the EU are not present, such as a common fiscal union or redistributive mechanisms (Van Parijs & Vandenberght, 2017:232-233). A possible way to implement BI within the EU would be to introduce a “Eurodividend” (Van Parijs & Vandenberght, 2017:235). The most appropriate way to finance a Eurodividend would be through a combination of an EU-wide VAT tax and a modest EU-level energy taxation (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017:235-241).

Yet, even though the EU is a highly advanced governance body above the nation state, it appears to be incapable of implementing BI. The heterogeneity of populations and identities that create a lack of solidarity among EU citizens, the plurality of public opinions within the EU, and a weaker set of political institutions compared to nation states are factors that would hinder BI implementation (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017:241). The Euro-crisis demonstrated the existing political cleavages between creditor and debtor countries that are also reflected in EU politics in general and threaten the project of European integration (Laffan, 2016:915-917). Moreover, Brexit appears to be another setback for this project. The way the migration crisis was discussed within the EU also demonstrated the different positions as well as public opinions among the EU countries. Together with the economic crisis it gave rise to populist anti-EU right wing parties (Hobolt & Tilley, 2014:972). BI on a European level, thus, appears to be “politically unacceptable” (Mencinger, 2015:167) due to the current solidarity problems among the EU-member states.⁸

⁸ Another regional suggestion is brought forward by Howard (2007) for the NAFTA, however given its focus on trade it is rather unlikely to observe the introduction of a BI there.

3.4.3. Subnational Level

On a subnational level, BI schemes have been advanced or are in place, as the Alaskan Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) and many other, mostly local, pilot projects show (Widerquist & Howard 2012:3; Givedirectly, 2017). However, the latter are experiments to gather data in order to examine the real life effects of BI proxy schemes. Thus, they do not qualify as real BI projects (Givedirectly, 2017). The PFD, a resource fund dividend scheme, does not provide payments high enough to guarantee subsistence (on average: \$1200 yearly), therefore, it also does not qualify as proper BI (Casassas & de Wispelaere, 2012:177). If the payment would have a substantial level, internal migration could occur, thus creating political as well as economic issues in this region. It is hard to justify why, within a country, people in one region should receive a BI and not in others.

3.4.4. National Level

The nation state, even though having lost much power and sovereignty in contemporary times to supranational institutions, appears to be the best starting point for the introduction of BI. Finland recently introduced unconditional monthly payments (560 € each month for two years) to 2000 long term unemployed in order to study what effects this will have on their lifestyles (Chapman, 2017). Even though having been introduced by the state, the payments only partially resemble BI due to their focus on unemployment, making them neither unconditional nor universal. This initiative, however, shows that governments are capable of introducing and considering measures similar to BI. The lost Swiss referendum about the introduction of BI, was the closest a country ever got to implementing a substantive BI (Minder, 2016).

As Pioch (2002:2) elucidates: “The comparative advantage of tax-financed welfare states is that they provide opportunities for future, possibly more radical reforms, like the introduction of a basic income.” This means that, on the national level, welfare regimes that are built on the specific ideas of the respective country’s capitalist systems and institutions already exist (Esping-Andersen, 1990:26-33). Thus, it is most likely that a BI would be established through an ongoing transformation of these systems and a shift within the taxation structure, rather than through instant change.

In order to implement BI, there is a need for democratic legitimisation and a monopoly over raising and distributing taxes. These are major strengths of the nation state that multi-governance arrangements like the EU or other supranational regimes do not have (Zürn, 2010: 92-95). As these are financed through taxes raised by nation states and do not enable direct democratic participation, nation states may be better suited for the implementation of BI.

Furthermore, democratic participation is “intrinsically valuable” (Jordan & Düvell, 2003:141) and nation states have been more successfully providing this than supranational bodies like the EU or UN.

However, if implemented on the national level, BI is not unconditional anymore, but dependent on membership of a nation state (Atkinson, 2011:1-2). As Standing elucidates (2017:63-64):

In an ideal world, in some utopian future, we might happily say that everybody, wherever they might be, should have the right to a basic income. But for the present our eyes must be focused on the state and in particular the nation, the country, where social policy is still crafted and implemented.

