by Guest Contributor | Sep 10, 2018 | Opinion
Written by: Jonathan Brun
For many years basic income advocates have lobbied for pilot projects to demonstrate the power of giving money to all citizens. Advocates all seem to use the short-lived Dauphin, Manitoba project in the 1970s as an argument for further pilot projects. This lobbying by advocates of Basic Income led to two pilot projects – one in Finland and one in Ontario, Canada. Finland’s program will end as originally scheduled this year and will not be extended. The pilot program in Ontario was canceled before any data could be gathered. This marks a significant setback for the Basic Income movement around the world.
The purpose of these pilot projects was to gather meaningful scientific data on the effects of basic income and use that to convince the public, bureaucrats, and politicians that basic income was a feasible and logical idea. However, scientific reasoning rarely works in the public sphere. Instead, basic income projects are at risk of ending prematurely. The reason Ontario’s experiment was canceled and Finland’s pilot program was not extended was not due to financial or scientific concerns, but rather because of politics. Therein lies the problem, if basic income projects are launched by politicians, they will be shut down by political situations.
Both of these pilot projects made a fundamental mistake – they targeted poor people. The projects were designed to show the benefits of a basic income over the traditional welfare system. They were not designed to show the benefits of a basic income for a wider part of society such as students, taxpayers or elderly people. By restricting the projects to people on or near welfare levels, the projects positioned themselves as yet another welfare program for the poor. As in most countries, the hard working, tax paying middle class has limited patience for welfare recipients. This is partially due to both constricting disposable income and human nature. We have seen country after country downsize their social welfare programs in an attempt to balance budgets, gain votes or free up cash for other programs such as tax cuts. Almost no country in the past thirty years has increased the size of their welfare programs. This should be a (big) hint to basic income advocates.
It is actually quite simple, most taxpayers have limited patience for people who do not work (for money). To think otherwise is simply idealistic and not aligned with the average (voting) population. At a recent discussion on the basic income debate in Montréal, Québec, I asked the famed basic income expert Evelyn Forget how she thinks we should pay for a basic income. Her response was that we should raise taxes on corporations and on people. When I replied this seemed challenging in the current political and economic situation, she responded that it was the best way to do it and people would just have to “deal” with higher taxes.
I strongly believe that the way you finance a basic income is the defining feature of a basic income. If you finance it through taxes, it will be viewed as another social welfare program not terribly different from numerous existing programs. This is a major problem. The entire idea of basic income is that it is different from other programs. If you finance it in the same way, through tax and redistribution, you are undermining the argument that makes basic income so appealing. Basic income is supposed to break the mold, join the left and right, simplify bureaucracy and give more freedom for individuals to build up their lives. If you fund it through taxes on workers, it will be viewed (rightfully so) as a transfer from workers to non-workers.
As an analogy to basic income advocacy, we can look at advocates for affordable housing. Both groups of advocates believe that what they are proposing is a basic right and should be made readily available. In the first case, basic income advocates argue that all members of a developed nation should have a minimum level of income that assures the essentials in life. Affordable housing advocates lobby that housing is a right, not a privilege, and it should be affordable for all members of society. I agree with both, but the way you go about implementing either is fundamental to the perception of the project by the general public.
For example, affordable housing levels in most western countries has decreased as an overall percentage of the housing market. This is due to affordable housing advocates taking the same approach as many basic income advocates – namely that affordable housing is there to alleviate the stress of expensive housing and that the affordable housing should mostly benefit the less fortunate. By casting their lot in with the poor, they are severely limiting the base of their political support.
Contrast that with Vienna, Austria. In Vienna, about 50 percent of the housing stock is owned, managed and maintained by the City. Basically, 50 percent of the housing stock is a public good, not a private good. Rents are remarkably affordable for a world class city and this brings dynamism and diversity to all the neighbourhoods. However, the main reason this was possible was because both the middle class and lower economic classes have a vested interest in the success of this public housing. This much larger political base assures that affordable housing projects continue. Basic income needs to take the same approach and stop advocating for basic income pilot projects as welfare replacements or as a poverty alleviation tool. It may indeed be that, but that is not the best way to advocate for basic income.
Contrast the controversy around pilot programs with the Alaskan Dividend Fund, which was instituted in 1976. The fund remains tremendously popular and has little risk of disappearing. Why? Because everyone gets it! No pilot project was done prior to the institution of the Alaskan dividend fund and no negative effects have emerged post-implementation. If there is one path forward for basic income, it is through the implementation of a lower level of basic income, but that goes to everyone – especially hard-working taxpayers who vote.
