by Karl Widerquist | Sep 27, 2019 | News
An early version of a book, Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend: Examining its Suitability as a Model, is now available for free download on my personal website. A summary, from the first chapter of the book (2012), is reprinted below. If you want to cite or quote it, please see the published version:
Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend: Examining its Suitability as a Model, edited by Karl Widerquist and Michael W. Howard. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012
Every year, every Alaskan gets paid. Every man, woman, and child receives a dividend as a joint owner of Alaska’s oil reserves. Alaskans are free to use this money as they wish with some potentially putting it towards a home improvement project. After all, if your looking for metal buildings Alaska is your place to find them. In 1956, Alaska ratified a constitution recognizing joint ownership of unoccupied land and natural resources. In 1967, North America’s largest oil reserve was discovered in publicly owned areas on Alaska’s North Slope. In 1976, the state government voted to dedicate a part of its yearly oil revenues to a state investment fund, called the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF). In 1982, the state government voted to distribute part of the returns from that fund as a yearly dividend, called the Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD), sometimes called “the Alaska Dividend.” In 2008, the dividend reached a high of $3269,[1] which comes to $16,345 for a family of five. More often in recent years, the PFD has been between $1000 and $1500 per person, which comes to between $5000 and $7500 for a family of five.
Karl Widerquist (left) Michael W. Howard (right)
The Alaska Dividend is one of the most popular government programs in the United States. It has helped Alaska attain the highest economic equality of any state in the United States. It has coexisted with, and possibly contributed to, the state’s growing and prosperous economy. And, seemingly unnoticed, it has provided unconditional cash assistance to needy Alaskans at a time when most states have scaled back aid and increased conditionality.
The Alaska fund and accompanying dividend seems to be a model worthy of imitation and adaptation. This book examines whether and how the Alaska Dividend is a model that can and should be imitated and adapted for circumstances elsewhere. It is an “edited volume” with authors who differ in their level of enthusiasm for (or skepticism of) the Alaska model. But we believe that the evidence provided by this book shows that the combination of policies we call the Alaska model is worthy of examination by other states, nations, and regions.
What is the Alaska model?
The “Alaska model,” as we use the term here, does not refer to the whole of Alaskan state government policy, nor to even to the whole of its oil revenue policy. It refers only to elements in the combination of APF and PFD. Although the APF is the source of revenue for the PFD, the two are different programs created at different times by different kinds of legislation. The APF is a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF)-a pool of assets collectively owned by the members of a political community usually invested into interest-generating assets. It was established by a constitutional amendment that did not specify what was to be done with the returns to the fund. The PFD is the policy of devoting the APF’s returns to a dividend for all Alaskan citizen residents. It was created by a simple act of the state legislature. Many nations and regions have SWFs, but only Alaska’s SWF pays a regular dividend to citizens. Many nations and regions provide some form of cash benefits, but so far, only Alaska pays a regular cash dividend to all of its residents.[2] The APF and the accompanying PFD link a resource-revenue-management policy with a progressive social policy. As an SWF, the APF helps to ensure that the state will continue to benefit from its oil after its reserves are depleted. As a dividend, the PFD helps every single Alaskan make ends meet each year without a bureaucracy to judge them.
We call this unique combination the Alaska model. It consists of three elements: (1) resource-based revenue (2) put into an SWF or some other permanent endowment, (3) the returns of which are distributed as a cash payment to all citizens or all residents. The extent to which a policy has to contain all three of these elements to qualify as following the Alaska model is not so important. But we will discuss the importance of each of these elements separately.
(1) Resource revenue.
The argument for the Alaska Dividend is simple and powerful: the oil, by right, belongs to all Alaskans. The PFD is an efficient and effective way to ensure that every single Alaskan benefits from it. If that argument works for Alaska’s oil, why not Maine’s fisheries, South Africa’s diamonds, Hong Kong’s real estate, Oregon’s forests, America’s broadcast spectrum, or the world’s atmosphere? Governments have allowed private, for-profit exploitation of these and many more resources, claiming that we will all benefit from the jobs and economic activity they create. But do we? Does a homeless person in Denver benefit from the gold being mined in Colorado? Does a shanty dweller in Johannesburg benefit from the diamonds being mined in South Africa?