However, BI on a national level does not necessarily mean that a country does not have obligations to the outside world. Rather, a nation state focus might just be a more realistic notion that should be accompanied by attempts to address problems of domination on the global scale (Vanderborgh & Van Parijs, 2017:217). As will be established in the next section, this can also be said about the republican perception of non-domination on an international level.

3.5. Labour Automation as a Cause for Migratory Pressures

The contemporary understanding of freedom of non-domination can be extended into the international sphere to question whether domination occurs between states or different national actors. This resembles Skinner’s (2010:99) notion that “it is possible to live and act as a freeman if and only if you live in a free state”, pointing towards the possibility that domination can occur outside of political communities. Especially economic interdependencies lead to possible dominating situations, in which states are dominated by external actors and, therefore, unable to respond to the will of their political community (Laborde, 2010:52; Bohman, 2012:110; Laborde & Ronzoni, 2016:281). Laborde & Ronzoni (2016:291) succinctly point out:

Domination in the international sphere is connected to global inequality, poverty, and lack of effective and accountable institutional regulation at the global level.

These connections have grown through structural shortcomings based on unequal distribution of power and resources that are also ingrained into international law and institutions. Also, the non-existence of regulation in the international sphere leads to domination. An example thereof would be the lack of an international migration regime -

leading to states dominating potential migrants, by unilaterally imposing borders (Honohan, 2014:38-44; Fine, 2014:17-26; Costa, 2014:408-411).

As shown in Table 1, the risk of automation is not just high in developed but also in developing countries. Two-thirds of all jobs in the developing world are susceptible to being automated. It is predicted that in developing countries the automation of labour will occur at a slower pace than in the developed world (World Bank, 2016:23). This may be because wages are lower, thus making it at first not attractive for corporations to replace cheap labour with expensive robots. However, this argument is only of short endurance, as robots' prices are falling steeply whilst their technology is improving quickly (Brynjolfsson et al., 2014b).

The special case for developing countries is that automation accelerates "premature deindustrialisation" (Rodrik, 2016:1), meaning they experience a quicker transition from industrial economies into service economies than developed countries have. This will reduce jobs in industrial sectors that were essential in order to create middle classes in developed countries. Furthermore, the jobs that will be left will be lower paid service jobs, thus increasing the inequalities in those countries (especially in Africa and Latin America) (Bland, 2016; Rodrik, 2016:2-4, 28-30).

Additionally, as job polarisation also occurs heavily in developing countries, the small (if existent) middle classes might be threatened and policies to protect people from the negative impact of labour automation should be demanded (UNCTAD, 2016:3). However, developing countries lack organised labour structures as well as a middle class that is very often responsible for demanding social security systems (Desai, 2015). Thus, BI as a policy alternative appears to be rather unlikely as Desai (2015) states that "the demand for comprehensive welfare programs in middle-income countries remains weak." Consequently, it can be expected that it would be even more unlikely to be an option for the least-developed countries around the world.

This is corroborated as developing middle income countries have only lately been establishing social security systems and institutions to support the poorest members of their societies (Barrientos, 2013:7-15). According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), 73% percent of the global population do not enjoy proper social security, resulting in high economic insecurity and structural poverty. This is especially the case in developing countries where a low percentage of the labour force receive unemployment benefits compared to 80% of the labour force in Europe (ILO, 2014:xxi-xxii).

Therefore, developed countries appear to be in a position of power, as they have more capacities to counter the consequences of labour automation, and, at the same time, are also highly involved in automating labour.

Automation will make it easier and cheaper for companies to manufacture goods close to where they are consumed (Wucker, 2015). Developed countries that see a large share of existing jobs at risk of being automated, could re-locate outsourced facilities in order to create short term employment possibilities at home, but will also replace outsourced labour by automation. Both of these situations will hurt low-wage countries, where a lot of jobs and factories have been set up in recent decades by corporations from developed countries (Hickel, 2017). This exemplifies the power position that corporations have through labour automation in countries where they employ many people. In general, developing countries also lack well endorsed labour laws, making it easier for corporations to dominate labour conditions (Laborde & Ronzoni, 2016:293). Moreover, developing countries will not enforce tough labour laws as they fear the threat of capital flight. Labour automation, then, adds more power to corporations but also depicts the structural weaknesses in international labour law (Boeri et al. 2008:2-3; Laborde & Ronzoni, 2016:283). Honohan elucidates succinctly (2014:37):

“[Globalization] has involved an increase in the potential for domination, with increasing connectedness, asymmetry of power and dependence across borders (especially, but not exclusively, of those in less developed countries).”

