Study Finds Issues with Universal Basic Income for Developing Countries

Study Finds Issues with Universal Basic Income for Developing Countries

Picture credit to: Biodiversity & Community Health.

Measuring income in developing countries

A study published in the National Bureau of Economic Research in the Fall examines cash transfer programs across a range of developing countries and uses household data from Indonesia and Peru to examine the effectiveness of targeted transfer programs in those countries. The study explores the costs and benefits of targeted and universal cash transfer programs, and the different circumstances that developing countries face that affect the performance of different transfer schemes.

One of the key challenges identified for developing countries that affect the viability of a universal basic income (UBI) are the sizes of the informal sector (1) and the resulting revenue sources. Developed countries largely get their revenue from income taxes (2), but given the size of the informal sector in many developing countries, the bulk of government revenue comes from sources like consumption taxes and official development assistance (ODA), with the latter in some low-income countries accounting for more than half of that country’s operating budget.

Effectively targeting the poor for cash transfer means that you must have a way to reliably measure income and means, and therein lies the problem for many developing countries. In Indonesia and Peru, 88% and 79% of the employed populations are reported as below the tax exclusion threshold, and therefore do not pay income taxes. This is not necessarily to say that upwards of 80% of true income is below the income tax threshold, but it shows the problems associated with informality and lack of information. In any case, it complicates the means-testing portion of targeted transfer programs like those in the US.

In lieu of directly measuring income for means-testing, developing country governments can use what’s called a “proxy-means test” by measuring indirect things like assets and consumption. Another complication is that people can easily misrepresent their economic situation, depending on what indicator the proxy-test uses to measure poverty. Therefore, the mechanism for determining who qualifies for the transfers are often a mystery kept by the designers of the proxy-tests, and the data collection method must in some way provide incentives for telling the truth.

Findings from the data

To measure the success of the targeted programs in Indonesia and Peru, the authors used consumption data from 2010-2011 period from the Indonesian National Socioeconomic Survey (SUSENAS) and the Peruvian National Household Survey (ENAHO) to measure the size of the program’s “inclusion errors” and the “exclusion errors”, meaning the amount of people who do receive transfers who shouldn’t and the amount of people who don’t receive transfers who should. They are able to do this because the datasets used provide information on predicted consumption used by the proxy-means tests of each country, and the actual consumption for that period in each country.

In the 2010 period, in both Indonesia and Peru, transfers reached around 80% of intended beneficiaries, meaning those whose economic situation actually qualified them to receive benefits got them 80% of the time, and 20% did not (meaning a 20% exclusion error). There was also a cost of transferring the benefit to 22% and 31% of those whose economic situation did not actually qualify them for the benefits, judging by the actual consumption data (meaning the inclusion error).

The authors then employ a social welfare function, which measures the utility of a dollar between a low-income person and a high-income person, to measure the effectiveness of more narrowly targeted programs in relation to a universal program (UBI). Using this function, they were able to identify a socially optimal targeted transfer amount, which was 19% and 18% of the population for Indonesia and Peru respectively. While utility is lowest at the point of no transfer, the graph shows utility and overall social welfare both decline steadily after the socially optimal point. A UBI, then, has the lowest utility of almost any ratio, and even with the administrative cost savings included, the added benefit is almost imperceptible (these are represented by the little tick mark pointing upwards at the point of “UBI”).

This is nothing too surprising, though, because it essentially confirms that having a system where wealthier individuals also receive the benefit is not as socially efficient as targeting the poorest individuals, because the dollars are worth more to poorer individuals. What is interesting is that savings in administrative costs in this model also do not provide a big boost to social welfare.

Advantages and drawbacks of universal cash transfers

A UBI would address some of the failings of targeted transfer programs by providing what the authors call “horizontal equity”, which essentially measures the degree of errors at different levels of transfer, and also an added benefit of transparency.

If we imagine a family in the exclusion error population goes to apply for benefits and find that they are not eligible, verifying their eligibility would be difficult given the secrecy of the methods used in proxy-means identification. A UBI would be an ideal fix for this problem because it is available to everyone, and though you would be including those who may not necessarily need it, you would not deny anyone who actually does need it.

