Esther Duflo and Abhijit Banerjee. Picture credit: dailyO
Esther Duflo, Abhijit Banerjee and Michael Kremer were awarded the Economics Nobel Prize this year. That alone would not represent a huge novelty, given the standard these professionals and scholars have set in the last few years. However, in an article as far back as June 2016, Banerjee had already defended the basic income policy for India, as a way to reduce poverty, cut through corruption and minimize bureaucracy. Later on, already in 2019, Indian voters got not to elect the party (Congress Party) which was more serious about implementing (a version of) basic income in India, favoring the BJP ruling party. That, however, did not end the discussion about basic income in the Indian continent, in part because Banerjee, Duflo and other respectable scholars like Thomas Piketty, have been thinking, writing and speaking about the issue at the highest levels.
This award comes right before the release of Banerjee and Duflo new book, entitled “Good Economics for Hard Times”, a forward-looking elaboration on society, economic problems and creative social solutions. In it, basic income features as an important, if not crucial policy, for reducing poverty, simplifying governmental aid programs and increasing universality in cash transfers. In the authors’ own words:
Immigration and inequality, globalization and technological disruption, slowing growth and accelerating climate change–these are sources of great anxiety across the world, from New Delhi and Dakar to Paris and Washington, DC. The resources to address these challenges are there–what we lack are ideas that will help us jump the wall of disagreement and distrust that divides us. If we succeed, history will remember our era with gratitude; if we fail, the potential losses are incalculable.
Meanwhile, also, other heavy-weight economists like Angus Deaton, also a recent Economics Nobel Prize laureate, have come forward in defense of basic income-like type of policies.
“The justification for [basic income] is ethical, not instrumental,” states Guy Standing at the ShapingHorizons conference at Cambridge University, UK, on September 11, 2019. He goes on to assure his audience that basic income studies have revealed that it may reduce poverty and inequality, but that “the real reasons for wanting to support a basic income is a matter of common justice.” See his full speech.
For Guy Standing it is a clear case: everybody’s wealth and income are mainly due to the achievements and efforts of others, especially our ancestors. It is they who have created what we all enjoy in the form of, for example, public knowledge and social services. If we add natural resources to the list, we are looking at the three most important pillars of what people alive today have at most contributed minimally towards: the commons.
As it is common legal practice around the globe allowing “to receive something for nothing” in the case of private inheritance, Standing suggests extending this idea to the social inheritance of the commons. In contrast to private inheritance, the distribution of commonwealth should not be based on, e.g. family bounds. The entitlement to a share of public wealth should instead be based on the simple requirement to be human. However, instead of sharing our rich commons, they are “privatized and plundered […] in the name of rentier capitalism,” as Standing puts it.
In addition to stating ethical reasons for basic income, Guy Standing also took the chance to stress how the global debate about basic income has changed dramatically over the last few years. With participants from as many as 45 countries the BIEN congress 2019 in Hyderabad, India, at the end of August this year demonstrates the global significance of basic income.
The 41 minutes long documentary focuses on Universal Basic Income (UBI), retracing its history, explaining its rationale, and investigating why and how the idea has reached a much larger audience and unprecedented support in the last years.
It does so with though many poignant interviews with prominent exponents of the UBI community, as Van Parijs, Guy Standing, Daniel Raventòs, Scott Santens and many others. “UBI, our right to live” makes a compelling argument for the necessity of the measure, is a manifesto for UBI in the present day, and is an excellent introduction to the subject.
The documentary addresses two of the main drivers that are bringing UBI at the center of the public debate: economic inequality and technological development. The two themes are correlated, as economic inequality has reached unsustainable levels, and automation may make it even worse, if not handled in the proper way. The risk is the increase of unemployment and growing inequalities between high and low skilled workers.
UBI could eradicate poverty altogether, and if it were to be financed through progressive taxation, reduce inequalities. Moreover, it would provide an economic safety net for workers, and thus endorse them with more bargaining power when it comes to choose a job. People could decide how to focus productively their energies in order to contribute to society and give meaning to their live, rather than being forced in unfulfilling jobs just to survive. Nobody would be left alone, as it is bound to happen under the patchwork that present-day welfare is.
