by Micah Kaats | Jan 16, 2018 | News
As many as 375 million people may have to switch jobs as a result of automation by 2030. This is according to a new report published by the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), a private sector think tank and the business and economics research arm of McKinsey & Company.
According to MGI researchers, “the transitions will be very challenging – matching or even exceeding the scale of shifts of agriculture and manufacturing we have seen in the past.” Such dramatic shifts in the global labor market will demand proportionately dramatic responses from governments, businesses, and individuals. Specifically, the MGI report emphasizes the importance of providing transition and income support to workers.
The report, entitled “Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained: Workforce Transitions in a Time of Automation”, builds on previous MGI research suggesting that 50% of global work activities could theoretically be automated by modifying existing technologies. While only 5% of jobs are at risk of disappearing entirely, 6 in 10 of jobs have 30% of constituent work activities that could be automated. According to MGI researchers, the question is not whether or not automation will alter the nature of work, but how long it will take.
Their analysis model potential net employment changes over 12 years for more than 800 occupations in 46 countries, focusing particularly on China, Germany, India, Japan, Mexico, and the USA. The report also accounts for several factors that could affect the pace of automation including technological and financial feasibility, demographic changes to labor markets, wage dynamics, regulatory responses, and social acceptance.
The report finds that 75 million to 375 million workers, or 3 – 14% of the global workforce, may be displaced by automation by 2030. These effects will be particularly felt in high income countries. In the most extreme scenario, 32% of American workers (166 million people), 33% of German workers (59 million people), and 46% of Japanese workers (37 million people) will be forced out of their jobs by 2030.
However, there may not be any shortage of new jobs available. MGI’s researchers note that new jobs will need to be created to care for aging societies, raise energy efficiency, address challenges posed by climate change, provide goods and services to the growing global middle class, and build new infrastructure.
Automation itself may also have the potential to create at least as many jobs as it destroys. Historically, transformative technological advancements have often led to significant jobs growth across industries.
The real challenge will be to ensure a smooth and stable transition between jobs. According to MGI research, automation is likely to disproportionately affect workers over 40, and sustained investments in retraining programs will be necessary to prepare midcareer workers for new employment opportunities. The report notes that this will require “an initiative on the scale of the Marshall Plan…involving collaboration between the public and private sectors.”
The MGI researchers also emphasize the need for increased financial support during transitions. Workers will need unemployment insurance to compensate for lost wages, as well as supplemental income to offset wage depressions typical in transitioning economies. A universal basic income (UBI) may be capable of satisfying both needs.
The report points to completed UBI trials in Canada and India, which showed no significant reduction in work hours and demonstrated increases in quality of life, healthcare, parental leave, entrepreneurialism, education, and female empowerment. The report also references ongoing and planned UBI experiments in the United States, Uganda, Kenya, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands as programs to watch in the years to come.
The worldwide spread of automation may be inevitable, but according to researchers at the McKinsey Global Institute, the demise of human labor is not. Whether or not we can respond effectively to the needs of a changing economy will depend largely on our ability to ensure a secure and stable transition for displaced workers.
More information at:
James Manyika, Susan Lund, Michael Chui, Jacques Bughin, Jonathan Woetzel, Parul Batra, Ryan Ko, and Saurabh Sanghvi, “What the future of work will mean for jobs, skills, and wages”, McKinsey Global Institute, November 2017
by Guest Contributor | Dec 4, 2017 | News
A new report from the International Labour Office (ILO), a United Nations agency dealing with labour-related issues, mentions Basic Income as an option for the reform of social security:
… is a renewed debate about a universal basic income (UBI) as a way of improving income security in the face of uncertain availability of jobs. As argued by proponents, it would guarantee a minimum standard of living for everyone irrespective of employment, age and gender, and would give people the freedom and space to live the life they want. Its proponents also argue that a UBI may contribute to alleviating poverty while reducing the administrative complexity and cost of existing social protection systems. A wide range of proposals are being discussed under the label of UBI, highly divergent in terms of objectives, proposed benefit levels, financing mechanisms and other features. Opponents of UBI proposals dispute its economic, political and social feasibility, question its capacity to address the structural causes of poverty and inequality, and fear that it may entail disincentives to work. Moreover, it is argued that a UBI – especially neoliberal or libertarian UBI proposals that aim at abolishing the welfare state – may increase poverty and inequality and undermine labour market institutions such as collective bargaining. (p.180)
To read the whole report, click here.