There is also the issue of labor market distortions that targeted transfers can cause. It is well known that programs in the US and in some European countries result in recipients to avoid finding work because they risk losing their entitlement. Even if the methods used in proxy-means testing are not known, households in developing countries may restrain themselves on activities that they perceive may end up disqualifying them for the benefit, such as reducing consumption or avoiding formal income.

Other issues with a large informal sector that would complicate implementation of a UBI are identification to avoid double counting, getting the money to recipients that may not have bank accounts or formal residences to mail a check to, and accruing taxes from the rise in incomes that will occur through increased consumption. Dependence on consumption taxes also presents a risk to the scheme, because large informal sectors might also affect tax losses from consumption.

Discussion on UBI in developing countries and alternative methods

The primary strength of the argument for UBI in the context of a developing country comes from the fact that targeted transfers currently deny resources to some of the extreme poor, where a UBI would theoretically not be denied to anyone. It would also theoretically be more straightforward and fairer of a system. A crucial strength with targeted transfers comes from the fact that it can use limited resources the most effectively, and even if it misallocates some resources, on the whole, it can effectively allocate resources.

It makes sense on an intuitive level for developing countries with tight budgets to send money where it would be the most effective through targeted transfers, but this results in both inclusion and exclusion errors, which can either be seen as the best outcome possible or simply insufficient. The exclusion error population could be seen as an unacceptable outcome creating a highly underprivileged class, and even the definition of the population that qualifies for transfers might be considered insufficient. In Indonesia, while the impoverished population has been receding, during the Asian financial crisis it rose to as high as 23%, and the population that is “near poor” have been estimated to be as much as 42% (3). This could play into an argument for UBI: by allowing everyone to have the same benefit, there would be no inclusion or exclusion errors, and it would still be much more socially optimal than no transfer at all.

While the authors recognize that targeted and universal programs work well in different circumstances, they seem to imply that, for developing countries, the social welfare achieved by targeted transfers is currently the best game in town. Universal programs like public education and health care are two examples of already widely accepted government programs, yet cash transfer programs remain largely targeted.

The authors also introduce some interesting alternatives that capture some of the strengths of targeted and universal programs. For example, with “community-based targeting”, a village might get a certain number of “beneficiary slots”, and in a completely public setting, the village communally decides where to allocate them. The strength of this program seems to emanate from the fact that local communities have a more intimate knowledge of who needs the assistance the most. In the “differential cost and self-identification” method, benefits would be available to an entire population like UBI, but your relative wealth would affect the ease of which you get the benefits, as determined by a proxy-means test. The key to this program would be the fact that the benefits are worth less the higher up the income ladder you are, and things like long application processes would deter some applicants. The added benefit to this would be that those who are in the exclusion error population would receive some recourse if they are initially denied benefits.

It is clear that having an income tax base with which to measure prosperity and draw taxes from is currently the ideal system to operate with a UBI. Jenson (2019) demonstrates that development accompanies a shift from self-employed to employed populations in the United States with over a century of data, which could be the natural outcome of development in other contexts. If a UBI turns out to be an ideal system for reducing extreme inequality and increasing other indicators of human wellbeing, a question of its appropriateness might also entail identifying the correct level of development. Advancing this issue still requires more pilots in more varied circumstances.

This research adds to the knowledge of basic income in developing countries from pilots in Namibia (2008), Madhya Pradesh (India, 2010), and in other expansions of cash transfer schemes in Zambia (2010) and in Iran (2011).

Notes

1 – The informal sector describes the portion of the population who work but do not contribute to a social security system, are often self-employed, and whose activities and revenue amounts are largely unknown.

2 – By contrast, in the 2017 US Federal Government budget, 83% of revenue came from individual income and payroll taxes.

3 – Figures from the World Bank’s report “Making the New Indonesia Work for the Poor”.

