by Karl Widerquist | Aug 14, 2019 | Opinion, The Indepentarian
This article is an early version of a paper that was published as:
Karl Widerquist, “The people’s endowment.” In Axel Gosseries and Inigo Gonzalez (eds.) Institutions for Future Generations, Oxford University Press, pp. 312-330
The proposal
Governments should start to build up a permanent endowment of publicly held assets, both financial and physical, lease at least some of them out to private industry, and use the revenue for two purposes: half for government spending and the other half for a dividend in the form of an unconditional basic income for all people-in recognition of their shared ownership of their common resources and the sacrifice they make living in a world where others own the environment they live in.[1] The goal should be to keep the total value of the portfolio growing (taking into account the overall value of its income-generating and non-income-generating assets), so that each generation leaves the next with a more valuable endowment.
Many private institutions, such as universities and museums, have large and growing endowments. Why doesn’t the government have one? Simply, we have failed to take advantage of enormous opportunities to create one.
There are essentially three things we can do with shared resources. 1. We can hold them as a commons, such as parks, rivers, and nature reserves, keeping them basically in their natural setting for the use of all but the property of none. 2. We can use them for jointly for public enterprises such as a national health service or a transportation system. 3. We can privatize them.
The endowment model is not about what mix of these three uses we should choose. It is model of how and under what conditions we should privatize resources. The private sector could be large or small, but we should privatize resources only if it is better for current and future generations to do so, and when we do privatize resources, we do so for profit to be returned to the people. The upfront sale price has to justify privatization. The government can hold and manage resources when there is a particular reason to do so, such as an environmental need, an obvious common use, or a market failure. Otherwise, it should lease resources at market prices, leaving private agents free to decide how to use them. It doesn’t necessarily need to oversee business; it merely needs to manage the terms on which it leases resources to private entities.
This model is very different from contemporary capitalist or socialist models of property ownership. Under contemporary capitalism most resources are assumed to be privately owned, but few governments have any consistent model of how resources are privatized. Permanent titles are often granted on an ad hoc basis, sometimes to cronies, often at little or no charge. Our governments give resources to corporations free or far below market rates, and our corporations sell them back to us at full market rates, capturing not only the value they add in production but also the scarcity value of the resources they received as a gift with resource rents going almost entirely to wealthy private individuals and corporations.[2] Ad hoc privatization continually shrinks the pool of shared resources, ignores environmental concerns, and creates institutions that cause inequality to persist across generations.
Under the socialist model, many resources are held and managed by the state, but there is no obvious socialist theory of privatization. Mixed socialist states and welfare capitalist sates are usually as ad hoc in their privatization as more capitalistic states.
The endowment will increase both the revenue governments earn from private use of common assets and our ability to protect both privatized and non-privatized assets for future generations. The dividend is important not simply to relieve the effects of poverty, inequality, and economic uncertainty, but also to ensure that every single person in whose name the endowment is held actually benefits from it. The permanent nature of the fund is necessary to ensure that all people with a claim to the environment, including our descendants benefit from the decisions we make now.
Thinking like a family farmer
Although the endowment model is far from the way most governments manage the people’s resources, it is typical of the way most or all private owners manage their resources. Two comparisons illustrate the difference.
1 A family farm
Imagine a successful farmer who wants her farm to benefit her children and their descendants. She has many options, including selling the farm to put the money into a trust that will pay dividends to them, renting it out and splitting the rent among them, holding it as a joint venue that would provide produce for her descendants, creating a land conservancy to preserve it as a family park. Any mix of these strategies treats the farm as her family’s endowment.
Now consider an option the farmer would never take seriously: a corporation asks her to give the land to it for free with no strings attached. The corporation claims that this will benefit the farmer’s children because it will “create jobs.” If her children are good workers, they can get those jobs and take out loans to buy houses the corporation will build on the land. Of course, it will charge market rates for those houses and the land they’re on. Certainly the farmer would recognize that although this proposal might get her children wages for their labor, it gets them nothing for the legacy she would relinquish.
No family farmer-no private owner-would do such a thing. Yet, this is exactly what governments do with the most of the assets they control in their peoples’ names. They give them away at vastly below market costs with few if any conditions attached in the hopes that the people designated as owners will create jobs. By giving away resources, governments not only create inequality of wealth and income; they also cede unequal control of those resources. They thereby create entrenched interests that become powerful in the public decision-making process for generations.
2. University endowments
Many non-government institutions-such as museums, universities, NGOs, and wealthy families-have endowments made up both of financial assets they use to generate income and of physical assets used to further the institution’s mission directly (such as items on display at a museum, the buildings on a university campus, or a family home).[3] In many cases, universities’ financial portfolios grow as their campuses get larger and more elaborate. Harvard’s financial endowment is over $32 billion, having risen from $17 billion in 2001.[4] Its managers claim to have delivered an average annual return of more than 12% per year over the last 20 years.[5] Its real estate holdings have increased to include thousands of acres of land and hundreds buildings, some used directly by the university others leased out for income.[6]
Thomas Piketty presents a great deal of historical evidence that the returns to capital have tended to exceed the economic growth rate for most of the last two centuries.[7] If his findings are correct, any capital-holding institution (whether a family, a business, or a non-profit enterprise) can grow its endowment over time as long as it spends less than its returns each year.
In light of these examples, it seems strange that governments don’t already have large and growing endowments as their legacy from centuries of the privatization they have authorized. In the name of the people, they control more assets than any private institution, yet the commons tends to shrink in size and value every year to privatization and pollution, and governments seldom build up financial (or any other) assets in return for all it relinquished.[8] For the most part, governments have acted neither as good custodians of the environment nor as profit maximizing sellers of resources.
SWFs: a positive step but a limited example
There is one example of national and regional governments taking small, limited steps toward the endowment model by establishing financial endowments, called “sovereign wealth funds” (SWFs). An SWF is a pool of financial assets held by the government in the name of the people. Usually, SWFs are set up by resource-exporting polities in hopes of turning a temporary resource windfall into a permanent income. One SWF, the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF) pays a regular dividend, called the Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD), to citizen-residents of Alaska. While the fund makes part of the temporary windfall permanent, the dividend ensures that every Alaskan, now and in the future, benefits from the state’s windfall.
SWFs provide an example of how governments can use endowments to benefit people, but they represent only a limited application of the wider endowment strategy, and their example might give people the impression that the possibilities of a resource endowment are more limited then they really are. [9] Right now, few resource-based industries pay the market value of the resources they appropriate; governments devote little of their resource revenue to SWFs; and only one of those SWF pays a dividend.
