by Daniele Fabbri | Jul 19, 2019 | Research
Credit Picture CC(OECD/Marco Illuminati)
The OECD published “The Future of Work Employment Outlook 2019“.
Change is underway, driven by digitalisation, globalization, and demographic changes, and will impact each and every way in which our society operates. While on the one hand these mega-trends can amplify our capacity to better our lives, on the other they also pose challenges, which need to be dealt with.
With estimates suggesting that 14% of jobs are at risk of disappearing completely in the next decades and 32% changing radically, middle skilled jobs are particularly exposed to the transformation, with the risk of a hollowing out of the middle class: automation works “from the middle out”. The transition will bring to the emergence of many lower quality jobs on one side, and to other with a high degree of knowledge intensity. The risk is that earning inequalities between low and high skilled workers will increase.
“Shaping a future of work that is more inclusive and rewarding calls for a Transition Agenda for a Future that Works for All- a whole-of-government approach that targets interventions on those who needs it most”
Traditional means of income support will need to be revised, as they leave out a great number of precarious workers, which will make up for a greater share of the labour force. In the context of a flexible job market, which will see an increase in the number of entries and exits, and the need for continuous modernization of skills and work practices, the design of new systems of workers protection will become pivotal to the functioning of societies. It is important that workers know where they stand and can get the necessary protection and help in the area that they are in. So if they need something like a portsmouth workers compensation attorney or something similar that relates to legal requirements, they will be able to do so for their support.
Workers outside of the traditional form of contract are the one in the direst situation, as access to social protection is difficult for workers in non-standard employment; those who are falsely self-employed, finding themselves under the yoke of employers who don’t want to be held accountable for them. With little control over their wage and their working hours, they are the ones requiring more protection.
With non-traditional workers 50% less likely to be unionized, the emergence of monopsony in the labour market cannot be discarded, and with the instrument of collective bargaining lacking, changes to address the problem by providing the employees with more leverage are required.
Whilst the outlook discards universal basic income (UBI) as being too costly, this says nothing about its actual capacity to work as a solution. It is true that the main obstacle to the introduction of a UBI is to find its source of financing, but the measure’s design would help solving many of the problem arising in the labour market, as recent publications by the World Bank and the International Labour Organization pointed out.
Article reviewed by Dawn Howard.
More information at:
OECD, The Future of Work
by Guest Contributor | Aug 18, 2017 | Opinion
According to the OECD, basic income (BI) is not an effective tool for reducing poverty. However, the outcome would depend on the model chosen for implementing a BI system, as well as the changes made in other parts of social protection.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published in May a Policy Brief paper studying the feasibility of a basic income model in four OECD countries, one of which was Finland.
On June 16, Kela organized a seminar in which Herwig Immervoll, a senior economist at the OECD, discussed the findings of his study and analysed the strengths and weaknesses of a BI scheme. After the seminar, the national broadcasting company YLE reported: “Universal basic income might increase poverty and inequality”.
Apart from Finland, the OECD study includes France, Italy and the United Kingdom. The analysis was done with the help of the EUROMOD microsimulation model. In each country, the starting point for the analysis was to take all existing spending on social cash-transfers together and see what level of BI they would amount to. Eventually, the level of BI was set near the existing levels of guaranteed minimum-income benefits for single individuals in each country, adjusted so that it would not increase the public expenditures.
In Finland, this resulted a BI of 527 euros for the working age adults and 316 euros for children and youth under 18 years of age. Those entitled to old-age pensions within the current main statutory retirement age (in Finland over 65-year-olds) were excluded from the BI model.
In the BI model used in the OECD analysis, all existing working-age benefits (including social insurance benefits) apart from cash transfers for housing and disability would be abolished. Also, the zero-rate tax bands of income-tax schedules and equivalent tax-free allowances would be abolished, and all income-tax thresholds would be shifted downwards by a corresponding amount. BI would be made taxable under personal income taxation alongside other taxable incomes.