More information at:

Rema HannaBenjamin A. Olken, “Universal Basic Incomes vs. Targeted Transfers: Anti-Poverty Programs in Developing Countries”, The National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2018

Abhijit BanerjeePaul NiehausTavneet Suri, “Universal Basic Income in the Developing World”, The National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2019

Anders Jensen, “Employment Structures and the Rise of the Modern Tax System”, The National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2019

Namibia Pilot Project, Basic Income Grant Coalition

SEWA, “Piloting Basic Income Transfers in Madhya Pradesh, India”, SEWA and UNICEF, January 2014

Pedro Arruda and Laura Dubois, “A brief history of Zambia’s Social Cash Transfer Programme”, International Policy Research Brief, June 2018

Chris Weller, “Iran tried its own basic income scheme — and people didn’t give up working”, Business Insider (France), May 23rd 2017

Jehan Arulpragasam and Vivi Alatas (coords.), “Making the New Indonesia work for the poor”, The World Bank, November 2006

Adi Renaldi, “Poverty Isn’t Decreasing, Indonesia’s Official Poverty Line Is Just Too Low”, Vice, July 23rd 2018

India: Farmers distress political response, explained

India: Farmers distress political response, explained

Indian farmer pouring fertilizer. Picture credit to: The National

As indicated before, there is political movement in India in the direction of basic income. Particularly in the state of Telangana, which started the implementation of its Rythu Bandhu (Farmer Investment Support) program in May 2018. Other Indian states, namely Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, Odisha, and Chattisgarh, have also introduced farm support initiatives, but Telangana conveyed the novelty of unconditionality. Sarath Davala, Vice Chair of the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), and coordinator of the India Network for Basic Income (INBI), has written extensively on this matter, as well as contributed with clarifications and specifications on social media.

In a nutshell, the current Rythu Bandhu program in Telangana, features the following characteristics:

1 – It is universal. All farmers with a land property registration are entitled to 4000 Rupees (50 Euros) per acre per season, making it 8000 Rupees (100 Euros) per annum. Cheques or money transfers were made directly to farmers bank accounts;

2 – It is unconditional: no conditions were prescribed. The farmer needn’t even cultivate. It is left to the farmer what he / she wants to do;

3 – It is called Farmer Investment Incentive Scheme. It was not called welfare, but termed as an investment. This means that, unlike conventional welfare schemes, such as loan waivers or crop insurance scheme, it is not intended as a relief after a calamity has hit, but as an investment.

Telangana has also introduced state-financed life insurance for farmers, over 5,8 million potential beneficiaries, and covering a sum of 500 000 Rupees (6190 Euros). The annual premium, paid by the government, is to be 2000 Rupees (25 Euros). Normally, if anyone wanted life insurance, they would have to visit a particular website to buy a policy, but now, the government is implementing these policies themselves.


Kalvakuntla Chandrashekar Rao. Picture Credit to: Wirally

This first attempt at unconditionality has had its problems, though. The program was criticized for being regressive, since no account was made for redistribution of these benefits to farmers, and so rich farmers were also getting the money from the government. And, since these farmers owned more land, they receive a greater portion of the investment. Another downturn was that tenants, or landless farmers, haven’t benefitted from the program since these do not possess property rights.

To address this last problem, the state of Odisha has announced in December 2018, and will roll out the scheme between February and March this year, pretty much the same as in Telangana but including landless tenants, estimated to cover around 1 million people (and their direct families). Under Odisha’s scheme, there are also available loans (for crop) at zero interest rates. In Jharkhand, Odisha’s neighbour state up North, the farmer assistance plan also disburses a fixed unconditional value per acre of cultivable land, 5000 Rupees (62 Euros) per annum, directed at small farmers (owners of less than 5 acres), for the next 4 years, benefitting over 2 million workers. So, in Jharkhand, rich farmers will be mostly excluded from the scheme. On the border with Bangladesh, in the West Bengal state, the scheme is somewhat more complex. Starting in February 2019, there will be a crop insurance for farmers land, with the state covering its premium. Plus, the same cash transfer as in Odisha will be rolled out, but with spending conditions (on seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, etc.). On top of that, a life insurance similar to Telangana’s, but covering only 200 000 Rupees (2470 Euros). West Bengal state farmer support scheme is directed at an estimated population of 7,2 million small and marginal farmers.

Other states, like Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, have also announced and are implementing policies to help farmers, namely in-kind benefits and loan waivers. But, overall, and according to Sarath Davala, is it a very positive thing to “see a shift from many conditionalities to unconditional”. However, he points out that these policies should not be lightly called “basic income”, as they depart in several ways from definitions of basic income (as, for instance, that of BIEN). Telangana’s policy is neither individual (it is family-based), nor universal (only for farmers, and not even for all of them), nor basic (not enough to cover individual basic needs). However, it does go a step further as far as the unconditional part is concerned.