Basic income should think strategically about how they plan to convince the average person to vote for a basic income. It may take a distinct political party (for another post) or a clear advocate of basic income such as Andrew Yang in the United States, who has placed basic income at the center of his presidential campaign. No matter how you look at it, trying to get basic income to become a reality through the path of replacing or supplementing welfare payments is a doomed idea that will never work. Get the middle class on your side and basic income advocates can win this political battle.
Jonathan Brun, Cofounder Revenu de base Québec.
Slight edits by Tyler Prochazka.
Originally posted here: Basic Income Pilot Projects Won’t Work
by BIKN Korea | Feb 15, 2018 | Opinion
South Korea’s government included an expenditure to design potential models for a basic income experiment into the budget for 2018. It shows that government and politicians in South Korea have started to consider basic income as a significant and unavoidable policy.
Against this backdrop, BIKN held a conference under the title of “Why we need a basic income experiment: The necessity of BI and significance of a BI experiment” on Jan. 23, 2017, which was co-sponsored by the Democratization of Economy Forum of the National Assembly.
Four speakers came to propose potential basic income models for Korea and to make a critical evaluation of the experiments that have already been carried out or will soon begin in other countries or regions.
Professor Seo (Gunsan National University) said the existing social security system is based on an employment-contract relation, revealing the limitations of highlighting the qualitative change of work into “flexible” employment. We need to form new strategies to face the current situation and we constructed three possible options.
The first strategy is an expansion strategy that seeks to expand the legal nature of employees considering their actual conditions. The second is to shift the basis of social insurances from employment-based social insurances to income-based ones. Finally, we could consider the basic income strategy. Professor Seo said that the first strategy, a kind of legal approach, has two drawbacks which does not keep up with the actual changes in the economy and is subject to many blind spots. Although, such a strategy could be helpful in the short-term. The second strategy is limited because it is still based on labor-related income. So she maintained that the basic income strategy is the most effective in the “workless” future.
Professor Baek (Catholic University), stood upon the same understanding of the current situation as Professor Seo. Seo brought attention to the transition to a welfare state centered on basic income in his presentation, “Precarious Work and Basic Income for Young People.” In the first he suggested the ideal method of transition is comprised of eight stages: 1) rational adjustment of the existing social security system; 2) implementation of new categories of social assistance programs such as unemployment allowance; 3) strengthening social allowances for children, the elderly, and people with disabilities; 4) introduction of a social benefit for young people; 5) implementation of participation income; 6) expansion of the coverage of age groups in age-related categorical allowances; 7) introduction of a low-level basic income which integrates a few social allowances; 8) implementing a full basic income. For this, he maintained that the most useful and effective method is to introduce a basic income for young people first, after he highlighted the insecurity of young people in Korea (unstable employment, low wages and exclusion from social insurances).
Dr. Park (Chungnam Institute) proposed a Farmer’s Basic Income or Rural Residents’ BI in “Requirement of Farmer’s (Rural Residents) BI and Introduction Plan.” His starting point is that the income of farmer’s household has steadily decreased, and the existing subsidy has a serious drawback. In 2016, the average earning of a farmer’s household is 63.5 percent of an urban worker’s one, which has undermined the foundation of agriculture. And the subsidy is paid in proportion to the arable acreage, which causes disadvantages to petty farmers. In fact, the total size of the subsidy is too small. Dr. Park proposed the Farmer’s BI or Rural Residents’ BI to enhance the public value of agriculture and to secure the income of a farmer’s household.
Professor You (Australian National University) proposed the principles and direction that should be the basis of a BI experiment in Korea, while examining the basic income experiments or similar ones carried out across the world. He found that the experiments could be a foundation for discussing implementation of BI, even though they have limitations. He proposed that we need to make comprehensive and long-term design for a BI experiment to whatever extent possible. To produce such a design, two features would be required: close cooperation with government and a wide range of expert participation.
The South Korea government will post the program to design BI experiments to which BIKN will apply with other academics and experts. It will be an opportunity to spread the legitimation and necessity of BI widely, even if BI is not implemented in a short timeframe in Korea.
Hyosang Ahn, Executive Director of BIKN
Edited by: Tyler Prochazka
by Guest Contributor | Dec 27, 2017 | Opinion
We know that basic income has risen dramatically in the public consciousness and also up the political agenda in the last two to three years. How has this been achieved? The academic literature offers theoretical explanations but no empirical evidence from any of the existing pilot projects. Therefore, I carried out research in four of the locations undertaking pilot studies, Finland, Scotland, the Netherlands and Ontario, to understand how basic income was legitimised as a policy, what problems they hope to address, and how the interpretation and implementation of basic income varies between them.