The OECD model would create many gainers and losers
The most important outcome of the OECD study is that the simulated BI model would strongly impact the income distribution in all studied countries. However, the effects vary greatly among the countries.
In all income groups, the BI model would create many gainers and losers. It would change the net income of most people in one way or another. It would lift some groups out of poverty and thrust others below the poverty line.
The simulated BI model would increase the income level of those small income groups who are currently not receiving any social benefits, or whose benefit level is very low. In turn, those receiving earnings-related benefits or several means-tested benefits would see a decline in their standard of living.
In Finland, those below 65-years-old receiving old-age pensions and single parents with low incomes would be among the losers of the model. The middle-income earners instead would generally benefit from the model.
The conclusion of the OECD is that particularly in countries with a comprehensive social protection BI is not an efficient tool for reducing poverty, since it does not target the benefits effectively. According to the OECD, a budget-neutral BI would not be distributionally neutral. High enough to be socially and politically meaningful and fiscally realistic, a BI would still require tax rises as well as reductions in existing benefits.
A very low basic income, instead, would have little other significance but increase poverty.
The outcomes of BI depend on reforms in taxation and social protection
How the findings of the OECD study are to be interpreted in the Finnish context?
Perhaps the most important issue that the research sheds light on is the fact that there are many institutional challenges in implementing a BI system, and those challenges differ among countries due to their different systems of social security and taxation.
As the OECD report (p. 5) notes, BI as an idea is simple, but the existing social protection systems are not. Therefore, there are grounds to argue that the same model of BI does not fit everywhere. If a reform such as BI were to be carried out, it needs to be adjusted to the existing institutions of social protection and taxation in each country separately. The parameters of the model should be adjusted so that it will not produce excessive changes in people’s incomes.
The greatest problems of the OECD’s microsimulation are that the income taxation is not changed to correspond with the BI model, and that the existing systems are demolished by the same means everywhere without examining the structures of social protection in each country separately. Due to this, BI seems to have unpredictable effects to income distribution.
The income distribution produced by a BI model can be influenced by adjusting the parameters of taxation and social security. In his presentation at the Kela seminar, Herwig Immervoll mentioned that tax reforms should be discussed in parallel with BI. Indirect taxes, such as environmental or value added taxes, have often been proposed as a complementary source for financing a BI scheme, combined with income taxation.
However, the OECD report does not mention these alternatives, and the premise seems to be that taxation in any form should not be increased.
In Finland, as well as in many other countries, some organisations and individuals have launched models of BI adjusted to the local context. Their objective has often (yet not always) been to not radically alter the income distribution or cause reductions in people’s after-tax incomes, especially in the lowest income groups. Microsimulation has been employed at least in the models of partial BI by the Green Party and the Left Alliance, and in the preliminary study for the national BI trial conducted by Kela.
In these models, BI is linked with a reform in income taxation that is designed so that radical changes in after-tax incomes will not occur in any income group. The aim is also to make the models budget neutral, that is, to cover the costs of BI by reforms in taxation and replacing the existing benefit systems. In these models, the old system will be abolished only in those parts where the level of benefits is lower than the BI.
One of the problems with the BI trial currently underway is that due to time constraints, the taxation reform proposed by the research team that designed the experiment was not included.
Will Finland implement a BI?
Though there exist BI models in Finland that would technically allow implementation of a BI system without radical changes in income distribution or public financing, the road of BI will probably be rocky even here.
The preparations of the BI experiment scheme revealed many institutional challenges in implementation of a BI model. The greatest obstacles for a BI are, however, ideological.
In Finland, BI has gained interest especially as a possibility to improve the incentives for paid work. The possibility to combine wages with social benefits more smoothly than today is an issue that no party opposes. Yet, many still find it morally wrong to give people money with no obligations. The opponents of BI fear that the “free money” would reduce people’s willingness to work and give a moral legitimacy to not apply for jobs.