What is noteworthy about labour automating technologies is that they are produced and advanced majorly by societies that see their labour forces shrinking as a consequence of an ageing population and decreasing birth rates. Pritchett (2006:40-42) criticises these technological advancements as abundant labour forces exist in developing countries, arguing that instead of developing labour automating technologies, borders should be opened to reduce international inequalities. However, it appears that labour automation is also affecting countries where labour is abundant, thus reducing wages and creating subsistence problems, which will in turn cause migratory pressures (Hickel, 2017).

This points to a profound problem as the dominating effects of labour automating technologies on one side justify a BI on the nation state level in developed countries, but, on the other side, create migratory pressures in developing countries, which might interfere with the economic sustainability of a BI project in a developed country. Thus, BI enhances and equally distributes freedom as non-domination within a national society but, on the global level, freedom of non-domination might decrease, as people outside of the nation state might be dominated by borders imposed in order to guarantee the increased freedom within the BI implementing nation state.

International domination may be countered by the installation of institutions that equally distribute freedom as non-domination across the international system through democratic

regulation (Bohman, 2008:190-200; Fine 2014:24-25). This is because people in a globalised world are often dependent on other states' decisions. Especially, potential migrants appear to be vulnerable to domination when they are in some kind of dependency relationship with the countries that impose borders on them (Honohan, 2014:41). These demands will be further elucidated in the normative discussion that follows in the next chapter.

4. Normative Discussion - Basic Income, Labour Automation and Migration

As established in the previous section, the introduction of BI on a nation state level enhances freedom for those receiving it but, at the same time, increases threats of domination for those outside the nation state and potentially increases migration pressures. The literature on BI and migration will be consulted in order to see what solutions it suggests. None of the previous literature on BI and migration involves labour automation in the discussion.

4.1. Basic Income and Migration

The debate about BI and migration has been rather limited with Van Parijs (1992), Jordan & Düvell (2003) and Howard (2006) arguing normatively and others debating whether BI would be a welfare magnet in case of its introduction (Pioch, 2002; Raventós, 2007; Boso & Vancea, 2012; Standing, 2017; Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017).

In the neo-classical scholarly conception of economic migration, above average wages and employment opportunities would be the main reasons to migrate, rather than the destination country's welfare system (De Giorgi & Pellizzari, 2009:2-3).

Boso & Vancea (2012), however, challenge the rationality of the migration choice. They compare the neo-classical model of migration with sociological theory and survey data to see whether BI as a generous welfare provision will increase migration. They come to the conclusion that individuals migrate either to reconnect with family or because of a new job and not necessarily to maximise welfare benefits, thus implying that BI might not increase migration.

However, their insights do not take into account the tension induced by labour automation, as the latter reduces jobs but not the labour force available, giving justification to argue that migration might not anymore be based on jobs, but rather on welfare or BI in order to subsist.

Raventós (2007:192-196) argues that it is not the introduction of BI but the inequalities within the world that create migration, thus rejecting the idea that people would move predominantly in order to receive BI. According to him, the argument is used to shy away from addressing global economic inequalities. However, he also does not consider whether a global phenomenon like labour automation would make those countries that counter it by introducing a BI especially attractive destinations.

To counter inequalities around the world and reduce migration, a global BI is advanced by Jordan & Düvell (2003:140-143) as the best ethical solution. However, they acknowledge that it would restrict state sovereignty, hence making it hard to implement in the first place. This exemplifies the tension described above, as it would be best to implement it on such a level, but it is highly unlikely to happen. Thus the focus should be put on what scholars say focusing on the nation state introducing a BI.

Pioch (2002), looking at the connection between migration and the sustainability of BI, comes to the conclusion that public opinion is very important as there is a close connection between welfare states and people's contribution to them. Hence, increasing welfare migration could reduce the public support for BI as the public assumes that migrants will live off the state's provision of social benefits.