The PFD has made sure that every single Alaskan has benefited from the state’s oil industry. Whatever benefit they might or might not get from more jobs or increased economic activity, every Alaskan can point to the dividends they’ve received since 1982 and say, I got this benefit from the state’s decision to exploit its oil reserves. Not many other programs do that, but many more could.
The case for taxing natural resources is at least as good, and probably far better than the case for taxing any other source of wealth. Resource taxes have the benefit of discouraging overuse of scarce resources. If properly employed, they can be an important part of a green environmental management strategy, giving people the incentive to reduce their consumption of scarce resources to sustainable levels. Yet, few if any countries in the world employ resource taxes in this way. Resources are often given away by governments to individuals and corporations who sell them back to the public with value added, but the sellers capture not only the value they add but also the natural resource value along with it.
A resource tax is literally a user fee. Anyone who takes possession of a resource makes it unavailable for others. The tax represents a payment for the burden imposed on others. This justification for resource taxation is more closely associated with “left-libertarianism,” discussed in chapters of this volume by Ian Carter, Alanna Hartzok, and Gary Flomenhoff. But as we will argue in a later chapter resource taxes are also consistent with liberal-egalitarian, utilitarian, and other theories of justice.
Of course, not every country has as much oil as Alaska, but one of the key lessons of this book is that a country does not have to be “resource rich” to have a resource dividend based on the Alaska model. We make this argument fully in the final chapter of this book. Here we preview only a small part of that argument.
One reason we know that a country does not have to be resource rich to have a resource dividend is that every country and every region has valuable resources. Later chapters of this book will show that the total value of natural resources (including not only mining, fishing, and forestry but also land value, the broadcast spectrum, the atmosphere, etc.) is surprisingly high even in areas not thought of as being resource rich. Gary Flomenhoft (this volume) shows that even “resource poor” states, such as Vermont, can create a substantial resource dividend.
Another reason we know that a country does not have to be resource rich to have a resource dividend can be seen from what a small part of Alaska’s resource wealth actually goes to supporting the fund. Alaska has many valuable natural resources, but the APF is supported almost entirely by taxes on oil. These taxes are extremely low by international standards, and only about one-eighth of the state’s total oil revenue goes to supporting the APF. Thus only a tiny fraction of Alaska’s resource wealth is used to support the PFD.
(2) A permanent endowment
Alaska introduced the APF largely because Alaskans knew that oil drilling would provide a very large but temporary windfall. They wanted to extend the period in which that windfall would benefit Alaskans by putting some of it away into a permanent fund. The APF was one of the first SWFs. Today many resource-exporting nations have them. Some nations have funds more than 10 times the size of the APF.
We see the essence of the Alaska model as a strategy to make sure that the system functions as a permanent endowment, but an SWF is not the only mechanism that can do so. To some extent treating resource taxes as user frees does so on its own. Some resources are capable of producing a permanent stream of revenue from user fees. These include land, the broadcast spectrum, and renewable resources. Such resources do not need to put revenue into a fund to function as a permanent endowment, and the Alaska model can be employed with only the first and second elements. Other resources produce only temporary resource streams. No nation can produce oil forever. Pollution taxes will hopefully discourage pollution. For revenue from sources like these to produce a permanent endowment, a mechanism such as an SWF is necessary.
(3) A cash payment to all citizens
To some extent the dividend was a way to sell ordinary Alaskans on the idea of a permanent fund. But to some extent the motivation for the fund was to support the dividend. Some of the lawmakers who created these programs, particularly Governor Jay Hammond, were influenced by the movement for what is now known as a “basic income”-a small unconditional income for every citizen to help them meet their basic needs. At the time, the policy was best known as the “guaranteed income” or the “negative income tax.” It was widely discussed by policymakers in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s. Hammond had unsuccessfully proposed a similar policy on a local level when he was a mayor of Bristol Bay Borough, and he very much saw the APF as an opportunity to create a basic income.