Through interviews with policymakers, experts and advocates involved in these pilots and in the promotion of basic income in these countries, I discovered a great deal of similarity in the factors which have allowed basic income onto policy agendas. Some have occurred by accident, some through long-term advocacy and political lobbying, and some through economic change. Importantly, these factors occurred at similar points in time, enabling them to interact and strengthen each other.
In all four of the pilot locations interviewees described how long-term support and advocacy for basic income has allowed public and political opinion about the idea to develop over time. Alongside this, long-standing problems such as unemployment and poverty have proved extremely difficult to address, and dissatisfaction with existing policies has grown. Interviewees explained how anxieties about the changing nature of work and the inability of social security systems to properly adapt to this new world have led increasing numbers of people to look to basic income as a radical alternative. Existing systems are seen as delivering poor outcomes, stigmatising those in poverty and being overly complex and bureaucratic. The assessment of basic income as a holistic and intersectional policy, capable of delivering multiple outcomes, was cited by several interviewees as reinforcing the desire to implement a pilot. Each pilot study aims for a range of positive impacts, both economic and social, pragmatic and ethical.
Interviewees in all four of the pilot locations reported high levels of public debate and engagement with the idea of basic income, and this appears to have been crucial in legitimising it as an idea . Public interest reached a critical mass, which, coupled with other factors, prompted political action. These pilot studies have not been developed solely by civil servants in a bureaucratic bubble but have been strongly influenced by campaigners, basic income advocates and experts from think tanks and academia. Evidence from the interviews shows that formal and informal coalitions and collaborations between these different groups has helped to shore up support and consolidate basic income as a legitimate policy.
Interviews in all of the pilot areas noted a context of growing interest in evidence-based social policy, and each pilot is framed as an experiment, not necessarily the precursor to a full roll-out of basic income. In Finland for example, both advocates and opponents of basic income supported setting up the pilot in order to evaluate if basic income can live up to its promises. The emphasis on experimentation was an important factor in enabling the Finnish pilot to take place but also meant that it does not necessarily signal deep political or social change.
It should be noted at this point that none of the pilot studies that are running (Finland, Netherlands, Ontario) are experimenting with a ‘full’ basic income: a universal, non means-tested payment with no obligations or conditions attached, paid regardless of other income.
Each study retains some element of conditionality, targeting or an earnings cap, above which the basic income payment is reduced. A clean break with existing policies and paradigms of social security has not been achieved or indeed attempted for the most part. Interviewees discussed political, bureaucratic, and experimental pressures that led to compromises in the scope and ambition of their pilots. These compromises appear to have been critical in allowing the pilots to take place, as they resulted in proposals that were deemed to be politically and experimentally acceptable. At a detailed level, each of the pilots look very different in how they were designed, whom they target, and how they operate; local influences proved powerful in translating the core concepts of basic income into operational models.
These compromises could be considered as a de-radicalisation of basic income, and have resulted in a curious situation in which pilots are not testing a ‘full’ basic income but have retained the basic income ‘brand’. This appears to be a presentational issue; many interviewees described a desire amongst politicians to demonstrate innovation, leadership and radical thinking, and basic income was seen as a way to do this. Retaining the basic income ‘brand’ even though the experiments deviate in important ways from the core ethical and economic values of basic income confers a positive light on those involved and attracts international attention.
When look at their specifics, each pilot in the study is different, influenced by myriad local factors. However, each pilot demonstrates striking similarities in the clustering of a number of factors that have allowed basic income onto the political agenda. Broad agreement on the importance of tackling poverty and unemployment, and the steady rise in public interest in basic income coupled with a desire for evidence-based policy and the hope that basic income could tackle multiple problems. As a small-scale, qualitative study, these findings cannot be considered a ‘how-to’ guide for other places hoping to develop their own pilot project but may prove useful in understanding how a radical idea such as basic income can find a place in mainstream policy.
Anna Dent is a consultant working in employment and skills policy and implementation for the public and non-profit sectors. She has particular interests in low-income workers, the changing nature of work, and welfare benefits. She holds an (Master of Science) in Public Policy from the University of Bristol, and is a fellow of the RSA (Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufacturing and Commerce).
by Michael Lewis | Sep 18, 2017 | Opinion
Michael A. Lewis
I recently read Kate McFarland’s very informative overview of several basic income “experiments.” The quotes are around that last word in my previous sentence because, as McFarland notes, not all these projects are truly experiments, at least not if the word “experiment” is being used the way it is in the social and biomedical sciences. As we use this term in the social sciences, an experiment is a study with the following features:
- Study participants or a cluster of them are randomly assigned to at least two groups
- At least one of the groups is a treatment group, while at least one is a control group
- The treatment group receives the intervention of interest, while the control group does not receive intervention.
