by Andre Coelho | Apr 8, 2017 | News
Event room at Coolabora. Credit to: Graça Rojão.
On the 25th of March 2017, a meeting of the Fórum Cidadania & Território (link) took place in Covilhã, a mountain city in Serra da Estrela, Portugal. This regular gathering of individuals and institutions was at Coolabora, a local non-governmental organization (NGO), and apart from particular issues related to citizenship and territory, it was also dedicated to presenting and discussing basic income.
Fórum Cidadania & Território is a formal network of NGO’s and individuals concerned with social issues, development and non-discrimination in Portugal. Hence it represents a larger universe of activity than the strict number of people attending these meetings allows for. In this 14th meeting, organized and hosted by Coolabora, activists promoting basic income in Portugal were invited, in this case André Barata, André Coelho and Pedro Ferrão.
André Barata presented basic income as a natural outgrowth of social democracy, nowadays very much torn apart and distorted. According to him, basic income is justified not so much because automation in upon us, but mainly as a right of citizenship. Countless generations of human beings have created everything upon which we live today, and so a basic income is a way for every person to get a fair share of that heritage. André Coelho exhibited a few slides to explain how a basic income could be financed in Portugal, referring to a study offered by Miguel Horta. He also reviewed what he considers to be the advantages of basic income, over our current social welfare systems. Paulo Ferrão spoke of the next BIEN Congress, taking place in Lisbon, and called for participation in the basic income week taking place while the Congress is ongoing (25th through 27th of September, 2017).
After these points, the debate was opened to the audience, who took the opportunity to pose questions and discuss the traditional arguments against basic income (e.g.: disincentive to work, difficulty in paying for a basic income).
by Andre Coelho | Feb 3, 2017 | News
Photo: Nick Pearce. Credit to: Bristol Festival of Ideas.
In this audio recording of a conversation, in front of a live audience at the Bristol Festival of Ideas on the 17th of November, 2016, Louise Haagh, Anthony Painter, Nick Pearce and Torsten Bell discuss the pros and cons of the basic income idea, chaired by Jonathan Derbyshire.
In this talk, Anthony Painter, the Director of the Action Research Center at the RSA (Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce), starts by describing what he calls the “gig economy” (one economy driven by tasks, not by jobs). He also refers to the great changes in the distribution of work which are occurring right now, and in the relationships with intelligent machines. According to him, people are feeling increasingly uncertain and powerless, which generates stress. That is his first argument for basic income: it is an agent for freedom. He says politics for basic income must be based in solidarity, empathy and compassion, and that basic income should not be pursued as an end in itself, but as a test and a measure for the betterment of society.
Nick Pierce, professor of Public Policy at the University of Bath (and former Director of the Institute for Public Policy Research), goes on to say that he considers himself to be a “friendly skeptic” of basic income. He recognizes qualities in the basic income movement, led by many activists, who defend tackling problems with current welfare states and pursue a vision/trend for the betterment of society; not simply reacting to problems. On the other hand, he does not agree that basic income can liberate individuals (from entanglement with the State and with the market), nor that it can liberate individuals from work. According to Pierce, work is a way to gain personal fulfillment and, as such, looks at basic income proponents as “anti-work” in a sense. He also fears basic income might lead people to disengage from one another, hence he considers it a dangerous form of dependency, particularly towards the State (seen as a provider). Pierce also points out that basic income, as a policy, will be a result of the social forces that have forged the different welfare states, hence may differ considerably from region to region. He advises basic income advocates to consider all of these regional differences, in order to propose meaningful basic income strategies.
Louise Haagh
Louise Haagh, as Reader at the Department of Politics in the University of York and co-Chair of the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), replies that basic income is a “natural outgrowth of social democracy”. This comes despite Haagh’s agreement that, in fact, the basic income movement has failed to detail the implementation realities of basic income around the world. However, she feels it has succeeded in getting basic income out of academia and into mainstream discourse. She also points out that other welfare features, such as public education and health, do not contain as many conditions as income support (e.g. behavioral conditions), but agrees that basic income should not be seen as a replacement for organized fulltime employment. Rather, they should be seen as a complementary feature to guarantee full citizenship. She also sees basic income as a small but crucial strategic element that enables societies to think about their development with a more long-term approach.