Alaska created the APF in 1974 and began paying out the PFD in 1982. Over the last 10 years (2004-2013), the dividend has averaged about $1,213 per year for every individual or about $4,853 for a family of four. Despite all those payouts, the APF is now worth more than $50 billion.[10] So far, the APF and PFD have been instrumental in helping Alaska avoid the resource curse, in which the people of many resource-exporting nations fail to benefit from their resource exports or in which those benefits prove temporary. If nothing else, all Alaskans have benefited in one direct way from Alaska’s oil. Very few resource-exporting regions can make that claim. For example, it is hard to say how or whether the poorest Mexicans and Nigerians have benefited from all the oil their nations have exported.[11]
The APF and PFD are financially sound. Alaska might choose to get rid of them someday, but as long as they are allowed to exist, they will provide benefits for all future Alaskans. Modern Pennsylvanians probably can’t say how or whether they’ve benefited from the Pennsylvania oil rush of the 1860s,[12] but future Alaskans will have one small tangible benefit.
Other SWFs are much larger than the APF. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia each have SWFs worth over $500 billion.[13] Norway’s SWF has $818 billion or about $161,000 for each person. It is primarily used to support the country’s pension system. [14] Norwegian pensions will be financed by the assets their government owns around the world for generations after their oil-exports have run out. The fund is now larger than the country’s national debt ($759 billion), so that by some counts, Norway has no net national debt.[15]
Not all SWFs are people’s endowments because they are held by authoritarian governments.[16] I use them only to demonstrate the possibility that public agents can build up endowments. I’m arguing that under a democratic government, the endowment is preferable. I have no statement whether authoritarianism with an endowment is better than authoritarianism without one.
The success of these SWFs ought to inspire imitation. If it is a good idea for Alaskans and Norwegians to be paid for their share of their country’s oil, it must also be a good thing for Namibians to be paid for their share in the country’s diamonds, for Jamaicans to be paid for their country’s beach resorts, for South Africans to be paid for the country’s gold, for the Swiss to be paid for their banking system, and so on around the world. However, because the SWF is a relatively new idea that has been tried only in limited circumstances, I’m worried that they will give people the impression that the endowment model is more limited than it is.
Four features of the endowment model
The endowment model has four features, or one could say, there are four tests to see whether a policy is following the endowment model. Governments fully employing the endowment model do the following things:
- They charge market rates (profit-maximizing prices) for the resources they privatize.
- They apply the model to all resources they privatize.
- If they privatize nonrenewable resources they save and invest a sufficient amount of the revenue so that the future generations receive a fair share of the benefit.
- They take sufficient account of the environmental, social, and political impact of privatization to ensure that whether they decide to privatize a resource, use it for a public enterprise, or leave it as part of the natural environment, the decision will fairly benefit all people of current and future generations.
The first goal applies to the price not the conditions of leases. An oil lease with environmental restrictions probably sells for less than one without. Maximizing revenue from a signal sale without regard to its impact on the environment would be a shortsighted effort to maximize the value of the endowment. The first goal simply means no gifts to businesses: once the authority sets the conditions of a lease, it charges what the market will bear for that lease.
The next two sections look at two examples of privatizations to see how resource-based SFWs get closer to the endowment model than most privatization efforts, but still fall far short of it.
1. U.S. broadcast spectrum policy
The broadcast spectrum is used by radio, television, cell phones, wireless internet, and so on-apparently with few direct environmental side effects. When you pay to access the broadcast spectrum, you pay partly for the company’s provision of service, but you also pay for the slice of the broadcast spectrum they control. Their slice has value because with currently available technology the spectrum is a scarce resource. The company didn’t create the broadcast spectrum. It didn’t invent it. It didn’t discover it. It controls the broadcast spectrum because the government gave it a lease. Although most governments nominally assert ownership of the broadcast spectrum,[17] in most cases, they charge little or nothing for leases to it.[18] The U.S. government, for example, gave away television-broadcasting rights largely in exchange for broadcasters’ promise to run occasional public service announcements.[19]
Of course, companies with broadcast spectrum leases spend money. It costs money running a business provide the cell phone networks, television, radio, wifi, or similar things, that is why business Accountants Brisbane, and ones similar, need to be incorporated in helping look over and manage financials. Businesses, big or small, encounter a number of costs they probably didn’t expect to be included in their budget. For example, as stated previously, networks and technology cost money. This could also be due to the hiring of Managed IT Melbourne services, or IT services wherever a company might be based, to give them assistance with running the technology side of things. They are equivalent to a young entrepreneur running a coffee house in a nice location where her wealthy grandmother pays the rent. Some of the money she makes is the return on her entrepreneurship, but all the value the flows form her location is a gift from grandma. The difference is huge. A 2003 study evaluated U.S. broadcast spectrum at $301 billion per year (more than one-eighth of government expenditure that year).[20] This does not include the value of that broadcasters add from their efforts and expenses. It’s the pure rental value of the spectrum-the gift from grandma government. The revenue forgone would be enough to provide a dividend of $1000 for every man, woman, and child in the United States every year from now on. Instead, from now on, this revenue will provide returns for the heirs of those who received the government’s gift of the broadcast spectrum.
Many other common assets are treated like the broadcast spectrum. The government created the internet; the community makes it valuable; but private companies capture most of the revenue it generates. The government lends money to banks at low interest rates, and they lend it out to the rest of us at higher rates. The U.S. government spends enormous sums to bail out banks and other institutions during financial crises, but does not usually leverage those moves into permanent ownership of banks or anything else.[21]
2. Alaskan Oil policy
Clearly, Alaska’s oil policy is closer to the endowment model than U.S. broadcast spectrum policy. Alaska have made money from resource privatization and taken steps to share part of that revenue with all current and future residents. But Alaska has fallen short of the endowment model in many ways. As mentioned above, the PFD is a small legacy, and barring a significant change, it is not likely to rise significantly.
The APF and PFD are small partly because Alaska receives a relatively small portion of the revenue from its oil exports. The state has received about one-third of the revenue generated by its oil exports. The other two-thirds have gone to private for-profit oil companies. Norway receives 78% of oil revenue, and still finds plenty of oil companies willing to drill.[22] Conditions are different in Norway than in Alaska, and it is not fair to could have done that well, but it is fair to say that Alaska could have raised a lot more money if it charged the market rate.
The other reason that the dividend will have a relatively small impact on future generations is that Alaska devotes only a small portion of its oil revenue to the fund. As of 2010, only 18.3% of the state’s oil revenue had been devoted to the APF.[23] One plan that was discussed in Alaska at the outset of the oil boom was to put all of the state’s oil revenue into an SWF and spend only the interest, gradually reducing other taxes as revenue from the fund made them unnecessary.[24] Had Alaska done so and had it received two-thirds instead of one-third of oil revenues, all else equal the fund would now be 10 times their current levels. The APF would be more than $500 billion.[25] If the state devoted half of the returns to the dividend and half to government spending, the dividend would be about $6,000 ($24,000 for a family of four) and the state would have $20 billion to spend each year-far exceeding the state’s budget of $12 billion in 2013.[26] Of course, all else would not have remained equal, and so it is not fair to say that this strategy would definitely have produced a fund this large, but it is fair to say that Alaska’s fund and dividend could be several times larger than they are now.