Basic income is a widely discussed topic in the academic literature in social science and philosophy. Researchers have examined the political and economic feasibility of the idea, its likely effects, and the ethical arguments for and against it. The United States and Canadian governments have conducted five social science experiments to see how a very similar policy would work. The Indian government will soon begin its own experiment. Basic income comes and goes in political popularity. It has recently appeared on the political agenda in Germany. It has considerable grassroots support in southern Africa today, and the Brazilian government is officially committed to phasing it in, although no timetable for moving beyond the first stage of the phase-in has been set. It is currently popular with Green and left-leaning parties in Europe, but its support (much like the support of the Alaska Dividend) often cuts across party and left-right divides.
As we will see in later chapters, not everyone agrees about the extent to which the Alaska Dividend fits the definition of a basic income. Usually, a full basic income is defined as an unconditional income, large and regular enough to meet a person’s basic needs. The Alaska Dividend is neither regular in size nor large enough to meet a person’s basic needs. But it is regular in timing and unconditional. So, it constitutes only a partial, irregular basic income. But it is the only version of basic income currently in practice in the Western industrialized world.
We (the editors of this book and the authors of this chapter) became interested in the Alaska model because of our interest in basic income. We’re excited to see an idea-so controversial in theory-has proven to be effective and extremely popular in the one place it has been tried. The Alaska model shows not only how basic income works, but also how the unique attributes of the Alaska model can be designed to work well elsewhere. The Alaska model is not perfect, but it is a successful strategy on which to build something better.
Employing the Alaska Model
By endorsing the Alaska model, we do not mean that governments should replace everything they do with the combination of a resource taxes, fund and dividend. We mean only that they should examine it as a possible addition to their toolkit. It’s only being used by one government, but it has proven to be more popular and more effective than many things that governments all around the world are doing. Certainly, it’s a policy that other governments should take a look at.
A preview of the book
The three parts of this book evaluate the Alaska model and discuss whether and how it can be adapted for other areas.
Chapters in Part One provide the background necessary to evaluate the Alaska model. Cliff Groh and Greg Erickson examine the unlikely history of the APF and the PFD and explain how the two programs work in practice. Scott Goldsmith discusses the impact of the dividend on Alaska’s society and economy.
Chapters in Part Two examine the ethical and political case for using the Alaska model as a tool for social justice. Jim Bryan and Sarah Lamarche discuss the political consequences of linking natural resource wealth and basic income, and how this policy combination can serve justice for future generations. Ian Carter presents the resource dividend as a left-libertarian economic policy. Christopher Griffin discusses the PFD as a practical application of the theoretical idea of Stakeholding. Stakeholding is a variation of the universal, unconditional grant idea. It differs from basic income in being delivered as a large lump sum grant rather than as a steady flow of smaller payments. Almaz Zelleke criticizes the extent to which the Alaska model, structured as a resource dividend, can be thought of as the practical implementation of basic income or even a step toward it. Jurgen de Wispelaere and David Casassas argue that the Alaska model, as it stands, is of limited value in promoting Civic Republican objectives. Steve Winter criticizes the Alaska Dividend for making recipients complicit with the oil industry. In the final chapter of Part One, we (Widerquist and Howard) respond with a chapter addressing the concerns of the authors in this section, and a discussion of why the link between resource taxation and basic income is important for different theories of social justice.