Pursuant to this is that for maintaining political as well as economic sustainability, a highly restrictive border regime is needed to create public support for BI (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017:ch. 8). Van Parijs & Vanderborght (2017:222) argue that "[the] sustainability of (genuine) domestic redistribution imposes firm limits on hospitality. This is true for conditional minimum income schemes, and is at least as true for an unconditional basic income." Especially politically, due to a lack of solidarity between multicultural or heterogeneous societies, it is hard to create BI heavily based on redistribution. This is firstly because people are less likely to show solidarity with non-nationals and secondly, because the institutions that create solidarity like work are weakened (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017:242). Thus, for Van Parijs & Vanderborght, the only option is to exclude people from a community by increasing border restrictions: "As long as the national level is the highest one at which genuine redistribution can be institutionalised it needs protection against selective immigration" (2017:221-222).

However, Chrisp (2017:266-270) warns that if BI is tied to restrictive regulations of citizenship, then this might increase welfare chauvinism. Right-wing parties could instrumentalise the idea of BI and use it to restrict immigration.

Howard (2006:19) advances that it would be justified for migrants to be excluded from payments, as long as they are not otherwise isolated from society. Standing (2017: 124-125)

shares this opinion as he does not really reject that a surge in migration could occur. He argues that it would be acceptable to include a waiting period or a permanent residency requirement in order to enhance support by citizens. This is renounced by Van Parijs & Vanderborght (2017:223) as they reject weaker solutions than restricting borders, as it would create a two-tier society in which the BI receiving part of the population could reject jobs that the non-BI receiving part could not. This provides a clear potential for domination in the republican understanding, as parts of society could arbitrarily interfere with the more vulnerable.

In a similar vein, Howard (2006:19) would see border restrictions as legitimate only if they ensure the protection of an adequate BI for the least advantaged in the nation state. This would have to be combined with a redistributive mechanism above the nation state level such as a regional or a global BI. The latter resembles Van Parijs' (1992:164) earlier position, as he argued that capital is more mobile than people, especially regarding the least advantaged of poor societies. Hence, he sees border restrictions justified, if global redistributive schemes were in place.

Thus, the majority of these arguments conclude that border restrictions appear to be necessary in order to install BI. However, some endorse that redistributive mechanisms above the nation state should be sought if borders are closed, pointing towards the responsibility of the nation state outside of its borders (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017:244).

The next step is to use this idea and illuminate it through normative theories of migration in order to figure out what obligations a BI introducing nation state should have in the context of increased migration due to labour automation induced BI.

4.2. Basic Income and Migration

Different motivations to migrate can be found (Sainsbury, 2006:230). Here the concern lies with economic migrants, as migration due to humanitarian or political reasons is not the focus of this research. However, due to labour automation and BI the term economic migrant is not necessarily understood as a migrant seeking to find a higher earning jobs, but rather to find subsistence in another country, which is capable of dealing with labour automation appropriately.

As, by definition, BI is universal and unconditional, it appears to be only logical that there are hardly any justifications for withholding BI to someone that has settled down in a country, thus the debate is pushed to the borders and not to the naturalisation process.

The current international migration policy regime, with respect to - at least - economic migrants, reflects a clear dual-tier morality between outsiders and insiders of states. Migration policies in developed countries are heavily driven by issues such as demographic transitions, a lack of (skilled) labour, human capital flight as well as social integration and security issues (Gaston, 2015:391-392). Therefore, immigration policies imply an economic rationale when selecting migrants that seek to enter for non-humanitarian reasons (Ruhs, 2008:404; Schachar, 2016:197-198).

Normative questions about migration enquire about one's moral obligations towards humans on a global level and on a nation state level, and whether there is a two-tier morality. Statists, here represented by Miller, argue that a two-tier morality is justifiable as sovereign states are the best entities to provide welfare, protect human rights, and create shared identities. The emphasis is on a political community's right to democratic self-determination. For Miller, people in many countries of this world see themselves as having a certain national identity that shapes their perception of themselves and others and hence demands to be included in the debate about borders (Miller, 2016:25-29; Parvin, 2016:7-8). Consequently, a management of migration helps to preserve parts of public cultures (e.g. languages) and to adapt others in a controlled fashion (Miller, 2005:199-200). Another argument, more indifferent towards shared cultures, is that the political community within a nation state has a right of democratic association, which includes the right to determine whom to include or exclude from the community (Walzer, 1983:23; Seglow, 2005:322-323). Thus, co-nationals have special obligations towards each other, but they do not have the same obligations towards people outside of the nation state (Miller, 2007:27).