If the only, or at least the most important function of BI is to improve work incentives, the great promises of BI may not be fulfilled after all. The preliminary studies for the BI trial revealed that BI models do not always unambiguously remove incentive traps, if parts of the old social security stay intact.
However, it seems likely that in Finland, as well as in other industrialised countries, the social security will be reformed in a direction that may contain some elements of BI, but not necessarily a ‘pure’ BI model.
If the political thinking emphasizing the labour supply and austerity in public economy prevail, the prospects for more generous BI models seem to be low. In the framework of current economic policies, the implementation of a BI would most probably mean at least demolishing large parts or other forms of social security.
BI as a social dividend?
The OECD report (p. 8) ends up recommending some kind of ’partial’ alternative of a BI model. One option mentioned is a possibility to introduce BI as a separate system from the existing social protection, whose function would be to share the benefits of globalisation and technological progress more equally.
This idea of ‘social dividend’ has often appeared in BI discussions. The state of Alaska is already giving an annual share of the permanent fund based on oil revenues to each citizen as a social dividend. There is similar thinking linked also to the idea of “helicopter money”, originally introduced by Milton Friedman, a cash transfer paid by the central bank to people’s accounts to stimulate consumer demand in economic downturns.
Considering BI as a social dividend would locate it in a new frame, where its function would not be to fix the problems of social security systems, but to distribute purchasing power also to those who lose their jobs or end up in low paid precarious jobs in the labour market turmoil caused by digitalization.
If BI were paid on top of other social benefits, its level could even be lower, or for instance connected to macro economy indicators. In that case, it could also be used to stimulate economies in downturns.
Johanna Perkiö
M.Soc.Sc., Doctoral Candidate
University of Tampere
email: johanna.perkio(at)uta.fi
Original article:
Johanna Perkiö, “The OECD and the problems of basic income“, Kela, June 30, 2017.
by Guest Contributor | Apr 5, 2017 | Opinion
Written by: Rahul Basu
A Universal Basic Income (UBI) is a periodic cash payment unconditionally delivered to all on an individual basis, without mean-test or work requirement. A Universal Minimum Income (UMI) would be a UBI set at a level to ensure everyone has at least a minimum income sufficient to keep body and soul together. This would engender personal freedom. If we add to this public health & education, and other targeted benefits for the disabled for example, it would be a wonderful situation. What would it take?
The math is simple. If we have to pay out a UBI at X% of average income, then it will cost at least the same X% of GDP. The proportionality is clear.
| Population x Average income |
= Total income of country (GDP) |
| Population x UBI of X% of Average income |
= X% of total income of country |
We must first establish what should be the target level of Minimum Income. A simplistic definition would be to take a percentage of average income. The idea here is that if on average citizens are earning a certain amount, then a percentage of that average could represent the poverty line. Let’s assume we set the poverty line at 60% of the average income, and target a UMI at that level.
In practical terms, the US average family income in 2015 was $92,673. A UBI of 10% would be $9,267 per family, clearly not sufficient to create personal freedom. Similarly in India, per capita income in 2016 was Rs. 93,231. A UBI at 10% would be a meager Rs. 9,323.
It could be argued that, if average income is calculated by simply dividing GDP by total population, growing inequality and robotisation will distort that average by sequestering income in the hands of the very rich, swelling the perceived average income by increasing GDP while the actual income of an average citizen remains much lower. In order to deal with this issue, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines relative poverty for developed nations as 60% of the median income level. To calculate the median, we first list every person in ascending order of income. We then find the midpoint, and the income associated with it. Finally, we calculate 60% of this income to work out the relative poverty level.
The US median family income in 2015 was $70,697, or 76% of the average income of $92,673. The relative poverty line is 60% of the median income or $42,418. This works out to 45.8% of GDP (60% * 76%). It is still completely utopian to imagine the US could pay out nearly half its GDP as a UBI.