Instead, the state gave itself an enormous tax cut at the expense of future generations by eliminating the income tax in 1980. Lower taxes, of course, are a benefit to for many of the people, but as then governor, Jay Hammond argues, the benefit of eliminating the income tax was felt mostly by the wealthiest Alaskans.[27] Additionally, it might not have been best for Alaska to devote all of its oil revenue to the APF. The state badly needed improvements to its educational system and its infrastructure at the time. These are also part of the endowment we leave for future generations, and they can be a more important than any financial legacy.[28]
In effect, by eliminating the income tax, the current generation of Alaskans is spending a temporary revenue stream on themselves, depleting a resource forever but leaving a fiscal cliff for future generations when the oil runs low. Similarly, living in the Persian Gulf, I get the impression that most hydrocarbon exporting nations will leave neither sufficient physical infrastructure nor sufficient financial savings to sustain their current level of development after the boom. These decisions represent a serious failure of today’s leadership to be a good custodian of the people’s common inheritance.
Alaska has also failed to apply to the model to most of the rest of its environment. There are a few other resource taxes, but the model could be applied many more of the Alaskan economy, such as land value. Valuation of land is a critical element of real estate and many hire a land valuer to maximize property revenue. Probably the most significant way that Alaska differs from the endowment model is not in its failure to maximize revenue from the privatization of resources, but in its failure to take ownership of the environment as a system, and to protect it sufficiently. I’ll talk about environmental issues later in this chapter.
Applying the model more widely
The rest of this chapter will dispel the following potential misconceptions as it explain the benefits of wider applications of the model.
- People might think that the financial fund is the endowment.
- Actually, our common resources are the endowment. The establishment of a financial fund is only one of many things we can do with it.
- People might think that resource endowments are inherently small or only for nations experiencing a resource boom.
- Actually, the all nations have many extremely valuable common resources, most of them renewable.
- People might think that getting revenue from resources naturally accompanies the irresponsible depletion of resources or degradation of the environment.
- Actually, a resource endowment provides a coherent mechanism for more responsibly managing resources for the benefit of future generations.
1. It’s not the fund: it’s the resources
SWFs are financial endowments, but our nonfinancial endowments-physical resources-are far more important. The act of creating an SWF is not the establishment of an endowment; it is the transformation of a physical endowment into a financial endowment. Physical assets don’t always have to be transformed into other forms to give people their highest value. As mentioned above, our parks, rivers, beaches, and public enterprises are parts of our endowment and they might already be in their highest value use.
The most important thing to learn from the resource-exporting polities is not that they have set up SWFs, but that they have stopped giving away resources for free and started demanding payment for at least some of the resources they privatize. Even the largest SWFs in the world represent a small and narrow model of the potential for a people’s endowment, because they are made up entirely of financial assets, and they are usually based entirely on revenue from one or two resources, which are generally not treated as part of a national endowment. The potential for all governments to build up SWFs is enormous and the potential for them to build up a common asset endowment beyond the financial SWF is even greater.
On average, from 1977 to 2010, 87% of the State of Alaska’s government revenue has come from oil taxes, fees, and royalties.[29] Several resource-exporting polities (such as Norway, Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia) are also financing all or most their government spending from resource-revenue.[30] Citizens pay almost no taxes, and so are less defined by their role as taxpayers and more as owners of shared resources.
The most important thing we, the people, do by establishing the endowment is to assert ownership over our environment as a system. Currently, no one truly owns the environment. Individuals own parts of it, but no one manages or takes responsibility for the system as a whole. The obvious candidate is the government as representative of the people, but governments have not really asserted ownership. They regulate some uses of the environment here and there but not as part of a systemic plan to restore and maintain a healthy environment and the total value of the people’s portfolio.
To see the natural resource base as the people’s endowment is to see the natural resource base as our treasure. It has to be managed for the long-term benefit of the people-in every sense in which it benefits the people-and we have to consider future generations as owners of the environment as much as we are. We will bring them into existence, and so, any transformation of resources we do should be a net benefit to all of them as well as all those alive now.
2. All nations are resource rich: the Vermont example
This section argues we can apply this model to nations not usually recognized as resource-rich.
This chapter does not discuss international justice. It assumes we’re stuck with the nation state system and discusses what states can do. Perhaps someday international institutions will have the authority to employ some or all elements of the endowment model. If so, most of what I say here still applies, and our ability to address the ecosystem as a whole improves. I do not discuss the issue that some nations have more valuable resources than others, because it is not as pressing as how we use those resources. Difference in the size of the resource base explains why Yemen is less wealthy than Qatar but not why it is less wealthy than Singapore. The most important issues involving our resources are in how we use them, who we allow to own them, and how we allow them to cross borders. Better management of resources would not make all nations equally wealthy, but it would make the poorest and most unequal countries much better off.
The difference between what we usually think of as a resource-rich nation and what we think of as a resource-poor nation is that resource-rich nations are rich in the kinds of resources governments usually sell and resource-poor nations are rich in the kinds of resources governments usually give away. All nations have enormously valuable resources, most of which are being privatized without any compensation to the people for removing them from the commons. For example, bottled water is just as much a resource as oil, but many companies take it out of the ground (or out of the tap) at no charge, many paying no more taxes than non-resource-extracting companies located on similarly valuable real estate,[31] like another gift from grandma.
Another example is perhaps even more telling. The beach resort industry is-financially speaking-just as much a resource export as the oil industry. The beaches of many developing countries are dotted with-and sometimes dominated by-resorts. Yet, to the best of my knowledge, there are no beach-resort-real-estate dividends. Not only are taxes on resorts often low; sometimes governments offer corporate subsidies for their development. Taxes for them can be handled by small business accounting firms. Resorts in the developing world are often owned and patronized by people from developed countries, offering little more than a few jobs to the locals. This is exactly what the farmer in the original example would never do: closing off land that were once freely available; getting no revenue in exchange; sometimes paying people to take it away; sometimes for little more than the hope of employment.
How big is the potential for revenue from common assets? Gary Flomenhoft estimates the value of common assets in the “resource-poor” state of Vermont, including the following assets: air, wildlife and fish, public forests, groundwater, surface water, minerals, land value, wind, the broadcast spectrum, the internet, the financial system, and the monetary system. He finds the total rental value of these assets to be somewhere between 8.86 and 28.31% of Vermont’s GDP. The wide range exists because of the difficulty of estimating the outcome of auction markets that don’t yet exist.[32]
If Flomenhoft’s low estimate is representative of the United States as a whole, common assets produced $1.28 trillion of revenue per year. If the higher figure is representative, the amount of rent available is $4.10 trillion-28.31% of the $14.5-trillion GDP of the United States. If half of that ($2.05 trillion) were used for government spending, it could fund 82% of the US government budget. The other half could fund a dividend of $13,300 per person per year, or $54,200 for a family of four.[33]
According to Mark Blyth and Eric Lonergan, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, and the Federal Reserve already own assets in excess of 20% of their countries’ GDPs.[34] That alone would make a good start: something in the neighborhood of $300 billion in that United States.