The fruits of technological advancement, if distributed via a UBI, rather than accumulated in the hands of the few, may help to shape a more just future, as this is what UBI is about (something that the documentary highlights): UBI is about justice and fairness, not charity.
It’s the instrument meant to redistribute what belongs to each and every person, the natural extensions of human rights in ensuring to everybody a standard of living adequate for a human being.
An early version of the book, Exporting the Alaska Model, is available for download for the first time. This is possible because most academic publishers allow authors and editors to post early versions of their works on their person websites. A preview, written in 2012, is below. If you’d like to cite or quote it, please refer to the published version:
In recognition of every Alaskan’s share of the ownership of the state’s oil reserves, every year, every Alaskan gets a dividend from the returns of the Alaska Permanent Fund (a sovereign wealth fund comprised of a pool of assets collectively owned by the residents of the state). It was created from royalties the state receives from the oil industry. Each year it pays a dividend to every Alaska resident. In 2008, the dividend reached a high of more than $3200 (including a supplement added from that year’s state budget surplus). That dividend amounted to more than $16,000 for a family of five.
Many other resource-exporting regions around the world have sovereign wealth funds, but only the APF pays a regular dividend to citizens. The APF and the accompanying Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) are actually a combination of resource-management policy and a progressive social policy. As a sovereign wealth fund, it helps to ensure that the state will continue to benefit from its oil long after its reserves are depleted. As a dividend, it helps every single Alaskan make ends meet each year without a bureaucracy to judge them.
The PFD is one of the most popular government programs in the United States. It has helped Alaska attain the highest economic equality of any state in the United States. It has coexisted with, and possibly contributed to, the state’s growing and prosperous economy. Most importantly it has given unconditional cash assistance to needy Alaskans at a time when most states have scaled back aid and increased conditionality.
Cliff Groh
This book argues that the model provided by the combination of the APF and the PFD is worthy of imitation by other states, nations, or regions. Of course, not every country has as much oil as Alaska, but every country has resources. The total value of natural resources (including not only mining, fishing, and forestry but also land value, the broadcast spectrum, the atmosphere, etc.) is surprisingly high even in areas not thought of as being resource rich. The case for taxing natural resources is at least as good, and probably far better than taxing other sources of wealth.
One reason Alaska introduced the APF was that lawmakers realized that oil drilling would give the state a large and temporary revenue windfall. They wanted to extend the period in which that windfall would benefit Alaskans by putting some if it away into a permanent fund. To some extent the PFD was a way to sell ordinary Alaskans on the idea of the APF.
But to some extent the motivation for the APF was to support the PFD. Some of the lawmakers who created the APF, most especially Governor Jay Hammond, were influenced by the movement for what is now known as a “basic income”—a small unconditional income for every citizen to help them meet their basic needs. At the time, the policy was best known as the “guaranteed income” or the “negative income tax.” It was widely discussed by policymakers in the United States in the 1960s and 70s. Hammond had created a similar policy on a local level when he was a mayor of Bristol Bay, and he very much saw the APF as an opportunity to create a guaranteed income. The argument was simple: the oil, by right, belonged to all Alaskans. The PFD was an efficient way to ensure that every Alaskan would benefit from it.
A similar argument can be made for almost any natural resource.
This book takes an interdisciplinary approach to assessing whether the APF is a model to be copied with chapters in the disciplines of economics, philosophy, sociology, history, and social policy studies. It also has chapters written by political activists and practitioners.
Several chapters discuss the history of the APF and similar policies around the world (both resource taxation policies and income support policies). Others chapters discuss the ethics of unconditional cash grants and resource taxes, and how the Alaska mode fits in with recent theoretical models. As mentioned, the PDF is essentially a small basic income—a political proposal that has been widely discussed in political theory literature. Stakeholder grants would replace the yearly basic income with a large, one-time payment when individuals come of age. Resource egalitarianism is the belief that all people should benefit equally from the natural resources of the Earth. Policies like the APF, which link resource taxes to direct redistribution, advance resource egalitarian goals. We discuss what should count as a “resource” for purposes of the standard of “equality of resources,” and how this might be focused on resources that can become the basis of a sovereign wealth fund. A clean atmosphere, for example, is a shared resource that is being depleted by billions of individual polluters.