Abizadeh (2008:38-39) challenges the claim that democratic association justifies the unilateral imposition of border controls, based on democratic theory and the notion of freedom as autonomy. If states are truly focused on popular sovereignty, they are not entitled to unilaterally impose border controls on immigrants, if these coercively limit their autonomy. The reason for this is that, according to democratic theory, if a policy is coercive or invades the autonomy of an individual (in this case a prospective immigrant), the affected individual has to be involved in this policy process. Consequently, the options for nation states are either to allow freedom of movement, or, if they want to impose borders, to ensure this is democratically justified by involving prospective immigrants in the policy process.⁹ Coercion here also includes preventative laws in terms of a "threat of coercion" (Abizadeh, 2010:125).

⁹ The cosmopolitan account of international freedom of movement and open borders is advanced by Joseph Carens (1987:251-252) based on a perception of freedom as interference. Borders are interfering with an individual as one is predetermined by one's birth and geographical borders, an

However, Miller (2010:115-118) criticises that prevention does not lead to coercion, as a preventative law does not coerce everyone equally, some might not even want to migrate. What this criticism is missing, however, is that even though no interference occurs, the imposition of borders already influences people's decisions on where or how to migrate (Honohan, 2014:39). A preventative law can be seen as a form of domination without interference (Honohan, 2014:34).

In this situation, domination occurs because states have the unilateral power to exclude people. Domination by borders, in this case does not occur equally but varies in scope (depending on how many people are affected by the domination), by intensity (depending on the arbitrariness of domination), and in extent (Honohan, 2014:40-41). The extent of domination looks at which areas of one's life are being affected by borders. This is especially important, given that labour automation affects the ability to generate economic subsistence and security. Economic migrants from countries affected by labour automation that lack the capacities to compensate for this, might be extensively dominated by border restrictions as they would be "unable to access the preconditions for a flourishing life" (Honohan, 2014:40).

To mitigate the domination induced by migration restrictions, regulation on a global level should be established. These regulations should include participation options for those subjected to coercive border restrictions (Honohan, 2014:41). This is stressed by Ivison (2010:42):

If the relevant antonym of liberty for the republican is slavery, then in the international sphere it is also the refugee, asylum seeker and the 'illegal' immigrant or 'queue jumper'. What they lack is not only the ability to block or control for the arbitrary interference of others (there are no institutional arrangements forced to track their avowable interests), but also the capacity to make claims that obligate others; they lack the appropriate moral and political addressee.

The quote above would therefore also include the migrant affected by labour automation, as he/she is not regarded to be an economic migrant but rather a subsistence migrant, as jobs are reduced world-wide, in the absence of an institution that could contest the unilateral imposition of borders. This gives rise to a demand for international institutions that mitigate domination on a global scale.

invention of humanity. Citizenship and immigration laws determine where and how one can move, thus limiting freedom substantively (Carens, 2013:236-252).

4.3. Power Relationships through Basic Income and Borders

What this means for BI and border restrictions is that there is a dominating relationship between developed and developing countries, as developed countries have contributed to the technological advances that are driving premature deindustrialisation and increase economic insecurity. Thus, if borders are being drawn up in order to protect BI countries dominate other countries and their citizens.

The following is an attempt to exemplify which responsibilities Germany would have with regard to mitigating migration pressures if it was to introduce BI. Firstly, facts about Germany will be covered to prove why implementing BI would be suitable. Subsequently, Germany will be used as an example to demonstrate more generalised arguments about wealthy countries implementing a BI policy, and its implications for migration.

4.3.1. Basic Income in Germany

The constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany contains a “fundamental right to the guarantee of a subsistence minimum” (BVerG, 2010) that should provide the material pre-conditions for a physical existence and the minimum means to be able to participate in society. Thus, the constitution indirectly encourages a certain basic level of income.