On the critical side against basic income, Torsten Bell, Director of the Resolution Foundation, says that basic income interest has appeared due to two anxieties: robot anxiety (human jobs are being “eaten” by machines) and Left Existential anxiety (real wages stagnate or dropped, plus support for the traditional Left is fading). However, he perceives this interest as waning progressively. Bell is convinced basic income is not going to happen in the UK, reasoning that robots are systematically underperforming compared to their human counterparts, and that there have never been more jobs in the UK. Moreover, he says, statistics show that part-time jobs are not rising, or have not been, since records have existed. Bell detaches the United States case from the European reality, stating that what is happening in the former is not likely to happen in the latter, and equates basic income to higher taxes and higher poverty. He further reasons that it makes no sense to give a basic income to rich people, and that generally the public does not like the idea that “you should be paid not to work”. Finally, he disagrees with a political organization system where an elite at the top own the robots and make all the money, which is then redistributed to everyone else (assumed idle).
Replying to criticisms, Anthony Painter underlines that the world of work is getting more precarious, less paid and more insecure; hence something – like basic income – must be done about it. Contrary to Torsten’s assertion, he highlights that basic income advocates usually justify basic income as a way to validate work, giving people the opportunity to contribute to society in a meaningful way. He also points out that any basic income implementation cannot possibly surpass the already tremendously bureaucratic welfare state in the UK, so it is only bound to reduce it. On the other hand, Nick Pierce disagrees that basic income is waning, but agrees that politicians are constantly searching for “big ideas” to hold on to. Finally, Louise Haagh agrees that fortunately the basic income idea is not defended on a pure philosophical ground anymore, but instead has progressed to a more hands-on, practical approach. As Nick, she also disagrees that the notion of a basic income is waning, judging from the daily activity at BIEN.
Listen to the full conversation:
Bristol Festival of Ideas, “Basic Income – An idea whose time has come?”, in association with the Institute for Policy Research and the University of Bath, November 17th 2016
by BIEN | Jan 1, 2017 | Bios & background Info, Opinion, Testimonies
Louise Haagh (BIEN Co-Chair)
I first came across basic income in summer of 2001 when instructed about it by Workers’ Party Senator Eduardo Suplicy, at his home in São Paulo. I was doing research on workers’ rights, at the same time undertaking a survey of economic security among residents in poor and middle-income districts (published in World Development, 2011a). Eduardo famously played a key role in the drive to legalise a basic income as a policy goal in Brazil, and in presenting the extension of targeted cash grants as a step towards it (Suplicy, 2002). Eduardo was insistent that I do not go home that evening till I mastered all there was to know about reasons for basic income and how the path towards it was being paved in Brazil. Night fell. I remember enjoying more than a few helpings of food and tea, before Eduardo was satisfied I understood, after which – the gentleman that he is – he accompanied me to somewhere I could hail a cab, making sure to have a long friendly chat with the driver before we were sent off into the night.
The basic income appealed to me then primarily as a necessary foundation for consolidating workers’ rights – and in many ways that is still how I see it, but in a broader context of rights to human development. I had been working on workers’ rights and issues of economic citizenship since the early 1990s, during my PhD on Chile and later work on South Korea, both places I spent a lot of time and in which I did surveys of workers’ condition of precarity and their institutional sources of power. Against this background I was struck by the sanity – the immediately obvious justification for basic income. It seemed to me evident that the most important justification was a basic humanist and democratic one – and I still think that today.