Chapters in Part Three discuss empirical questions about how the Alaska model can be adapted to be used most effectively in other states, nations, and regions. Gary Flomenhoff provides a detailed empirical investigation of the resource tax revenue available in the state of Vermont. He finds that even the resource-poor state of Vermont can raise $2000 (and possibly much more) for each resident each year. Michael Howard looks at the cap-and-dividend approach to global warming as a version of the Alaska model applied to pollution control. Karl Widerquist proposes personalizing the Alaska model into what he calls “Citizens’ Capital Accounts.” Alanna Hartzok argues that any dividend program based on an SWF has a strong responsibility for socially responsible investing, and presents evidence the APF currently fails to live up to that goal. Michael A. Lewis addresses the issues of fund and risk management, which will be important if the Alaska model is to further economic security of recipients. Angela Cummine discusses whether other existing Sovereign Wealth Funds (particularly in the Middle East) should move toward an Alaska-style dividend. Greg Erickson and Cliff Groh discuss the challenges to the APF and PFD in Alaska today and the extent to which the model can be expanded and improved within Alaska.
In the concluding chapter, Howard and Widerquist respond to the concerns of authors in Part Three and discuss six lessons they take away from the Alaska experience.
[1] Including a one-time supplement of $1200 from that year’s state government budget surplus.
[2] Iran is currently in the process of phasing in a regular dividend.
Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend: Examining its Suitability as a Model, edited by Karl Widerquist and Michael W. Howard. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012
by Andre Coelho | Apr 24, 2019 | News
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nz4ZflSFVrs
Andrew Yang, the only Democrat presidential candidate to the US elections in 2020 announcing a basic income policy in his platform, has been on CNN Presidential Town Hall, solo featured on the latest 14th of April.
At this televised campaign event, Yang was clear about his intentions to help Americans transition through these present times of great transformation and uncertainty. Central to his campaign is the Freedom Dividend policy (unconditional 1000$/month for every adult starting at 18) which, according to him, will be a key policy to help people to retrain, gain other skills and stay active in entering this new age of automation. He points out other potential benefits to be gained from the Freedom Dividend, such as deep reduction of bureaucracy, paternalism in social services, stigma for beneficiaries and social security running costs. He also referred the increased leverage power accruing to individual workers and unions, if they had such a thing as the Freedom Dividend to fall back onto.
In the show, he was faced with most of the important questions asked to any presidential candidate, namely related to policies in economy, employment, health, education, housing, drug use and possession and gun control. The environment was, however, a clear absence in this CNN’s Town Hall show, which could be an indication of what really are the priorities in the minds of American people. Specifically, speaking about the employment issue, Yang was direct to say that “the goal should not be to save jobs, the goal should be to make our lives better”, which is very different from what other Democratic candidates (e.g.: Bernie Sanders) are saying (Federal Jobs Guarantee). Nevertheless, Andrew Yang is certain that the Freedom Dividend “does not solve all problems for all people, but it will move us in the right direction”.
Faced with the inevitable question on how to pay for the Freedom Dividend, Yang underlines the importance of “we have to go where the money is”. As an experienced entrepreneur, and specifically one related to technology, Yang has an idea about how much money tech giants (e.g.: Facebook, Uber, Google, Amazon) have, and how much they owe in federal taxes. So, according to him, effectively taxing these companies will make up for the most part of the Freedom Dividend cost, plus any savings possible from eliminating obsolete social benefit schemes (due to the implementation of the dividend).
He also attributes the rise of hate ideologies (e.g.: white supremacy) as a result of a dysfunctional economy, because poor, stressed people are easier to scare into these hateful discourses. Removing, therefore, “the economic boot off people’s throats” will definitely help diminish these polarizing hate agendas which, according to him “have no place in our society”. Yang also believes the Freedom Dividend will improve people’s chances of getting better housing conditions (although refers municipal intervention as important, in order to provide for affordable housing) and better school performance. On the latter, he cites research that says 75% of kid’s performance at school depends on non-school factors, among which one of the most important is economic condition. Hence, the Freedom Dividend can also help kids learn more, and better.
More information at:
André Coelho, “United States: Andrew Yang is not only talking about basic income: if elected, the idea is to implement it”, Basic Income News, 15th March 2019
Jason Burke Murphy, “Unites States: Andrew Yang reaches milestone: likely to be in a televised debate”, Basic Income News, 19th March 2019
by Andre Coelho | Apr 14, 2019 | News
David Khan. Picture credit to: Sylvan Lake News
This Monday, April 12th 2019, David Khan, leader of the Alberta Liberals, announced a series of fundamental changes to the way social policies are practiced in this Canadian province, if elected next Tuesday (Alberta Votes 2019). These changes include large investments in oil-related infrastructure, public and health services, eliminating or considerably reducing income tax, and setting up a basic income pilot test.
