by Andre Coelho | Jan 21, 2019 | News
Road in rural India. Picture credit to: India TV.
Farmers in India are under considerable stress. Uncertainty regarding weather, yield, prices and revenue, create the perfect conditions for distress and fragility over the exposure to shark lenders. That also means that massive hunger is a risk just around the corner, and in a year of elections in India, its rural population (about 70% of total population) is repeatedly targeted for campaign purposes. Loan waivers, for instance, have been a pet political tool for election purposes, even though waivers haven’t traditionally helped small or marginal farmers (around 80% of all farmers).
To counteract this state of affairs, some states in India start to take matters in their own hands. The province of Telangana has been the first Indian state to provide and unconditional cash transfer to farmers. This, the decision of the Sikkim state to go forward with basic income implementation, experimentations popping up in several parts of the world (e.g.: Germany, Ukraine, United States, Spain), and some political support for basic income over central government in New Dehli, particularly after the 2016-2017 economic survey and its famous chapter on basic income, leads to renewed conversations in India.
In programs like this one, provocatively titled as “Government mulls universal basic income, is India ready for income for all?”, obstacles to basic income seem more in number and in size, than opportunities and benefits it can potentially provide. TV pundits take turns at criticizing the idea: it disincentivizes work, it is unaffordable, it is vague and populist, it cannot possibly be a replacement for long-time and traditional forms of help to those in need. However, simultaneously, some high placed economists and politicians see at least some advantages and viability in a basic income for all Indians, or directed to certain population cohorts (such as farmers). The dice are rolling.
Sarath Davala. Picture credit to: BIEN
Sarath Davala, coordinator at India Network for Basic Income (INBI), has written on Facebook: “Increasingly I am beginning to think that India could be the first country to take the plunge into a kind of Targeted Basic Income. It won’t be universal, but it will certainly be unconditional. The initiative is more likely to come from the provinces”. Guy Standing, also a long-time activist and researcher on basic income and someone who has been deeply involved in the Indian (basic income) experiments, has also pronounced himself at the onset of India’s first steps towards this revolutionary policy: “The beauty of moving towards a modest basic income would be that all groups would gain. That would not preclude special additional support for those with special needs, nor be any threat to a progressive welfare state in the long-term. It would merely be an anchor of a 21st century income distribution system. Will the politicians show the will to implement it? We need to see”.
More information at:
“Why Telangana gave cheques to farmers instead of direct transfer”, rediff Business, May 11th 2018
André Coelho, “India: Sikkim state is on the verge of becoming the first place on Earth implementing a basic income”, Basic Income News, January 11th 2019
Guy Standing, “Basic income works and works well”, The Hindu, January 14th 2019
by Andre Coelho | Jan 11, 2019 | News
Flowers, on the way to the mountain. Picture credit to: Rookie’s Journal
Sikkim, the second smallest state in India, has grown a reputation, over the years, for environmental consciousness, ethnical diversity and tourism. It is also the home of one of the most educated people on Earth, with a 98% literacy rate. Moreover, in the last couple of decades, policies in the state have been implemented in order to reduce poverty, which presently sits below 8% (from a 41,4% in 1994). The Sikkim Democratic Front (SDF), the democratically elected party governing the state since 1994, has written basic income into its manifesto for the 2019 Assembly elections, and aims to have it implemented by 2022.
SDF’s MP in New Dehli’s Lower House of Representatives (Lok Sabha), Prem Das Rai, has said that “our party and Chief Minister Pawan Chamling (…) are committed to bringing in Universal Basic Income. This, we will do three years of coming back to power in the state”. This initiative is not intended as a pilot test, but as an actual implementation, hence Prem Das Rai words: “Basically, it’s an income given to families irrespective what do they do. In Sikkim, it will be for everyone and every household.”
As for financing the basic income scheme, SDF officials are considering surplus energy generation revenue (from hydropower) and redirecting costs from welfare programs which cease to be relevant. Restructuring the tax edifice and using tourism revenues are also future financing routes to cover for basic income. In any case, Prem Das Rai is confident that this is “not just a feasible idea, but a very positive idea”.
