Jurgen De Wispelaere and Lindsay Stirton, “When Basic Income Meets Professor Pangloss”

Jurgen De Wispelaere and Lindsay Stirton, “When Basic Income Meets Professor Pangloss”

Jurgen De Wispelaere (Visiting Research Fellow at the University of Tampere) and Lindsay Stirton (Professor of Public Law at the University of Sussex) have coauthored a new article in which they argue that basic income advocates must not ignore questions about how the policy is to be administered (“When Basic Income Meets Professor Pangloss: Ignoring Public Administration and Its Perils”).

De Wispelaere and Stirton consider several reasons for which basic income supporters believe that issues of administration are immaterial, such as the assumption that technology will render administration unproblematic and the comparative claim that administering a basic income could not be more difficult than administering conditional benefits. The authors find such justifications insufficient, maintaining that the challenges of administering a basic income are non-trivial, and that their resolution can impact the political feasibility and even ethicality of a basic income proposal.

The article has been published in the British political journal The Political Quarterly.

 

Jurgen De Wispelaere and Lindsay Stirton, “When Basic Income Meets Professor Pangloss: Ignoring Public Administration and Its Perils,” The Political Quarterly, December 14, 2016.

Abstract:

Basic income advocates propose a model that they believe will dramatically improve on current welfare programmes by alleviating poverty, reducing involuntary unemployment and social exclusion, redistributing care work, achieving a better work–life balance, and so on. Whether these expected social effects materialise in practice critically depends on how the model is implemented, but on this topic the basic income debate remains largely silent. Few advocates explicitly consider questions of implementation, and those that do are typically dismissive of the administrative challenges of implementing a basic income and critical (even overtly hostile) towards bureaucracy. In this contribution we briefly examine (and rebut) several reasons that have led basic income advocates to ignore administration. The main peril of such neglect, we argue, is that it misleads basic income advocates into a form of Panglossian optimism that risks causing basic income advocacy to become self-defeating.


Post reviewed by Danny Pearlberg

Photo: Scene from theatrical production of Candide (Pangloss on viewer’s left), CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 shakespearetheatreco.

VIDEO: Officials at Finnish Social Insurance Institution explain Finland’s basic income trial

Videos of two lectures on Finland’s basic income pilot are now available online. The lectures, delivered by Marjukka Turunen and Olli Kangas of Kela, were originally aired as part of a public event on Finland’s “social innovations”.

As previously announced in Basic Income News, Kela, the Social Insurance Institution of Finland, held a series of short lectures called “Socially Innovative Finland” on January 12, 2017. The event, which was open to the public and streamed lived online, highlighted two “social innovations” from Kela: the eight-decade-old maternity package, under which all mothers-to-be receive a package of child necessities, and the two-year basic income experiment launched this year. Two speakers, Marjukka Turunen (Head of Legal Affairs Unit) and Olli Kangas (Director of Government and Community Relations), discussed the basic income experiment and fielded a variety of questions from the live and online audiences.

Olli Kangas: “Basic income – Part of tomorrow’s social security?”

Kangas situates Finland’s basic income experiment in its political and economic context: the center-right government that took office in May 2015 decided to investigate a basic income as a way to remove the disincentives to work and reduce the bureaucracy inherent in Kela’s current programs of unemployment compensation; meanwhile, changes in the labor force underscored the need for a revised system of social security.

Kangas describes the rise of short-term labor contract labor and the threat of automation as general sources of motivation for basic income. Then, focusing specifically on the Finnish context, he discusses the country’s increase in self-employment as well as its high rate of structural unemployment. He goes on to explain how Finland’s current welfare system can creates a disincentive to work. In some cases, as he describes, individuals who leave unemployment benefits to take a job face an effective marginal tax rate of 80-100%. Moreover, the current system creates “bureaucratic traps” whereby individuals are deterred from accepting short-term work (asking, e.g., “If I accept the job for six months or so, do I again qualify for the benefit I used to have?”).

YouTube player

 

Marjukka Turunen: “How the basic income experiment works in practice”

Turunen provides an introduction to Finland’s basic income experiment, including an overview of the experiment’s design, motivation, and implementation. She explains why the researchers hypothesize that the basic income will provide an incentive for unemployed persons to take on paid employment–the main outcome that the experiment has been designed to test–and describes other potential benefits to individuals. For example, she notes that financial security brings “peace of mind” and allows individuals to plan for the future with less uncertainty. Furthermore, the basic income eliminates the time-consuming task of applying to Kela to maintain unemployment benefits–which, as she mentions, requires the submission of paperwork every four weeks–or to change benefit status due to sickness or childbirth. Recipients of the basic income are not required to inform Kela of their employment status, income, or other life changes.