The party’s platform ranges a large number of issues, from finance, employment, poverty, energy, democratic reform, down to indigenous relations and drug possession. However, the Alberta Liberals are clear in their overall message: if elected, they are here to put the economy growing. That pervading principle of contemporary economics has been contested extensively, but (economic) growth still attracts strongly, and David Khan is focused on achieving it.
Khan boldly states: “I encourage all Albertans to read our policies because we have the best pro-growth fiscal strategies of any party in this election.” In this case, it means to move from a tax policy based on income tax, to another resting on an 8% Value Added Tax. Even though that number is 60% below the standard VAT rate of many European countries (generally above 20%), Khan is certain “it’s the least harmful way of collecting tax”. That would cumulate with a generalized income tax break, effectively exempting 70% of the Albertian population from paying income tax.
Revenues, then, for governmental investments such as mental health services, social health care, affordable housing and, the basic income pilot test, would mainly come from energy-related commerce, particularly oil, which if an expansion does happen, might lead to more professionals with experience in the oil industry, looking to Find Work in Canada or possibly find work in other similar projects. There might however be some possible backlash. That is professed at the same time as strictly defending the environment, where “we will not tolerate industry damaging our future and our children’s future” can be read on the party’s platform first text page. However, it seems to go unnoticed that the oil industry’s record on environmental protection has not been admirable, to say the least. The idea is to restart the Trans Mountain and the East pipeline projects, both stalled for a long time due to constitutional and environmental reasons. For some reason these projects have been kept waiting, or stored in place for later elimination, because, at put by Jon Biger Skjærseth and Tora Skodvin in their book on climate change and the oil industry, “these companies share the same core aim of selling as much oil and gas as possible at the highest possible price and the lowest possible cost within the same global market”. And, of course, eventually all that oil and gas gets burned, adding up to the already alarming CO2 levels in the atmosphere.
As for the basic income test pilot, the Alberta Liberals are invested in rolling it out, since they “support the creation of a Basic Income.” The arguments for such a belief come from reduced bureaucracy, financial security for all and the elimination of jobs through automation.
More information at:
Sarah Rieger, “Alberta Liberal platform promises basic income pilot project, no income taxes for most“, CBC News April 8th 2019
Damian Carrington, “‘Worrying’ rise in global CO2 forecast for 2019“, The Guardian, January 25th 2019
by Andre Coelho | Feb 16, 2019 | News
Picture credit to: Finland Toolbox
Finland’s famous “basic income experiment” is now over. The analysis program is being rolled out, and was scheduled according to the following timetable (from Kela (Finnish Social Services)).
At the end of 2018, a phone survey was made, involving all participants (2000 experiment subjects and 5000 people forming the control group), to check on “the impact of the basic income on employment, taxable earnings, take-up of unemployment benefits paid out by Kela, and enrolment in employment services”. This survey was done according to international standards on questionnaires (e.g.: European Social Survey, International Social Survey Programme, European Union Survey). Furthermore, interviews are planned to be performed in early 2019, in order to “interpret and shed further light on some of the unanswered questions and unexpected results”. To contextualize the registry data collection, phone survey and interviews, a thorough look will also be directed to public debate and popular support (or lack thereof) for basic income. This clearly means that the investigators did more than just try to answer the overarching question posed by the Finnish government at the start of the experiment: “could basic income increase employment and simplify the social security system?” (video)
Now that the experiment is over, and while the data treatment and deep analysis is being performed, BBC put together a short video piece entitled “Did Finland’s basic income experiment work?”, asking the corollary inquiry “How free money changed people’s lives?”. In a couple of interviews with experiment participants, the message coming through is that the experiment brought promises of a better, more secure life, with less governmental bureaucracy, but unfortunately it had to end (with no prospects of expansion, let alone implementation by the current government). One of those participants, Tania, told BBC that “basic income changed my life”, since it allowed her to “stand on [her own] two feet”. Another participant, Thomas, referred that the same difficulties remained, during the experiment, for getting into paid employment, which might be related to the fact that the experiment had a very small target group of people (2000), spread along the whole of Finland. That level of scattering doesn’t allow for community effects on the introduction of a kind of basic income allowance, and so the marketplace does not adjust accordingly. This seems to be aligned with one of the preliminary conclusions just published: that the experiment did not result in higher levels of paid employment for the participants.
