by Hannah Trippier | Jul 31, 2018 | News, Research
The Welfare Conditionality (WelCond) project recently released a report on how people receiving benefits in the UK experience welfare conditionality within a social security system. Welfare conditionality is where a person’s eligibility for benefits is dependent on meeting certain requirements, for example attending regular interviews, which will be taken away if a person does not meet the latter.
The study used longitudinal qualitative methodology to investigate the experience of people receiving welfare in the UK and the changes in their behaviour over time. Over five years, from 2013-2018, the study conducted 1082 qualitative longitudinal interviews with 481 people receiving welfare (including jobseekers, single parents, migrants, homeless people, and offenders who have left the judicial system), 52 semi-structured interviews with policy stakeholders and 27 focus groups with frontline welfare practitioners.
Longitudinal qualitative methodology enables researchers to gain an insight into people’s experience of and perspectives on welfare conditionality over a period of time. However, qualitative research does not enable the assessment of the effectiveness of welfare conditionality intervention on relevant outcomes (such as the motivation to work). Accordingly, the results of the study cannot be taken to show the effectiveness of welfare conditionality as an intervention but can be used to gain a greater understanding of the potential benefits and harms of this practice.
The results of the study indicated that benefit sanctions do little to enhance people’s motivation to prepare for, seek, or enter paid work. On the contrary, in some cases the imposition of benefits sanctions led to feelings of reduced motivation and disengagement with the social security system. Welfare conditionality was viewed to be largely ineffective in facilitating people’s entry into paid labour market or in sustaining employment. Participants often reported a lack of change or sustained change in employment status, where they shifted between short-term, insecure, and low paid jobs, and periods of receiving benefits.
Additionally, welfare conditionality and benefit sanctions were reported to be connected to adverse outcomes such as poverty, increased reliance on charitable providers and informal support networks, increased debt and loss of tenancy, etc. People dealing with high debts may have to go for a rental property after losing their home and take the assistance of a letting agents to find a property at a reasonable rate. Welfare conditionality can also be associated with negative health outcomes, including fear, anxiety, psychological distress, and exacerbating existing health conditions, particularly in people with mental health issues.
The study also indicated that the current support provided often did not help people looking for work and that the provision of personalised, holistic support could be more effective in helping people to gain and retain employment. This was noted as a potential facilitator to increase motivation to prepare for, seek and enter work, and to enable people to overcome personal and structural barriers to work.
The authors of the study concluded that the perceived benefits of welfare conditionality to increase motivation to work did not outweigh the potential drawbacks and recommended a trial of conditionality-free benefits for those looking for work and the removal of benefit sanctions for people receiving incapacity benefit for existing health conditions. As an alternative to welfare conditionality, the authors recommended that personalised, holistic employment support should be given to help people enter the job market.
More information at:
Welfare Conditionality, “Final findings report – Welfare Conditionality Report 2013-2018“, Welfare Conditionality, June 2018
by Harry Curzon | Jul 15, 2018 | News
A working group has been set up by the Citizens Basic Income Trust (CIT), the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN) affiliate in the United Kingdom, with the task of conceptualizing what a basic income policy might look like in the UK. The educational exercise came up with a working title of Fair Allowance Act. Within the draft proposal some key points were laid out, such as who’s entitled to the allowance and pilot schemes.
To receive the payment a person must meet the basic conditions which consist of being “at least 16 years old, is in Great Britain and is not a person for whom Child Benefit is in payment.” As a no means tested welfare policy, the draft policy only sets limitations on payment regarding the age of the individual and does provide payment to an individual regardless of employment status. “No amount may be deducted in respect of earned income or unearned income”, it is stated in the document.
Additionally, the draft lays out limitations on the State’s ability to enforce “any work-related requirement on any individual as a condition of receiving Fair Allowance.” However, the draft does fail to state possible costs and pricing of the policy, although it further sets out framework for how pilot schemes on the issue should be implemented.
Developments on British Universal Basic Income (UBI) policy come since half of all Britons suggest that they want a form of universal income that is given out regardless of employment status. Although this proposed legislation is only illustrative, it represents the first tangible step towards basic income policy in the UK and certainly provides the template for further legislative ideas on the issue.
More information available at:
Citizens Income Trust. “Illustrative draft legislation for a Citizen’s Basic Income – Citizen’s Income”. June 14th 2018
Harriet Agerholm, “Half of Britons want all UK citizens to get a universal basic income”. The Independent, September 11th 2017
by Toru Yamamori | Jul 5, 2018 | News
Scottish Parliament building.
As reported before on Basic Income News, the Scottish Government has committed to help local government advance their Universal Basic Income (UBI) experiments in four local municipalities (Glasgow, Edinburgh, Fife and North Ayrshire).