In one sense, it doesn’t matter how much money there is in treating assets as the people’s endowment. Whether it raises a little or a lot, we owe it to ourselves and our descendants to start thinking about our resources as our endowment, rather than squandering it for the benefit of the politically connected. We need to stop thinking that businesses need or deserve the gift free resources just to induce them to provide services using those resources. If they can make money with otherwise common resources, they should pay the full market value for those resources.
3. Our responsibility to future generations
People are likely to ask two nearly opposite question about the idea of financial compensating future generations for what we do now. They could point to technology improvements and ask why we should we financially compensate future generations for anything when they will probably have far higher living standards than we do. They could point to environmental degradation and ask whether any amount of financial wealth can compensate future generations for the incredible damage we’re doing now.
A. Finance and future generations
The question of whether we should financially compensate future generations is closely tied to a question of whether it is even possible for one generation to financially compensation another. One might argue that we can’t financially compensate future generations, because they will have to produce all the goods they consume from the stock of natural resources, developed capital, and labor available at the time. Financial instruments are not resources; they are only claims on resources by one party against other parties living at the same time. Given this obvious fact, what does it mean to say that a financial endowment provides anything for future generations?
The key to the answer is that any generalization we make about future generations applies only to the average, not to everyone. The unequal world we live in is-financially speaking-nearly opposite of Lake Woebegone: most of our children are below average. We need to compensate all financially below-average citizens for granting claims resources that create financially above-average citizens.
We need to take responsibility not only for the physical environment but also for the institutional setting that we leave our descendants. The ad hoc privatization system our ancestors left us creates an institutional setting that guarantees inequality. If we don’t change, the wealthiest 1% of future generations will control most of the world’s resources, because ad hoc privatization assigns permanent ownership of resources to some and not others. The beneficiaries of privatization will pass on the benefits of those resources to future generations, giving them greater claim to the natural resources, capital, and labor available than other members of their generation.
Future generations could rectify economic inequality using the government’s power to tax and redistribute property that exists in their generation, but it is wrong of us to put them in the position where they have to do so and to create an institution setting making it so difficult for them to do so. Once a group obtains strong legal rights over specific resources, they gain both the motivation and the political power to protect that privilege. The income tax, the inheritance tax, and the capital gains tax all have powerful political enemies. The APF has no enemies. It’s just a pool of publicly owned funds with a long established history as public funds. Even though it is an equalizing mechanism just as much a redistributive income tax, no one feels inhibited by its existence. If it did not exist, some wealthy people would own those assets instead. Established history would tell them it was theirs. They would feel the pinch of any tax meant to have the same equalizing effect as the APF, and they have political to resist those taxes.
Thus, the goal of a shared financial endowment is to bolster the income and wealth of those who would otherwise be born with fewer claims on resources in compensation for the privatization that would otherwise result in default inequality. The financial endowment will give all the members of future generations some claim on the wealth accumulation our economy will do between now. The endowment gives future generation greater political and economic leverage to distribute their production in ways that recognize everyone as free and equal citizens. Although we cannot compensate a future generation as a whole, we can compensate the average person for the privileges we bestow on the people we name as owners of property. And for this, the financial portion of the endowment works very well.
B. How can we compensate for environmental degradation?
If we leave future generations an unhealthy environment, there is nothing we can do economically or technologically to compensate for it. The environment we leave our descendants is as much a part of our legacy as the capital and knowledge base we leave them. It is as much theirs as it is ours.
We have to pass on a healthy environment, but it’s unreasonable to think that no natural resources should ever be converted into consumption or investment goods. The environmental problem is not that we have made environmental tradeoffs. It is that we have avoided facing them for what they are. Even today environmental regulations tend not to be based on a careful examination of the costs involved. Some actions (such as chlorofluorocarbon emissions) are limited or prohibited; other actions (such as most green house gas emissions) are allowed freely,[35] as if anything not prohibited imposes no costs on others. Any use of natural resources involves environmental tradeoffs that affect all current and future people. Environmental accounting-the effort to make these tradeoffs explicit-is still in its infancy, and little, if any, public policy around the world incorporates realistic appraisal of environmental tradeoffs.[36] Within a strategy to protect a healthy environment, it is these tradeoffs we compensate for. Estimating future environmental costs of present use is extremely difficult, and until we have better understanding, we need to err on the side of caution.
The endowment is a powerful tool to help because charging for something discourages its use. A simple application of Adam Smith’s invisible hand theory[37] implies that users of resources will overexploit them unless they pay the environmental costs of their use. This is one reason for the rule that the purchase price of any resource has to justify its use. Once we tie government revenue to the value of the resource endowment, we give government an incentive to put a high value on the resource base.
One might think that if we start charging businesses for resources, we will start privatizing even more of our environment to make more money. I want to argue that the opposite is true. Throughout history, resources have typically been up for grabs or given away by governments to crony capitalists. In either case, people have incentive to exploit resources to extinction.[38] There was no dodo dividend. The assertion of ownership over common resources provides the following three mechanisms to reduce the overexploitation of resources.[39]
- The endowment encourages the community think like an owner. A demand for payment asserts ownership, and ownership confers rights to control and manage.[40] When private companies own the environment, any government action to protect it is “interference” with the powers that naturally flow from ownership. Once we establish the people as owners of the environment, government as custodian, and private companies as the hired help, environmental protections naturally follow from the people’s ownership. If companies want to lease the people’s resources, they have to follow the people’s terms.
Ownership (whether public or private) is the solution to the tragedy of the commons. The term “tragedy of the commons” comes from theorized pastoralists who have an incentive to over-graze a common field that none of them owns.[41] One solution is to divide the field into private property, but another solution is to formalize collective ownership, establishing an authority to set rules of access.[42] Agribusiness firms do not have incentive overgraze their own fields or butcher their own herds to extinction; they do have incentive to overwhelm the common watershed with excessive cattle excrement, hormones, fertilizer, and other pollutants.[43] Establishing the people’s endowment creates an authority to say this is people’s watershed; these are the terms of access.
- The endowment encourages the community to think like a monopolist, and to realize its price-setting power. This statement is less true of a resource like oil, which is sold a world market. But even the poorest countries have monopoly power over many valuable assets, including local real estate, the monetary system, and the broadcast spectrum. Monopolists don’t sell all they can at the lowest prices. They restrict supply to obtain higher prices. Once we realize the enormous monopoly power the community has over access to the environment, it doesn’t make sense for the people to unload their precious resources at bargain prices; it makes sense to hold them back to see how much money they can get.
- The endowment encourages people to think not just like any monopolist, but like Johnny Carson. Who? In the late 1970s and ’80s, he was the highest-paid television entertainer in the world.[44] His command over a huge audience gave him monopoly power, which he used not just to demand more money but also to demand less work. His time was valuable. The wealthier he became from selling his time, the more time off he could afford. He restricted the supply of his time beyond the profit-maximizing point and enjoyed the non-market value of his resource.
