by Malcolm Torry | Feb 2, 2018 | Opinion
Discussion of alternatives to Citizen’s Basic Income are increasingly debated, so we are here publishing for the first time a paper prepared in 2015 for a consultation organised by some of the UK’s major charities on options for reforming the benefits system.
Introduction
This short article outlines three options for the reform of the UK’s tax and benefits system: Tax Credits, Negative Income Tax, and Citizen’s Basic Income.
The descriptions and discussions assume that both the tax unit and the benefit unit are the individual and not the household. The complexities related to household-based options would require additional description and discussion.
Tax Credits
( – real ones: not what the Government calls ‘tax credits’)
A credit is allocated to every individual. If someone is earning nothing, the full credit is paid. As earnings rise, the credit is withdrawn. At the point at which the credit is exhausted, Income Tax starts to be paid. (A Tax Credit that is withdrawn as unearned income rises is theoretically a possibility, but the administration would be even more complicated than for the version described here.)
In the diagram, the credit is worth £x per week. As earnings rise, the credit is withdrawn, so net income rises slower than earned income. At earnings of £y per week (the break-even point), the credit has all been withdrawn. Above this point, Income Tax is paid.
The diagram assumes that the rate at which the credit is withdrawn is the same as the tax rate. If the rates are different then the slope of line EF is different above and below earnings of £y per week.
Administration
The tax credit can be administered by the Government or by the employer. If the Government administers the Tax Credit, then the employer must provide regular and accurate earnings information to the Government, as with the current Universal Credit. If the employer administers the Tax Credit then, if someone moves between employers, their Tax Credit administration has to be transferred between employers. If they have a period of unemployment, then administration of the Tax Credit has to be handed to the Government and then on to the new employer. If someone has two employments, then the employers have to decide which of them will administer the Tax Credit. And if someone has occasional other earnings, then their employer needs to be informed so that the Tax Credit can be withdrawn accordingly.
If every working age adult receives the same Tax Credit then neither their employer nor the Government needs to know any personal details. If people in different circumstances receive different levels of Tax Credit then their employer and the Government will need to know individuals’ circumstances in order to allocate the correct credit.
Our current income tax system is cumulative. An annual amount of income is not taxed. Each week, or each month, the employer has to calculate how much tax to deduct so that, by the end of the year, the correct amount of tax has been deducted. With Tax Credits, the tax system would be non-cumulative. Each week, or each month, the correct amount of the Credit would need to be paid in addition to earnings, or no Credit would be paid and earnings would be taxed. A non-cumulative system requires a single tax rate, so anyone paying higher rate tax would need to pay additional Income Tax at the end of the tax year.
Negative Income Tax
Income Tax deducts money from earnings above an earnings threshold, and a Negative Income Tax pays money to the employee below the threshold: so a Negative Income Tax scheme functions in the same way as a Tax Credit scheme. The only difference is in the specification. A Tax Credit scheme specifies the amount to be paid out when there are no earnings, along with a withdrawal rate as earnings rise. For a Negative Income Tax, the threshold is specified along with tax rates above and below the threshold. If the rates above and below the threshold are the same, then for earnings below the threshold, the same amount is paid out for earnings of £z below the threshold as would be collected in tax on earnings of £z above the threshold.
As the system is essentially the same as a Tax Credit scheme, the same diagram applies. Different rates above and below the threshold would result in the EF having different slopes above and below earnings of £y per week. Administrative considerations would be the same as for Tax Credits.
Citizen’s Basic Income
A Citizen’s Basic Income is an unconditional income paid to every individual by the Government, and it is not withdrawn as earnings rise. Tax is paid on all or most earned income.
In the diagram, a Citizen’s Basic Income of £x per week is paid to everyone. All earnings are taxed. The line EF shows the net income.
(The diagram assumes that a single tax rate is charged on all earnings.)
Administration
The Government pays a Citizen’s Basic Income to every individual, the amount depending only on the person’s age ( – larger amounts could be paid to older people as a Citizen’s Pension, and lower amounts to children and young people). Employers would continue to administer Income Tax via PAYE as they do now.
(A variant is a Participation Income. This would require fulfilment of a ‘participation condition’ before receiving it. The graph would be the same as for Citizen’s Basic Income, but only for those receiving it. The participation conditions would need to be specified and each individual’s fulfilment of them would have to be monitored. This would result in considerable administrative complexity, and would also mean that many of a Participation Income’s effects would be closer to those of means-tested benefits than to those of a Citizen’s Basic Income.)
Comparison
Negative Income Tax, Tax Credits, and Citizen’s Basic Income, all generate the same net income diagram, so all three schemes would reduce marginal deduction rates (the total rate of withdrawal of additional income), would incentivize employment, and would enable families to more easily to earn their way out of poverty.
The differences between the schemes are administrative.
(For more detailed discussion of all of these options see Malcolm Torry, The Feasibility of Citizen’s Income (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 214-230.)
by Andre Coelho | Feb 1, 2018 | News
The London School of Economics (LSE) will host a Basic Income day event on Tuesday, 20th of February 2018.
This event will join several experts to discuss political feasibility, funding mechanisms and costing of basic income, in the morning session. On the afternoon, a roundtable will take place, featuring representatives of several basic income pilot projects and experiments worldwide. Among these pilot projects, findings from the Namibia, India and Kenya cases will be discussed, as well as analysis from the US and Canadian experiments in the 1970s. Other initiatives, ongoing or in preparation, will also be referred, such as in the Netherlands and Scotland.
A wide range of academics, researchers, activists and officials (namely from the United Nations Development Programme) will be present, such as Hartley Dean, Anne Miller, Sarath Davala, Evelyn Forget, Olli Kangas and Michael Cooke, to name a few.