However, the referred published report does include important (preliminary) results of other (less objective than hours in employment) analysed variables, such as Life Satisfaction, Trust, Confidence, Physical and Mental Health, Concentration, Depression, Financial Security, Stress and Attitudes Toward unconditional basic income (UBI). International basic income activist Scott Santens has summarized these results in a convenient way, which might be put into an even more succinct list (percentages refer to differences between averages of the experiment’s treatment group and the control group, over each variable):
Life Satisfaction – observed an 8% improvement;
Trust – observed an increase of 6% in other people, 5% in the legal system and 11% in politicians;
Confidence – observed an increase of 21% of confidence in one’s future, and a 22% increase in one’s ability to influence society;
Physical and Mental Health – observed a 17% improvement;
Concentration – observed a 16% improvement;
Depression – observed a 37% reduction (measured through qualitative answers);
Financial security – observed a 26% improvement;
Stress – observed a 17% improvement (over the number of people who responded they felt “little or no stress at all”);
Attitudes Toward UBI – observed a 38% improvement over the number of people who strongly agree that a nationwide UBI would make it easier to accept job offers, and a 24% increase over the number of people who think Finland should now adopt a UBI.
It should be made clear again, if two years of the pilot itself and another of preparation were not enough to explain the real important parameters of the experiment, that what happened in Finland was not exactly a basic income (implementation) experiment. It was, as Santens put it, “a test of slightly reducing the marginal tax rates experienced by the unemployed, and also slightly reducing the amount of bureaucracy they experience”. From this to a basic income as defined by BIEN goes a long way. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that such a limited experiment, both in scope as in depth, could generate such positive preliminary results on human (generalized) wellbeing.
More information at:
Toru Yamamori, “Finland: Wellbeing improved: First results of the BI experiment”, Basic Income News, February 11th 2019
Olli Kangas, Signe Jauhiainen, Miska Simanainen, Minna Ylikännö (eds.), “The Basic Income Experiment 2017–2018 in Finland. Preliminary results”, Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, February 8th 2019
Scott Santens, “What is There to Learn From Finland’s Basic Income Experiment? Did It Succeed or Fail?”, Medium, February 14th 2019
by Guest Contributor | Sep 10, 2018 | Opinion
Written by: Jonathan Brun
For many years basic income advocates have lobbied for pilot projects to demonstrate the power of giving money to all citizens. Advocates all seem to use the short-lived Dauphin, Manitoba project in the 1970s as an argument for further pilot projects. This lobbying by advocates of Basic Income led to two pilot projects – one in Finland and one in Ontario, Canada. Finland’s program will end as originally scheduled this year and will not be extended. The pilot program in Ontario was canceled before any data could be gathered. This marks a significant setback for the Basic Income movement around the world.
The purpose of these pilot projects was to gather meaningful scientific data on the effects of basic income and use that to convince the public, bureaucrats, and politicians that basic income was a feasible and logical idea. However, scientific reasoning rarely works in the public sphere. Instead, basic income projects are at risk of ending prematurely. The reason Ontario’s experiment was canceled and Finland’s pilot program was not extended was not due to financial or scientific concerns, but rather because of politics. Therein lies the problem, if basic income projects are launched by politicians, they will be shut down by political situations.
