by Andre Coelho | Oct 18, 2019 | News
Esther Duflo and Abhijit Banerjee. Picture credit: dailyO
Esther Duflo, Abhijit Banerjee and Michael Kremer were awarded the Economics Nobel Prize this year. That alone would not represent a huge novelty, given the standard these professionals and scholars have set in the last few years. However, in an article as far back as June 2016, Banerjee had already defended the basic income policy for India, as a way to reduce poverty, cut through corruption and minimize bureaucracy. Later on, already in 2019, Indian voters got not to elect the party (Congress Party) which was more serious about implementing (a version of) basic income in India, favoring the BJP ruling party. That, however, did not end the discussion about basic income in the Indian continent, in part because Banerjee, Duflo and other respectable scholars like Thomas Piketty, have been thinking, writing and speaking about the issue at the highest levels.
This award comes right before the release of Banerjee and Duflo new book, entitled “Good Economics for Hard Times”, a forward-looking elaboration on society, economic problems and creative social solutions. In it, basic income features as an important, if not crucial policy, for reducing poverty, simplifying governmental aid programs and increasing universality in cash transfers. In the authors’ own words:
Immigration and inequality, globalization and technological disruption, slowing growth and accelerating climate change–these are sources of great anxiety across the world, from New Delhi and Dakar to Paris and Washington, DC. The resources to address these challenges are there–what we lack are ideas that will help us jump the wall of disagreement and distrust that divides us. If we succeed, history will remember our era with gratitude; if we fail, the potential losses are incalculable.
Meanwhile, also, other heavy-weight economists like Angus Deaton, also a recent Economics Nobel Prize laureate, have come forward in defense of basic income-like type of policies.
More information at:
Abhijit V. Banerjee, “The best way to welfare”, The Indian Express, June 18th 2016
Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo, “Excerpt: Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo on Which Kind of UBI Could Work in India”, October 15th 2019
André Coelho, “India: The stars were not aligned in 2019, for basic income in the Indian continent”, Basic Income News, May 29th 2019
by Guest Contributor | Oct 15, 2019 | Opinion
“The justification for [basic income] is ethical, not instrumental,” states Guy Standing at the ShapingHorizons conference at Cambridge University, UK, on September 11, 2019. He goes on to assure his audience that basic income studies have revealed that it may reduce poverty and inequality, but that “the real reasons for wanting to support a basic income is a matter of common justice.” See his full speech.
For Guy Standing it is a clear case: everybody’s wealth and income are mainly due to the achievements and efforts of others, especially our ancestors. It is they who have created what we all enjoy in the form of, for example, public knowledge and social services. If we add natural resources to the list, we are looking at the three most important pillars of what people alive today have at most contributed minimally towards: the commons.
As it is common legal practice around the globe allowing “to receive something for nothing” in the case of private inheritance, Standing suggests extending this idea to the social inheritance of the commons. In contrast to private inheritance, the distribution of commonwealth should not be based on, e.g. family bounds. The entitlement to a share of public wealth should instead be based on the simple requirement to be human. However, instead of sharing our rich commons, they are “privatized and plundered […] in the name of rentier capitalism,” as Standing puts it.
In addition to stating ethical reasons for basic income, Guy Standing also took the chance to stress how the global debate about basic income has changed dramatically over the last few years. With participants from as many as 45 countries the BIEN congress 2019 in Hyderabad, India, at the end of August this year demonstrates the global significance of basic income.
Further, recent developments in the UK allow justified hope that basic income is soon to play a larger role in the political debate of a country that suffers under its austerity policies of the last decade or so.
First, the Green Party UK favors basic income while referring to it as “citizen’s income”, and second, Scotland’s SNP supports the idea of basic income in the form of a “Citizen’s basic income” and is preparing basic income pilots to be happening in the near future. Third, at the request of the Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, John McDonnell MP, Guy Standing has created a report to the British Labour Party detailing how UBI pilots could be implemented in the UK.
It is not only the first time that a British politician has specifically requested a report on basic income, but it is also unprecedented that the same politician has confirmed his commitment to conducting basic income pilots on the basis of such a report if his party wins the next general election.