Currently the community’s share of the revenue from privatization is so small that we don’t feel like we can afford to hold any more back. Once start making companies bid pay for what they take out of the commons, we can realize the power over our environment Johnny Carson asserted over his time.
Compare two strategies for a country managing its beaches. Under the current strategy, politically connected corporations obtain the beaches at far less than their market value. Most the beaches become private resorts inaccessible to many citizens. Under the John Carson strategy, the people raise the price above the revenue-maximizing level, holding back a large amount of beachfront property to retain for public use, but making a very high rate on beaches they do privatize. A few private resorts dot the beaches, but large areas remain for public or for wildlife.
Our environment-left alone and unexploited-is the most important part of our endowment. We can have fewer smoke stacks, fewer drain pipes, bigger parks, cleaner air, a healthier environment, and make a higher rate of return on the resources we do exploit. We will leave our descendants in a better position both financially and environmentally. We aren’t doing this now, partly because we don’t have enough democracy, but also because we’re not looking where the money is and not taking power over it.
Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the idea of a people’s endowment, in which we establish the precedent that the people as a whole own the environment and the resources within it. It has argued that this strategy will help create an institutional structure that more fairly shares the benefits of our economy with-and better protects the environment-for all people, living today and in the future.
The people’s endowment is better than the tax-as-you-go method of financing government expenditure because it alters the institutional structure toward greater equality and responsibility. Default ownership in the current system is highly unequal creating leverage for the wealthy to resist tax-as-you-go efforts to combat inequality. Once the endowment is established, a high level of equality becomes the default. Businesses have to add value and pay for the resources they hold to make money.
The chapter has argued that the endowment will better maintain the environment for future generations because it focuses our attention on the environmental tradeoffs we make daily and because it gives the community greater power to set environmental rules.
The chapter has not argued for any specific level of public and private sectors. It has simply argued for how we should go about privatization of resources. This strategy does not necessarily imply a larger government sector. We should choose the mix of public and private uses of resources based on what is better overall for present and future people. We should privatize resources only if our environmental endowment is made more valuable by doing so, and only if private actors are paying enough to make privatization profitable for the community.
Of course, we need to make sure that the terms of use are loose enough to give people flexibility in the projects they will pursue as individuals with the resources they obtain. Access to resources needs to be open to all people on the same basis without discrimination. And everyone has to have access to enough resources to afford the basics of life. But anyone who holds resources must pay back to the community, and that payback must be enough to make their ownership a benefit for everyone else-now and in the future.
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[1] Similar proposals include (Barnes 2014); (Blyth and Lonergan 2014); (Flomenhoft 2012); (Widerquist 2012b); (Widerquist 2012a) This proposal obviously takes inspiration from left-libertarian proposals such as (Vallentyne and Steiner 2000); (Vallentyne and Steiner 2000b) The main difference between this proposal and more standard left-libertarianism is the emphasis on the community’s monopoly power over its resources (explained below).
[2] (Mansfield 2008)
[3] These institutional endowments are not people’s endowments, because they are not set up to serve the interest of the people as a whole. Whose interest these endowments serve is an interesting issue, but off the topic of this chapter. I use them only as examples of how endowments can work.
[4] (Institute 2003); (Institute 2014)
[5] (Harvar-Management-Company 2014)
[6] (Arsenault 2009)
[7] (Piketty 2014)
[8] (Flomenhoft 2012); (Widerquist 2012b)
[9] (Widerquist and Howard 2012b); (Widerquist and Howard 2012c)
[10] (Alaska-Permanent-Fund-Corporation 2014); (Permanent-Fund-Dividend-Division 2014), averages are the author’s calculations from the table.
[11] For further arguments along these lines, see (Widerquist and Howard 2012b); (Widerquist and Howard 2012c)
[12] (Black 2000)
[13] (Sovereign-Wealth-Fund-Institute 2014)
[14] (Norges-Bank 2014)
[15] (International-Monetary-Fund 2013)
[16] (Tétreault, Okruhlik, and Kapiszewski 2011)
[17] In the United States for example, public ownership is asserted in (73d-Congress-of-the-United-States 1934), 301.
[18] (Flomenhoft 2012), 100.
[19] (Snider 2003), 12.
[20] (Snider 2003), 12.
[21] (Sherman 2009)
[22] (Flomenhoft 2012)
[23] (Erickson and Groh 2012)
[24] (Moss 2012), 76, 86 n18.
[25] Author’s calculations assuming a population of 700,000 and a real return rate of 4 percent.
[26] (Roberts and Solow 2003)
[27] (Hammond 1996)
[28] (Rose 2008)
[29] (Erickson and Groh 2012), Table 3.1, 43
[30] Qatar for example receives more than 70 percept of government revenue from hydrocarbons and another 10 percent from business taxes, much of which is directly or indirectly related to hydrocarbons. (International-Monetary-Fund 2010), table 13, p. 10.
[31] (Flomenhoft 2012), 96-98.
[32] (Flomenhoft 2012).
[33] (Widerquist 2012b)
[34] (Blyth and Lonergan 2014)
[35] (Hoffman and Wells 1989)
[36] (Odum 1996); (Mathews 1997); (Owen 2008)
[37] (Smith 1976)
[38] (Martin 2005); (Martin and Klein 1984) (Roberts and Solow 2003)
[39] Adapted from (Widerquist and Howard 2012a)
[40] The now-standard account of that we mean when we use the word “ownership” defines it as a bundle of 11 rights and duties (Honoré 1987), 161-192.
[41] (Hardin 1968)
[42] (Feeny et al. 1990)
[43] (Williams and Hann 1978)
[44] (McWhirter 1982)
by Karl Widerquist | Mar 6, 2019 | Opinion, The Indepentarian
The website, Revista Libertalia, recently published an article in Spanish with extensive quotes from an interview conducted with me. The article is entitled, “Voces sobre la renta básica (II): ¿Está justificada? [Voices on basic income (II): Is it justified?].” It’s author is Pablo Magaña. The Spanish version was published on February 28, 2019. The author created, but did not publish an English version of the article. The quotes below reproduce the entire English version with no additional editing.
Voices on the basic income (II): Is it justified?
The idea of a basic income raises many hopes and some eyebrows. In this article, some of its defenders will explain to us which is, in their view, the best way to justify it. However, in order to make the discussion more interesting, we also asked them to answer one common objection that is often raised against the proposal: the free-riding objection. What does this objection say? Quite simple. Unlike other social security schemes, a basic income is unconditional, which means that you can be entitled to it regardless of your socio-economic condition. And, more crucially, regardless of the extent to which you contribute to your society.
For some people, this is plainly unfair. The viability of a basic income depends upon the existence of enough contributors to a common public fund. But, as long as this scheme is already in place and working in a stable manner, if any individual decided not to contribute to it, there would be nothing we could do in response: given the income’s unconditional character, the supposed free-rider would still be as entitled to it as any other citizen. Let us suppose – so goes the classical example[i] – that I decided to spent all my time living high, surfing the waves in Malibu, playing guitar under the moonlight, driving along endless highways on the wheel of an old van. Sounds great, doesn’t it? Still, since such a plan would only be possible if others work and contribute to a common fund, my decision might look like an injustice, a clear case of free-riding. But is it really like this?