Several chapters debate whether it is a good idea to link a progressive social policy, such as a cash grant, to an environmental policy, such as a resource tax. One reason to make this link is that resource taxes redistributed as dividends reflect shared ownership claims to the environment. Other reason to do so is that the redistribution of resource tax revenue can compensate people for the cost of moving to less resource-intensive activities. One danger is if the redistribution of resource taxes is seen as a good thing, people might be more willing to accept increased exploitation of natural resources.
The book also discusses possible ways that the model might be altered and improved, including a proposal for Citizens Capital Accounts, which personalize the fund, giving each individual owner, among other things, the power to decide whether to take out regular dividends or let her earnings accrue as a protected investment. Instead of passively receiving a check each year, each citizen have some control over a small portion of the principle and the choice of when and whether to withdraw her available returns.
The book also has country- and region-specific proposals with estimates of what size dividend might be achievable in various places. As criteria for success we consider effects on poverty, effects on inequality, effectiveness in discouraging greenhouse gasses and other forms of pollution (for carbon-based taxes), efficiency, satisfaction of voters, and other factors.
Summary
This book is divided into three parts. Part I discusses employing the Alaska model in circumstances similar to those of Alaska: in wealthy, resource-exporting nations and regions. Part II discusses applications of the model further afield. And Part III discusses a hybrid proposal for an individualized version of Alaska’s fund and dividend.
Michael W. Howard (right) and Karl Widerquist (left) in the rain at the 2017 NABIG Congress in New York
Hamid Tabatabai (chapter 2) begins Part I with a discussion of the second place in the world to introduce a resource dividend: of all places, Iran. Like Alaska, Iran stumbled upon the dividend following a peculiar set of circumstances. For most of its period as a resource-exporting nation, Iran has used its resource wealth to support an inefficient system of commodity subsidies (mostly on gas and oil consumption). Iranian politicians knew that these subsidies had to go, but the policies benefited so many people in such a significant way that the politicians knew they could not eliminate them without a similarly broad-based policy (discussed as the fifth lesson in section 2 above). After lengthy discussions, the policy that emerged was a basic income in the form of a regular resource dividend. The policy is not funded by a permanent resource endowment, but it does employ the other two elements of the Alaska model.
Angela Cummine (chapter 3) looks at the very opposite issue. There are many SWFs in the world today. Some of them are many times larger than the APF. Yet, only the APF pays a dividend. Given the enormous popularity of the PFD, why have no other resource-exporting nations imitated it? Employing information gained from interviews and other sources, Cummine assesses the reasons SWF managers around the world are skeptical about dividends.
Alanna Hartzok (chapter 4) looks back at the Alaska model itself in advance of export. She argues that the APF and PFD embody the idea of socializing the rent of assets that rightfully belong to the people as a whole, but to do this, managers at the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (APFC) should take on a strong responsibility toward social investing, and they are not yet living up to that responsibility. Any nation or region wishing to socialize rent on a large or small scale should, therefore, take a look at what the APFC has done right and what it has done wrong.
Rather than looking at employing the Alaska model in other places, Cliff Groh (chapter 5) looks at the future of the Alaska model in Alaska. Although the PFD has a sound permanent endowment in the APF, it is the only part of the Alaska government that has such safe financial footing. Most of Alaska’s state budget is based on current oil export revenues. The volume of Alaskan oil exports has been declining for more than 20 years. So far, increases in the price of oil have more than made up for the decline in the volume of oil exports, but they will not always do so. When oil revenue begins to dry up, there will be enormous pressure on the state government budget, which will also put pressure on the APF and PFD. Groh discusses when this might happen, what it will mean, and what can be done about it.
Gary Flomenhoft begins Part II with a chapter (chapter 6) estimating the potential for a common-asset-based dividend in the “resource-poor” state of Vermont. He shows that even Vermont has many resources that are being given away for free by government to corporations who sell those resources back to the people at higher prices. Flomenhoft estimates how much revenue the state could generate by treating those assets the way Alaska treats its oil. In his low estimate, he finds that Vermont could support a dividend at least as large as Alaska’s; and in his high estimate, he finds that Vermont could support a dividend many times larger—perhaps more than $10,000 a year for every Vermonter. If a resource-poor state such as Vermont can do it, any state or nation can too.