For additional information on the ethical reasons for basic income, see Guy Standing’s most recent book “Plunder of the Commons”.
Hannes Mehrer
PhD student, Cambridge University
by Karl Widerquist | Sep 27, 2019 | News
An early version of a book, Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend: Examining its Suitability as a Model, is now available for free download on my personal website. A summary, from the first chapter of the book (2012), is reprinted below. If you want to cite or quote it, please see the published version:
Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend: Examining its Suitability as a Model, edited by Karl Widerquist and Michael W. Howard. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012
Every year, every Alaskan gets paid. Every man, woman, and child receives a dividend as a joint owner of Alaska’s oil reserves. Alaskans are free to use this money as they wish with some potentially putting it towards a home improvement project. After all, if your looking for metal buildings Alaska is your place to find them. In 1956, Alaska ratified a constitution recognizing joint ownership of unoccupied land and natural resources. In 1967, North America’s largest oil reserve was discovered in publicly owned areas on Alaska’s North Slope. In 1976, the state government voted to dedicate a part of its yearly oil revenues to a state investment fund, called the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF). In 1982, the state government voted to distribute part of the returns from that fund as a yearly dividend, called the Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD), sometimes called “the Alaska Dividend.” In 2008, the dividend reached a high of $3269,[1] which comes to $16,345 for a family of five. More often in recent years, the PFD has been between $1000 and $1500 per person, which comes to between $5000 and $7500 for a family of five.
Karl Widerquist (left) Michael W. Howard (right)
The Alaska Dividend is one of the most popular government programs in the United States. It has helped Alaska attain the highest economic equality of any state in the United States. It has coexisted with, and possibly contributed to, the state’s growing and prosperous economy. And, seemingly unnoticed, it has provided unconditional cash assistance to needy Alaskans at a time when most states have scaled back aid and increased conditionality.
The Alaska fund and accompanying dividend seems to be a model worthy of imitation and adaptation. This book examines whether and how the Alaska Dividend is a model that can and should be imitated and adapted for circumstances elsewhere. It is an “edited volume” with authors who differ in their level of enthusiasm for (or skepticism of) the Alaska model. But we believe that the evidence provided by this book shows that the combination of policies we call the Alaska model is worthy of examination by other states, nations, and regions.
What is the Alaska model?
The “Alaska model,” as we use the term here, does not refer to the whole of Alaskan state government policy, nor to even to the whole of its oil revenue policy. It refers only to elements in the combination of APF and PFD. Although the APF is the source of revenue for the PFD, the two are different programs created at different times by different kinds of legislation. The APF is a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF)-a pool of assets collectively owned by the members of a political community usually invested into interest-generating assets. It was established by a constitutional amendment that did not specify what was to be done with the returns to the fund. The PFD is the policy of devoting the APF’s returns to a dividend for all Alaskan citizen residents. It was created by a simple act of the state legislature. Many nations and regions have SWFs, but only Alaska’s SWF pays a regular dividend to citizens. Many nations and regions provide some form of cash benefits, but so far, only Alaska pays a regular cash dividend to all of its residents.[2] The APF and the accompanying PFD link a resource-revenue-management policy with a progressive social policy. As an SWF, the APF helps to ensure that the state will continue to benefit from its oil after its reserves are depleted. As a dividend, the PFD helps every single Alaskan make ends meet each year without a bureaucracy to judge them.
We call this unique combination the Alaska model. It consists of three elements: (1) resource-based revenue (2) put into an SWF or some other permanent endowment, (3) the returns of which are distributed as a cash payment to all citizens or all residents. The extent to which a policy has to contain all three of these elements to qualify as following the Alaska model is not so important. But we will discuss the importance of each of these elements separately.
(1) Resource revenue.
The argument for the Alaska Dividend is simple and powerful: the oil, by right, belongs to all Alaskans. The PFD is an efficient and effective way to ensure that every single Alaskan benefits from it. If that argument works for Alaska’s oil, why not Maine’s fisheries, South Africa’s diamonds, Hong Kong’s real estate, Oregon’s forests, America’s broadcast spectrum, or the world’s atmosphere? Governments have allowed private, for-profit exploitation of these and many more resources, claiming that we will all benefit from the jobs and economic activity they create. But do we? Does a homeless person in Denver benefit from the gold being mined in Colorado? Does a shanty dweller in Johannesburg benefit from the diamonds being mined in South Africa?