Currently, social security is provided through means-tested social assistance schemes, providing a social security minimum, as well as unemployment insurance that is paid through contributions of those employed. Swank (2002:162-163) considers Germany to be the ideal type of corporatist welfare state.¹⁰ Labour automation would reduce the number of people on the contributing side of the social contract and increase those on the receiving end, threatening its sustainability. Furthermore, low fertility rates and an ageing society are seen as a threat to the workforce, thus demanding a higher migration rate for qualified personal (Brenke & Clemens, 2017:675). However, labour automation is seen as an alternative to counter the lack of personal, reducing the demand for migrant labour force.

According to Table 1, the threat of labour automation appears to be very high in Germany. In all studies, Germany shows a tremendously high level of jobs that are at risk of being automated. The study by Arntz et al. (2016:15) concludes that, within the OECD,

¹⁰ Challenged through neoliberal policies over the last two decades (Agenda 2010), but the corporatist social contract still exists and is deeply ingrained in the public perception of welfare provision in Germany (Ferragina et al. 2015:268).

Germany is the country with the highest threat of labour automation. Additionally, Germany is the leading investor in robots within the EU (IFR, 2016:12).

Furthermore, economic inequality in Germany has been increasing over the last decades. This is indicated by the fact that personal wealth is very unequally distributed (Gini-coefficient: 0.76) (WSI, 2017a). The same is true for net-household wealth, where the richest 10% own 60% of the whole net-household wealth, compared to 50% OECD average (WSI, 2017b, WSI, 2017c). Additionally, in 2015, Germany experienced the highest poverty rate since reunification (every sixth person is considered below the poverty line) (WSI, 2017d). This is at odds with the current economic performance of Germany, as one would expect that the poverty rate decreased (WSI, 2017d). However, the increasingly unequal income distribution is a major contributor to growing poverty levels. High income earners have constantly earned more and low income earners have not seen an increase in their work income (Grabka & Goebel, 2017:76-82). Within the EU, the German labour market depicts the highest level of polarisation, with 22.5% of the labour force being employed in the low-wage sector (compared to 17.2% on average in the EU) (WSI, 2017a). All of these factors stress that there is a high economic vulnerability occurring within German society, with people likely to be dominated through poverty and economic insecurity.

BI appears to be an appropriate measure to reduce this vulnerability. In the upcoming 2017 federal election, the “Bündnis Grundeinkommen” (Alliance for BI), a single-issue party solely focused on implementing a BI in Germany, is running for the first time, reflecting the growing political support of a BI in Germany (BGE, 2017). Furthermore, it is supported by the Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) and the Liberal party (FDP), with the latter seeing it primarily as a means to fight structural unemployment (FDP, 2017:65; Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2017:198). There also appears to be substantial public support for BI in Germany: In a representative survey, 53% of respondents said that they would endorse a BI, although half of the proponents had questions about its feasibility, especially how to finance it (Schmidt, 2016). This illustrates that political sustainability of the support for BI is highly dependent on which financial models will be employed in order to implement BI.¹¹ Given the issue of labour automation induced migration and a high likelihood of jobs being automated in Germany, it is possible that Germany would need to implement border restrictions in order to make BI politically sustainable.

¹¹ For a further financial discussion of a German BI see: Gilroy et al. (2013) or for a comprehensive Negative Income Tax proposal Sommer (2016: ch. 4).

4.3.2. Germany, Basic Income and Migration within the European Union

Eastern and Southern European countries, regarded as migrant sending states within the EU, are highly threatened by labour automation (Bowles, 2014). As migrants within the EU tend to be more likely to move into countries that provide more generous welfare benefits, BI could be identified as raising migration, given the loss of jobs due to labour automation (De Giorgi & Pellizzari, 2009:12). This is corroborated by Pioch (2002:5) who adds that BI would have to be paid to non-nationals within the EU, under the European laws of free movement and non-discrimination. Non-discrimination means that one cannot be treated differently based on one's nationality. It is, however, distinguished between economically active and non-active migrants regarding what social benefits they can claim (Bruzelius et al., 2016:405). BI would eliminate this distinction, as it is unconditional by definition, therefore paid to everyone. Together with the Free Movement Directive (2004/38/EC), which allows EU citizens and their family members to move and live freely within the EU territory, it would not be possible to exclude migrants from other EU countries (European Commission, 2014).