Photo: “Unemployment line” at FDR Memorial, CC BY 2.0 woodleywonderworks
by Karl Widerquist | Nov 26, 2017 | Opinion, The Indepentarian
This post is one of several previewing the book I’m writing on Universal Basic Income (UBI) experiments, and it is the second of two reviewing the five Negative Income Tax (NIT) experiments conducted by the U.S. and Canadian Government in the 1970s. This post draws heavily on my earlier work, “A Failure to Communicate: What (if anything) Can We Learn from the Negative Income Tax Experiments.”
Last week I argued that the results from the NIT experiments for various quality-of-life indicators were substantial and encouraging and that the labor-market effects implied that the policy was affordable. As promising as the results were to the researchers involved the NIT experiments, they were seriously misunderstood in the public discussion at the time. But the discussion in Congress and in the popular media displayed little understanding of the complexity. The results were spun or misunderstood and used in simplistic arguments to reject NIT or any form of guaranteed income offhand.
The experiments were of most interest to Congress and the media during the period from 1970 to 1972, when President Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan (FAP), which had some elements of an NIT, was under debate in Congress. None of the experiments were ready to release final reports at the time. Congress insisted researchers produce some kind of preliminary report, and then members of Congress criticized the report for being “premature,” which was just what the researchers had initially warned.[i]
Results of the fourth and largest experiment, SIME/DIME, were released while Congress was debating a policy proposed by President Carter, which had already moved quite a way from the NIT model. Dozens of technical reports with large amounts of data were simplified down to two statements: It decreased work effort and it supposedly increased divorce. The smallness of the work disincentive effect hardly drew any attention. Although researchers going into the experiments agreed that there would be some work disincentive effect and were pleased to find it was small enough to make the program affordable, many members of Congress and popular media commentators acted as if the mere existence of a work disincentive effect was enough to disqualify the program. The public discussion displayed little, if any, understanding that the 5%-to-7.9% difference between the control and experimental groups is not a prediction of the national response. Nonacademic articles reviewed by one of the authors[ii] showed little or no understanding that the response was expected to be much smaller as a percentage of the entire population, that it could potentially be counteracted by the availability of good jobs, or that it could be the first step necessary for workers to command higher wages and better working conditions.
The United Press International simply got the facts wrong, saying that the SIME/DIME study showed that “adults might abandon efforts to find work.” The UPI apparently did not understand the difference between increasing search time and completely abandoning the labor market. The Rocky Mountain News claimed that the NIT “saps the recipients’ desire to work.” The Seattle Times presented a relatively well-rounded understanding of the results, but despite this, simply concluded that the existence of a decline in work effort was enough to “cast doubt” on the plan. Others went even farther, saying that the existence of a work disincentive effect was enough to declare the experiments a failure. Headlines such as “Income Plan Linked to Less Work” and “Guaranteed Income Against Work Ethic” appeared in newspapers following the hearings. Only a few exceptions such as Carl Rowan for the Washington Star (1978) considered that it might be acceptable for people working in bad jobs to work less, but he could not figure out why the government would spend so much money to find out whether people work less when you pay them to stay home.[iii]
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who was one of the few social scientists in the Senate, wrote, “But were we wrong about a guaranteed income! Seemingly it is calamitous. It increases family dissolution by some 70 percent, decreases work, etc. Such is now the state of the science, and it seems to me we are honor bound to abide by it for the moment.” Senator Bill Armstrong of Colorado, mentioning only the existence of a work-disincentive effect, declared the NIT, “An acknowledged failure,” writing, “Let’s admit it, learn from it, and move on.”[iv]
