What would be the effect of a citizen’s income (CI), aka basic income or BI, on wage levels – how would employers respond to its introduction? What would be its effect on the supply of labour, and on the total amount of paid work done in the economy? Would we still need a legally enforced minimum wage? This article explores the behavioural effects of a BI, on workers, jobseekers and employers. It first examines contrasting hypotheses as to the effects on wages and labour supply, then use official data to make a rough estimate of these effects for individuals in different socioeconomic and household circumstances. Analysis indicates that a Minimum Wage will remain essential after the introduction of a modest BI, to prevent the latter substituting for wages and job security, especially in the case of individuals in less advantaged circumstances.
Introduction
Frequently mentioned arguments for a BI include two different groups of incentive effects that can’t all take place at once for the same person or household. The first is the category of effects that increase labour supply to employers; that it would help people out of the ‘poverty trap’ and encourage them to get a job, or to move from part-time to full-time work. The second is the category of effects that would reduce labour supply to the market; that it would encourage shorter working hours and more leisure; that it would encourage some people to take time off work to study or to care for elderly loved ones or to do unpaid volunteer work. Which groups in the labour force would increase their ‘offer’ of work to the market and which would reduce it? Under what circumstances, and in response to what level of BI, would people work more, or work less ?
We are in the dark here for a number of reasons. Firstly, most previous experiences of anything like a BI have been in other countries, often in much poorer countries than the UK with much more self-employment – Brazil, India and Namibia to mention examples. The US and Canadian experiments of the 1970s were far from ‘universal’, all being a variant of income maintenance for previous welfare claimants only. All we have to go on to tell us what might be the labour market effects of BI are the responses of claimants and employers to previous benefit systems in the UK or in comparable European contexts, and informed guesses about what claimants and employers would do in response to a new type of benefit which has no very similar precedent in nature or scale.
The risk of BI reducing wage rates and job security
Benefit systems have in some instances been found in practice to lead to lower wage rates (Gray 2014). Among these examples, the oldest was the Speenhamland system of poor relief in the early nineteenth century (Polanyi 1957). More recently, lower wage rates, increased precarity and job splitting – leading to jobs with very short hours in place of the full time work that most jobseekers wanted – was an evidenced effect of the high ‘earnings disregard’ levels present in French, German and Belgian systems of unemployment benefit in the 1980s and early 1990s (Gray 2002, 2004). In the UK, Wilkinson (2001) found a ‘Speenhamland effect’ of Working Families Tax Credit. The same argument was made in relation to tax credits when they were first introduced (Bennett and Hirsch 2001). Since 2014, the UK government itself hinted that employers had taken advantage of tax credit, defending their 2015 plan to reduce tax credit allowances (later reversed, but only partly) by saying that ‘the tax credit system had, for too long, been used to subsidise low pay’ (BBC News, 15.9.15). This view was underlined by the statement that corporation tax was being cut to ‘introduce incentives for business to remove the need for tax credits with pay rises ‘ (George Osborne’s budget speech on 8.7.15).
Thus benefit systems that allow unemployed people to move into temporary employment like that offered by this denver staffing agency, without total loss of benefit, as in the examples above, can lead to reduced wages. With WFTC (and the later Working Tax Credit), when unemployed people got a job they re-applied for in-work benefits to partially replace their out-of-work benefits, whilst with Speenhamland and the continental disregards (Polanyi, op.cit; Gray 2002) they just kept some of the benefit they had whilst they were unemployed. Such systems, to a greater or lesser degree, alleviate the ‘poverty trap’ where almost 100% of benefits are lost on taking a job, as with JSA, discouraging employment. But unfortunately downward pressure on wage rates is an inevitable effect of allowing unemployed people to keep getting state money when they get a job, if that is all we do. If ending the ‘poverty trap’ persuades some unemployed people to take jobs they previously wouldn’t have accepted because the wage was too low, employers will then find it easier than before to recruit the numbers they want at a lower wage – unless a minimum wage law prevents this . In fact right wing writers (e.g. Friedman 1962, Parker 1989) have argued for BI precisely because it helps and encourages people to take low paid jobs. And if pay falls, it falls not just for those who may be desperate for any job, but for all those changing jobs – and possibly even for those in jobs and staying in the same workplace. Many recent press reports show how easy it is for employers to issue new, worse contracts in the current under-regulated, under-unionised environment. Some defenders of BI argue that if the BI was high enough, a minimum wage law would not be needed – and even that some element of ‘wage subsidy’ is beneficial because it would protect small businesses like rural shops. (Or, one might add, this would help socially important sectors currently placed in serious difficulty by the recent rise in the legal minimum wage, in particular social care). But pay would fall not just for small businesses (including small shops and care homes, which some people might want to have lower costs to prevent them from closing). It would fall for supermarket chains and other corporate giants as well. In any case there are alternative, more targeted, ways of helping small businesses or particular sectors – especially those where, as with social care, the public sector is the main customer.