Paul Segal (chapter 7) discusses employing the Alaska model in the poorer nations of the world and discusses the impact on poverty of doing so. He finds that a resource dividend could cut world poverty by more than half, as measured by the World Bank’s poverty rate of US$1.25 per day at purchasing-power-parity.
Jason Hickel (chapter 8) examines the potential impact of the Alaska model on a less developed nation—the newly independent state of South Sudan. Although South Sudan has large oil reserves to draw on, the potential impact of the Alaska model on it is hard to estimate because the state is so new and few good data are available. However, he finds that oil exports have the potential to finance both a substantial dividend and significant infrastructure improvements.
Governor Jay Hammond, “Father of Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend”
Jay Hammond’s contribution (chapter 9) applies the Alaska model to Iraq. Hammond was the fourth governor of the state of Alaska and is justly described as the father of the PFD. He campaigned for the idea long after he left office. His posthumous contribution to this book is a piece he wrote near the end of his life suggesting that a permanent fund and dividend would help ensure that Iraq’s oil revenues were shared by members of all of its diverse communities. This chapter includes a brief introduction by Larry Smith.
Michael W. Howard’s chapter (chapter 10) discusses the cap-and-dividend approach to global warming as a politically viable way of applying the Alaska model at the federal level in the United States. The idea of cap-and-dividend is simple. The government limits the amount of carbon emissions allowed (the cap). It sells the rights to make those emissions to the highest bidder and redistributes the proceeds as a dividend for all citizens.
Widerquist closes Part II with two chapters (chapters 11 and 12). The first examines the possibility for, and potential size of, a permanent common-asset-based endowment for the United States. The second examines the prospects of exporting the Alaska model back home to Alaska to widen and deepen the use of the strategy we call the Alaska model in Alaska itself. Widerquist argues that a fuller use of the Alaska model will strengthen Alaska against the likely eventual decline in resource revenues.
Part III of the book is entirely devoted to the discussion of a proposal by Karl Widerquist to create an individualized version of the permanent fund and dividend approach. Widerquist’s proposal, called Citizens’ Capital Accounts (CCAs) (chapter 13), assigns a portion of the principal of the fund to each individual at birth. They can decide when and whether to draw dividends, but the principal must remain in the fund for future generations. Widerquist argues that CCAs provide more economic security for the money than basic income or other similar proposals, because they allow individuals to keep the returns in their safe investment account until they are needed. Subsequent chapters by Michael W. Howard, Jason Berntsen, Ayelet Banai, and Christopher L. Griffin, Jr. (chapters 14–17) evaluate, criticize, and consider variations of the CCA proposal. In the final chapter of part III (chapter 18), Widerquist responds to criticism.
An early version of a book, Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend: Examining its Suitability as a Model, is now available for free download on my personal website. A summary, from the first chapter of the book (2012), is reprinted below. If you want to cite or quote it, please see the published version:
Every year, every Alaskan gets paid. Every man, woman, and child receives a dividend as a joint owner of Alaska’s oil reserves. Alaskans are free to use this money as they wish with some potentially putting it towards a home improvement project. After all, if your looking for metal buildings Alaska is your place to find them. In 1956, Alaska ratified a constitution recognizing joint ownership of unoccupied land and natural resources. In 1967, North America’s largest oil reserve was discovered in publicly owned areas on Alaska’s North Slope. In 1976, the state government voted to dedicate a part of its yearly oil revenues to a state investment fund, called the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF). In 1982, the state government voted to distribute part of the returns from that fund as a yearly dividend, called the Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD), sometimes called “the Alaska Dividend.” In 2008, the dividend reached a high of $3269,[1] which comes to $16,345 for a family of five. More often in recent years, the PFD has been between $1000 and $1500 per person, which comes to between $5000 and $7500 for a family of five.