Suppose we use the World Bank definition of extreme poverty, $1.90 per day. By simple multiplication, for the US to provide a UMI at this level would require $57 per person each month. Not quite enough to survive on, but it would still cost the US government $221bn each year (pop of 318.9 million). In the Indian context, the World Bank’s poverty line is Rs. 28.71 (at PPP exchange rate of 15.11). A UMI would pay out Rs. 10,478 per person per year, for a total of Rs. 13,119 billion a year. This is more than 10% of India’s GDP, and is 61% of India’s entire 2017 Union Budget of Rs. 21,470 billion.
The essential proportionality of a UBI as a percentage of per capita income, requiring the same percentage of GDP to finance it, creates the dilemma facing UMI. If we wish to achieve a minimum income level, then targeting seems unavoidable. We may decide to keep goal of universality (everyone receives UBI) while giving up the goal of minimum income (the amount is enough to live on). Even then, it is clear that for any meaningful level of UBI, there needs to be substantive discussion of the financing source. Even a UBI of 1% of per capita income, a small amount for most individuals, would require 1% of GDP to finance, a very significant amount for any government. A UBI of 10% of GDP would likely require an entirely new financing mechanism.
In view of this simple mathematical challenge, the Basic Income movement would be well advised to pay closer attention to the funding mechanism. The success of UBI depends on the practical and political feasibility of the funding mechanism. And if such a mechanism is found, we would still have to explain why universality is preferable to targeting. It is likely that the only successful UBIs will be those where universality is a logical, political or legal necessity. This has been the case with the two most significant examples of UBI, Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend and Iran’s UBI in lieu of fuel subsidies.
About the author: Rahul Basu is a member of the Goenchi Mati Movement, which asks for minerals to be treated as a shared inheritance. Mining is the sale of the family gold. For fair mining, there must be zero loss mining, saving all mineral money in a permanent fund, and distribute the real income only as Citizens’ Dividend.
by Tyler Prochazka | Aug 19, 2016 | News
One of the biggest objections to the universal basic income, especially from libertarians and conservatives, is that it is far too costly to implement. Among OECD countries, however, this is largely untrue.
The Economist recently unveiled a Basic Income Calculator that can illustrate how much each person could receive under a UBI by scrapping existing non-health related welfare. The United States would be able to achieve a $6,300 basic income.
To reach a $10,000 basic income, the U.S. government would need to use an additional seven percent of GDP. This would still keep the United States at welfare spending below many other OECD countries as a percentage of GDP.
Seven countries already spend more than $10,000 per person on non-health welfare and could decrease their spending under a UBI.
To see the full Economist basic income calculator, click here.
Data Team, “Daily chart: Universal basic income in the OECD”, The Economist, June 3, 2016.
by Guest Contributor | Jun 20, 2016 | Opinion
The level of Basic Income (BI) is a matter of heated debate in discussions of BI for national implementation, investigating the level at which BI would be ‘high enough’. There is also growing dispute regarding ‘partial’ vs. ’full’ BI. This was the central topic of investigation at this year’s BI conference in Maastricht in January. The following calculations, using a common formula and comparing BI levels for 24 European/OECD countries, aim to assist in the resolution of this debate.
We don’t want to make the system worse than it is. It’s logical, then, that the minimal level of BI should reach, at least, the level of current Social Assistance (SA): we could call this ‘partial’ BI. All BI proposals included in this analysis satisfy this condition.
It follows that implementation of a BI close to the level offered by the current social security system (e.g., the SA level) implies budget neutrality in countries with a more universal system.[1] This follows the argument “If we can afford our current welfare system, we can afford basic income” that Max Ghenis has well elaborated. These proposals might be socially more acceptable, given that the change would be ‘minimal’.
So, if the level of SA in a country indicates 1) the socially acceptable level of social aid and 2) the first estimation of the social welfare budget, BI at the same level would likely be the most financially and socially affordable solution, offering the shortest implementation time frame. Proposals for Slovenia[2], Hungary[3] and Finland[4] belong to this category.