Can we avoid the Speenhamland effect and the poverty trap with a single measure? Probably not , for two reasons, as follows. First of all there is the question of whether a BI would be affordable at a level high enough to enable people to refuse all jobs below whatever we consider to be a reasonable wage level. Secondly any measure which increases labour supply is likely to induce easier recruitment at low wages. BI removes the poverty trap for the unwaged, and many of their job applications are directed at low paid sectors. So BI on its own, even at a high level, is liable to induce wage freezing, or recruitment at lower than previous hourly rates, just as did tax credit and the continental high-disregard systems. This can be avoided by ensuring that employers are obliged by law to pay a minimum wage – as I argued in 2014, such a regulation is an important safeguard against the BI being use to benefit employers rather than employees.
However, also at stake are other aspects of labour standards, and these are at issue even with a very high level of BI. Guy Standing (1999) amongst others has argued that a BI is a good defence against precarity – in these days of widespread temporary jobs, zero hours contracts and part-time unemployment, it makes such conditions more tolerable and less exposed to poverty. But if such jobs become more tolerable, employers will find it easier to recruit to them. In effect, such employers would be using state funds as a subsidy to support their practice of laying off workers for the weeks or days they are not needed, rather than meeting the costs of continuous maintenance of their labour force as they do in long-term employment contracts with specified hours. Again repeating the argument of my 2014 paper, limiting the use of temporary labour, and in particular zero hours contracts, is an important form of regulation to prevent this. What is important here is the similarity between a BI and the high disregards in these French, Belgian and German benefit schemes, which did encourage the offer of temporary and ‘mini-jobs’. They were like a partial BI for the unemployed. To combat these effects of encouraging more precarity, alongside a BI we need regulation of zero hours and limitation of temporary work. This is essential if the BI is not to end up subsidising employers who show no long-term responsibility for training or supporting their workforce and want to turn labour supply on and off like a tap.
Moreover, the problems of precarity are not solved by a BI without other measures. A prospective landlord or mortgage company will be unimpressed by someone who doesn’t know whether next week’s income will be her wage for 40 hours (say £400) plus her £80 BI, or just her £80 BI. It is creditworthiness and a secure long-term income that gets people a home – which is a good reason for minimising insecurity in the jobs market. A stable and secure income is important for individuals’ credit rating and thus their financial wellbeing, according to journalists’ advice on how to obtain a good credit rating.
An ‘on your bike’ economy where individuals have unpredictable changes in jobs and housing may also be inimical to family relationships and children’s education ‘
BI and the freedom to with-hold one’s labour
So far this paper has focussed on one potential effect of BI –the increase in the supply of labour. That is, the unemployed would move more easily into employment because they would face no poverty trap, and precarious jobs would become more acceptable. But it is often said that BI would enable people not to work, that is not to work for so long or all the time because they chose study, caring, or volunteering; or not to work because they wanted to refuse exploitative conditions. At first sight these two expectations seem in contradiction to each other; would BI induce more paid work or less? Firstly, it depends on the level of BI compared to average wages. Secondly, the effects would differ between various population groups.
Let us consider first the effect of BI on the unemployed. Unemployed people fall mainly into two groups – those receiving JSA and those who are ineligible – plus some eligible non-claimants who feel they cannot meet the very strict conditions, or have no fixed address. The ineligible group are mainly people whose 6 months’ entitlement to insurance-based JSA has expired and they cannot claim income-tested JSA because they have an employed partner . Ineligible unemployed also include those aged under 18. The argument that people are deterred from working by the benefits poverty trap applies mainly to this non-claimant group, because for those on JSA, the benefit conditions are the main factor. People on JSA are currently under such strict rules as to what jobs they can refuse that they are often obliged through fear of sanctions to apply for rock bottom pay and conditions regardless of the ‘poverty trap’ (Gray 2004). The financial incentive effect of a BI (that is, removing the poverty trap) would make little difference to them. What would make a big difference is that BI is unconditional : all the job centre rules about applying for so many jobs each week, with sanctions for even minor rule infringements, would not apply.
Current JSA rules have been getting gradually tighter, with sanctions and the imposition of compulsory work-for-benefit placements becoming more common, even since 1996. These aspects of the job centre system, described by labour economists as ‘conditionality’ and by critics also as ‘workfarist (Gray, 2004; Peck and Theodore, 2000) were designed to chase people into bad jobs. According to OECD-reported research, greater conditionality of benefits systems do increase the outflow from unemployment into jobs (OECD, 1994, 2000). That is, greater conditionality leads to an increase in labour supply. Conversely, relaxing the punitive sanctions and workfare regime would enable people to spend longer looking for a good job, or re-training in new skills, with nobody forcing them to take the first offer even if this does not meet their income and job security needs or fully use their skills. That is, less conditionality could be expected to lead to a fall in labour supply; this option to turn down bad jobs would work against the Speenhamland effect explained earlier. If a BI was introduced, it is hard to say which effect would win out – easier recruitment by employers to low paid or casual work because of the cushion of BI, or more difficult recruitment on low wages/temporary contracts because of the end to benefit ‘conditionality’.