Robert Spiegelman, one of the directors of SIME/DIME, defended the experiments, writing that they provided much-needed cost estimates that demonstrated the feasibility of the NIT. He said that the decline in work effort was not dramatic, and could not understand why so many commentators drew such different conclusions than the experimenters. Gary Burtless (1986) remarked, “Policymakers and policy analysts … seem far more impressed by our certainty that the effective price of redistribution is positive than they are by the equally persuasive evidence that the price is small.”[v]
This public discussion certainly displayed “a failure to communicate.” The experiments produced a great deal of useful evidence, but for by-far the greatest part, it failed to raise the level of debate either in Congress or in public forums. The literature review reveals neither supporter nor opponents who appeared to have a better understanding of the likely effects of the NIT and UBI in the discussions following the release of the results of the experiments in the 1970s.[vi]
Whatever the causes for it, an environment with a low understanding of complexity is highly vulnerable to spin with simplistic if nearly vacuous interpretation. All sides spin, but in the late 1970s NIT debate, only one side showed up. The guaranteed income movement that had been so active in the United States at the beginning of the decade had declined to the point that it was able to provide little or no counter-spin to the enormously negative discussion of the experimental results in the popular media.
Whether the low information content of the discussion in the media resulted more from spin, sensationalism, or honest misunderstanding is hard to determine. But whatever the reasons, the low-information discussion of the experimental results put the NIT (and, in hindsight, UBI by proxy) in an extremely unfavorable light, when the scientific results were mixed-to-favorable.
The scientists who presented the data are not entirely to blame for this misunderstanding. Neither can all of it be blamed on spin, sound bites, sensationalism, conscious desire to make an oversimplified judgment, or the failure of reports to do their homework. Nor can all of it be blamed on the people involved in political debates not paying sufficient attention. It is inherently easier to understand an oversimplification than it is to understand the genuine complexity that scientific research usually involves no matter how painstakingly it is presented. It may be impossible to communicate the complexities to most nonspecialists readers in the time a reasonable person to devote to the issue.
Nevertheless, everyone needs to try to do better next time. And we can do better. Results from experiments in conducted in Namibia and India in the early 2010s and late ’00s were much better understood, as resulted from Canada’s Mincome experiment that sadly did not come out until more than two decades after that experiment was concluded.
The book I’m working on is an effort to help reduce misunderstandings with future experiments. It is aimed at a wide audience because it focuses the problem of communication from specialists to non-specialists. I hope to help researchers involved in current and future experiments design and report their findings in ways that are more likely to raise the level of debate; to help researchers not involved in the experiments raise the level of discussion when they write about the findings of the experiment, to help journalists understand and report experimental findings more accurately; and to help interested citizens of all political predispositions see beyond any possible spin and media misinterpretations to the complexities of the results of this next round of experiments—whatever they turn out to be.
[i] Widerquist, 2005.
[ii] Widerquist, 2005.
[iii] Widerquist, 2005.
[iv] Widerquist, 2005.
[v] Burtless, 1986.
[vi] Widerquist, 2005.
by Kate McFarland | Nov 8, 2017 | News
In an interview with BBC News, Nobel Laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz warned that basic income (citizen’s income) should not be the current priority of the Government of Scotland.
On September 5, First Minister Nicola Sturgeon announced that the Scottish Government would provide funding for basic income trials in the regions of Fife, Glasgow, North Ayrshire, and Edinburgh, where pilot studies of the policy had received the support of local authorities.
During October’s Inclusive Growth Conference, Sturgeon reaffirmed the government’s commitment to supporting trials of basic income, despite acknowledging that the policy might prove infeasible in the end:
Despite the fact that this has some critics, we are going to work with interested local authorities to fund research into the feasibility of a citizen’s basic income scheme.
I should stress our work on this is at a very early stage. It might turn out not to be the answer, it might turn out not to be feasible.