Coming to the BI proposal from the perspective of workers’ movements, and in general the problem of the democratisation of everyday institutions, gives a different perspective on the political character of a BI reform. Above all, it makes it evident that BI intersects with other institutional and political challenges. This is something I am very conscious of when thinking about the question of how a BI might extend the social bases of freedom.
The sense in which I first found BI intuitively important was in relation to occupational freedom. I had been studying the economic liberalisation and institutional restructuring of the Chilean economy during the years of Pinochet and found that the precariousness among workers it generated, both economically and institutionally, had become embedded in a way that the new democratic regime of 1990 could not overturn (Haagh 2002a, 1999). The result, I argued (Haagh, 2002b), was that Chile deepened political rights without this leading to the expected deepening of social rights, given the absence of economic rights. This marked an evident contrast to the formation of welfare states in Europe in the 20th century, as discussed in T.H. Marshall (1949). Before I knew about basic income – during the mid-1990s – I had been working on a concept of ‘occupational citizenship’ – first in my PhD and then during a later British Academy post-doctoral fellowship at Oxford University. Essentially, what sparked my enquiry was the contradiction within liberal economic theory – so manifest in the labour market outcomes I studied in Chile – between the expectation of worker mobility– and the lack of underlying forms of economic security – in the forms both of money and services – that would make this sustainable.
I argued the atomised labour market regime not only predictably led to weak investment in skills, and thus a low-wage, low–skill equilibrium economy (Haagh 1999). In addition, it undermined workers’ freedom in a way that denied them effective citizenship within the polity at large (Haagh 2002a,b).
Having theorised a ‘gap’ in terms of absence of occupational citizenship (Haagh 1999, 2002a), it seemed obvious to me that basic income (BI) would be a necessary but not sufficient element in improving persons’ control of their lives.
There are important lessons from Latin America about the political conditions for a BI reform that are important to consider as the debate on BI is gaining force in Europe today. These are of both a practical and analytical kind. Like the case of Chile’s in part stunted democratization, the story of BI in Latin America is not a straightforward one of cash grants turning into rights (Lo Vuolo 2013). Similarly, one cannot be sure prospective transitions into partial forms of basic income through experimentation in Europe will turn into secure bastions of freedom, given the overall context of austerity and preceding roll-back of public sector protections (Haagh 2015).
It is ironic to think that Friedman – who advocated a form of constant basic security in the shape of the Negative Income Tax essentially on freedom grounds as rooted in an idea of independence – also indirectly was architect of Chile’s economic experiment.[1] The irony lies in the fact that that experiment was not complemented with a set of basic rights outside the market. On the contrary, deregulation of unions’ functions – detailed in Haagh (2002a,b) – along with other mechanisms of economic security, was paralleled with the implementation a state organised system of individual insurance, too weakly subsidized to afford real protection (Haagh 2002a, 2006). Given the underlying precarity of workers’ income streams, the individual insurance model was unable to offer effective cover.
The case of Chile shows why basic income has moral appeal, yet the basis of that appeal that lie in destabilisation, precarity, inequality, and loss of workers’ democratic rights may not be a likely political basis for a sustainable BI reform. Moreover, time has shown that in conditions of high inequality and weaker public finances, such as in Latin America, political preferences are likely to continue to be for targeted and conditional benefits (Lo Vuolo 2013, Haagh 2007, 2011a, 2013, Haagh and Helgø 2002).
The practical contradiction – as demonstrated in Chile – between the two seemingly symbiotic elements of Friedman’s advocacy, for economic liberalisation, and for basic security, is then not that surprising from a political and institutional perspective.
This is because the destabilisation of institutions that the first project entails destroys the basis for everyday cooperation within society that gives legitimacy to the second project to extend universal rights. Although Friedman did not see the Negative Income Tax as a welfare right, but as a kind of money mechanism to promote agency and ensure against basic risk, even something ostensibly simple like the NIT, depends on quite complex institutional development and political agreements. The fact that Friedman did not like the welfare state does not mean it did and does not exist in the United States. It is its more hierarchical – interclass-distributive- form that makes it more incoherent and punitive (Haagh 2012, 2015).