Here is an update. On the 20th June 2018, the first official meeting of ‘the Cross-Party Group in the Scottish Parliament on Basic Income’ was held in the Parliament. The group has been formed to examine the options for a basic income as a policy for reform of the current social security system in Scotland, including, where appropriate, its potential sources of funding. It will be co-chaired by Ivan McKee MSP (a member of the Scottish Parliament) and Alex Rowley MSP.
A Scottish Government spokesperson informed on the latest general situation as follows.
“Scottish Ministers have awarded funding to four local authorities in Scotland to undertake feasibility studies and to develop pilot models. This funding covers the financial years 2018-19 and 2019-20. The local authorities will submit a final business case, including proposed pilot models, to Scottish Ministers for consideration by March 2020 – this will set out full details of the ethical, legislative, financial and practical implementation of the pilot on the ground. A decision will be made at this stage whether to contribute to funding the proposed pilots.“
For more details, check Basic Income Scotland.
For more information:
Sara Bizarro, “Scotland: Scottish Government provides £250k to support feasibility work on BI pilots”, Basic Income News, December 2nd 2017
Kate McFarland, “Scotland, UK: Nobel-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz cautions again Basic Income during BBC interview”, Basic Income News, November 8th 2017
Claire Bott, “Scotland’s First Minister announces basic income experiments”, September 16th 2017
This article was reviewed by André Coelho.
by Claire Bott | Mar 15, 2018 | News, Research
The UK-based Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce (RSA) has released a report suggesting a Universal Basic Opportunity Fund (UBOF) as a stepping-stone to a full universal basic income (UBI).
The suggested UBOF would consist of £5000 a year for two years, and would be made available to every person in the UK upon request. Although this would fall significantly short of a full, life-long UBI, the study’s authors, Anthony Painter, Jake Thorold and Jamie Cooke, suggest that the UBOF would have a number of potential uses: “A low-skilled worker might reduce their working hours to attain skills enabling career progression. The fund could provide the impetus to turn an entrepreneurial idea into a reality. It could be the support that enables a carer to be there for a loved one without the need to account for one’s caring to the state.”
Noting that the UK’s rate of corporate tax is currently being gradually reduced from 28% to 17%, the study suggests that the UBOF could be funded simply by returning the corporate tax rate to its original level.
The study states that “The UBOF is an ambitious effort to re-envisage the relationship between citizen and state, emphasising trust in people as opposed to a default of suspicion as is the case currently. It also represents a practical step and valuable experiment on the possible road towards a more permanent Universal Basic Income model.”
The RSA states that its mission is “to enrich society through ideas and action.” It regularly publishes research papers on a variety of social issues. Anthony Painter is the Director of its Action and Research Centre, while Jamie Cooke is the head of RSA Scotland, and Jake Thorold is a research assistant.
More information at:
Anthony Painter, Jake Thorold and Jamie Cooke, “Pathways to Universal Basic Income“, RSA Action and Research Center, February 2018
by Patrick Hoare | Mar 5, 2018 | News, Research
Credit to: Flickr
In a new paper, published by the Institute of Labour Economics (IZA) in December 2017, James Browne of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Herwig Immervoll, of both the IZA and the OECD, have discussed what the social and economic consequences might be when replacing some existing social benefits with a comprehensive basic income. The study contributes to the expanding literature (building on the work of Atkinson 1995) that uses the microsimulation technique, a method that builds a computer program based on economic inputs (such as costs, income, expenditure and savings) in order to see what the effect of one variable output (such as poverty or inequality) would be if an input was changed. It was most recently developed by EUROMOD (the only multi-country EU-wide tax-benefit model currently available), and was used in Malcolm Torry’s paper, published in May 2017 by the Institute for Social and Economic Research, which analyzed similar scenarios and outcomes to Browne and Immervoll’s. This article will compare the two papers in an attempt to better understand the growing work in this area.
The Browne-Immervoll paper focused on four countries across Europe that have different population and labour-market structures, as well as very different tax and transfer policies: Finland, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. It looked at a situation where a universal basic income (UBI) would directly replace other working-age cash-payment benefits, including unemployment benefits, social assistance and other generalised minimum-income schemes, in-work benefits, early retirement pensions (i.e. pensions paid to those below retirement age whatever their official label), student maintenance grants and family benefits. In order to ensure that hardship was not ‘built into’ the policy changes, disability allowances and housing benefits would be retained, as well as the funding of other public services, such as the provision of healthcare and education. In line with BIEN’s definition of the UBI, payments would be, in all other ways, universal, paid to the individual, provided at regular intervals in cash, and be unconditional. The funding for the reform would have to take place under budget-neutrality, which would be achieved by taxing the basic income provided and by removing any tax-free allowance from the fiscal model. The marginal rates of tax, thereafter, would remain in accordance to the rates in place prior.