Feature one above is key.
What random assignment does is make it very likely that the treatment and control groups will be balanced. “Balanced” roughly means that the distribution of variables related to both the intervention and outcome of interest are the same across treatment and control groups. So if after the data are analyzed we find a difference in the outcomes between treatment and control groups, we can attribute such a difference to the intervention of interest.
The random assignment feature is why Eight’s study in Uganda, as McFarland points out, has limited “usefulness as an experiment.” I think it is fair to say in fact, that social scientists would not consider what Eight is doing an experiment at all. I am not saying that Eight’s study has no usefulness whatsoever. It may be useful when it comes to keeping BI “in the spotlight” and, thereby, help to maintain attention on this movement. For those of us who, at least in principle, like the idea of a basic income, this is a good thing. But we should be careful when it comes to considering what we can learn from the Uganda “experiment.”
The study in Uganda is usually called a pre-test/post-test study. In such studies, measures are taken before an intervention of interest (the pre-test part), after the intervention is implemented (the post-test part), and then these “before and after” measures are compared to one another. If certain changes are observed, these may be attributed to the intervention in question. The problem with such studies is that we do not know what would have happened to the group which received the intervention had it not received it. Maybe the observed changes in the relevant measures would have occurred even if there had been no intervention. The reason we want control groups in experiments is to allow researchers to estimate what would have happened to the group that received the intervention had it not received it. Without a control group, the Uganda study simply may not tell us much about the effects of the cash grants they are testing.
The third feature above has to do with the intervention of interest. This is very pertinent to the experiments McFarland wrote about, as well as BI experiments in general. Following BIEN, McFarland defines BI as “a periodic cash payment unconditionally delivered to all on an individual basis, without means-test or work requirement.” As I read her piece, I thought she was interpreting this definition to mean that if a policy provides a cash payment, exactly as spelled out in the definition, but also decreases the payment if a recipient obtains an income from selling their labor, then such a policy wouldn’t be a basic income. Alaska has no income tax, but it does have the Permanent Fund Dividend. Since it gives folks the dividend but does not tax any of it back in the form of an income/earnings tax, its grant would be an example of a basic income. But if the U.S. or any other nation, granted people money unconditionally, periodically, on an individual basis, and without a means test but also taxed all sources of income, including earnings, then that country would not have a basic income. This may seem like a mere semantic point, having nothing to do with BI experiments. But I think it is incredibly relevant.
McFarland makes it clear that some places are assessing the effects of a BI as defined by BIEN. Others are testing the effects of programs similar to BI, as defined by BIEN, but with the added feature of a decrease in the BI grant if someone works. I think she refers to this as a guaranteed minimum income.
I suspect that if the U.S. ever did anything like a BI, it would be this guaranteed minimum income version. I think this is because of the vulnerability of a BI, as McFarland defines it, to what I call the “Bill Gates objection”—why give really rich people more money? If one can respond that rich people will not be net recipients because they would pay more in income taxes than they would receive in the BI, this might be a viable response to the objection.
If I am right about this, then studies like the one in Finland, which focuses on a BI, might not tell those of us in the U.S., or in other nations following a similar course, as much as we would hope. That is because the effects of a BI might differ from the effects of a guaranteed minimum income. As an example, if one could get a BI and keep all their earnings without any loss in the amount of their BI grant, such a policy could have a different effect on labor supply than one which would curtail the grant when income from earnings increased. All this means that BI supporters who get enthusiastic about findings from BI experiments ought to take a moment to see if what was studied is what they actually have in mind.
About the author:
Michael A. Lewis is a social worker and sociologist by training whose areas of interest are public policy and quantitative methods. He’s also a co-founder of USBIG and has written a number of articles, book chapters, and other pieces on the basic income, including the co-edited work The Ethics and Economics of the Basic Income Guarantee. Lewis is on the faculties of the Silberman School of Social Work at Hunter College and the Graduate and University Center of the City University of New York.
by Andrew Sisk | Mar 31, 2017 | News
A cash-transfer experiment in was initiated in Finland at the beginning of 2017. In the experiment, the country’s social security agency, Kela, will pay €560 ($600) a month guaranteed for two years to 2,000 Finns, unemployed when the program began.
Chris Weller, profiles five participants in the program in an article for BUSINESS INSIDER. In this “modified version of Basic Income” participants are not told how to spend the funds they receive, nor will the payments be reduced if they get a job or start trading online currencies with a Bitcoin Trader mit Risiken verbunden?
For the full article:
Chris Weller, “Finland just launched a radical experiment in giving people free money — here’s how 5 residents are using their extra cash”, (March 7, 2017)