About this issue, basic income activist Scott Santens has written, on Twitter: “What makes this news so big in my opinion is the fact they’re talking about full universality, unlike what’s being discussed at the national level right now, where cash may be targeted to the poorest 33% of the country and thus not actual UBI. This news out of Sikkim is actual UBI.”
More information at:
Liz Mathew, “Sikkim says it will become first state to roll out Universal Basic Income”, The India Express, January 10th 2019
André Coelho, “India: 2019 General Elections and basic income”, Basic Income News, January 9th 2019
by Andre Coelho | Jan 9, 2019 | News
Indian woman worker with spectacles. Picture credit to: Sarah Day
New ideas seem to be running dry in the Indian political context. Within Congress, Government (BJP – Bharatiya Janata Party) and opposition parties (ex.: AAP – Aam Aadmi Party). Tweaking with the minimum support prices for food production and/or with the multiplicity of welfare programs is not going to substantially change rural population’s main concern, which is declining real wages (purchasing power after adjustment for price variations). These have been steadily falling since 2014, ever since the BJP came to power, which means that to stay too focused on the former issues will not probably get BJP reelected this year. Also farm loan waivers (credit write off) has been used as a political tool, especially by the opposition (mostly center and left-wing) parties, given the high indebtedness rates of rural families (over 50%) and their dependency on predatory lenders (also over 50%).
However, according to political analyst Saubhik Chakrabarti, from The Economic Times, loan waiver is not going to be decisive for these next elections, even though it has been flagged by the opposition in regional suffrage (which has won three states from BJP). This decisiveness might very well come from pushing the basic income policy, an old new idea that has been hot in India ever since the 2016-2017 Economic Survey Report featured a whole chapter to it. And this applies to both parties / coalitions with a shot at forming a government in 2019, because what really impacts real wages is not topping crop prices or forever trying to fix a broken welfare distribution system (very complex and prone to corruption). A real difference may come from directly and unconditionally giving people what they need the most, economically: money.
Even though there will be no time to properly design, let alone implement a basic income scheme regionally – and even less likely a national implementation – before this year’s elections (latest in May), Chakrabarti suggests that one or more pilot tests could be tried out. According to him, that could be done “in chosen districts, accompanied by a blaze of political publicity, [being] enough to take to voters, with the promise that re-election will lead to an across-India UBI program.”
More information at:
Saubhik Chakrabarti, “Doling out a universal basic income scheme may be Narendra Modi’s best chance to win 2019 mandate”, The Economic Times, 24th December 2018
“Farm loan waiver: How to nip it in the bud”, The Economic Times, 7th January 2019
Kate McFarland, “India: Government Economic Survey presents case for basic income”, Basic Income News, February 4th 2017
by Sarath Davala | Jan 6, 2019 | Opinion
Written by: Sarath Davala [1]
In the last two weeks, there has been much speculation in some sections of media about Prime Minister Narendra Modi seriously considering Universal Basic Income (UBI) as a policy option. This comes on the heels of the electoral debacle Modi’s party faced in the recent elections in four states, and coincidentally just months ahead of the 2019 parliamentary elections.
This is the second wave of interest the current government has shown toward the idea of Universal Basic Income (UBI). The first wave was in early 2017 when the then Chief Economic Advisor to the Government of India, Dr. Arvind Subramanian, included a substantial chapter [2] on UBI in his annual Economic Survey (2016-17) which was presented to the Indian Parliament. The chapter explored the concept of UBI and observed that it could be a way forward to address poverty. Subramanian stated that a full-fledged UBI may not be feasible in India immediately, though it was possible to think of a Quasi UBI (QUBI) which would identify specific demographic groups in the population and give them an unconditional basic income. One of his speculations was that a QUBI could be to all women citizens, which would ensure that every household will receive a basic income. The discussion within the government did not proceed beyond this point, apparently as the Prime Minister was not convinced at that time of the political dividends flowing from this policy route.
The immediate trigger for the second wave of interest in basic income is the recent elections in the states of Telangana, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. At the time of these elections, the financial crisis affecting farmers became center-stage and the Congress party promised that they would waive farm loans as soon as they came to power. And they did so when they took charge of three states.