The EU regulations show that even though a nation state has been identified as the best place to introduce BI, certain supranational regulations exist that restrict sovereignty over social policies. However, it also shows that supranational regulatory mechanisms exist that try to minimise domination either through borders or through exclusion within a society by discrimination. However, given BI is being introduced in order to provide economic security within a political community in times of labour automation, a dilemma is created. One possible solution to this is to look at how domination of borders would differ regarding those on the outside in terms of Honohan's taxonomy of scope, intensity and extent (2014:40-41). This could help to align priorities between the outside and the inside to give a better direction on how to enable sustainability within the nation state.

4.3.3. Germany and Equally Wealthy Countries

In the international sphere (outside of the EU), a human right to freedom of movement does not exist (Oberman, 2016:32).

The cosmopolitan open borders advocate Joseph Carens elucidated that border restrictions could be legitimate, but only among equally wealthy countries with moderate welfare regimes. Because if a country wants to increase its welfare provision, it can only do so by restricting migration in order for it to be sustainable. Furthermore, given that those countries would respect the rights of their citizens, and provide high levels of individual freedom, no substantial reasons would exist for migration, apart from very individual ones (Carens, 1988:227; Mailaender, 1999:1066). Thus, BI, being more generous in terms of its

unconditionality and universality, might justify border restrictions among equally wealthy countries. On one hand, citizens of wealthy countries would be interfered with, as they would no longer be able to move to Germany. However, on the other hand, they would not really be dominated as the restrictions would be among wealthy countries and these should have the resources and administrative expertise to create similar policies to counter labour automation. Relatively, they appear to have a competitive advantage over less developed countries. This idea could also be applied to the republican notion of freedom of non-domination on the international scope.

Between equally wealthy countries there should not be subsistence migration due to a state's lack of capacities to counter labour automation, thus, the extent of domination by borders would be smaller than in the case of subsistence problems. Furthermore, the scope would be small as individuals would not move to Germany in order to subsist, but for other reasons. Lastly, the intensity would depend on how Germany would enforce its borders. Given, that business and leisure travels would probably still be allowed, it appears that among equally wealthy countries also the intensity of domination would be smaller.

4.3.4. Germany and Developing Countries

In the case that Germany would restrict its borders to make BI sustainable, those that suffer subsistence problems due to the threat of labour automation would be more affected. Subsistence migrants lack addressees for their claims and as Germany would be at least partly responsible for their decreased well-being because of labour automation and restricted borders, it would have to react to the need to establish international institutions or regulations.

Ronzoni argues that protecting states from being dominated requires not only regulation in form of international law, but also regulation of informal and structural power (2010:208). For Germany, this would mean that it should strengthen international migration governance, but also look at how its corporations arbitrarily interfere with citizens in developing countries. This should be based on "thin, but hard, regulation" (Ronzoni, 2017:208). Hard, as there is a delegation to global authorities in order to regulate labour automation and migration, but thin, as it should empower states to participate in the policy process aimed at enhancing freedom as non-domination.

As currently existing international organisations have authorities of their own, from a republican perspective, one should be sceptical about whether they do not arbitrarily dominate, as they lack a clear scheme of democratic participation or equal inclusion of everyone's claims (Laborde, 2010:52; Barnett & Duvall, 2013:56-58). Increasing accountability of these organisations should be a major responsibility of countries such as Germany, which

is a member of many exclusive international institutions (e.g. OECD, G20, G7) and should push forward initiatives to make them more participatory in order to hold them accountable. This would allow the equal participation of poorer countries to use the possibility of “effective contestation” (Laborde, 2010:61) in order to voice their concerns on global governance issues and contest unequal distributions of power, the latter being seen as a major reason for dominating structures.