The PFD has made sure that every single Alaskan has benefited from the state’s oil industry. Whatever benefit they might or might not get from more jobs or increased economic activity, every Alaskan can point to the dividends they’ve received since 1982 and say, I got this benefit from the state’s decision to exploit its oil reserves. Not many other programs do that, but many more could.
The case for taxing natural resources is at least as good, and probably far better than the case for taxing any other source of wealth. Resource taxes have the benefit of discouraging overuse of scarce resources. If properly employed, they can be an important part of a green environmental management strategy, giving people the incentive to reduce their consumption of scarce resources to sustainable levels. Yet, few if any countries in the world employ resource taxes in this way. Resources are often given away by governments to individuals and corporations who sell them back to the public with value added, but the sellers capture not only the value they add but also the natural resource value along with it.
A resource tax is literally a user fee. Anyone who takes possession of a resource makes it unavailable for others. The tax represents a payment for the burden imposed on others. This justification for resource taxation is more closely associated with “left-libertarianism,” discussed in chapters of this volume by Ian Carter, Alanna Hartzok, and Gary Flomenhoff. But as we will argue in a later chapter resource taxes are also consistent with liberal-egalitarian, utilitarian, and other theories of justice.
Of course, not every country has as much oil as Alaska, but one of the key lessons of this book is that a country does not have to be “resource rich” to have a resource dividend based on the Alaska model. We make this argument fully in the final chapter of this book. Here we preview only a small part of that argument.
One reason we know that a country does not have to be resource rich to have a resource dividend is that every country and every region has valuable resources. Later chapters of this book will show that the total value of natural resources (including not only mining, fishing, and forestry but also land value, the broadcast spectrum, the atmosphere, etc.) is surprisingly high even in areas not thought of as being resource rich. Gary Flomenhoft (this volume) shows that even “resource poor” states, such as Vermont, can create a substantial resource dividend.
Another reason we know that a country does not have to be resource rich to have a resource dividend can be seen from what a small part of Alaska’s resource wealth actually goes to supporting the fund. Alaska has many valuable natural resources, but the APF is supported almost entirely by taxes on oil. These taxes are extremely low by international standards, and only about one-eighth of the state’s total oil revenue goes to supporting the APF. Thus only a tiny fraction of Alaska’s resource wealth is used to support the PFD.
(2) A permanent endowment
Alaska introduced the APF largely because Alaskans knew that oil drilling would provide a very large but temporary windfall. They wanted to extend the period in which that windfall would benefit Alaskans by putting some of it away into a permanent fund. The APF was one of the first SWFs. Today many resource-exporting nations have them. Some nations have funds more than 10 times the size of the APF.
We see the essence of the Alaska model as a strategy to make sure that the system functions as a permanent endowment, but an SWF is not the only mechanism that can do so. To some extent treating resource taxes as user frees does so on its own. Some resources are capable of producing a permanent stream of revenue from user fees. These include land, the broadcast spectrum, and renewable resources. Such resources do not need to put revenue into a fund to function as a permanent endowment, and the Alaska model can be employed with only the first and second elements. Other resources produce only temporary resource streams. No nation can produce oil forever. Pollution taxes will hopefully discourage pollution. For revenue from sources like these to produce a permanent endowment, a mechanism such as an SWF is necessary.
(3) A cash payment to all citizens
To some extent the dividend was a way to sell ordinary Alaskans on the idea of a permanent fund. But to some extent the motivation for the fund was to support the dividend. Some of the lawmakers who created these programs, particularly Governor Jay Hammond, were influenced by the movement for what is now known as a “basic income”-a small unconditional income for every citizen to help them meet their basic needs. At the time, the policy was best known as the “guaranteed income” or the “negative income tax.” It was widely discussed by policymakers in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s. Hammond had unsuccessfully proposed a similar policy on a local level when he was a mayor of Bristol Bay Borough, and he very much saw the APF as an opportunity to create a basic income.