In the state of Telangana, the ruling party TRS went a step further by implementing several months before the elections a scheme called Rythu Bandhu, (Farmer Investment Support) which gives to the farmers Rs. 8000 (USD $115)[3] per acre per annum[4]. The cutting edge of the scheme is that it is unconditional, a feature that is considered central to the idea of basic income. Irrespective of whether farmers take up cultivation or not, the investment will be transferred to the farmers. The scheme benefited about 5.8 million farmers who own a total of 14 million acres of cultivable land in Telangana.
In 2017, responding to farmers’ agitation in the state, the Madhya Pradesh government implemented a different kind of scheme for farmers. It was called Bhavantar Bhugtan Yojana (BBY) which originally intended to pay farmers the net difference between the actual sale price and the Minimum Support Price announced by the government. Subsequently, however, the government introduced the notion of a modal rate which is the average of the sale price of a given crop sold in Madhya Pradesh on any given day, and in markets of two other neighboring states.
Both the schemes ran into controversy, particularly the latter. Regarding the Rythu Bandhu scheme, the criticism was that the scheme does not give any benefit to the tenant farmers who actually cultivate the land. Secondly, the scheme was criticized as regressive since it was paying rich farmers as well. The government then appointed J-PAL, a reputed international group based in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the United States to monitor and evaluate the scheme. In the initial survey conducted by it after the first round of transfers were made in June 2018 revealed that most cheques were for less than Rs.20,000 (USD $287), and only 0.8% of the farmers received more than Rs.50,000 (USD $718). A follow-up survey by J-PAL revealed that farmers spent the money judiciously with over 77% purchasing crop inputs, and 92% percent saying that they were satisfied with the scheme.
The Madhya Pradesh scheme was criticized because it brought in the notion of a modal rate which was far above the actual sale price. Ordinary farmers, who were unaware of the critical distinction between the actual sale price and the modal price, were in for a shock. Assuming the government would compensate them the difference between MSP and Sale Price, many of them also made distress sale of their produce and then realized that they would get much less compensation. Disappointed with this conditionality, many farmers were unwilling to sign up for the subsequent crop. This was not the only conditional aspect of this policy. The sale must take place during a prescribed window of three months. There was a cap on the volume that a farmer can get compensated per hectare. There was also a proposal that if a farmer sells his produce for less than 50% of the MSP, he becomes ineligible since it is the poor quality of his produce that is the reason for the low sale price, and that government should not compensate the farmer for producing low quality produce. And lastly, the scheme was applicable to only seven specific crops.
It appears that these two schemes and the farm loan waivers are the three primary options that the central government is discussing in order to find an effective response to the distress farmers all over the country are experiencing. Let us consider each one of them.
First, the loan waivers. All the three new Congress governments have announced loan waivers within days after assuming power. Even as these announcements have been taking place, experts from different locations have criticized loan waivers as harmful to the economy. Following these announcements by the new Congress governments, the former RBI Governor Dr. Raghuram Rajan released a document entitled ‘An Economic Strategy for India’ which he co-authored with 12 other well-known economists including the IMF Chief Economist Gita Gopinath and Sajjid Chinoy of JP Morgan, among others. The report advises the government to “… eschew loan waivers that divert resources from needed investment.” Arvind Subramanian in a recent interview severely criticized farm loan waivers as “an inefficient, retrograde and even perverse method of addressing farmers’ distress”. He further added that nearly 50% of the small and marginal farmers cannot and do not borrow from formal banks and they are completely left out of this mode of addressing farmers’ issues. Dr. Urjit Patel who had recently resigned as the RBI governor criticized farm loan waivers as corrupting the credit culture in the country. Addressing his party workers in Karnataka, PM Modi himself called Karnataka government’s farm loan waivers as a “cruel joke on farmers”, and that it benefits only a handful of farmers.
It is clear the farm loan waiver is not likely to be part of PM Modi’s new grand electoral narrative. This now brings us to the other two options. Between the two, the Rythu Bandhu seems to be a clear winner not just because of the electoral gains that the TRS party reaped from its introduction. It is because of certain essential features it has that are unique and demonstrate a clear transformation in the very grammar of welfare policymaking in India.