The State Bank of India (SBI) has also taken an interest in unconditional cash transfers to farmers, although at the expense of the universal basic income (UBI) policy, as presented in a recent report. The SBI confirms that unconditional cash transfers will have a more “meaningful impact” on farmers, than conditional policies applied up to now. However, it advices against UBI, stating that a “cash transfer scheme is always a better option than a UBI scheme. Many countries have found that UBI does not address the structural problems and is at best a solution in interregnum”. It remains unclear, though, how did the SBI found that one policy is superior to the other, in the lack of real UBI implementation around the world. Also, the SBI does not mention which “structural problems” UBI was found not to solve, and in which countries.

More information at:

André Coelho, “India: Telangana, unconditional cash transfer to farmers and more“, Basic Income News, January 21st 2018

Sarath Davala, “Why Narendra Modi May Answer Farmers’ Distress With a Basic Income Plan“, The Wire, January 11th 2018

Anshuman Kumar, “Farmers gain as schemes bring direct benefit to parties“, The Economic Times, January 18th 2019

Unconditional cash transfer to farmer better option: SBI report“, The Economic Times, January 22nd 2019

’21 Lessons for the 21st Century’ shows humanity’s challenges

’21 Lessons for the 21st Century’ shows humanity’s challenges

Review of “21 Lessons for the 21st Century” by Yuval Noah Harari

The third book by Yuval N. Harari, historian and author of the bestselling books “Sapiens, a Brief History of Humankind” and “Homo Deus, a Brief History of Tomorrow”, was published in August this year.

What does the future hold, an unemployment ridden wasteland or a leisure based post-work society?

Whereas Harari’s former works were focused on the past of humankind or toward its future, “21 Lessons for the 21st Century” investigates the most pressing issues of our times. Professor Harari finds 21 topics which embody the plethora of uncertainties surrounding our present and immediate future, and then, with the past history of our specie well in mind, suggests his thought-provoking vision about them. His unique timeliness is due to his unparalleled ability to reframe the past in order to investigate the present.

In the second lesson, “Work,” Harari talks about automation, Artificial Intelligence, machine learning and the impact they will have on the labor market and society as a whole. In order to avoid collapse, deep change is required, a true renovation of our social models.

And Universal Basic Income (UBI) may be one of the answers.

The pace of automation

It is unclear how the labor market will look in the long run. What is certain is that it is undergoing change. The advances in Information Technology (IT), machine learning and robotics will bring on a wave of automation, the author said.

But it is not the first time in human history that society measures itself with automation, as we already faced similar events, most notably with the industrial revolution. And the fear of mass unemployment was proven unjustified. Thus, in Harari opinion, we have to ask whether this time will be different.

Are our concerns about a jobless future legitimate? Or are we exaggerating the magnitude of the phenomena? Do we incur in the risk to act like modern luddites?

The situation of the nineteenth century was different, Harari mantains. When industrialization hit, it is true that many jobs were appropriated by machines, but at the same times many new jobs were created and the quality of life was profoundly improved.

As humans have two kinds of abilities, physical and cognitive, during the industrial revolution machines competed for only one share of the things humans could do, the physical one. When jobs in the industrial or agricultural sectors were automated, they opened the door to jobs requiring a cognitive skill set, the category of jobs we commonly associate with the third sector.

What is happening is due to the fact that the AI revolution is not just embodied by the evolution of computers, becoming faster and more “intelligent,” but it’s closely related to other fields; the momentum of the revolution is shouldered by advances in biology and social sciences, Harari said.

As more is understood of the underlying biological mechanisms controlling the emotive dynamics of humans, the more computers become able to analyze human behavior, foresee human decisions, and take their place in a number of jobs. In addition to delivering results, these AI tools tend to keep other significant processes in mind as well. In many cases, managing IT services effectively and improving them requires more than manpower alone. There are times when IT professionals might take time to learn what is CMDB in ServiceNow or other relevant topics. Nevertheless, an AI-specific tool can decipher complex terms and provide results quickly. .