In short, the conditions of precarity in Latin America – now more common in the developed world – showed me why basic income is morally necessary for the market economy (as Friedman knew), but not itself sufficient for freedom in a democratic polity.
The Chilean case also showed me that the moral appeal of basic income is not the same as a political foundation for basic income reform. The two may even be contradictory if moral appeal is linked with conditions of crisis and compensation, as distinct from equality as equal standing in a more complex sense, which gives to BI a key but partial role in democratising institutions’ form.
For me it is very important to stress the compatibility of basic income and the interests of workers’ movements. The demands made by workers’ organisations historically can be argued to have played a transitional role in a process of democratisation to consolidate more universal rights. At the same time, the interests they channel in terms of institutions’ stability and democratic form represents something constant and deeper. This is important to remember today when – in a context of growing precarity in the developed world – there is a risk that the defence of basic income comes to be thought about as compensation for loss of – or an exchange for – other rights.
Coming back to that evening in 2001, it was not at all a surprise to me then that it was a Senator of a Workers’ Party advocating for basic income who was trying to convince me of the. To me, it was intuitive that workers’ movements should and would embrace the idea – at least in the context of a family of rights-based institutional changes. Having come to BI via work on unions, I was therefore quite surprised when – after going to the BIEN Congress in Geneva in 2002 – I became aware of the polemical nature of the BI debate concerning the relationship of that proposal and the established welfare state – hereunder social democracy and the union movement. Although it is painful to acknowledge, I think an important basis for that real life tension lies in the academic basis of the BI proposal as couched in fairly abstract and idealistic terms (Haagh 2011b).
In short, coming from the comparative institutional tradition of historical enquiry it seems evident to me that basic income is an element in a wider process of democratisation of institutions in society. The success, substance, form, and stability of that proposal is likely to stand or fall with the level of democratisation of society as a whole.
That is why we should not be surprised that BI experiments and debates are happening today in some of the most institutionally developed welfare states in Europe. It is far from given however how they will turn out.
[1] Explaining the purpose of the Negative Income Tax that closely resembles a basic income, Friedman (1979, 120) argued that the ‘basic amount’ (or ’personal allowance’) would “..provide an assured minimum to all persons in need regardless of the reasons for their need, while doing as little harm as possible to their character, their independence, or their incentive to better their own condition” (italics added) 120 He further (ibid. 121) noted, “[t]he negative income tax would allow for fluctuating income… but that is not its main purpose. Its main purpose is rather to provide a straightforward means of assuring every family a minimum amount…”
Friedman, M., 1990[1979/1980], Free to Choose, San Diego: Harvest.
Haagh, L. (2015) Alternative Social States and the Basic Income Debate: Institutions, Inequality and Human Development,’ in Basic Income Studies, Special Issue on Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century, August, ISSN (Online) 1932-0183, ISSN (Print) 2194-6094, DOI: 10.1515/bis-2015-0002, August 2015, https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bis.ahead-of-print/bis-2015-0002/bis-2015-0002.xml
Haagh, L. (2013) ‘The Citizens’ Income and Democratization in Latin America – A Multi-Institutional Perspective‘ in Rubén Lo Vuolo (Ed.) Citizen’s Income and Welfare Regimes in Latin America. From Cash Transfers to Rights, Exploring the Basic Income Guarantee Series, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Haagh, L. (2012) ‘Democracy, Public Finance, and Property Rights in Economic Stability: How More Horizontal Capitalism Upscales Freedom for All’ in Polity, October, Volume 44, No. 4. pp.542-587.
Haagh, L. (2011a) ‘Working Life, Well-Being and Welfare Reform: Motivation and Institutions Revisited’, World Development, March, Vol. 39, No.3. pp.450-573. Also available Basic Income, Social Democracy and Control over Time at: https://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeewdevel/v_3a39_3ay_3a2011_3ai_3a3_3ap_3a450-473.htm
Haagh, L. (2011b) , Policy and Politics, January, Vol. 39, No.1, pp. 41-64.