Firstly, it is an entitlement without having numerous conditionalities. The only conditionality is that the recipient must have a clear title. The curse of various welfare schemes in India is that each one comes with innumerable conditionalities thereby giving extraordinary discretion to inspectors who administer it. Rythu Bandhu makes a departure from this welfare practice. This is based on the assumption that any support given by the government must be given only to the deserving and that we need to ensure that it is spent only for the purpose it is given. Who deserves and who does not is decided by the government. And so is the purpose. Secondly, Rythu Bandhu is a proactive policy and not relief after the calamity has occurred. In fact, some economists such as Ashok Gulati, Arvind Subramanian, Bimal Jalan, etc., have said that it could be a potential agricultural policy for the entire country. The main point is that it is defined as an investment rather than welfare. Thirdly, because it is unconditional and a cash transfer, it is very easy to deliver. The record of delivery of Rythu Bandhu has been very impressive. Except in those cases where the land ownership is in dispute, the majority of farmers in the state have received cash in their bank accounts.
In addition to these innovative features, the TRS government has also added an additional scheme to all farmers called Rythu Bima, a life insurance scheme which provides coverage of Rs. 500,000 (USD $7,179). The annual premium of Rs.2272 (USD $33) per farmer is to be paid entirely by the state government.
This is this grand electoral moment that PM Modi is facing. What is he likely to do? Given that farmers have become quite vocal and that there is hardly any time before the Model Code of Conduct would come into operation around March 2019, he must respond in some form in the interim budget. Most likely, he will implement some version of Rythu Bandhu in combination with an insurance scheme for farmers. While this cannot be called a true UBI, it does carry the spirit of the idea of basic income because of its unconditionality. Normally we would be inclined to dismiss this is an electoral gimmick. We should not forget that in an electoral democracy, change comes in a clumsy way. We must be clear when we are positively moving forward and when we are not. In this case, the Indian political parties are embracing the spirit of basic income. This shift in India’s policy grammar should be seen as a welcome move in our journey to build a better society.
[1] Sarath Davala is the Vice-Chair of BIEN and Coordinator of India Network for Basic Income (INBI).
[2] Universal basic Income: A Conversation with and within the Mahatma
[3] To make sense of these amounts, it is useful to know that the rural poverty line in India is defined on the basic of per capita expenditure, which is half a dollar a day.
[4] This amount will be disbursed twice in a year, one just before Rabi crop season and one before the Kharif crop season.
by Daniele Fabbri | Jan 1, 2019 | Research
Credit Picture to: The Open University
A new paper, “Myth-Busting? Confronting Six Common Perceptions about Unconditional Cash Transfers as a Poverty Reduction Strategy in Africa”, based upon evidence collected in eight Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) over a decade, presents evidence in favor of Unconditional Cash Transfers (UTCs) in Low and Middle Income Countries (LMICs).
Using experimental and quasi-experimental evaluations of large scale UTCs in SSA, conducted in collaboration with the Transfer Project, which sees the participation of UNICEF, FAO, The University of North Carolina, national governments and local research partners, the paper collects evidence regarding six common misconceptions about UTCs and refutes them: 1) UTCs induce higher spending on alcohol or tobacco; 2) UTCs are fully consumed (rather than invested); 3) UTCs create dependency (reduce participation in productive work); 4) UTCs targeted to households with young children increase fertility; 5) UTCs lead to negative community-level economic impacts (including price distortion and inflation); 6) UTCs are fiscally unsustainable.
1) UTCs induce higher spending on alcohol or tobacco
A common argument against UTCs is that they would lead to spending on superfluous goods, as alcohol, tobacco, or drugs, which are sometimes called “compensatory bads”.
The argument is largely based upon anecdotal evidence, spurring from the fear that cash would be administered improperly and wasted, and would lead to the prioritization of in-kind transfers. The paper found that as the household expenditure allocated on food and other items increased, spending on alcohol and tobacco didn’t.
2) UTCs are fully consumed (rather than invested)
Being transfers unconditional, the fear may arise that they are immediately consumed, and that they do not stimulate longer term planning and investment in productive activities and human capital.
Noticing that the cash transfers were administered in locations where the populations is well below the poverty line, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that much of the transfer is used to cover basic needs, which in turns ensures the maintenance and a form of stimulus to human capital development.
Even as the role of direct expenditure is substantial, the paper finds that UTCs have positive effects on the productivity indicators chosen as representative of investments, stimulating crop and livestock activities.