Basic income is a widely discussed topic in the academic literature in social science and philosophy. Researchers have examined the political and economic feasibility of the idea, its likely effects, and the ethical arguments for and against it. The United States and Canadian governments have conducted five social science experiments to see how a very similar policy would work. The Indian government will soon begin its own experiment. Basic income comes and goes in political popularity. It has recently appeared on the political agenda in Germany. It has considerable grassroots support in southern Africa today, and the Brazilian government is officially committed to phasing it in, although no timetable for moving beyond the first stage of the phase-in has been set. It is currently popular with Green and left-leaning parties in Europe, but its support (much like the support of the Alaska Dividend) often cuts across party and left-right divides.
As we will see in later chapters, not everyone agrees about the extent to which the Alaska Dividend fits the definition of a basic income. Usually, a full basic income is defined as an unconditional income, large and regular enough to meet a person’s basic needs. The Alaska Dividend is neither regular in size nor large enough to meet a person’s basic needs. But it is regular in timing and unconditional. So, it constitutes only a partial, irregular basic income. But it is the only version of basic income currently in practice in the Western industrialized world.
We (the editors of this book and the authors of this chapter) became interested in the Alaska model because of our interest in basic income. We’re excited to see an idea-so controversial in theory-has proven to be effective and extremely popular in the one place it has been tried. The Alaska model shows not only how basic income works, but also how the unique attributes of the Alaska model can be designed to work well elsewhere. The Alaska model is not perfect, but it is a successful strategy on which to build something better.
Employing the Alaska Model
By endorsing the Alaska model, we do not mean that governments should replace everything they do with the combination of a resource taxes, fund and dividend. We mean only that they should examine it as a possible addition to their toolkit. It’s only being used by one government, but it has proven to be more popular and more effective than many things that governments all around the world are doing. Certainly, it’s a policy that other governments should take a look at.
A preview of the book
The three parts of this book evaluate the Alaska model and discuss whether and how it can be adapted for other areas.
Chapters in Part One provide the background necessary to evaluate the Alaska model. Cliff Groh and Greg Erickson examine the unlikely history of the APF and the PFD and explain how the two programs work in practice. Scott Goldsmith discusses the impact of the dividend on Alaska’s society and economy.
Chapters in Part Two examine the ethical and political case for using the Alaska model as a tool for social justice. Jim Bryan and Sarah Lamarche discuss the political consequences of linking natural resource wealth and basic income, and how this policy combination can serve justice for future generations. Ian Carter presents the resource dividend as a left-libertarian economic policy. Christopher Griffin discusses the PFD as a practical application of the theoretical idea of Stakeholding. Stakeholding is a variation of the universal, unconditional grant idea. It differs from basic income in being delivered as a large lump sum grant rather than as a steady flow of smaller payments. Almaz Zelleke criticizes the extent to which the Alaska model, structured as a resource dividend, can be thought of as the practical implementation of basic income or even a step toward it. Jurgen de Wispelaere and David Casassas argue that the Alaska model, as it stands, is of limited value in promoting Civic Republican objectives. Steve Winter criticizes the Alaska Dividend for making recipients complicit with the oil industry. In the final chapter of Part One, we (Widerquist and Howard) respond with a chapter addressing the concerns of the authors in this section, and a discussion of why the link between resource taxation and basic income is important for different theories of social justice.
Chapters in Part Three discuss empirical questions about how the Alaska model can be adapted to be used most effectively in other states, nations, and regions. Gary Flomenhoff provides a detailed empirical investigation of the resource tax revenue available in the state of Vermont. He finds that even the resource-poor state of Vermont can raise $2000 (and possibly much more) for each resident each year. Michael Howard looks at the cap-and-dividend approach to global warming as a version of the Alaska model applied to pollution control. Karl Widerquist proposes personalizing the Alaska model into what he calls “Citizens’ Capital Accounts.” Alanna Hartzok argues that any dividend program based on an SWF has a strong responsibility for socially responsible investing, and presents evidence the APF currently fails to live up to that goal. Michael A. Lewis addresses the issues of fund and risk management, which will be important if the Alaska model is to further economic security of recipients. Angela Cummine discusses whether other existing Sovereign Wealth Funds (particularly in the Middle East) should move toward an Alaska-style dividend. Greg Erickson and Cliff Groh discuss the challenges to the APF and PFD in Alaska today and the extent to which the model can be expanded and improved within Alaska.