Haagh, L. (2007) ‘Basic Income, Occupational Freedom and Anti-Poverty Policy’ in Basic Income Studies, Vol. 2, Issue, 1, June.
Haagh, L. (2006) ‘Equality and Income Security in Market Economies: What’s Wrong with Insurance?’’ in Social Policy and Administration, Vol. 40:4, 385-424.
Haagh, L. (2002a) Citizenship, Labour Markets and Democratization – Chile and the Modern Sequence, Basingstoke: Palgrave, St. Antony’s Series.
Haagh, L. and Camilla Helgø (2002) (Eds), Social Policy Reform and Market Governance in Latin America, Basingstoke: Palgrave. St. Antony’s Series.
Haagh, L. (2002b) ‘The Emperor’s New Clothes: Labor Reform and Social Democratization in Chile’, Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 37, No.1, Spring, pp. 86-115.
Haagh L (1999) ‘Training Policy and the Property Rights of Labour in Chile (1990-1997): Social Citizenship in the Atomised Market Regime, Journal of Latin American Studies, Cambridge University Press, 31, 429-472.
Lo Vuolo, R. (Ed.)Citizen’s Income and Welfare Regimes in Latin America. From Cash Transfers to Rights, Exploring the Basic Income Guarantee Series, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Marshall, Thomas, H., 1949, Citizenship and Social Class, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Suplicy, E. (2002), Renda de Cidadania – A Saída é Pela Porta, Cortez Editora
Photo credit: Enno Schmidt
At the end of 2016, the year in which BIEN celebrated the 30th anniversary of its birth, all Life Members were invited to reflect on their own personal journeys with the organization. See other contributions to the feature edition here.
by Guest Contributor | Aug 10, 2016 | Opinion
By Alexander de Roo
The 20th century was the century of social democracy in Western Europe. But nowadays the social democratic model of the welfare state is in deep crisis. This model — in which paid work is central, full (male) employment is the norm, and social benefits are dependent on performance in paid work — is no longer working and no longer appealing to voters.
The strong political position of social democracy in Western Europe has been based on the strength of labor unions. Economic changes, however, have accelerated the declining membership of unions. The strength of the various social democratic parties has thus been structurally eroded. Consumption and leisure time are becoming ever more important. These factors open the way for basic income as the economic model for the 21st century.
There is a strong relationship between the strength of the unions and the popularity of the Dutch Labor Party in national elections. In the chart below, the dotted line represents the strength of the unions, while the continuous line represents the strength of the Labor Party:
As you can see, there is a structural relationship between the strength of the unions and the electoral strength of the Dutch Labor Party (PvdA – the social democratic party of the Netherlands). The unions are slowly losing members in the Netherlands. The decline is largely due to structural changes in advanced economies. For example, total manufacturing employment in America has fallen from nearly 20 million in 1979 to 12 million today. The kinds of workers who have lost out — unskilled men, in particular — were precisely those who were most likely to belong to a union in the first place. And what has sprung up in their place further undermines unions. If you went to a factory in the 1970s, you would have seen assembly lines of people. Such workers were much more amenable to the idea of “class consciousness”. Go to a factory today and you might you find a few people monitoring robots and other whizzy bits of machinery. Add other economic changes to the mix — globalization (which makes it harder for unions to regulate work), the rise of a more flexible service sector and government policies — and the loss of union clout seems inevitable. More recent reforms to minimum wage and workplace discrimination have also reduced the need felt by individuals to belong to a union.
The decline of the Dutch Christian Democratic party
Additionally, the other political party essential to the construction of the Dutch welfare state, the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), is in structural decline. Below, we see the electoral results of the CDA over the last 60 years – from an absolute majority in the 1950s and early 1960s to only 10 percent in the 2012 elections.