But as work and employment changes as rapidly as it is doing, I think it’s really important that we look and are prepared to be open-minded about the different ways in which we can support individuals to participate fully in the new economy [1].
Stiglitz, who has served as an economic advisor to the Scottish Government since 2012, believes that pursuing a basic income would represent misaligned priorities in light of Scotland’s fiscal constraints. Instead, the distinguished economist urges the government to prioritize benefits targeted to those who need them most, job creation to ensure a job to all who want one, and a livable income for all who work full-time.
When asked about the UK’s interest in basic income during an interview with the BBC’s Sunday Politics Scotland, he replied:
I think the point of a citizen’s income is that it recognizes rights of ordinary individuals–that supporting individuals, social protection, is not aimed at those who have been left behind, but is a basic part of our society.
But I do worry about two things. One, as you say, there are fiscal constraints. Should the scarce money be used to give everyone a basic amount, or should it be targeted at those who have particularly strong needs? I think there needs to be some targeting.
Secondly, over the long run, our responsibility as a society is to make sure that everybody who wants a job can get one. And the underlying problems of the lack of employment and lack of adequate pay–anybody who works full time ought to have a liveable income–those are the issues that, in the long run, we need to address.
Stiglitz has previously been hailed in the basic income community as one of a long Nobel-winning economists who have (reportedly) endorsed basic income. His presumed endorsement took place at the World Summit on Technological Unemployment in February 2015, when he was asked if he supported basic income as a policy response to technological unemployment, and replied “Yes, that’s part of the solution,” before going on to stress that basic income alone is not a complete solution.
In October 2016, Stiglitz again said that “the idea of a basic income is a good idea” in response to a question from Vox reporter Ezra Klein (“What you do think about a universal basic income in America?”). He added, however, that he had not yet made up his mind about the question of whether it is better to target limited resources to those most in need:
If you don’t have a lot of resources, isn’t it better to try to target the limited resources you have at those who really, really need it, the people who are disabled, the people who are elderly without other sources of income, a variety of people who are seriously disadvantaged. The problem with the universal basic income is that you give a flat amount to a large amount of people, and that means, because you have so many people, you can’t give as much as you would to help those who most need it.
He went to note that, “on the other side of the coin, those who most need it have difficulty in navigating the bureaucracy” — a problem that would be avoided by a basic income.
It appears, then, that Stiglitz has not changed his mind on basic income so much as determined that, in Scotland and the UK, fiscal constraints and the need for targeted benefits outweigh the advantages promised by universality.
Watch Stiglitz field a question basic income on Sunday Politics Scotland:
[1] Quoted in Tom Martin, “Sturgeon vows to press ahead with radical benefits overhaul, despite official warnings,” Express, October 21, 2017 (accessed October 27, 2017).
Photo: “Old Scotland” CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 Tatters ✾
by Patrick Hoare | Nov 4, 2017 | News, Research
In a paper released in October 2017, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has analysed the feasibility and effects of introducing a Universal Basic Income (UBI) in various economies, looking at how it might help ease destructive levels of inequality present in many societies around the globe.
The ‘IMF Fiscal Monitor: Tackling Inequality’ focused on how fiscal policy can help governments address high levels of income inequality (from here simply ‘inequality’) while minimizing potential trade-offs between efficiency and equity. As part of the second half of the discussion, the UBI was considered as a mechanism of fiscal redistribution currently being widely debated.
Underpinning the analysis of UBI were a number of premises. The first of these was the assumption that some inequality was inevitable within a market-based economic system. Even though data reveals a decline in the global levels of inequality over the last three decades, the increased inequality within certain economies has had adverse effects, not only in terms of social corrosion and political polarisation but also in terms of economic prosperity. As such, the inequality the report sought to address was the type that was specifically having a negative impact.