On the other hand, the level of BI should be high enough to ensure a material existence and participation in society. We assume this when we argue that BI should be at least at the level of the current Poverty Threshold (PT): we could call this ’full’ BI. BI at such a level would probably fulfill the role of an emancipatory welfare system.[5] Proposals for Switzerland[6] and the Netherlands[7] fit into this second category.
The question is, how costly are lowered aspirations regarding a ‘partial’ BI level (e.g., in Slovenia, Finland and Hungary) in service of affordability and/or social acceptance in the foreseeable future? Will we achieve anything? As the microsimulation in Slovenia demonstrated, however, even a partial BI proposal (budget neutral, well below PT and above SA) proved to be: 1) better for the majority, 2) the same or better for the more vulnerable and 3) better for the lowest deciles. The Hungarian BI proposal seems to draw similar conclusions.
To serve discussion regarding the level of BI in different countries, a common formula (similar to that used for the Slovenian proposal) was used to calculate the levels of BI proposed in various countries.
Formula: BI = an average of three components:
- Social Assistance for a single person with no children: Indicates the currently acceptable minimal level of social aid (and the ‘budget’ of the current social security system).
- 1/2 of the Poverty Threshold at the point of 60% of the median income: Takes into account income distribution and the risk of poverty.
- 1/3 of average net wages: Takes into account the ‘value of work.’
A table with Basic Income calculations for 24 European and OECD countries allows us to draw comparisons across and within countries regarding: the social protection system (e.g., SA), the average wage (AW), the poverty threshold (PT), BI calculations using the same formula (both in national currencies and euro) and different BI proposals. It’s very important to note, however, that in countries where the level of SA is already higher than the BI calculation, the existing SA should be taken as a starting point. BI proposals for Finland and the Netherlands belong to this group.
Such BI calculations (that are above SA & ‘budget neutral’ & below PT) could serve BI discourse as the first benchmark:
- at which we could expect results that would be: a) better for the majority, b) the same or better for the more vulnerable and c) better for the lowest deciles;
- of the BI level calculation for countries that, as yet, have made no BI calculations;
- to evaluate competing national proposals;
- to evaluate proposals across countries;
- to evaluate existing social security systems, investigating by how much they diverge from this preferable solution;
- of common European social welfare solutions made by the people (of 99%) for the people and not from the EU elites.
Valerija Korošec: PhD in Postmodern Sociology, MSc in European Social Policy Analysis. Author of (eng) UBI Proposal in Slovenia (2012) sl. Predlog UTD v Sloveniji: Zakaj in kako?(2010). Co-editor UBI in Slovenia (2011). Member of Sekcija za promocijo UTD. Member of UBIE. Slovenian representative in BIEN. Fields of expertise: poverty, inequality, sastifaction with life, social policy anlaysis, gender equality, ‘beyond GDP’, paradigm shift, postmodernism, UTD, basic income. Slovenian. Born 1966 and raised in Maribor. Lives in Ljubljana. Employed at the Institue of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development (Government Office of Republic Slovenia). Views under my name are my own. @valerijaSlo
Footnotes:
[1] All included countries have a universal SA system, except: 1) Finland, Germany, Belgium, Estonia and Denmark, which have different levels of assistance based on employment status according to OECD statistic – in these cases it was the data for the ‘Employed’ SA level that were included; and 2) the United Kingdom, Greece and Italy, which have no scheme comparable to SA.
[2] https://basicincome.org/bien/pdf/munich2012/Korosec.pdf
[3] https://let.azurewebsites.net/upload/tanulmany.pdf (English version unavailable).
[4] https://basicincome.org/news/2015/12/finland-basic-income-experiment-what-we-know/
[5] https://basicincome-europe.org/ubie/charter-ubie/
[6] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-pay-idUSBRE9930O620131004
[7] Alexander de Roo, by mail.