Before introducing some possible answers to this challenge, we will look first at some arguments in favor of a basic income.
According to Hillel Steiner[ii], “the best way to defend the right to UBI involves a dual strategy: (a) showing that this right is implied by some more basic and uncontested principle, and (b) showing that this right is compatible with, and does not encroach upon, other widely accepted rights”. As a left-libertarian, Steiner regards the Earth as humanity’s common possession[iii], which entails that if somebody intends to appropriate herself of any portion of it, she should compensate her fellow co-owners. If she didn’t, she would be illegitimately appropriating of something that is not really hers. In other words, she would be stealing. Steiner’s emphasis on natural resources colors both his model of basic income and his preferred justification of it:
“In my view, a right to UBI should be funded by a 100% tax on the ownership of natural resources, commonly termed a ‘Land Value Tax’ or, more accurately, a ‘Location Value Tax’. This tax would be levied on the value of those locations themselves, and not on the value of any improvements made to those locations by human labour. A right to a UBI funded in this way satisfies (a) since those taxable natural resources/locations, not being the product of any person’s labour, are rightfully available for use by everyone. So if someone wants to privatise some of them, and to exclude all others from using them, then it seems only fair that the privatizer should compensate those others. The UBI I’m proposing simply is that compensation.”
This is a fairly common way to defend the right to a basic income, also employed by Guy Standing[iv], author of Basic Income: And How we Can Make it Happen[v]. In Standing’s view, “the right to a basic income can be justified on three ethical grounds. First, it is a matter of common justice. The land, the air, water, and even ideas inherited from our ancestors are all part of the commons which belong to everybody equally. But elites and the wealthy have been given, have inherited or have used the commons for their benefit. Therefore, they should compensate the commoners who have lost the commons, and the fairest way to do that is give everybody in society a common payment, a ‘common dividend’ on our collective public wealth”.
Again, the basic income is presented as a way of compensating human beings for having deprived them of what is, in essence, a public good. However, as we have seen, Standing believes there are additional reasons on behalf of a basic income. “[A] second fundamentally ethical reason for a basic income”, he contends, “is that it would enhance individual and societal freedom. In particular, it would strengthen republican freedom — the freedom from domination by figures in unaccountable positions of power. Whether you are on the political left or right, we all claim (or most of us do!) to believe in freedom. But you cannot be free unless you have the capacity to say ‘no’ to people who can oppress or exploit you. If you do not have basic income security, you do not have that capacity.”
Note that this argument is slightly different from the previous one. Granted, here the argument is also premised upon the existence of an injustice. Yet in this case the injustice does not involve the illegitimate appropriation of what is commonly owned, but rather the presence of a structure of domination under which individuals cannot really be considered autonomous or free. According to this argument, justice requires that nobody ever feel the need to be subjected to another’s arbitrary will, an aim which would only be secured by implementing a right to a basic income[vi].
Political philosopher Karl Widerquist[vii], author of many books and articles on the basic income[viii], has defended a similar view. As he puts it, we need acknowledge that:
“[I]t’s wrong for anyone to come between another person and the resources they need to survive. It’s wrong for anyone to put conditions on people’s access to the resources they need to survive. Don’t ignore this fact: poverty is the lack of access to the resources you need to live a decent life. A healthy person with the right skills and access to a healthy environment can do many things that are impossible for an impoverished person in society today. They can build their own house; fish, farm, or hunt their own food; they can work with who they want. They call work alone or with whoever they want. They don’t need a boss. They never have to follow orders.”
“Our societies create poverty by interfering with people who would like to use the resources of the Earth for themselves. We do it because better off people want to control all the world’s resources. By allowing a small group to control the world’s resources without paying compensation to the people they thereby make propertyless, we put most people in the position in which “work” becomes synonymous with “a job.” Making a living means taking orders. This is not a fact of nature. It is the outcome of society’s rules. We need to change those rules.”
“UBI rectifies that problem. It says if you’re going to hold more resources than others, you have to pay something back in compensation, so that no one ever again is forced to live in poverty and no one is ever forced into the position where they must take orders to survive.”
“UBI is not the end of the market or the end of paid labor. It is simply a market where income doesn’t start at zero, and workers are freed from the threat of destitution. With UBI, workers enter the labor market as free people. Employers have to pay enough to make it worthwhile for workers to take those jobs. UBI will give us a high-wage economy that works for everyone.”
One view in this vicinity has been defended by philosopher Elizabeth Anderson[ix], who, nonetheless, does not believe that a basic income would necessarily be the best option. Now, if it was, she says, the best way to ground it would be as follows:
“The best case for the UBI is as follows. Automation, and changes in the nature of employment, are bringing about the disappearance of stable jobs and the rise of a precariat class whose members are unable to support themselves with steady employment. UBI is needed to provide the security and basis for a decent life for a rising number of people in the world. BI should be universal to ensure its political stability and to avoid the costs of means testing and intrusive investigations of people’s lives.”
Among other things, Anderson is well-known for her defense of so-called “relational egalitarianism”[x], the view that theorists of justice should focus a bit less on how resources are distributed and more on how we treat each other (the latter having obviously implications for the former). This is to say, what matters the most is not who gets what, but whether we treat each other as an equal or not – without distinctions based on social status or power asymmetries.
Before finishing this part of the article, let us look at another possible strategy to justify a basic income. Until now, the arguments we have seen have focused either i) on a compensation for an illegitimate appropriation of a common good, or ii) on the need to make sure that individuals enjoy a minimal independence, in that they ought not to be forced to choose between accepting orders or starve. But there is a third line of argument, which would stress iii) the alleged positive consequences of a basic income. This is Guy Standing’s third argument:
“The third ethical reason for wanting a basic income is that it would tend to provide basic security, which is what we call a public good. We all want basic security in our lives, and basic security is a superior public good in that if everybody in our community has basic security, it increases the value of it for everybody. Basic security has been shown to increase tolerance, resilience, altruism and mental bandwidth (or mental health and IQ).”
This is all very well, one might say. But, what happens with our Malibu surfer? Isn’t he objectionably free-riding on his fellow citizens? Isn’t it unfair that he can live a highly pleasant life while I have to break my back from 9 to 5?
In Steiner’s view, the answer is no: “[E]veryone – lazy, as well as industrious – is entitled to that compensation”. For remember that, according to him, a basic income is not just another subsidy, but the compensation that those who want to possess more than their fair share of the Earth’s natural resources have to pay to the rest of us – whether we are surfers or not.
Widerquist, in his reply, invites us to cast some doubt on the value judgments and the assumptions presupposed by the objection:
“The thing that most detracts people from UBI is the belief that prosperous people have the right and responsibility to tell less prosperous people what to do. We, the prosperous, want to think we are better than the less prosperous. We want to think our virtue—rather than a less-than-perfectly-fair system—is the reason people are less prosperous than we are. We like to think that we know what the less prosperous need to do to become prosperous—even though the vast majority of us have no idea what it is like to grow up poor and how different people’s circumstances can be.”