The second premise clarified that measures aiming to alleviate inequality should not come at the expense of achieving economic GDP growth. Supporting this, data was presented showing that between 1988 and 2008, across all types of economies, there had been an average growth of real income per capita across every income bracket, even if the increases had been greater for those earning more. It was also shown that an increase in overall growth between 1985 and 2015, in particular in East and South Asia and the Pacific Region, had coincided with huge reductions in relative poverty and absolute poverty, and, therefore, with increases in social welfare. With no clear trend between increased inequality and growth, and with various studies suggesting, contrarily, either that redistributive policies may slow growth or that redistributive policies may help growth (given that the marginal propensity to consume among the poor is higher), it was determined that, on balance, growth should not be unduly undermined.
The third condition stipulated that, given the limited fiscal space most economies operate within, simulations measuring the impact of a UBI should be performed under the assumption of budget neutrality. The vast drop in progressivity among the tax systems of the OECD member states, in particular the drop in the average top rate of personal income tax (PIT) from 62% to 35% between 1980 and 2015, does not seem to have been economically motivated, since during this period there was no evidence of: increased income tax elasticity; proportionally less income going to the top earners (the opposite was the case); increased support for the social welfare of the rich; decreased support for redistribution (the opposite was the case); or, a more progressive tax system being harmful to growth (there was some evidence to suggest the opposite could be the case). It was therefore accepted that this lower progressivity must be the consequence of political preference. As such, in order to control for various political perspectives, the funding for a UBI would have to come from a combination of spending cuts and increased taxes.
Following the establishment of such conditions, the central examination of the UBI was based around simulations of implementation within eight economies: Brazil, Egypt, France, Mexico, Poland, South Africa, the UK and the US. The choice of countries controlled for heterogeneity in geographical area, developmental stage (emerging market and advanced economies), and the generosity and progressivity of the countries’ current noncontributory transfers. The analysis of a UBI was then judged on whether it could increase coverage (the number of beneficiaries) and progressivity (those most in need benefiting proportionally more) of current redistributive programs, without impeding growth.
In almost all cases coverage increased, given the universality of UBI, however improvements in progressivity very much depended on the financing method and the existing level of progressivity within a particular economy. Where UBI was seen as a replacement for current benefit systems, countries with low progressivity but high coverage, such as South Africa, saw larger swathes of their lower earners suffer at the expense of a smaller percentage of beneficiaries within the same income category. In this circumstance, where consumption inequality is higher as a consequence of income inequality, progressivity as well as coverage could be improved if a UBI was financed by increased indirect taxation (consumption tax) rather than through cuts to the current system. In economies where both coverage and progressivity are already relatively high, such as the UK and France, replacing the current system with a UBI would be regressive. Similarly, even in a country where progressivity is high but coverage low, such as Brazil, the introduction of a UBI as a replacement would likely trade one off against the other, ultimately negatively affecting lower income households. In the situation where PIT among the top-earners is increased as a way of financing a UBI (altering the economic behaviour of these payers), the model calibrated to the US economy (moderate coverage and progressivity) found that, although efficiency, in terms of output forgone, was lower than against a system with indirect taxes, the PIT increase yielded greater overall welfare, especially where aversion to inequality was high. The final scenario, where simulations focused on comparing a UBI funded either directly, indirectly or through cuts, against the expansion of a benefit – the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the US – at the same fiscal cost, found that, due to the targeted nature of the EITC subsidy, welfare improvements were higher than would experienced under the implementation of a UBI.
In summary, The Fiscal Monitor concluded that a perfectly implemented means-tested system would always be superior to a UBI, since it would ensure the necessary coverage and provide the greatest level of progressivity within the bounds, constraints and conditions assumed. Therefore, in countries where there is a ‘good’ transfer program, the finance necessary to fund a UBI would be better used on improving the current system. That said, in reality, given the existence of imperfections in such systems, a UBI could be a powerful means of combating poverty and extreme poverty, especially in countries where both progressivity and coverage is poor. It was also noted that a UBI could be implemented for other reasons, such as in combatting job market disruptions associated with technological progress.
More information at:
IMF Publications, ‘IMF Fiscal Monitor: Tackling Inequality, October 2017’, International Monetary Fund website, October 2017