Both of these pilot projects made a fundamental mistake – they targeted poor people. The projects were designed to show the benefits of a basic income over the traditional welfare system. They were not designed to show the benefits of a basic income for a wider part of society such as students, taxpayers or elderly people. By restricting the projects to people on or near welfare levels, the projects positioned themselves as yet another welfare program for the poor. As in most countries, the hard working, tax paying middle class has limited patience for welfare recipients. This is partially due to both constricting disposable income and human nature. We have seen country after country downsize their social welfare programs in an attempt to balance budgets, gain votes or free up cash for other programs such as tax cuts. Almost no country in the past thirty years has increased the size of their welfare programs. This should be a (big) hint to basic income advocates.
It is actually quite simple, most taxpayers have limited patience for people who do not work (for money). To think otherwise is simply idealistic and not aligned with the average (voting) population. At a recent discussion on the basic income debate in Montréal, Québec, I asked the famed basic income expert Evelyn Forget how she thinks we should pay for a basic income. Her response was that we should raise taxes on corporations and on people. When I replied this seemed challenging in the current political and economic situation, she responded that it was the best way to do it and people would just have to “deal” with higher taxes.
I strongly believe that the way you finance a basic income is the defining feature of a basic income. If you finance it through taxes, it will be viewed as another social welfare program not terribly different from numerous existing programs. This is a major problem. The entire idea of basic income is that it is different from other programs. If you finance it in the same way, through tax and redistribution, you are undermining the argument that makes basic income so appealing. Basic income is supposed to break the mold, join the left and right, simplify bureaucracy and give more freedom for individuals to build up their lives. If you fund it through taxes on workers, it will be viewed (rightfully so) as a transfer from workers to non-workers.
As an analogy to basic income advocacy, we can look at advocates for affordable housing. Both groups of advocates believe that what they are proposing is a basic right and should be made readily available. In the first case, basic income advocates argue that all members of a developed nation should have a minimum level of income that assures the essentials in life. Affordable housing advocates lobby that housing is a right, not a privilege, and it should be affordable for all members of society. I agree with both, but the way you go about implementing either is fundamental to the perception of the project by the general public.
For example, affordable housing levels in most western countries has decreased as an overall percentage of the housing market. This is due to affordable housing advocates taking the same approach as many basic income advocates – namely that affordable housing is there to alleviate the stress of expensive housing and that the affordable housing should mostly benefit the less fortunate. By casting their lot in with the poor, they are severely limiting the base of their political support.
Contrast that with Vienna, Austria. In Vienna, about 50 percent of the housing stock is owned, managed and maintained by the City. Basically, 50 percent of the housing stock is a public good, not a private good. Rents are remarkably affordable for a world class city and this brings dynamism and diversity to all the neighbourhoods. However, the main reason this was possible was because both the middle class and lower economic classes have a vested interest in the success of this public housing. This much larger political base assures that affordable housing projects continue. Basic income needs to take the same approach and stop advocating for basic income pilot projects as welfare replacements or as a poverty alleviation tool. It may indeed be that, but that is not the best way to advocate for basic income.
Contrast the controversy around pilot programs with the Alaskan Dividend Fund, which was instituted in 1976. The fund remains tremendously popular and has little risk of disappearing. Why? Because everyone gets it! No pilot project was done prior to the institution of the Alaskan dividend fund and no negative effects have emerged post-implementation. If there is one path forward for basic income, it is through the implementation of a lower level of basic income, but that goes to everyone – especially hard-working taxpayers who vote.
Basic income should think strategically about how they plan to convince the average person to vote for a basic income. It may take a distinct political party (for another post) or a clear advocate of basic income such as Andrew Yang in the United States, who has placed basic income at the center of his presidential campaign. No matter how you look at it, trying to get basic income to become a reality through the path of replacing or supplementing welfare payments is a doomed idea that will never work. Get the middle class on your side and basic income advocates can win this political battle.
Jonathan Brun, Cofounder Revenu de base Québec.
Slight edits by Tyler Prochazka.
Originally posted here: Basic Income Pilot Projects Won’t Work