Advances in neuroscience and behavioral economics revealed that our choices do not depend on free will as much as on the calculations of the neurons in our brains, assessing probabilities at enormous speed, the author writes. Human intuition can be considered “hacked” as it was revealed to consist of pattern recognition, the ability to identify recurring patterns and use them to create models and make predictions. And AI can become very good at pattern recognition. If intuition is no more than assessment of probabilities and creation of predictive models, it should not come as a surprise that machines can take our place, given that our very functioning is imperfect and prone to errors: it relies on circuits created through the evolution of our specie, in contexts far in time and place from those in which we try to apply them –the savannah is nothing like today’s cities.

Automation will not impact the entirety of fields, as some jobs are more susceptible to it than others, Harari writes. Jobs based on repetition will be more prone to automation, so if you want to stand out with your applications, consider working with an executive resume writer. Multifaceted activities and unexpected scenarios are still a no-go zone for machines. Where the jobs of many doctors, requiring diagnostics and prescriptions could be expected to be a no-brainer for AI, the job of nurses would prove more problematic, requiring a mix of personal relationships and physical activity. Caretaking will probably be one of the most difficult task to automate, and could very well be the activity in which most humans will be occupied in the future, Harari suggests.

The future of jobs

Harari sustains that talking about a jobless future is premature, as automation will allow for more time and resources to be invested in study and research, with the potential to develop new treatments, drugs and deepen our understanding of the biological world. There are jobs where machine automation is not desirable, such as many law-related jobs. Furthermore, there will be a place for human-machine cooperation.

Drones require many operators to work them, driverless vehicles require some form of supervision, and cybersecurity and maintenance will be needed. Some of the top cybersecurity threats aren’t simple to defeat – you can’t just set up a firewall, you need to actively fight against any hacks or viruses. With this being said, as we advance in technology the requirement for human intervention will become less stringent.

But the jobs we are talking about are knowledge intensive, which means that even if they were numerically sufficient to limit unemployment (and they are not), we would nonetheless be left with the problem of unemployment due to under-specialization. In Harari’s opinion, one of the main differences of this technological revolution from the precedent is the degree to which professions are interchangeable. When jobs are less specialized, it’s easier to switch from one profession to another, its often the same for machines. What we may find then is that jobs that machines will not be able to do interchangeably are most likely going to require a high degree of specialization from people. This alignment could pose the risk of facing “the worst of both worlds”: mass unemployment and lack of qualified workers.

And professor Harari notices how, even for those who are able to pursue a new career like in the example shown above, the rapid pace of technological advance or societal changes could make it obsolete in the matter of years. Not just professional development, but jumping from a field of study to another will become the norm in a volatile job market, as the ephemeralization of work will make the idea of formation for a career as an one-off effort laughable.

This should also be seen as an emotive cost for workers, the uncertainty causing a great strain in terms of mental health: if the unstable job market of the first decades of the twenty-first century produced an explosion of work-induced stress, mental resilience to change will be among the factors skimming the employment market.

Societal change

Looking back at the history of the industrial revolution, Harari considers how the new social conditions – great industrial metropolis and the dynamic nature of the arising economic markets – could not be accommodated by the existing political, economic and social models. Institutions such as religion, monarchy and feudalism were no longer apt to direct society. A whole century of social unrest followed before an equilibrium was found, with liberal democracies, fascist regimes and communist regimes on the playing field. What automation will bring rests in the realm of speculation, but Harari highlights how there is potential for great societal disruption, and we cannot afford complacency at the risky of bloody revolutions following systemic unemployment, given the great destructive power of modern warfare.

Universal Basic Income

The author then goes on investigating the role governments will have to assume as technology advances, saying that they will necessarily have to intervene, both via the creation of a dedicated structure for permanent formation, and by providing a safety net for people as they face transitions between jobs. The mantra should be the one which Scandinavia is already applying: “protect workers rather than jobs.”

Universal Basic Income (UBI) is one of the potential models that could respond to the technological and economical revolution we are expecting, Harari says. Its focus on the provision of means to satisfy basic needs is aligned with the necessary imperative of protecting people and not jobs, and could help to preserve the social status and self-worth of humans in a work-lacking future.

Financed through progressive taxation, an UBI would act as a redistributive instrument in a world which sees growing polarization between the riches and the poor. An alternative idea, in the author’s opinion, is to rethink the meaning of work by taking into account the education of children and caretaking. Considering caring for others as work which should deserve a monetary compensation would help foster informal safety nets and strengthen communities. Doing so would help preserve the social fabric which could be disrupted by the upcoming AI revolution. Since it would fall upon governments to pay for such activities, this would not ultimately differ from UBI.