Information and registration can be accessed at the event’s webpage.
More information at:
Citizen’s Income Trust Newsletter, January 2018
by Citizens' Income Trust | Jan 12, 2018 | News
Image credit to Nathaniel Houghton, on Medium.
The Guardian has published a podcast of a debate on Citizen’s Basic Income (start to listen at 16:00 minutes):
Could a universal basic income be a solution to precarious work, automation and a happy, healthier society? It has enthusiasts from Silicon Valley to the Labour party, but would it actually work?
We hear from Marjukka Turunen, from the Finnish welfare agency Kela in Helsinki, which is trialling a basic income scheme.
On the expert panel: Torsten Bell, director of the Resolution Foundation, the Observer’s Sonia Sodha and the chair of Compass, Neal Lawson.
by Toru Yamamori | Jan 1, 2018 | News
Sonia Sodha (Twitter account image)
Sonia Sodha, lead writer at the Observer, urges the British Left not to support UBI. According to her latest opinion piece for the Guardian, UBI will not cure any social disease that UBI advocates claim will be alleviated, and rather, it is currently a fatal distraction from other battles on which the British Left should focus.
Sodha charted the rationales for UBI in the following three categories: tech utopians’s prophecy of a decrease of jobs, Ken Loachian welfare critics’ blame against inhumanely complex welfare system, and.labour market dystopians’ poverty backstop against insecurity.
Sodha dismisses the tech utopian’s argument by insisting it falls ‘lump of labour fallacy’. According to Sodha, ‘[f]ar from robots stealing jobs, the reality is that many firms are underinvesting in technology, suppressing productivity’ in Britain, and ‘technology will radically reshape the world of work without reducing its sum total’. She also dismisses the argument of what she calls ‘Ken Loachian-welfare critics’ (though Loach himself has never argued what Sodha labels under his name) and states:
“We could fix the caring issue simply by increasing the generosity of the stingy state benefits paid to those who care full-time for older people or adults with disabilities. If we were so inclined, we could get rid of punitive benefit sanctions and replace them with a welfare-to-work system that puts much more emphasis on training and support for people to find the job that is right for them, not the first that comes along.”
Finally, Sodha opposes the labour market dystopians, by accusing them of not fighting for labour rights but for ‘a dribble of cash’. Similar points to Sonia Sodha’s were made by Bo Rothstein in a recent Social Europe article, ‘UBI: A bad idea for the welfare state’ A response followed, ‘Universal Basic Income: Definitions and details’. The same detailed response would apply here.
Behind her accusations, there is a recent move for UBI inside the Labour party. See the articles below for more on Labour Party activity regarding UBI support:
Toru Yamamori, “UNITED KINGDOM: Jeremy Corbyn, candidate for Labour Party leader, recruits Basic Income advocate to draft economic plan”, Basic Income News, August 8th 2015
Toru Yamamori, “United Kingdom: Labour Party considers universal basic income”, Basic Income News, February 21st 2016
Kate MacFarland, “UK: Labour Leader to Investigate Universal Basic Income“, Basic Income News, September 15th 2016
Genevieve Shanahan, “UK: Labour Party sets up working group to investigate UBI”, Basic Income News, February 10th 2017
More information at:
Sonia Sodha, ‘UBI is no panacea for us – and Labour shouldn’t back it’, The Guardian, 18th December 2017.
by Malcolm Torry | Dec 28, 2017 | Research
Satelite picture over Europe. Credit to: TechCrunch.
A new working paper from the Institute for Social and Economic Research at the University of Essex reports on research using the EUROMOD microsimulation programme to simulate the labour market effects of several different tax and benefits reforms in countries in different parts of Europe.
The reform options tested are as follows:
- An unconditional Basic Income – correctly defined
- A general Negative Income Tax – that makes a payment if earnings fall below a threshold (the payment being proportional to the amount that wages fall below the threshold), and deducts tax above the threshold
- What the researchers call a ‘conditional basic income’ – which is a means-tested benefit that is withdrawn at a rate of 100% as earnings rise, thus constituting a guaranteed minimum income
- In-work benefits – means-tested in-work benefits without a relationship with the income tax threshold.
All of the reforms assume a flat income tax.
The research finds that the General Negative Income Tax usually promises the most efficient employment market: although in the context of the UK there is almost nothing to choose between a General Negative Income Tax and an Unconditional Basic Income. The research did not take into account the administrative complexities of a Negative Income Tax. If it had been possible to simulate the effects of administrative complexities on labour market decisions then they might have found that in the UK an Unconditional Basic Income would have turned out to be the most efficient option.
The working paper is entitled The case for NIT+FT in Europe: An empirical optimal taxation exercise, and is by Nizamul Islama and Ugo Colombinob.
Click here to read the working paper; or here to download the paper as a pdf.
Abstract
We present an exercise in empirical optimal taxation for European countries from three areas: Southern, Central and Northern Europe. For each country, we estimate a microeconometric model of labour supply for both couples and singles. A procedure that simulates the households’ choices under given tax-transfer rules is then embedded in a constrained optimization program in order to identify optimal rules under the public budget constraint. The optimality criterion is the class of Kolm’s social welfare function. The tax-transfer rules considered as candidates are members of a class that includes as special cases various versions of the Negative Income Tax: Conditional Basic Income, Unconditional Basic Income, In-Work Benefits and General Negative Income Tax, combined with a Flat Tax above the exemption level. The analysis shows that the General Negative Income Tax strictly dominates the other rules, including the current ones. In most cases the Unconditional Basic Income policy is better than the Conditional Basic Income policy. Conditional Basic Income policy may lead to a significant reduction in labour supply and poverty-trap effects. In-Work-Benefit policy in most cases is strictly dominated by the General Negative Income Tax and Unconditional Basic Income.