Karl Widerquist (left) Michael W. Howard (right)
The Alaska Dividend is one of the most popular government programs in the United States. It has helped Alaska attain the highest economic equality of any state in the United States. It has coexisted with, and possibly contributed to, the state’s growing and prosperous economy. And, seemingly unnoticed, it has provided unconditional cash assistance to needy Alaskans at a time when most states have scaled back aid and increased conditionality.
The Alaska fund and accompanying dividend seems to be a model worthy of imitation and adaptation. This book examines whether and how the Alaska Dividend is a model that can and should be imitated and adapted for circumstances elsewhere. It is an “edited volume” with authors who differ in their level of enthusiasm for (or skepticism of) the Alaska model. But we believe that the evidence provided by this book shows that the combination of policies we call the Alaska model is worthy of examination by other states, nations, and regions.
What is the Alaska model?
The “Alaska model,” as we use the term here, does not refer to the whole of Alaskan state government policy, nor to even to the whole of its oil revenue policy. It refers only to elements in the combination of APF and PFD. Although the APF is the source of revenue for the PFD, the two are different programs created at different times by different kinds of legislation. The APF is a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF)-a pool of assets collectively owned by the members of a political community usually invested into interest-generating assets. It was established by a constitutional amendment that did not specify what was to be done with the returns to the fund. The PFD is the policy of devoting the APF’s returns to a dividend for all Alaskan citizen residents. It was created by a simple act of the state legislature. Many nations and regions have SWFs, but only Alaska’s SWF pays a regular dividend to citizens. Many nations and regions provide some form of cash benefits, but so far, only Alaska pays a regular cash dividend to all of its residents.[2] The APF and the accompanying PFD link a resource-revenue-management policy with a progressive social policy. As an SWF, the APF helps to ensure that the state will continue to benefit from its oil after its reserves are depleted. As a dividend, the PFD helps every single Alaskan make ends meet each year without a bureaucracy to judge them.
We call this unique combination the Alaska model. It consists of three elements: (1) resource-based revenue (2) put into an SWF or some other permanent endowment, (3) the returns of which are distributed as a cash payment to all citizens or all residents. The extent to which a policy has to contain all three of these elements to qualify as following the Alaska model is not so important. But we will discuss the importance of each of these elements separately.
(1) Resource revenue.
The argument for the Alaska Dividend is simple and powerful: the oil, by right, belongs to all Alaskans. The PFD is an efficient and effective way to ensure that every single Alaskan benefits from it. If that argument works for Alaska’s oil, why not Maine’s fisheries, South Africa’s diamonds, Hong Kong’s real estate, Oregon’s forests, America’s broadcast spectrum, or the world’s atmosphere? Governments have allowed private, for-profit exploitation of these and many more resources, claiming that we will all benefit from the jobs and economic activity they create. But do we? Does a homeless person in Denver benefit from the gold being mined in Colorado? Does a shanty dweller in Johannesburg benefit from the diamonds being mined in South Africa?
The PFD has made sure that every single Alaskan has benefited from the state’s oil industry. Whatever benefit they might or might not get from more jobs or increased economic activity, every Alaskan can point to the dividends they’ve received since 1982 and say, I got this benefit from the state’s decision to exploit its oil reserves. Not many other programs do that, but many more could.
The case for taxing natural resources is at least as good, and probably far better than the case for taxing any other source of wealth. Resource taxes have the benefit of discouraging overuse of scarce resources. If properly employed, they can be an important part of a green environmental management strategy, giving people the incentive to reduce their consumption of scarce resources to sustainable levels. Yet, few if any countries in the world employ resource taxes in this way. Resources are often given away by governments to individuals and corporations who sell them back to the public with value added, but the sellers capture not only the value they add but also the natural resource value along with it.
A resource tax is literally a user fee. Anyone who takes possession of a resource makes it unavailable for others. The tax represents a payment for the burden imposed on others. This justification for resource taxation is more closely associated with “left-libertarianism,” discussed in chapters of this volume by Ian Carter, Alanna Hartzok, and Gary Flomenhoff. But as we will argue in a later chapter resource taxes are also consistent with liberal-egalitarian, utilitarian, and other theories of justice.
Of course, not every country has as much oil as Alaska, but one of the key lessons of this book is that a country does not have to be “resource rich” to have a resource dividend based on the Alaska model. We make this argument fully in the final chapter of this book. Here we preview only a small part of that argument.