“Not only are these beliefs unfounded, they are not good for the middle class. Because we want to put the very poor in the position where they have to do what more prosperous people want, we put the vast majority of people in the position where they have to do what the wealthiest few want. Probably well more than 90% of people in every country have no choice but to take a job for a living. The vast majority of us—even some very prosperous people—are unfree to work for ourselves. And so, we must go to an employer—most of whom represent very wealthy corporations—get a job, and take orders all day. That is neither freedom nor fairness.”
“UBI will put the middle class in a much better bargaining position. In most countries, the middle class is not significantly better off than they were 40 years ago. Virtually, all the benefits of the last 40 years of economic growth have gone to the wealthiest 1%. UBI will help the other 99% command the better wages and the shorter working hours that they have earned.”
Another way to answer the free-riding objection involves calling into question its relevancy. Why should we care so much, the rejoinder goes, about something that is actually very unlikely? A rejoinder of this type has been endorsed by Guy Standing:
“The normal human condition is to want to work, to improve ourselves, to improve our living conditions, to improve the life prospects of our children and so on. I would feel sorry for somebody who would not work because he or she had a modest basic income. But of course this is not what happens or is likely to happen to more than a tiny number of people. We have found in our pilots that people with a basic income work more, not less, and are more productive, not less.”[xi]
Indeed, Standing believes that even if free riding was as likely as the objection assumes, the good consequences of a basic income would probably outweigh its potential defects or unfair aspects. As he puts it, a basic income “would encourage more of us to spend more time doing work that is not labour, such as caring for elderly frail relatives or children or doing community work. Most of us will go into old age wishing we had done more of that type of work and less of labour”.
Finally, one can accept the core of the objection – namely, that justice requires some degree of reciprocity – while denying that one’s contributions to society must be measured solely according to their market value. In Elizabeth Anderson’s words: “Everyone ought to contribute to society. But not all positive contributions to society need be via paid employment on the market. Much of women’s work taking care of children and elder dependents is not paid, although it is socially necessary. Much nonprofit work makes a huge difference for others, but it is also not paid. Most people want to make a positive contribution and will do so in one way or another. Society should expand opportunities to make a contribution, but not insist that they survive a market test”.
What this view suggests is that Californian surfers needn’t be free-riding on us. Though their economic contribution to society may border on nothingness, this wouldn’t necessarily imply that they cannot contribute in other ways, nor that they are unable to provide us with valuable things. Suppose we discovered that no member of the Rolling Stones has ever paid a dollar in taxes since they became famous. Would that mean they haven’t contributed to society as much as they should? Probably. Would it also mean they haven’t contributed anything at all? That seems harder to stomach. For many people, listening to their songs, going to their concerts, or simply learning to play guitar by imitating Keith Richards or Roon Wood are in themselves valuable experiences that would not vanish of a sudden.
Are these arguments convincing? Do they answer adequately to the free-riding objection? Do they really succeed in justifying a basic income? That is something for the reader to decide.
—————-
[i] This objection was famously formulated by John Rawls in his article “The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good” (1988), Philosophy & Public Affairs 17(4): 257, n. 7. For an equally well-known response, see also Philippe van Parijs,“Why Surfers Should be Fed: The Liberal Case for an Unconditional Basic Income” (1991), Philosophy & Public Affairs 20(2): 101-131.
[ii] https://www.manchester.ac.uk/research/hillel.steiner/
[iii] See, for instance, Steiner’s article “Left Libertarianism and the Ownership of Natural Resources” (2009), Public Reason 1(1): 1-8.
[iv] https://www.guystanding.com/.
[v] For the Spanish tradition, see: https://www.marcialpons.es/libros/la-renta-basica/9788494769474/.
[vi] Let us remember that a similar argument was put forward by Matt Zwolinski in this article’s predecessor: https://www.revistalibertalia.com/single-post/2019/02/09/Voces-sobre-la-renta-basica-I-La-renta-basica-y-el-libertarismo.
[vii] https://www.qatar.georgetown.edu/profile/karl-widerquist.
[viii] See, for instance, https://www.amazon.com/Independence-Propertylessness-Basic-Income-Exploring/dp/1137274727.
[ix] https://www-personal.umich.edu/~eandersn/.
[x] The locus classicus of this discussion is “What is the Point of Equality?” (1999), Ethics 109(2): 287-337.
[xi] These results are discussed in chapter 8 of the book mentioned in note iv.
“Voces sobre la renta básica (II): ¿Está justificada? [Voices on basic income (II): Is it justified?]” by Pablo Magaña, Libertalia, February 28, 2019
by Karl Widerquist | Feb 21, 2018 | Opinion, The Indepentarian
This essay was originally published in the USBIG NewsFlash in December 2006.
Four basic income advocates died in November 2006. Noble-Laureate Milton Friedman (Nov. 16), Brazilian economist Antonio Maria da Silveira (Nov.21), former director of the Citizens Income Trust (Britain) Richard Clements (Nov. 23), and inventor and philanthropist Leonard Greene (Nov. 30). Below is a short discussion of the role of each in the debate over the basic income guarantee.
MILTON FRIEDMAN
Milton Friedman, the economist who most popularized BIG in the United States, died November 16, 2006. Friedman was on the most influential economists of the Twentieth Century. His work has been influential in diverse areas of economic theory, but most particularly in the area of monetary economics. Although his proposal of a strict rule for increasing the money supply each year by a given percentage has been largely discarded, his critical work on the mistakes made by the central bank that led to the Great Depression and other economic downturns has simply become part of common knowledge.
More than his contribution to the science of economics, Friedman is known for popularization of free market libertarianism in numerous books, articles, and a television show on the Public Broadcasting System. He opposed government regulation of industry and the privatization of state-owned industries right up to and including the Post Office. He was an early advocate of public school choice and of the privatization of Social Security. Thus, he became known as a spokesperson for conservative republicanism, but his libertarianism was never quite in line with traditional American conservatism. As early as the 1960s, he opposed the military draft and supported the legalization of drugs. None of his proposals seemed more out-of-line with the 1980-2006 conservative revolution than his advocacy of the basic income guarantee under the name of the negative income tax (NIT).
Welfare state policy in the United States, and to some extent across the industrialized world, has been dominated by an uneasy marriage of the liberal desire to help the poor with the conservative desire to force the poor to become better people. So, we have a hugely complex system that is stingy with some of the people who need it most, generous with people who fit into arbitrary categories, and makes everyone jump through hoops to meet the conditions of eligibility. One might expect a free-market libertarian to oppose using the tax system either to help or to improve the poor, but to a free market libertarian it is clear which of the two is the greater danger.
To a libertarian, government interference, control, and humiliation of the poor is a waste of time and money and whatever it might do to improve the poor, it does not make them more free. Through this kind of reasoning, Friedman became a supporter of the basic income guarantee.