The blue line represents the three different Christian democratic parties in the Netherlands, which merged in 1980 to form the singular CDA – represented by the green line.
In the general election of 2006 — before the 2008 economic crisis — the CDA and the PvdA together had 46 percent of the vote. That proportion dropped to 32 percent in both the 2010 and 2012 national elections. Today, according to opinion polls, these two parties together command just over 20 percent of the vote. That is to say, the parties of the old social model have declined from 46 percent in 2006 to 20 percent in 2016, losing more than half their support in just 10 years.
Conclusion: Political support for the old welfare state, developed by the Labor Party and the Christian Democratic Appeal, along with the unions, has been completely eroded.
The Dutch Precariat: Almost 40 percent
“In the 21st century, technological changes are being introduced into economic and social life at a much faster pace than in the 20th century,” noted Dennis Meadows, one of the authors of Limits to Growth, in a 2012 lecture in Brussels.
One of the most important trends has been the rise of flexible work. This has been especially strong in the Netherlands. Today 20 percent of Dutch workers, amounting to 1.7 million people, are on flexible contracts. The increase seems unstoppable. Unions are demanding that politicians repair this state of affairs by restoring the old model of stable, regulated jobs through legislation.
Alongside the 1.7 million flex workers are 1.3 million people who are self-employed. At least 20 percent of these – 0.3 million people – became self-employed due to a lack of alternatives. The graph below shows the increase in flexible jobs over last 10 years, and the corresponding decrease in regular jobs. The blue bars signify the increase in the number of flex workers, while the brown bars indicate the change (usually negative) in the number of regular workers.
Additionally, there are 0.6 million people officially registered as unemployed, and 0.4 million who depend on social benefits (“Bij-stand” in Dutch). In total, 3 million people and their dependents form the Dutch precariat. Approximately 5 million people still have regular jobs – 10 percent fewer than 10 years ago. And automatization is threatening even these jobs. In the debate in The Netherlands, the position that the rise of the robots will lead to structural unemployment is still minor. However, studies like one from Oxford University show that approximately 50 percent of the jobs that exist today will no longer be secure in 20 years’ time (THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT: HOW SUSCEPTIBLE ARE JOBS TO COMPUTERISATION? Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael A. Osborne; September 17, 2013).
Opportunities for basic income implementation are growing in the Netherlands
“Nothing is more powerful than an idea whose time has come.” – Victor Hugo
The decline of the two old parties that built the Dutch welfare state, combined with the rise in number of the Dutch precariat, opens the way for a post-social democratic pathway. Basic income has the strongest card. In contrast to the 1980s and 1990s, large parts of the Dutch population are now receptive to the idea of basic income, given that the present welfare system is – in their eyes – no longer worth fighting for.
History of the basic income debate in the Netherlands
There was fierce debate about basic income in the 1980s and 90s in the Netherlands. The Dutch branch of BIEN, “Vereniging Basisinkomen”, was founded in 1989. Before that, an organization called “Workshop Basic Income” promoted the idea. The PvdA almost adopted basic income in its national election program in 1993 (with 40 percent in favor). Then, in 1994, there was a debate about basic income in the national government. On the side of basic income were the Minister of Economic Affairs, Hans Wijers (of Democrats 66, left wing liberals), and the Minister of Finance, Gerrit Zalm (the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, right wing liberals). On the other side, the Prime Minister, Wim Kok (of the PvdA), argued successfully that basic income’s time had not yet come, claiming it to be a topic for 30 years down the line. The economic upswing of the early years of the new millennium subsequently overshadowed this discussion in the Netherlands.
The financial and economic crisis of 2008 changed the economic and political landscape. And, over the past three years, the basic income discussion has returned to the Netherlands, becoming much more intense than it was 25 years ago.
Even with the recent economic upswing, the old status quo — under which almost all adult citizens had a secure, regular job — is history. A new scheme of social security is urgently necessary. The general public recognizes this.