Given that UBI could prove itself a valuable instrument to build a model for the society of the future, Harari calls for a better investigation of its possible application; that is, minimum and universal need to be defined.

In a globalized world, where market and industries are interconnected and delocalization is the norm, the meaning of universal need to be ascertained. UBI experiments have always been of reduced geographical extension, and it is usually thought, in its largest declinations, as a country specific measure. But if it was applied at the national level, its locality would create a problem, as its redistributive effects would not affect those who need it the most. As the wealth appropriated through the world is concentrated in a few nations, a progressive taxation used to fund UBI would then redistribute wealth not globally, but to a lucky minority.

Ideally, a global government could work out a functioning form of global UBI, but at the cost of its feasibility: redistributing wealth globally could very well prove impossible, in the opinion of professor Harari.

If a minimum income has to be enough to accommodate one’s basic needs, we have to decide which needs are basic, and this could prove to be a difficult exercise: homo sapiens needs food and water to survive, everything else may be considered superfluous, the author says.

Today we may consider also shelter, healthcare and instruction as basic needs, but there is no certainty about what is going to be included among them in the future. Human needs depend very much on expectations, they are far from being objective, and so the definition of minimum will remain a fluid concept as society changes through time, Harari forecasts. This means that the mere access to an income will not per se suffice in making people happy, but UBI will have to be integrated with activities which makes people satisfied, from civic engagement to sport.

Harari suggests that his country of origin, Israel, could be thought of as a testing field for a satisfying life in a post-work world. There, half of the ultra-Orthodox Jews do not work, but spend their lives praying and studying the sacred tests, while receiving government subsidies and a share of free services. They derive their happiness from the strong ties they develop with the community they live in and from the fulfillment gained via their investment in religion, Harari mantains.

Even as they are looked at with contempt from the laic citizens of Israel, which see them as freeloaders, their example may very well provide a model for the society of the future: life will be spent in the search for purpose, which could be found through the development of a strong sense of community and by investing time studying and in the construction of social relationships. Those activities, combined with the economic safety net provide by UBI, can maybe provide a picture of the society of tomorrow.

Written by: Daniele Fabbri

More information at:

Yuval N. Harari, “21 Lessons For the 21st Century”, Jonathan Cape, 30 August 2018

Yuval N. Harari, “Yuval Noah Harari on whatthe year 2050 has in store for humankind”, Wired, 12 August 2018

Europe: New UBI Research from CESifo

Europe: New UBI Research from CESifo

Photo by Stefan Kühn, CC BY-SA 3.0

The CESifo Group of Munich is a European research group that seeks to employ both high-quality economic theory and the methods of an empirical institute. Operating since 1999, CESifo is a collaboration between the Center for Economic Studies (CES), the ifo Institute (“Information and Forschung” or research), and the CESifo GmbH (Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research).

CESifo publishes a quarterly journal, the latest issue of which is devoted to Unconditional Basic Income (UBI).  Five of seven pieces within this 48-page publication present a variety of perspectives on UBI research and theory, predominantly addressing the European context.

  1. Straubhaar, Thomas, “Universal Basic Income – New Answer to New Questions for the German Welfare State in the 21st Century”, CESifo Forum 19 (3), 2018, 03–09 | DetailsPDF Download

The focus: Transforming social support in Germany by replacing Bismarckian welfare state ideals

Straubhaar describes a series of proximate social and economic changes due to globalization, aging societies, income polarization, and dissolution of traditional economic safety nets. He comments that the contemporary version of the welfare state is founded upon 19th century Bismarckian principles that rely on a classic population pyramid (weighted by youth at the bottom), a male-breadwinner model, a fast-growing economy, and a labor-focused Protestant work ethic, none of which will continue to be relevant indefinitely. He proposes UBI as a welfare state model that would completely replace all other publicly financed social support and provide a 21st century solution to the aforementioned changes, particularly in Germany, but as a model for the rest of the world.