In the concluding chapter, Howard and Widerquist respond to the concerns of authors in Part Three and discuss six lessons they take away from the Alaska experience.
[1] Including a one-time supplement of $1200 from that year’s state government budget surplus.
[2] Iran is currently in the process of phasing in a regular dividend.
Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend: Examining its Suitability as a Model, edited by Karl Widerquist and Michael W. Howard. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012
by Guest Contributor | Sep 24, 2019 | Opinion
I was privileged to attend the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN) 2019 Congress just now where I drew attention to the role of complementary currencies and attempted to dispel any fantasies about the role of blockchain in transferring wealth.
I’ve always supported Basic Income (BI) in principle. It is probably the most direct possible strategy to address the perennial problems of poverty and inequality. It works by giving enough money to live to everyone, effectively putting a floor on poverty, and taking away the fear and want that drives people to underprice their labour. It is unconditionality makes it cheaper to administer than a normal social security system.
This week I learned that there have been plenty of trials, and they consistently demonstrate the above benefits in addition to others like empowering women (at least in India) and helping people to invest in their own livelihoods.
After a week of conversation as an outsider to the movement, I want to record here some other thoughts, which I hope may be of value.
- 1. The term:
- It must have taken years of debate to settle on ‘Basic Income’ so maybe my thoughts on the matter are nothing new and too tardy. The term Basic Income does not express (to me) the intention that it should be enough to live on. Because the term ‘basic’ does not at all imply ‘sufficiency for living’ there is nothing to stop politicians issuing any paltry sum and calling it ‘Basic Income’. On the surface, it would be a victory but it could lead to conflict in the movement and bad public relations, especially if results were disappointing. I am reminded of what happened in microfinance, which was a fabulous idea for charitable lending to the poor which became something entirely different and less effective as it scaled and had to become commercially viable. Also instead of ‘income’ I much prefer ‘dividend’, because it implies the entitlement that the rich, (who most need convincing about these ideas) understand so well. Dividend also dovetails with the commons discourse, in which so much of the world is enclosed commons which in truth belong to everyone. So language like a social dividend, or a living income, would seem much stronger.
- 2. BIEN Identity & purpose:
- In my time as a complementary currency activist, I have visited several other movements, most of whom are hardly referencing each other. This silo-ing is an easy trap to fall into, especially when the movement is funded to focus on its core issue, and especially when the arguments are technical or complex. Basic income should not build a tribe of fans and advocates for a single universal policy, but about building expertise and disseminating it throughout the social movements as a strategic option for them. BIEN should be a hub of expertise not a force in its own right. I was glad to see some politicians in the congress, and I wasn’t the only complementary currency practitioner, but I would have liked to have seen more people around from the trades union, think tanks, monetary reform, commons, and especially from the movements du jour, Gillets Jaune, Extinction Rebellion and Friday’s for Future. BIEN is conspicuously absent from this list of grassroots movements meeting in Iceland next week.
- 3. More focus on economics:
- It seems to me that more formal economists should be involved in costing BI and anticipating the economic (and social) benefits. Economics is needed to justify (though not to determine, I am cynical to say) almost all political decisions today. I would have liked to learn more about the economic effects of increased spending by the poor, like GDP and sales taxes, about how the richest would pay most of their BI straight back into a progressive tax system, and about the longitudinal social benefits when the poor eat better, sleep better and live less stressfully. This is sometimes quantified as ‘social value’ – another expression I did not hear this week. I heard some discussion about how BI is funded, but nothing about modern monetary theory (MMT). Bernie Sanders just announced at $17trn Green New Deal (GND) manifesto pledge which would be funded I think by MMT. Are any basic income advocates advocating MMT?