Torry’s paper, dealing specifically with the UK economy, also deemed it permissible to remove tax-free allowances and to tax all earned income in order to contribute toward the funding of the reform whilst maintaining budget-neutrality. Being guided by Hirsch’s recommendations (2015) based on political feasibility, however, Torry allowed for increased Income Tax rates of up to 3 percentage points across the board to help with this funding. Additionally, and significantly, his model maintained – where necessary – the means-tested benefits entirely removed in the Browne-Immervoll version, such that if the introduction of the UBI (which he, alongside others, label a ‘Citizen’s Basic Income’) wouldn’t be sufficient in improving the economic situation of an individual, then the means-tested benefits in place prior to the reform would be available as a form of supplementary benefit.
Given the conservative (or non-existent) fiscal expansion allowed across the modelling, which in both cases is argued as being necessary for realistic simulation, the rate of the net BI payments to be provided was significantly below the poverty line in all cases. In the Browne-Immervoll model, the UBI, for adults, would be at just 21% of poverty line level (defined as 50% of median household income) in Italy (€158), at 32% in the UK (£230), at 49% in Finland (€527), and at 50% in France (€456). The tapering of income at this level (or lower for 16 to 18 year olds) had the inevitable result of an increased rate of poverty in each scenario. This effect was especially pronounced in the UK, rising from 10% to 15%, due to the fact that the UK’s pre-UBI system relied heavily on means-testing and would have, in situations of such low income levels, provided additional benefits no longer available in the new model. Though Torry’s calculated UBI for the UK was only marginally higher for both adults (£264 per month) and young adults (£216 per month), the poverty rate under the conditions of his scheme followed the opposite trend and dropped substantially, falling from 14.84% to 11.8%. This difference – the effect of which is relatively even greater given the fact that Torry, in line with De Agostini, 2017, defined the poverty line as 60% of median household income – can largely be explained by the fact that Torry retained the very same means-tested benefits that Browne and Immervoll removed.
The analysis of potential gains and losses to income groups also reflected the difference in the methodologies used by the papers. The unwillingness in the Browne-Immervoll simulation to increase any current marginal rates of tax in order to collect revenue led to the expected result that those on lower incomes, overall, experienced larger relative losses. The very poorest – with little or no income – experienced gains, due to the universal and unconditional features of the new scheme, but the regressive nature of the flat uniform payments was not sufficiently offset by any progressive mechanisms, and thus the model delivered an overall regressive outcome. In contrast, Torry’s desire to avoid regressivity, and his willingness, therefore, to raise all the marginal tax rates, resulted in the top two highest earning deciles experiencing loses in disposable income of up to 5%, the third highest maintaining their level of disposable income, and the fourth decile down experiencing gains.
In order to understand the effect on work incentives of introducing a UBI, both papers focused on whether the reform would increase the effective tax rates on additional income, thus disincentivizing earning extra at the margins. Though this metric fell, on average, in both simulations – thus showing that there would be an increased (or, at least, not decreased) incentive to work – in the Browne-Immervoll model this was the consequence of removing the benefits associated with low-employment or unemployment, whereas in the Torry model this trend occurred in spite of keeping such benefits in place. As such, Torry’s simulation saw people getting wealthier – thus potentially moving up tax-brackets – but still managed to create a system where the financial rewards to work remained, or were even increased.
In conclusion, Browne and Immervoll determined that introducing a UBI in place of most other means-tested benefits would be costly and lead to negative social outcomes. Torry concluded, by contrast, that a UBI of similar level could be financially and politically feasible and would lead to many positive social outcomes. Given, however, that universal and uniform payments in an unequal society will, by definition, always increase regressivity if not offset by sufficiently progressive funding, the data gathered and logical conclusions derived are completely consistent with the papers’ respective methodologies. This comparative analysis shows that by adjusting a model’s predicated constraints, one can collect quantitative evidence to support different desired conclusions. On this basis, a UBI’s potential introduction does not seem to be determined by its feasibility (implementation, political likelihood, or positive economic outcome) but rather, by whether there can be consensus on what its purpose should be. That is, is UBI a mechanism for equalising wealth or a mechanism to simply provide everyone with something, no matter how small or large that payment may be?
More information at:
James Browne and Herwig Immervoll, ‘Mechanics of Replacing Benefit Systems with a Basic Income: Comparative Results from a Microsimulation Approach’, Institute of Labour Economics IZA, December 2017
A Atkinson, ‘Public Economics in Action: The Basic Income/Flat Tax Proposal’, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995
‘Why use EUROMOD?’, Euromod.ac.uk
Donald Hirsch, ‘Could ‘citizen’s income’ work?’, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2nd March 2015
Paola De Agostini, ‘EUROMOD Country Report: United Kingdom (UK)’, Euromod, February 2017