Turunen also describes Kela’s process of selecting a sample of 2000 individuals for the experiment, contacting them, and distributing the first funds. She points out that researchers will not conduct interviews of the subjects during the course of the experiment, in order to avoid a possible source of influence on their behavior. Moreover, it is the policy of Kela not to disclose information about the basic income recipients to the media. Nonetheless, Turunen notes, some recipients have themselves divulged information about their situations and reactions to the basic income trial; she reviews some of these preliminary reactions near the end of the lecture.

YouTube player

Reviewed by Danny Pearlberg 

Photo: Helsinki, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 Jonathan

Interactive model shows basic income’s effect

Interactive model shows basic income’s effect

Imagine entering a website for your country which after answering a few questions would inform you how much money you would receive from a basic income. This is net of any increased taxes from each of the financing models proposed to finance the UBI. This site will also tell you how the country would be affected overall. Each of the variables are listed and are changeable, which gives those interested the ability to measure results from all possible outcomes.

We have this now in a Google Docs spreadsheet form, and it has been forwarded to all the members of the international BIEN outreach group of which I am a member. The original Excel version can be found here.

The outreach group has several objectives. My primary focus in this group is the collaboration, communication, connection, and mutual support of the international groups who are working on modelling, financing and forwarding a universal basic income.

At the congress earlier this year, I presented a paper on a European wide basic income financed by a collective goods and services or value added tax. This was a costed model which indicated that an increase of the European VAT rate of 16 percent to 22 percent would be sufficient to finance a basic income of 150 to 200 Euros for everyone in the European union over the age 18. The expected results for Europe was people had more money to spend, there was increasing employment, no need for austerity measures, big savings in bureaucracy and healthy economies in Europe with the measures they need to cope in a changing world.

While 96 percent of people in Europe would be better off with this UBI, a higher percentage could have been achieved by having a tax-free income allowance as well with a slightly higher GST rate. I was not able to model this, as it impacts individual member budgets while I was seeking a collective UBI agreement keeping with the existing aligned VAT rates across Europe. However, this is the suggestion that I made to the New Zealand government last year.

The Labour party here, along with all the left-leaning parties, have indicated an interest in or directly support UBI. I find that reading other people’s spreadsheets brings on a headache so I have designed an interactive model that hides away the calculations and simply delivers the results of each financial model in a dollar value for your individual circumstance.

I have made this template available to the BIEN international community. They would need to enter their own existing welfare budget, the country tax and VAT incomes. It also asks for the population income and taxation per income band. Doable from web sources in some countries, but needing real work and government assistance in others. It does offer a way to map financial results given different financing models.

While we could disperse this information through our own networks, I have an additional objective in that there are six questions that the website would require you to answer, most of which relate directly to the calculation of your personal UBI net advantage. While the other asks whether you would leave your job if you received a UBI. I will consult with the parties here as to whether they need anything further answered as there were hints of a UBI financed by a capital gains tax which would be interesting to compare.

The four models currently considered are:

  • Tax free earnings to $100,000 and UBI of a higher amount financed by a raise in GST.
  • A moderate UBI financed by a raise in GST.
  • A lower UBI financed by the top tax rate.
  • A lower UBI financed by increasing the income tax by the same percentage.

My conclusions are as follows:

  • The bottom earners of less than $16,000 are best off with the model (1) as are the people earning more than $70,000.
  • The middle earners from $16,000 to $70,000 (the majority) are better off with model (3) however the top tax rate would need to be more than 100 percent and therefore it is not possible.
  • Model (2) has the second best overall result of $10,187 average extra money per person yearly. Model (1) has the best of $13,376.
  • Model (4) has a similar overall result to model three of an $8,604 average additional income per person annually.

The spreadsheet also adds the total cash benefit for the entire population, and I hope that if this was put to a vote that this would be given due attention, as the extra cash received by many from the top tax being increased is not much more than from the tax-free GST model. The country total is $47 billion for the GST model compared to $26 billion for the top tax. This gap widens as the variables are changed.

My conclusion is that the tax-free GST model is the best method of financing UBI for New Zealand.

My hope is that someone will first audit these findings and bring about this information being shared on a website. This way, people get a chance to view what a UBI means to them and their country. The questions answered will help developers with the data they need to see what the likely outcomes for their country would be.

A final note – A tax on spending enables people to save with the extra UBI they receive, seek employment without a punishing higher tax rate, get a entry-level job without paying any tax on it and still receive the full UBI.

 

UPDATE: Added new spreadsheet version.

About the Author:

Peter Brake is a self-employed accountant in a busy public practice and a part time organically certified olive farmer. A member of the BIEN outreach task-force, one of four members charged with creating a space in the next congress for Bien affiliates and international developers of UBIs to share their progress, discuss common problems and brainstorm common solutions. He is actively involved with the British, European, Indian and New Zealand UBIs.

FINLAND: First Basic Income payments sent to experiment participants

Finland’s basic income experiment is now underway, with the first payments having been mailed this week. With the experiment generating much media attention, here is a review of some of the basics.