National poll: 40 percent in favor; 15 percent don’t know; 45 percent against basic income
In a recent national poll, 40 percent of the Dutch population declared themselves to be in favor of a basic income, with 45 percent against and 15 percent expressing uncertainty. The voters of the three left wing parties are in favor, with their endorsement breaking down as follows: GreenLeft 60 percent, the Socialist Party 54 percent, and PvdA 53 percent.
The votes of Democrats 66 are divided, with 44 percent in favor and 45 percent against. The followers of the right wing parties, by contrast, are quite clearly against basic income: 73 percent against in People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, and 61 percent against in CDA. It is interesting to note that voters of the populist right wing Party for Freedom, headed by Geert Wilders, are also divided, with 37 percent in favor, 46 percent against and 17 percent uncertain. The Party for Freedom is the biggest party in current polls.
Enthusiasm
When we hand out our basic income leaflets to the general public, about 50 percent of people take the pamphlet and react positively, while the other half ignores us. Several times a young couple, arm in arm, would pass me – the young man would nod that he was not interested, but the young woman would leave him to walk back and collect a leaflet! We have lively discussions with the public. Even young people who were not alive 25 years ago, when that first debate raged, have already a very good idea of what basic income is. I have been active in politics for 42 years and I have never encountered so much enthusiasm.
Free money for everyone
The return of the basic income idea to the Dutch debate has been invigorated by a book by the young historian Rutger Bregman (only 28 years of age), Gratis Geld voor Iedereen (Free Money for Everyone), which was published in September 2014, along with a few national television documentaries. Bregman’s influential book on basic income is now available in English, under the title Utopia for Realists.
Petition for the Dutch parliament
A petition to put basic income on the agenda of the Dutch parliament gathered 50,000 signatures over a couple of months. The intention is to generate 100,000 signatures by autumn so that basic income can play a role in the election campaign for the Dutch national elections in March 2017.
Local experiments with basic income
Several basic income experiments are planned in the Netherlands. Nineteen municipalities have officially declared their willingness to initiate such an experiment to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. Utrecht, Groningen, Tilburg and Wageningen were the first four to do so, and they are currently in conversation with the State Secretary for Social Affairs and Employment in order to establish the necessary space in the law. These experiments will not comprise trials of a full basic income, even though many are based on the idea of a basic income. Instead, elements of a basic income are to be implemented in these experiments within the rubric of the current Dutch minimum welfare scheme (“Bij-stand”). More precisely, for the experiment participants, allowances will be made unconditional, allowing recipients of the minimum welfare to earn money simultaneously and thereby removing the currently existing poverty trap.
Various questions will be addresed by these experiments:
- Will people become more active if they are free to do what they want, as compared to the present situation under which they must apply for jobs and be policed?
- Will people become more autonomous?
- Will people become healthier?
- Will people be quicker to participate in paid work if they are allowed to earn in addition to receiving their allowance?
A large majority of the parliament is in favor of the experiments, but the details are still under discussion nationally, and there is a legal process that must be completed. If all goes well, the first experiments will start in January 2017.
Why have the experiments not yet started? Will there be 25 experiments in 2017?
The experiments should have already started, in fact, but the national government is very slow in giving the green light. The Dutch GreenLeft asked the national parliament in November 2015 to clear the way for these experiments. Fifteen of the 17 political groups in the national parliament said yes, with only Wilders’ Party for Freedom and Prime Minister Rutte’s People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy saying no. According to the latest update, the government is now working on an administrative decree which will allow the 25 most advanced municipalities to start their experiments in January 2017. That is likely to annoy the other 50 municipalities that also wish to initiate their own experiments.
Since the national elections are set for March 17th, 2017, this issue will most likely play a role in the national election campaign. It is likely that the left wing parties (GreenLeft, PvdA and, perhaps, the Socialist Party) will put forward demands for a Finnish-style experiment of basic income during the 2007 national election. One small party, the Cultural Liberal Party, is already advocating for the introduction of a basic income of €800 in the Netherlands.