“He believed that if you wanted to fight poverty you should give the poor more money and let them figure out how to use it,” as Renée Montagne of National Public radio summarized his thinking. He, therefore, advocated BIG in the form of the NIT: a small in-cash grant to everyone who had a low income with a low “marginal tax” rate that would give them plenty of incentive to earn money on the private market if they could.
Friedman did so much to popularize BIG that many BIG supporters today tend to forget that he never lost his free market attraction to the idea that perhaps the government should do nothing for the poor. Friedman’s support for the NIT almost always came with the disclaimer to the effect that as long as we are spending money to help the poor, we might as well use the most efficient method to help them. He even sometimes described the negative income tax as a transitional program toward the complete abolition of all government assistance to the poor—not quite what most BIG advocates hope for.
Nevertheless there is good reason to think of Friedman as a champion of the BIG movement. Friedman’s NIT was broad and generous to those who needed it most. Daine Pagen, of the Caregivers Credit Campaign complained that many recent articles on Friedman treated the NIT as the precursor to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Although the EITC is a form of negative tax that was an outgrowth of the NIT movement, it is actually a very narrow and water-down alternative. Friedman’s NIT was a comprehensive solution to poverty aimed at everyone, not only at low-income workers as the EITC is.
Under the NIT, the government would make no judgment about why a person was poor. It would help everyone in need, and create an incentive system so that everyone who worked more had more a higher take-home pay. It would leave it up to the individual to decide whether that was in their best interest. This kind of thinking is diametrically opposed to “welfare reform” under Temporary Assistance to Needed Families, which is designed to force ever single parent into the labor market whether or not she believes the needs of her children make that impossible.
Friedman wrote extensively on the NIT between 1960 and 1980, but he paid less attention to the topic in the last 25 years of his life. However, in an interview with Brazilian Senator and economist Eduardo Suplicy in 2000, Friedman reiterated his support for BIG. When Suplicy asked what Friedman thought of basic income as an alternative to the NIT, Friedman responded, “A basic or citizen’s income is not an alternative to a negative income tax. It is simply another way to introduce a negative income tax.”
A quick web search will produce thousands of articles on Friedman. For a broad view of his career and contributions, see Samuel Brittan in the Financial Times: https://www.ft.com/cms/s/cb74eef8-7599-11db-aea1-0000779e2340.html
ANTONIO MARIA DA SILVEIRA
Antonio Maria da Silveira, professor of economics at Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, died on November 21. According to his long-time friend, Eduardo Suplicy, “Antonio Maria was the first Brazilian economist who proposed the institution of a guaranteed minimum income program through a negative income tax. It was in the article Redistribuição de Renda (Redistribution of Income), published in Revista Brasileira de Economia, in April 1975.” Drawing inspiration from Economists as diverse as J. M. Keyns and F. A. Hayek, Antonio Maria argued that it would soon become feasible for the government to secure a decent living for everyone. Suplicy credits him with being a consistent voice in favor of a basic income guarantee right through the passage of a bill to gradually phase in a basic income in Brazil. Suplicy’s tribute to Antonio Maria da Silveira is in the December issue of the BIEN NewsFlash (www.basicincome.org).
RICHARD CLEMENTS
Richard Clements, former director of the Citizens Income Trust (CIT), died November 23, 2006. According to the CIT, “The Citizen’s Income Trust has been sorry to hear of the death of Richard Clements. After being editor of Tribune and running Neil Kinnock’s office, Richard was Director of the Citizen’s Income Trust from 1993 to 1996, when sadly he had to retire because of his own ill health and to look after his wife Bridget. He was a most effective Director, and we were very sorry when he had to leave. Not surprisingly, he was particularly good at raising the profile of the Citizen’s Income debate in the press.” Clements was also a campaigner against nuclear weapons and editor of the British left-wing newspaper, the Tribune. The British newspaper the Guardian article on Clements is on the web at: https://www.guardian.co.uk/obituaries/story/0,,1955580,00.html.
LEONDARD GREENE
Can you imagine a better way to make a fortune than to invent a product that saves lives? Can you imagine a better thing to do with a fortune than use to fight poverty and disease? Leonard Greene made his fortune inventing safety products for airplanes. His stall warning device (a safety feature that is now standard equipment on commercial aircraft) has saved an uncountable number of lives. After Greene was a well established business owner with dozens of patents and a multimillion-dollar business to his credit, he founded the Institute for SocioEconomic Studies, which funded research on healthcare policy and on the Basic Income Guarantee. Greene wrote two books on the Basic Income Guarantee, Free Enterprise Without Poverty and The National Tax Rebate. Greene’s BIG idea was simple: What if they United States replaced everything it is now doing to maintain someone’s income and replaced it with a basic income in the form of a tax credit or tax rebate? Greene found that the revenue currently devoted to tax deductions, welfare policies, farm subsidies, and many other programs could be redirected to a basic income large enough to virtually eliminate poverty in the United States. His ideas have not caught on with mainstream politicians, but they have continuing appeal. His idea for redirecting all U.S. income support spending into a basic income has been virtually reinvented by Charles Murray in his latest book, In Our Hands, and the idea of BIG in the form of a tax credit is very much the idea behind the BIG bill submitted in the 109th Congress by Representative Robert Filner. He is survived by eight children. He son, Donald Greene died in United Flight 93 on September 11, 2001. Leonard Greene died November 30, 2006 at the age of 88.
EDITORIAL NOTE
When I volunteered to write the USBIG Newsletter in 2000, I did no realize how many obituaries I would have to write. It is a particularly sad duty that I have never quite gotten used to. Friedman’s death, following Herbert Simon in 2001, James Tobin in 2002, John Kenneth Galbraith early this year, marks the end of an era when the great economists who seemed to disagree on everything else, all seemed united behind the guaranteed income as the best way to reform anti-poverty policy. Friedman was first among these because of long-term efforts to popularize the idea. Although Friedman considered himself a liberal (or libertarian) who believed freedom was the overriding value that should guide policy and who believed that freedom conflicted with egalitarianism and economic equality, he had something to teach egalitarians. His logic (if you really want to help the poor, give them money and let them decide how to use it) leads me inevitably to the belief that unconditional assistance, in the form of some kind of basic income guarantee, must be the centerpiece of any truly egalitarian program. It has also made me suspicious of anyone who calls himself egalitarian but advocates conditional assistance to the poor. There can’t be egalitarianism without respect for the poor, and how can we say we respect the poor if we advocate policies designed to promote “equality but…”? For example, I support equality but only for the truly needed. I support equality but only if they are willing to work. I support equality butnot one of them is going to get their hands on one red cent of my tax dollars if they’ve ever refused a job. I can’t help but be suspicious. I can’t help but come back that that idea, if you really care about the poor, if you really want to help them, you will give them money unconditionally, with no supervision, without asking for anything in return. Sometimes it takes a libertarian spot a true egalitarian.
-Karl Widerquist, New Orleans, LA, December 20