  1. Torry, Malcolm, “Some Lessons from the Recent UK Debate about Universal Basic Income”, CESifo Forum 19 (3), 2018, 10–14 | DetailsPDF Download

The focus: Enhancing UBI data distribution and ensuring that discussions maintain a clear definition of the difference between UBI and other related economic policies

Torry highlights a number of key events and issues from the UK that have broader relevance for the global community interested in UBI. The first discusses the important use of microsimulation to predict the impact of economic policies on households of varying incomes (for example, to estimate the loss of disposable income to low-income families if means-tested benefits remain or are removed). The second relates a story in which a public organization cherry-picked UBI data, to which Torry simply says that high-quality research ought to be better distributed. The third and fourth call the reader’s attention to the importance of using specific definitions of UBI schemes and not allowing the term to be misused.

  1. De Wispelaere, Jurgen, Antti Halmetoja and Ville-Veikko Pulkka, “The Rise (and Fall) of the Basic Income Experiment in Finland”, CESifo Forum 19 (3), 2018, 15–19 | DetailsPDF Download

The focus: Improving the international understanding of Finland’s basic income experiment, its origins, and its limitations

The Finnish basic income experiment began as a one-line commitment in the national Government Programme in 2015. Kela, the Finnish Social Insurance Institution, proposed several experiment design options, and a two-year control trial began in January 2017. Kela will evaluate the results and present them to Parliament in 2019.

Basic income stakeholders have become increasingly critical of the trial parameters, raising concerns about the limits of the sample and the pilot’s restricted scope and goals. The authors argue that proponents of UBI initially overstated the extent of the Finnish government’s commitment and capabilities, heralding the commitment as a “watershed” moment for European basic income, when in fact the Finnish experiment and others have been limited from the outset by policy inertia, existing budgetary and taxation systems, and other institutional limitations. The pilot program is designed to assess basic income as a means of activating the labour market, a politically safe goal, and was never likely to result in policy changes of the kind UBI advocates desire to see.

  1. Colombino, Ugo and Nizamul Islam, “Basic Income and Flat Tax: The Italian Scenario”, CESifo Forum 19 (3), 2018, 20–29 | DetailsPDF Download

The focus: Evaluating proposed basic income-related policy packages in Italy and comparing their political origins

Like other European countries, Italy has seen several basic income proposals that have yet to be implemented. Several current potential models are rooted in different political ideologies and thus provide an interesting comparison. The first, “Reddito di Inclusione,” (RdI) is a basic income scheme that targets the most impoverished segment of the population in practice but is intended to be universal. The second, “Reddito di Cittadinanza” (RdC) is means-tested and only covers the population “below the relative poverty threshold” (20). Another model, proposed by Istituo Bruno Leoni (a think tank), involves both basic income and a flat tax.

The authors provide a basic overview of the differences between UBI, means-tested guaranteed income, and negative income tax. They then simulate and evaluate the various government-proposed combinations of policies, concluding that while it is possible to design a fiscally neutral policy package, current government proposals have not yet done so.

  1. Widerquist, Karl, “The Devil’s in the Caveats: A Brief Discussion of the Difficulties of Basic Income Experiments”, CESifo Forum 19 (3), 2018, 30–35 | DetailsPDF Download

The focus: Making UBI research accessible and understandable, particularly with regard to its limitations

Widerquist’s basic thesis is that, contrary to popular representations of policy research, all UBI experiments contain a significant list of caveats. He argues that science journalism has not done an adequate job of communicating the limitations of UBI studies, or indeed any social sciences research, to the public. Furthermore, specialist researchers’ lists of caveats are inadequate for communicating a study’s limitations. Widerquist has an upcoming book that will address both best practices in UBI research given its inherent difficulties and best practices in communication the results of said research to the public and policymakers. In this article, he identifies four broad strategies: (1) iteratively designing studies with public feedback, so that research directly addresses the questions relevant to local stakeholders; (2) highlighting UBI’s impact in publications, rather than its side-effects (even though the latter might be more interesting to researchers); (3) attempting to define a “bottom line” or generalizable conclusion from research; and (4) addressing and discussing ethical controversies.

  1. Clauss, Michael and Stefan Remhof, “A Euro Area Finance Ministry – Recipe for Improved Governance?”, CESifo Forum 19 (3), 2018, 36–43 | DetailsPDF Download

The authors discuss the possibility and potential function of a euro-area finance ministry. Such an organization could either martial Europe’s national fiscal policies to align them throughout the region, or it could be one more “layer” of fiscal authority in each European nation. This paper does not explicitly address UBI.