3) UTCs create dependency (reduce participation in productive work)
A common perception that is based upon the longstanding discourse on welfare dependency, fears that gave birth to the concept of workfare in the sixties and that grew under Reaganism and Thatcherism.
The idea is that poor families receiving cash transfers would become lazy and lose the incentive to work, when it isn’t laziness in the first place to create poverty. The allegations of welfare dependency thus stem from a sort of moral high ground, the implication being that poverty is somehow “deserved” and that the poor are not willing to work in order to better their condition once they receive the transfer.
We have seen formerly that UTCs influence investments, it is thus certain that they do affect household decision making in labor allocation, i.e. how receivers participate to the labor market; but labor force participation rate as exemplified by the chosen indicators showed no significant impact of transfers on labor supply.
4) UTCs targeted to households with young children increase fertility
Policymakers often sustain that Cash Transfers conditional to motherhood and having young children will have the unintended effect of increasing fertility rates.
The concern is even more severe for SSA, the last region to start experiencing the demographic transition.
Given that Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) are the instrument of choice to foster higher fertility rates in OECD countries, the implications for their application look unavoidable; nonetheless the study found no instance in which a government UCTs increased fertility in SSA. Rather, the evidence suggests that UTCs have in some instances increased birth spacing and delayed pregnancies among young women.
5) UTCs lead to negative community-level economic impacts (including price distortion and inflation)
This fear stems from the idea that isolated cash injections would have a one-sided effect and only stimulate the demand side, whilst having no impact on the supply side. This would lead to detrimental effects, namely price distortion and inflation, devaluating the transfer and affecting also non-beneficiaries, which would find themselves facing higher prices.
The study found no evidence of inflationary effects, which can be explained by three factors: the relatively small share of UTCs beneficiaries (20% of the households); the sum of the transfer, which while substantial for the poor recipient it’s just a tiny proportion of the total cash flow of the community; the supply side is elastic, and there is enough market inter-connectivity for production to match increases in demand.
Theory suggests that UTC could be used to overcome market failures, functioning as a stimulus to pro-poor productivity and having net positive impact on local economies. Positive spillovers should manifest and affect non-beneficiaries, as a result of the stimulus to aggregate demand.
Local economy simulations indicate that UTCs generates positive effects on the local economy, with every dollar injected in the economy via the transfer causing nominal multiplier effects ranging from 1.27 in Malawi to 2.52 in Ethiopia.
6) UTCs are fiscally unsustainable
Once UTCs end their experimentation phase and are institutionalized, there is diffused concern that the administrative costs are too high. The fear is that the medium or long-term maintenance of the programs is fiscally unsustainable, and supposedly high administrative costs have been cited as one of the main reasons for not adopting UTCs.
The cost-transfer ratio (CTR) is the indicator generally used to measure the cost-efficiency of the programs. The CTR depends largely on the time at which it is measured; at the beginning of the programs there are large, fixed, start-up costs which weigh heavily on the ratio, representing a large part of the total costs in the first period. The start-up costs combine with the lack of economies of scale, which require times to be attained.
Using estimates of the CTRs for the programs of the Transfer Project, accounting for the scale-up effects and correcting for the start-up, lump sum costs, the study found that cash transfers at scale as a percentage of current spending and GDP are feasible and fully within the cost considerations of any national government. The expenditure for UTCs as a percentage of general government expenditures would have an average of 4.4 percent across countries, but could decrease of the 37% if the program was limited to the rural areas.
“…we have drawn on cross-country evaluation data to summarize evidence on six common perceptions that we believe hold back political acceptance of such programs. While the political context is such that these perceptions will need to be tested in each specific program in order to be fully internalized, we hope that the growing body of evidence, including that presented inthis paper, will permit more evidence-based rather than ideologically-based debates around cash transfers in LMICs”
More information at:
Sudhanshu Handa, Silvio Daidone, Amber Peterman, Benjamin Davis, Audrey Pereira, Tia Palermo, Jennifer Yablonski, “Myth-Busting? Confronting Six Common Perceptions about Unconditional Cash Transfers as a Poverty Reduction Strategy in Africa“, The World Bank Research Observer, Volume 33, Issue 2, 1 August 2018, Pages 259–298