- 4. Climate change:
- I did not attend all the sessions, but I saw almost no mention made of climate change. The last 18 months have seen an upsurge of concern about the rapidity and the magnitude of climate change and with it much attention to the psychological and social consequences.
- 5. The big picture:
- My largest concern is that BI could be widely implemented in a relatively short time, but because the economy itself is constantly changing and/or because the economy will change in response to BI, it could soon stop working as intended. I read one article on this a while ago, saying that if everyone’s income increased, rents (land rents) would increase commensurately, canceling out the benefit. Upon examination, this turns out to be a whole slew of arguments showing how naive it could be to think we can change the economy with a single intervention. To prevent rent-inflation, they could, of course, be capped, but inflation could also occur in other sectors like utilities, or food, and preventing all that would cause the neoliberals in charge will balk at the idea of such a heavily planned economy.
In some ways, the BI is not very radical, which is part of its appeal of course. Some would argue that it is just a tweak to capitalism, similar to the welfare state, and that capitalism has fundamental problems and must be replaced. The focus on basic income as the solution could leave little room for more radical ideas or different approaches. What if, for example, governments were prevailed upon to ensure that no one in their borders needed to be malnourished or cold or ill alone. This is much more concrete than BI and would deliver similar benefits. it could be achieved using BI or other strategies in keeping with the prevailing ideology.
BI is a strategy, not the goal, a means not an end. It may not be the best means for every country. I still support BI but it seems it is a single strategy amongst many, and that implementing it will not be the end of the struggle between capital and labour, just a step in the right direction.
Written by: Matthew Slater
by Guest Contributor | Sep 11, 2019 | Opinion, The Indepentarian
This is a guest post by Rahul Basu for The Indepentarian Blog. Welcome, Rahul.
Author: Rahul Basu
The Future We Need
This is a comment on Karl Widerquist’s excellent proposal for a People’s Endowment. I’m a member of The Future We Need (TFWN), a global campaign to make the intergenerational equity principle foundational for our civilization. Similar to Karl, the core idea is that we, the present generation, are simply custodians over what we inherit. We must ensure that future generations inherit what we did. Ideally, we would leave a bequest. Importantly, if we fail to follow this rule, then each successive generation becomes poorer with civilization collapse and human extinction as the final result. And it is clear that our current civilization has been consuming its capital base, bringing these possibilities into fruition.
Capital vs revenue
We make a critical distinction between capital (the corpus of our inheritance) and revenue – the surplus after we ensure the corpus is kept whole. Minerals, being non-renewable, are purely capital in nature. Broadcast spectrum, regenerated each instant, is purely revenue in nature. When companies (like nuggetsbygrant.com) invest in minerals that they extract and sell, the entire proceeds must only be used to fund new intergenerational assets to ensure the endowment corpus remains intact. In the case of minerals, we insist that the proceeds only be saved in a future-generations fund (FGF) as Karl also suggests.
Only the real income from the endowment, ie, the income after compensating for inflation, may be used or distributed. By contrast, the fees for the broadcast spectrum could be used as it is a renewable resource without first saving it in a future generations fund. Reasoning from property rights logic, we insist that all such recurring income from public endowments must be distributed only as a citizen’s dividend. A diversion of the recurring income to the budget is effectively imposing a per head tax. Of course the government may tax the people, even the dividend, through explicit legislation, thereby strengthening the social contract.
Defending the commons
If we reason from Ostrom’s principles for long lived commons, an important aspect is that the commoners must benefit directly from the commons. In the absence of this direct benefit, there is little reason to defend the commons, and it will be lost. Alaska’s famous Permanent Fund Dividend was explicitly designed to link Alaskans to their Permanent Fund and to help defend it for future generations of Alaska. The endowment income and especially its capital are a great political temptation. As long as the income is absolutely equally distributed, it affords no help in creating a winning electoral coalition.