Funding of basic income should be based on consumption rather than labor
The Dutch branch of BIEN has developed a model to raise VAT and environmental taxes, while removing most tax exemptions, to fund a basic income of €1100 per person. In the long run, this amount should be increased to €1400. The option of a small tax on financial transactions is also of interest in this regard. We oppose models that would fund basic income solely on an increase of taxes on labor. The Dutch Central Planning Bureau did just that in 2006, resulting in 56 percent income tax for everyone and a five percent increase in unemployment. We are instead fighting for a new calculation based on increasing consumption taxes so as to make it clear to the public that a basic income is (easily) affordable.
Alexander de Roo (alexanderderoo@gmail.com) was one of the founding fathers of BIEN and served as BIEN’s treasurer from 1986-2006. He studied chemical technology in Delft (1972-1978) and political science in Amsterdam (1976-1982), and was a GreenLeft Member of the European Parliament from 1999-2004.
Alexander de Roo photo credit: Bill Crompton.
Content reviewed by Genevieve Shanahan and Kate McFarland.
by Kate McFarland | Jul 5, 2016 | Research
Dutch sociologist Dick Pels has published a new book, A Heart for Europe: The Case for Europatriotism, which is available for free download from Good Works Publishing Cooperative based in Bristol, UK.
The following is an introduction from the author:
European civilization is the never-ending quest for a more gentle, more relaxed, more trustful and less dangerous society: a society in which people are no longer afraid of each other, of their institutions, or of themselves. But Europe currently finds itself in the eye of a ‘perfect storm’, being chased by the multiple dangers of populist nationalism, Russian revanchism, neoliberal financial havoc, religious terrorism and refugee chaos. Facing these violent challenges, we urgently need to rethink our European ideals of peace, freedom, democracy, sustainability and the good life. It is urgent that we regain the original passion which lay behind the European project, in order to rescue the idea of a civilized European patriotism from the politics of fear which is conducted by both rightwing and leftwing nationalists.
Most of the book does not specifically address basic income; however, Pels does briefly make a case for a Europe-wide basic income in a chapter entitled “The European Good Life”.
While he does not foresee a basic income in the immediate future, Pels believes that Europeans might look forward to “something like an individualized European basic income, which would not only provide citizens with a guaranteed income but also relax the work ethic and relativize the political goal of full employment” (p. 102) — which he goes on to call a “eurodividend”.
Like the first legal state pension introduced in 1889 by Bismarck, who intended to outflank social democracy and to forge stronger ties between the newly united German states, such a ‘eurodividend’ could effectively bind citizens to the European project, while also removing economic imbalances within the eurozone and halting the social race to the bottom. It would lay a common European ‘social floor’ under the national welfare states, which would otherwise retain their diversity. As an individual share in the profits of European unification, the eurodividend would literally ‘make the profits of Europe visible for everyone’ (pp. 102-3).
Another major benefit of a “eurodividend”, according to Pels, is that it permits a more equitable distribution of time. Noting that a good life requires that “we win back command over our own time…from the economic production and consumption spheres,” Pels states, “A European basic income could be one way of distributing this time freedom more evenly and fairly. It would not only benefit the stressed-out multitaskers and burnt-out managers of the rich Northwest, but every EU citizen” (p. 104).
Read more about the book — or just download and read the book itself — at the publisher’s website.
Dick Pels has taught at various Dutch and English universities, and he was the director of the Bureau de Helling, the research foundation of the Dutch Green Party, until 2013. His previous English-language books include Property and Power, A Study in Intellectual Rivalry (1998), The Intellectual as Stranger (2000), and Unhastening Science (2003). He has also co-edited a volume on basic income, Het basisinkomen: sluitstuk van de verzorgingsstaat? (1995), with Robert van der Veen.
A guitarist and singer-songwriter, Pels writes and performs songs in the blues and folk-rock genres. He lives on the historic yacht Nymphaea.