Regarding borders, a regulation on a global level that would take into consideration on what grounds individuals are excluded from states, would enhance transparency as exclusion would be based on law and not on arbitrary politics or power constellations. A precondition would be equal contestation in the regulatory process, enabling participation of those that are extensively dominated through borders. However, this would also mean that state sovereignty would be undermined, as people would not be able to self-determine who should be allowed in and thus endangering BI and also their popular sovereignty. Not the entrance of subsistence migrants in itself but the access to BI would pose a problem to the sustainability of a BI (Honohan, 2014:43). Thus, a nation state like Germany would have to look outside to address the dominating structures that create migration in the first place. Domination, identified as labour automation in this research, enables “non-democratic actors with truly global reach” (Laborde, 2010:61) such as corporations, to create pressures on those weaker countries they are active in. Thus, a BI introducing country - Germany - would need to make sure that its MNCs do not dominate in developing countries. Given the complex corporate governance structures of MNCs and the constant threat of capital flight, this should be dealt with through regulations on a global scale, in order to reduce evasion tactics (Laborde & Ronzoni, 2016:293). A strengthening and a better monitoring of international labour laws should be pushed forward. This would also mean enabling countries to counter labour automation through investments in human capital and institution building.

All of this could strengthen the international regulation of migration and labour automation and could make it more predictable. However, everything mentioned above does not mean that BI with border restriction is not possible, but that these are only legitimate if they are imposed on the basis of participatory and at best democratic justification, thus also enabling the vulnerable on the global scale to contest decisions (Costa, 2014:412). Border restricting decisions therefore need to be taken on a global level as migration for subsistence induced by labour automation is an irreducibly global problem.

5. Concluding Remarks and Further Research

This research demonstrates the spectrum of challenges and opportunities that the implementation of BI brings. It also shows how interrelated the world is and points to the fallacy of a dual morality point of view. It demonstrates, from a republican perspective, that if labour automation is a reason to introduce BI to reduce economic insecurity and domination within a society, one should also focus on how labour automation dominates the world in its full extent.

It is argued that as labour automation creates migratory pressures outside of the nation state, the latter has the responsibility to mitigate these if it wants to establish borders in order to keep BI sustainable. Otherwise, clearly domination would occur. This has been exemplified by the example of Germany and its hypothetical introduction of BI. Within the EU, it would hardly be possible to exclude migrants due to the non-discrimination rule and guaranteed freedom of movement. An exclusion of migrants from BI would not just be a breach of EU law but would also built a dual tier society that would increase possibilities of domination between BI recipients and EU migrants.

Furthermore, in the international case, in general, it can be justifiable to exclude migrants from wealthy countries. As this case explains, borders dominate those affected on different levels. The domination especially towards migrants that move in order to subsist appears to be very extensive. As economic migrants are perceived as subsistence migrants because of labour automation and because the latter is the cause for introducing a BI, countries that impose borders to keep a BI sustainable have responsibilities on the global level. Germany, for example, would have to create supranational solutions in order to firstly mitigate the effects of labour automation, but also in order to make the policy process surrounding border restrictions participatory, especially for those that are most affected by labour automation. Only then might border restrictions be justifiable, in order to make BI sustainable.

Freedom of non-domination appears to only occur if one is living in a free state, but if that free state is dominating others, then it would be hypocritical to minimise domination only within national borders.

This research has been highly focused on the negative aspects of labour automation, thus narrowing the argument for BI and migration to economic insecurity. However, in the future, other migratory pressures will occur that are unrelated to labour automation, but pose similar dual-tier morality problems, including, for example, climate change induced migration from countries that have not contributed to climate change as much as others have. Thus, the

debate on BI, labour automation and border restrictions points to much broader problems of global responsibility.

An issue for further discussion is how the citizens of a nation state would react to a push towards the global. This would focus more on the allegiances among citizens and not so much on the responsibilities of developed countries vis-à-vis developing countries.

Furthermore, research should develop the nation state's responsibilities on a global level regarding BI and the republican perspective. This should also look at the financial costs that would arise if a nation state introduces BI due to labour automation, but also pushes for less domination on the global scale. This research should focus on how to use labour automation in order to finance BI and international regulation, without imposing too many costs on citizens of a state.

The case of Germany should be complemented with empirical data on how people and policy makers feel about these suggestions. Furthermore, it would be good to look at other countries in order to see how countries differ regarding BI, labour automation and migration.

Lastly, further research should explore how BI could be implemented on a level above the nation state in order to reduce the pressures of migration without having to establish complex international institutions. Blockchain technology appears to be an interesting tool to reduce points of interference in the distribution of BI and to increase participation and transparency.

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