Unlike Karl, who suggests a 50:50 split of the income between a dividend and the budget, we insist that the only distribution from the endowment be as a Citizen’s Dividend. The primary reason is that any other division between the dividend and the budget is fundamentally arbitrary. Even if only 1% is currently diverted to the budget, through budget crises, politicians will attempt to capture more until nothing is left. Only a rule that distributions must only be through a dividend can be defended against political attack. And without the dividend, even the fund will come under attack. While protecting the endowment for future generations is the principal reason behind our rules, our posts Why income distribution only as Citizen’s Dividend and Why 100% to Permanent Fund deal with other common objections to this austere but logical structure.
Henry George
Sweden
Henry George argued that increases in property prices have the impact of reducing wages as low as possible. He also argued that property values increase due to society. While a piece of land in Central London is worth much more than equivalent land in a remote area, the increase in value is due to society creating London, not due to the acts of the professional property manager or the owner. Henry George argued that a land value tax would compensate society for its contribution, while reducing incentives for keeping land idle.
In a similar vein, Dag Detter, the former president of Statsföretag, a Swedish government holding company and national wealth fund, created to centralize and consolidate state ownership of public commercial assets, argues that there are many idle assets on government balance sheets that if better utilised can conservatively provide $2.7 trillion a year. In fact, it turns out that most governments do not even know what real estate assets they own.
Norway
In the public sphere, Norway’s management of its North Sea oil endowment, in particular its rule of saving all the proceeds from selling its oil in an intergenerational fund, is considered one of the leading examples for nations to emulate. There is an interesting back story. Norway separated from Sweden in 1905. One of the first issues was to deal with hydro power plants that had just been set up by foreign companies. The then Minister for Justice, Johan Castberg, was influenced by Henry George and the US progressive movement (usually thought to start with the publication of Henry George’s Progress and Poverty in 1879). He put in place laws that permitted the hydro power plants to run, but that they would revert to public ownership after 60 years. Today, this is called a BOT – Build-Operate-Transfer.
The laws were called “waterfall” laws. The name actually refers to the idea that the hydro plants “fall back” to public ownership, the legal doctrine of escheat. There is also a connection to Intellectual Property rights regimes, where the IP reverts to public ownership after a period of time. Conceptually, this seems to indicate that private ownership of property is at the sufferance of the commoners, and all private property could be required to revert to the commons over time.
Returning to Norway. These hydro plants were returning to public ownership in the late 1960s. Norway’s first oil field, Ekofisk, was discovered in 1969, with this experience fresh. Apparently, this influenced a number of aspects of how Norway managed its oil for the benefit of the people first but in partnership with private enterprise.
Singapore
Karl suggest that the fund corpus be managed such that it grows and we leave a bequest for future generations. This is something that TFWN supports as well. Temasek, one of Singapore’s two large SWFs, follows a more challenging rule that its corpus must remain constant as a share of Singapore GDP. In effect, this implies reinvesting not just to keep pace with inflation, but to keep pace with the growth of the economy. Consequentially, only the return in excess of the economy growth rate can be distributed. This rule has the effect of keeping the endowment proportionate to the overall economy. If the rule of distributing income above inflation is followed, the endowment would remain static while private property would increase, making the endowment less and less relevant. As a corollary, it also puts a very high hurdle rate for investments from the fund. It is worth noting that Singapore’s model for management of its land (90% still in public ownership, 80% living in public housing) fits well with the ideas of Henry George. And interestingly, Singapore also occasionally pays a bonus to its citizen’s when the budget is in surplus.
Framing is crucial
Karl’s article contains a couple of seemingly minor terminology issues that actually have very significant consequences.
Erroneous government accounting incentivizes extraction
There is an important framing error in the use of terms such as “windfall revenue”, “income” or “earning” in connection with the proceeds from selling oil. Selling the crop of the family farm generates revenue. However, the proceeds from selling the family farm is capital, not revenue. The use of “windfall revenue” hides the true nature of the oil sale. The origins are in government accounting and reporting. Governments worldwide, following IMF’s Global Financial Statistics Manual 2014, erroneously treat the proceeds of selling their shared mineral endowment as “revenue”. More extraction = more revenue = good. Hence the enthusiasm to open the Arctic Refuge to oil exploration and the opening of Pebble mine in Bristol Bay, both in Alaska.