  1. Nam, Chang Woon and Peter Steinhoff, “The ‘Make in India’ Initiative”, CESifo Forum 19 (3), 2018, 44–45 | DetailsPDF Download

The authors discuss a 2014 federal initiative to promote industrial manufacturing in India. This paper does not explicitly address UBI.

More information at:

“CESifo Forum 03/2018 (Autumn): Unconditional Basic Income”, 01-48, ifo Institute, Munich, 2018

 

 

USA: Trump’s response to poverty in the USA

Picture credit to: Big Think.

On the 12th of July 2018, Trump’s Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) released the report “Expanding Work Requirements in Non-Cash Welfare Programs”, in response to an executive order made in April 2018 on reducing poverty in America.

The poverty rate of 3%, as measured in the CEA report, is at an all-time low. Although a favorable result, the authors point out that “many non-disabled working-age adults do not regularly work, particularly those living in low-income households. Such non-working adults who receive welfare benefits […] can become reliant on welfare programs.” In an attempt to increase self-sufficiency in recipients of benefits, they propose strengthening and increasing work requirements.

Ed Dolan reflects on the results outlined in the report in his article for the Niskanen center. He poses four questions that challenge the report’s main conclusions.

  1. Are the measures of poverty used in the report appropriate?

In the report poverty was measured through consumption starting in 1980, when the first reliable data is available. After adjusting for changes in purchasing power, the results show that the poverty rate has fallen compared to 1980. Although this approach has solid ground in research, Dolan argues that alternative measures produce different results (examples available here and here), mainly due to different definitions of poverty itself and using different years as the base for comparison.

  1. Who are the recipients?

The CEA distinguishes between two groups that currently receive welfare support: i. recipients unable to work, and ii. non-disabled recipients able to work. They report that non-disabled recipients have lower employment rates compared to the general population of working age. The authors explain this finding with the fact that recipients receive less benefits as their income raises which demotivates them to find work.

Dolan challenges this argument by saying that recipients cannot be easily grouped into non-disabled and disabled welfare beneficiaries. The Kaiser Family Foundation study found that some individuals that reported not working due to some form of disability do not meet the social security disability requirements for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) support, making them officially non-disabled. These individuals are unlikely to get employed despite policy adjustments, effective tax rates and work requirements.

  1. Are work requirements effective?

According to the CEA, there is sufficient evidence to support the claim that work requirements would be effective in reducing dependency on welfare benefits and increasing employment. Their argument is based on the welfare reform that took place in the 1990s.

Dolan disagrees with this conclusion, pointing out that the golden standard among experts for evaluating the 1990s reform is a series of eleven experiments known as the National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies, conducted in the 1990s across the country with each lasting five years. In these experiments, participants were divided into two groups. The treatment group received benefits as a function of work requirements, while the control group continued to receive payments without conditions. The treatment group had modest gains in employment and there was a 1% decrease in total income on average. The results showed that the increase in wages was often smaller than the decrease in benefits. Finally, positive results were produced only where administrative support was provided (one-on-one interactions, training etc.). Dolan believes this provides little evidence that work requirements would help recipients move towards self-sufficiency. He also criticizes the CEA report for not emphasizing the crucial role of administrative support.

  1. What is the real agenda?

Dolan believes that work requirements are not likely to be effective at increasing employment and raising self-sufficiency: “Think of it this way. As currently configured, the message to in-kind welfare beneficiaries is, ‘We encourage you to work, but if you do work, we will take your benefits away.’ Adding work requirements changes the message so that it becomes, ‘If you work, we will take your benefits away, but we will also take them away if you don’t work.'” However, as a tool to lower welfare payments and reduce administrative costs work requirements could be effective, since more individuals would be excluded from the system, according to Dolan.

More information at:

“CEA Report: Expanding Work Requirements in Non-Cash Welfare Programs“, Council of Economic Advisers, July 12th 2018

Executive Office of the President, “Reducing Poverty in America by Promoting Opportunity and Economic Mobility“, Executive Order 13828, April 10th 2018

Ed Dolan, “Do we really want expanded work requirements in non-cash welfare programs?“, July 23rd 2018

MaryBeth Musumeci, Rachel Garfield, and Robin Rudowitz, “Medicaid and Work Requirements: New Guidance, State Waiver Details and Key Issues“, January 16th 2018