by Liam Upton | Jul 9, 2015 | Research
Abstract: Thomas Piketty’s recent book, “Capital in the Twenty-First Century,” provides a great deal of empirical support for the observation that the rate of return on capital (r) is greater than the growth rate of the economy as a whole (g); i.e. “r > g”. From this observation, Piketty derives two important insights: entrepreneurs eventually become rentiers, and except during unusual circumstances, inequality tends to rise over time. This paper views Piketty’s observation against the institutional setting that has prevailed over the period of his study and makes two additional observations. First, whether Piketty’s two insights follow from his observation depends not simply on whether r is greater than g, but on whether the difference between the two is greater than the consumption of the capital-owning group. The relative size of capitalists’ consumption and capital income is not obvious, and therefore, more evidence is needed to confirm the connection between Piketty’s observation and his insights. Second, the statement r has been greater than g is more accurate than simply r is greater than g. Whether r continues to exceed g depends crucially on the political and institutional environment in question. Economists tend to view one specific institutional setting, a version of laissez faire, as natural. But there is no natural set of property institutions, and those that have prevailed over the two centuries of Piketty’s observations are extremely favorable to capital owners. Awareness of the flexibility of potential property institutions raises many ethical questions and makes many tools available to address inequality—one of the most obvious being the taxation of rent on capital distributed as a basic income.
Karl Widerquist, “The Piketty Observation Against the Institutional Background: How natural is this natural tendency and what can we do about it?“, Basic Income Studies, 2015
by Liam Upton | Jul 1, 2015 | Research
Abstract: The paper addresses the recent emergence of two phenomena on the political agenda of many OECD countries: political parties born out of Social Movements and the Universal Basic Income (UBI). Regarding the former, one of the most important novelties in the Spanish political context has been the emergence of PODEMOS. Coming from nowhere, just four months after its foundation the party became the third political force in 23 of the 40 main cities in the European elections 2014. With regards to the latter, one of the social policy proposals most discussed recently in Spain, especially after PODEMOS included it in the program for the European elections, has been the UBI. The paper explores the future of this proposal on the economic agenda of PODEMOS in the light of the preferences of its constituency. To do so the paper uses an online survey on the UBI conducted during November 10 and December 15 2014 by the “Circle” of PODEMOS on the UBI proposal. We propose and test two hypotheses in the article: (1) being left-wing is going to play a decreasingly important role in the vote for PODEMOS; (2) as a result of this, PODEMOS won’t include the UBI proposal in the party’s economic program for the general elections in November-December 2015.
Borja Barragué, César Martínez Sánchez, “The Basic Income on the agenda of PODEMOS: A matter of political or financial viability?“, Academia.edu, 29 July 2015
by Andre Coelho | Jun 3, 2015 | Research
Red Renta Basica. Article “Negative Income Tax em Portugal”
Abtract:”The NIT – Negative Income Tax – is a wealth redistribution system. It works through a tax which reaches for a part of the richest population wealth and distributes it through all others, in an automatic and unconditional fashion. This means no questions asked and no job seeking requirement, but also without introducing a disincentive to work.
This study is a simulation over such a tax in Portugal, in its present day conditions. This tax would be the actual labor tax with some changes. From the simulation with labor tax working this way in a “closed circuit” and a 50% tax on each citizen’s income over 7000 €, it would be possible to guarantee to all adult Portuguese citizens a monthly income of at least 300 €.
Comparing to present day values, this simulated tax represents an increased taxation on the highest incomes. But this tax can be set at any other level, which conditions how much redistribution will occur.
NIT will turn several State social benefits obsolete. Eliminating these programs will relieve public spending by an amount around 70% of what is presently collected with labor tax. Furthermore, the NIT challenges present day public programs for employment and support in unemployment. These programs are based upon the idea that jobs are the source of income for citizens, which means that if those incomes can be guaranteed by other means, then the former can be eliminated, total or partially. This can save public treasury up to more than present day labor tax collection.
The NIT is also associated with solidarity and social cohesion, which naturally will clash with maintaining large incomes and pensions for a minority, as it supports dignified income for all as a human right. This can lead to ceiling caps on pensions, which will liberate even more public funds.
Finally, NIT will reduce poverty and, proportionally, its weight on public funds, in terms of health costs, security costs, among others.
Miguel Horta (2015), “Negative Income Tax in Portugal [Negative Income Tax em Portugal]“, Red Renta Básica, April 24 2015
by Josh Martin | May 20, 2015 | Research
Abstract: While basic income has surged in policy interest in recent years, political research has not kept up with the debate in the trenches. In this paper we tackle a political problem any enacting coalition must face: how to ensure the political stability of a basic income scheme over time. We first demonstrate how basic income schemes are particularly vulnerable to processes of policy change discussed in the recent policy feedback literature. We then analyze whether constitutionalizing basic income in a Bill of Rights protected by strong judicial review would offer a valuable route for boosting basic income’s stability. A careful examination of the decision-making process within judicial review suggests that, caught up in a dilemma between judicial restraint and judicial activism, an enacting coalition would do well not to rely on constitutional mechanisms as the sole avenue for ensuring the political stability of basic income.
by Toru Yamamori | May 18, 2015 | Research
Abstract:”The long-term vision of economic security and social participation for people with a disability held by disability activists and policy-makers has not been realized on a global scale. This is despite the implementation of various poverty alleviation initiatives by international and national governments. Indeed within advanced Western liberal democracies, the inequalities and poverty gaps have widened rather than closed. This article is based on findings from a historical-comparative policy and discourse analysis of disability income support system in Australia and the Basic Income model. The findings suggest that a model such as Basic Income, grounded in principles of social citizenship, goes some way to maintaining an adequate level of subsistence for people with a disability. This article concludes by presenting some challenges and a commitment to transforming income support policy.”
Jennifer M. Mays, “Countering disablism: an alternative universal income support system based on egalitarianism,” Scandinavian Journal of Disability Research, 2015.
by Toru Yamamori | May 16, 2015 | Research
Geoff Crocker proposes ‘a basic income funded by QE in proportion to output GDP and not counted as deficit’ as ‘the only ultimate solution’. This prescription is based on his diagnosis that ‘the delinkage of productivity and real wages is the underlying cause of the 2007 economic crisis.’
Geoff Crocker, “The Economic Necessity of Basic Income,” Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Paper No. 62941, posted 18 March 2015.