One reason we know that a country does not have to be resource rich to have a resource dividend is that every country and every region has valuable resources. Later chapters of this book will show that the total value of natural resources (including not only mining, fishing, and forestry but also land value, the broadcast spectrum, the atmosphere, etc.) is surprisingly high even in areas not thought of as being resource rich. Gary Flomenhoft (this volume) shows that even “resource poor” states, such as Vermont, can create a substantial resource dividend.
Another reason we know that a country does not have to be resource rich to have a resource dividend can be seen from what a small part of Alaska’s resource wealth actually goes to supporting the fund. Alaska has many valuable natural resources, but the APF is supported almost entirely by taxes on oil. These taxes are extremely low by international standards, and only about one-eighth of the state’s total oil revenue goes to supporting the APF. Thus only a tiny fraction of Alaska’s resource wealth is used to support the PFD.
(2) A permanent endowment
Alaska introduced the APF largely because Alaskans knew that oil drilling would provide a very large but temporary windfall. They wanted to extend the period in which that windfall would benefit Alaskans by putting some of it away into a permanent fund. The APF was one of the first SWFs. Today many resource-exporting nations have them. Some nations have funds more than 10 times the size of the APF.
We see the essence of the Alaska model as a strategy to make sure that the system functions as a permanent endowment, but an SWF is not the only mechanism that can do so. To some extent treating resource taxes as user frees does so on its own. Some resources are capable of producing a permanent stream of revenue from user fees. These include land, the broadcast spectrum, and renewable resources. Such resources do not need to put revenue into a fund to function as a permanent endowment, and the Alaska model can be employed with only the first and second elements. Other resources produce only temporary resource streams. No nation can produce oil forever. Pollution taxes will hopefully discourage pollution. For revenue from sources like these to produce a permanent endowment, a mechanism such as an SWF is necessary.
(3) A cash payment to all citizens
To some extent the dividend was a way to sell ordinary Alaskans on the idea of a permanent fund. But to some extent the motivation for the fund was to support the dividend. Some of the lawmakers who created these programs, particularly Governor Jay Hammond, were influenced by the movement for what is now known as a “basic income”-a small unconditional income for every citizen to help them meet their basic needs. At the time, the policy was best known as the “guaranteed income” or the “negative income tax.” It was widely discussed by policymakers in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s. Hammond had unsuccessfully proposed a similar policy on a local level when he was a mayor of Bristol Bay Borough, and he very much saw the APF as an opportunity to create a basic income.
Basic income is a widely discussed topic in the academic literature in social science and philosophy. Researchers have examined the political and economic feasibility of the idea, its likely effects, and the ethical arguments for and against it. The United States and Canadian governments have conducted five social science experiments to see how a very similar policy would work. The Indian government will soon begin its own experiment. Basic income comes and goes in political popularity. It has recently appeared on the political agenda in Germany. It has considerable grassroots support in southern Africa today, and the Brazilian government is officially committed to phasing it in, although no timetable for moving beyond the first stage of the phase-in has been set. It is currently popular with Green and left-leaning parties in Europe, but its support (much like the support of the Alaska Dividend) often cuts across party and left-right divides.
As we will see in later chapters, not everyone agrees about the extent to which the Alaska Dividend fits the definition of a basic income. Usually, a full basic income is defined as an unconditional income, large and regular enough to meet a person’s basic needs. The Alaska Dividend is neither regular in size nor large enough to meet a person’s basic needs. But it is regular in timing and unconditional. So, it constitutes only a partial, irregular basic income. But it is the only version of basic income currently in practice in the Western industrialized world.
We (the editors of this book and the authors of this chapter) became interested in the Alaska model because of our interest in basic income. We’re excited to see an idea-so controversial in theory-has proven to be effective and extremely popular in the one place it has been tried. The Alaska model shows not only how basic income works, but also how the unique attributes of the Alaska model can be designed to work well elsewhere. The Alaska model is not perfect, but it is a successful strategy on which to build something better.