If minerals are seen as a shared inheritance, then different questions arise. Why is the mineral endowment being sold instead of keeping them for the use of future generations (who may have less environmentally destructive practices)? Why now? Will Alaska achieve zero loss or will some of the value be captured by the extractive companies by changing terms in their favor through political contributions, lobbying and bribes?
As Karl has pointed out, it is apparent that Alaska is selling its oil for lower than its true value. (Note that the losses due to under-recovery of the oil value is effectively a per head tax on inherited wealth – the value of the endowment reduces and everyone loses equally.) Proper accounting would require these losses to be made good. Seen clearly, more extraction of this nature = larger losses = bad.
Further questions arise. Will the entire proceeds be saved in the Alaska Permanent Fund? Will the only distribution of the income be through the Permanent Fund Dividend? Nothing less will ensure that future generations receive their rightful inheritance.
As Karl points out, Alaska saves less than 20% of the proceeds from selling their oil wealth in their Permanent Fund. And recently, a bill has been enacted providing for the use by government of a part of the income of the fund. They are consuming their shared mineral inheritance, cheating all future generations of Alaskans. If ordinary Alaskans understood this, surely both the Arctic Refuge and the Pebble mine decisions would be questioned.
What should be called a tax?
A related important framing issue plays an important role in the Alaskan struggle to protect their Permanent Fund and Dividend. Revenues, income and earnings imply something has been provided in exchange. Taxes are unrequited payments, ie, payments without any directly reciprocal consideration. Grover Norquist’s Americans for Tax Reform’s Taxpayer Protection Pledge is signed by most US Republicans and requires voting against any new taxes or tax increases. As a consequence, elected Republicans only vote for tax reductions.
Alaska has four broad choices in balancing its budget: (a) reducing spending, (b) reducing its losses from selling its oil (though ideally this should go to the Fund), (c) imposing an income tax or increasing the sales tax rate, and finally (d) diverting the income of the Permanent Fund to balance the budget.
As we have seen, income and sales taxes are opposed. The consideration for selling oil is often called an “oil tax”. However, calling them a tax means Republicans adamantly oppose increases, even when all evidence points to massive unrecognized losses. Any diversion of the PF earnings to the budget is in effect a per head tax (or a negative basic income). But since the diversion to the budget isn’t called a tax, Republicans are happy to support it. So the only options seem to be to cut spending or divert the Permanent Fund earnings.
If the terminology changed – we used “price for selling our oil endowment” instead of “oil taxes”, and “a per head tax” instead of an unremarked budget appropriation, then incentives for the Republican politicians change. Since spending cuts alone cannot balance the budget, increasing the price of the oil (ideally it should all go to the Permanent Fund) or explicitly imposing a tax are the only feasible options.
All of this is hidden by the terminology we use, underpinned by the error in government accounting. The IMF must amend its GFSM 2014 to treat the proceeds of selling mineral wealth as capital received in exchange, not “revenue”. And every single individual must change the terminology used to reflect the correct situation. Without this, the incentives to extract and consume our natural resource endowment will inevitably lead to civilization collapse, perhaps even human extinction.
Conclusion
The idea of a people’s endowment is extremely powerful. It hides behind the success of nations such as Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. It is important that ordinary people share in the benefits of the endowment to ensure its protection. Unfortunately, even the language we use, underpinned by a crucial accounting error, is a significant contributor to the increasingly likely end of our civilization.
About the Author
Rahul Basu is the Research Director of Goa Foundation, an environmental NGO in India. The Future We Need is a global movement asking for natural resources to be viewed as a shared inheritance we hold as custodians for future generations. This work is based on the practical work of the Goa Foundation. Whose Mine Is It Anyway is a campaign to make government finances and national income statistics treat mining as the sale of minerals. Read Mitigating the Resource Curse by improving Government Accounting and Government Accounting and the Resource Curse – Response to FAQs. IPSASB has started on a new International Public Sector Accounting Standard for natural resources. The Goenchi Mati Movement is advocating these principles for all mining in Goa, India. A joint campaign has successfully asked for these principles to be part of India’s National Mineral Policy.