 

On January 1, 2017, Finland launched an experiment in which 2,000 individuals–randomly selected from a pool of unemployment benefit recipients–will receive unconditional cash payments of €560 (about 590 USD) per month for two years.

The first payments were sent out on Monday, January 9.

The main goal of the experiment, as it presently stands, is to determine whether unconditional cash transfers are more effective than means-tested unemployment benefits with respect to promoting job-seeking and employment. Olli Kangas, leader of the research team at Kela that designed the experiment, has recommended expanding the experiment to other target populations (including “other persons with small incomes” and individuals under age 25).    

 

The Sample

The test subjects comprise 2,000 individuals between the ages of 25 and 58 who were receiving unemployment benefits from Kela (the Social Insurance Institution of Finland) as of November 2016. These subjects were randomly selected from a pool of about 175,000 individuals nationwide.

To avoid selection bias, participation in the experiment was mandatory for those selected.  

Kela reports that, of those selected, 87% had been receiving the Labour Market Subsidy, while 13% had been receiving the Basic Unemployment Allowance. These programs provide taxable payments of €32.80 per day, five days per week, to those (and only to those) who are officially registered as unemployed job seekers. The benefits are subject to withdrawal if a recipient turns down an offer of work or training. Furthermore, if a recipient takes temporary or part-time employment, the amount of the benefits is decreased (as a general rule) by 50 cents per euro in earned income over €300 per month.  

 

The Basic Income

Those included in the study population will be paid a monthly basic income of €560 for a period of two years. Unlike the Labour Market Subsidy and Basic Unemployment Allowance, the amount of the benefit does not decrease if the recipient earns additional income (regardless of the amount of earned income).

The basic income is not subject to tax. However, it is counted as income for the purpose of determining eligibility for additional social assistance.

Kela notes that there are some circumstances under which payment of the benefit might be terminated, such as moving abroad or entering military service.

 

Research Objectives

The Finnish government is interested in testing basic income as a way to remove work disincentives in the current welfare system as well as to reduce bureaucracy.

Kela plans a study of the trial in which the group of the 2,000 individuals receiving the basic income is compared with a control group consisting of all individuals in the original target population who were not selected to receive the benefit. The study will examine, for one, differences in employment rates between these groups.

Information about individuals’ employment status will be gathered through register data. Kela will be conducting no interviews or questionnaires of the test subjects, since such interventions have the potential to influence behavior. (Kela has also expressed concern about interviews with test subjects conducted by the media.)

It is possible that the experiment will be expanded in subsequent years–as research team leader Olli Kangas has recommended–to test different levels of basic income or different taxation models, or to include additional population groups. However, no firm plans have been made, and moving forward with any expansion is contingent on the amount of funding allocated to the experiment by the Finnish government.

 

More Information

The latest information about the study can be found on Kela’s “Basic Income Experiment 2017-2018” webpage: https://www.kela.fi/web/en/basic-income-experiment-2017-2018.


Thanks to Danny Pearlberg for reviewing this article.

Photo: Saariselkä, Finland CC BY 2.0 Ninara.

AUDIO: Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz addresses UBI on the Ezra Klien Show

AUDIO: Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz addresses UBI on the Ezra Klien Show

Economist Joseph Stiglitz was awarded a Nobel Prize in 2001 for his work on information asymmetries in the market. He was Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Bill Clinton and Chief Economist of the World Bank from 1997 to 2000. And he is a supporter of universal basic income (UBI).

On October 25, 2016, Stiglitz was the featured guest on Vox editor Ezra Klein’s podcast, The Ezra Klein Show. Although the question was not a focal point of the 70 minute interview, Klein did ask Stiglitz whether he favors a UBI in the United States.

The famed economist replied that he thinks UBI is a “good idea”, although he has not made up his mind about one question: if a society has limited resources, is it better to target those resources on the poor–those who need assistance the most–rather than giving an unconditional cash transfer to everyone? As Stiglitz goes on to describe, however, those who are in most need of support often cannot afford to wait weeks or months to receive it; under the current system, however, many are forced to undergo such a waiting period–given the paperwork they must complete and the bureaucracy they must navigate. Stiglitz claims that an unconditional basic income would avoid this problem.

Stiglitz seems disposed to support a UBI in a country that is rich enough to afford unconditional payments to the rich and poor alike. (He mentions the US, Switzerland, and Norway as examples of sufficiently wealthy countries.) At the same time, though, he is quick to rule out a UBI in the US as politically infeasible.

The full episode can be heard here. The question about UBI begins at 55:25 and Stiglitz’s reply lasts until about 58 minutes.

This is not the first time Stiglitz has been asked to comment on UBI. In February 2015, he was asked about technological unemployment at the World Summit on Technological Unemployment, and replied that he agreed UBI would be part of the solution–although he went on to discuss the fact that a UBI alone is not the whole solution.


Joseph Stiglitz at Asia Society New York CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 Asia Society