Employing the Alaska Model
By endorsing the Alaska model, we do not mean that governments should replace everything they do with the combination of a resource taxes, fund and dividend. We mean only that they should examine it as a possible addition to their toolkit. It’s only being used by one government, but it has proven to be more popular and more effective than many things that governments all around the world are doing. Certainly, it’s a policy that other governments should take a look at.
A preview of the book
The three parts of this book evaluate the Alaska model and discuss whether and how it can be adapted for other areas.
Chapters in Part One provide the background necessary to evaluate the Alaska model. Cliff Groh and Greg Erickson examine the unlikely history of the APF and the PFD and explain how the two programs work in practice. Scott Goldsmith discusses the impact of the dividend on Alaska’s society and economy.
Chapters in Part Two examine the ethical and political case for using the Alaska model as a tool for social justice. Jim Bryan and Sarah Lamarche discuss the political consequences of linking natural resource wealth and basic income, and how this policy combination can serve justice for future generations. Ian Carter presents the resource dividend as a left-libertarian economic policy. Christopher Griffin discusses the PFD as a practical application of the theoretical idea of Stakeholding. Stakeholding is a variation of the universal, unconditional grant idea. It differs from basic income in being delivered as a large lump sum grant rather than as a steady flow of smaller payments. Almaz Zelleke criticizes the extent to which the Alaska model, structured as a resource dividend, can be thought of as the practical implementation of basic income or even a step toward it. Jurgen de Wispelaere and David Casassas argue that the Alaska model, as it stands, is of limited value in promoting Civic Republican objectives. Steve Winter criticizes the Alaska Dividend for making recipients complicit with the oil industry. In the final chapter of Part One, we (Widerquist and Howard) respond with a chapter addressing the concerns of the authors in this section, and a discussion of why the link between resource taxation and basic income is important for different theories of social justice.
Chapters in Part Three discuss empirical questions about how the Alaska model can be adapted to be used most effectively in other states, nations, and regions. Gary Flomenhoff provides a detailed empirical investigation of the resource tax revenue available in the state of Vermont. He finds that even the resource-poor state of Vermont can raise $2000 (and possibly much more) for each resident each year. Michael Howard looks at the cap-and-dividend approach to global warming as a version of the Alaska model applied to pollution control. Karl Widerquist proposes personalizing the Alaska model into what he calls “Citizens’ Capital Accounts.” Alanna Hartzok argues that any dividend program based on an SWF has a strong responsibility for socially responsible investing, and presents evidence the APF currently fails to live up to that goal. Michael A. Lewis addresses the issues of fund and risk management, which will be important if the Alaska model is to further economic security of recipients. Angela Cummine discusses whether other existing Sovereign Wealth Funds (particularly in the Middle East) should move toward an Alaska-style dividend. Greg Erickson and Cliff Groh discuss the challenges to the APF and PFD in Alaska today and the extent to which the model can be expanded and improved within Alaska.
In the concluding chapter, Howard and Widerquist respond to the concerns of authors in Part Three and discuss six lessons they take away from the Alaska experience.
[1] Including a one-time supplement of $1200 from that year’s state government budget surplus.
[2] Iran is currently in the process of phasing in a regular dividend.
Chapters in Part Two examine the ethical and political case for using the Alaska model as a tool for social justice. Jim Bryan and Sarah Lamarche discuss the political consequences of linking natural resource wealth and basic income, and how this policy combination can serve justice for future generations. Ian Carter presents the resource dividend as a left-libertarian economic policy. Christopher Griffin discusses the PFD as a practical application of the theoretical idea of Stakeholding. Stakeholding is a variation of the universal, unconditional grant idea. It differs from basic income in being delivered as a large lump sum grant rather than as a steady flow of smaller payments. Almaz Zelleke criticizes the extent to which the Alaska model, structured as a resource dividend, can be thought of as the practical implementation of basic income or even a step toward it. Jurgen de Wispelaere and David Casassas argue that the Alaska model, as it stands, is of limited value in promoting Civic Republican objectives. Steve Winter criticizes the Alaska Dividend for making recipients complicit with the oil industry. In the final chapter of Part One, we (Widerquist and Howard) respond with a chapter addressing the concerns of the authors in this section, and a discussion of why the link between resource taxation and basic income is important for different theories of social justice.