It is because of the threat of sanctions and workfare that some voices in the trade union movement have recently taken up the historically popular claimants’ movement demand for a BI, a demand first flagged up by Bill Jordan (1989). BI was enthusiastically discussed at a conference on welfare held by UNITE and the PCS in autumn 2014, leading to the publication by UNITE of the ‘National Welfare Charter’ linking BI to the demands to end sanctions and workfare, which was endorsed by a fringe meeting of the TUC in 2015 (see
There was also a UNITE/USDAW motion supporting the principle of BI passed at the TUC itself in 2016.
Over and above the virtue of abolishing benefit sanctions, a BI that was high enough to enable people to refuse low pay or very insecure work would probably reduce the total of hours worked and the number of jobs offered. Some of the worst jobs would not be offered because they would attract few applicants. But if the BI was not high enough to enable people to refuse ‘bad’ jobs, it would have the opposite effect – low pay would be more acceptable and employers would recruit more easily at low wages than if there was no BI. It is impossible to say, a priori, how much would be ‘high enough’ to mark the tipping point or boundary between these two effects, above which labour supply falls. Moreover, the tipping point could vary according to socioeconomic group and region.
Turning to people who are not on out-of-work benefits – that is, people in paid work, mothers and other carers, students and would-be students, the level of the BI would be the key factor in their decisions about whether and how much to work. Just as people clearly find it hard to manage on JSA of £73.10 per week, they would probably not stay completely out of work for long on a BI of £70 or £80 per week unless they had some parental support. However for many students that might be riches, given that the maximum maintenance grant of £65 per week in England has just been abolished for new starters. Some parents might work more if they found £70 or £80 a handy childcare grant, but others might want to spend more time with their children. Some older people might find it was enough to make up any deficit in their pension entitlement and therefore retire sooner than they would otherwise. Some full-time workers might do less overtime, and some people (in particular students or those in poor health) might give up part-time jobs. Some people might feel more confident about starting their own business with even a small BI as a cushion in the early stages, rather as they were once encouraged by the Enterprise Allowance Scheme of the 1980s – but they could be people moving out of unemployment or out of jobs they found boring or ill-paid, so the net effect on labour supply is again unpredictable.
If a BI were high enough (how high we don’t know) it would encourage more people to work part-time, even those used to quite high hourly rates. For there to be any substantial effect of a BI in terms of people withdrawing, at least by working shorter hours, from jobs they already had, a BI would have to offer enough for them to feel that the loss of income was worth the gain in non-work time. For example if a BI of £150 per week was introduced, this would enable someone to give up 10 hours work per week without loss of income if s/he earned £15 per hour after tax, but to give up 15 hours work per week and have the same weekly income as before if s/he only earned £10 net per hour. But if the BI were only £60, the person on £15 per hour would only feel motivated to work 4 hours per week less whilst the person on £10 per hour might work 6 hours less. The higher the BI in relation to the individual’s hourly wage, the greater would be the likely reduction in labour supply from people already in paid work. The ‘value of leisure’ (whether used as leisure, or for some form of unpaid work or study) clearly varies considerably with the individual, depending on their tastes, commitments and current hourly wage rate. As a rule of thumb, one might expect that if – and only if – people have a ‘target weekly income’ they want, irrespective of the amount of effort it takes to obtain it, the ratio of the BI to the hourly wage rate gives us the maximum number of hours by which they would seek to reduce their work time. So for example, if the hourly wage was £10, a BI of £100 would induce people working 45 hours to seek only 35 hours, and a BI of £140 would induce people to seek 31 hours rather than 45. But things might not be as simple as that, firstly because the value of the first extra hour of leisure may be greater than further hours, secondly because employers are not that flexible, and thirdly because the ‘target weekly income’ may vary with the extent of income security, the effort involved in earning, the costs of commuting, work clothes and lunches, and the influence of other family members in response to the introduction of a BI.
Conversely, if we consider new graduates or school leavers, or mothers returning to work, the question might be, ‘what is the minimum extra income I need?’ The higher the BI, the more likely they would be to meet that target with a small number of hours’ work per week. The higher the ratio of the BI to the hourly wage, the more likely are new entrants or re-entrants to the labour market to be satisfied with a small number of hours of work. But independently of the level of the BI, the higher their hourly wage rate the more likely people are to achieve their ‘target’ income with a short working week. So if we want to encourage part-time work to reduce any pressure placed by automation on the ‘supply’ of jobs, a high legal minimum wage would help, whatever the level of BI offered.
Clearly not everyone would react to the introduction of BI in the same way. How it would affect their ‘propensity to work’ would vary with the level of wages individuals can obtain, depending on occupation, skills, experience; their entitlements (or lack of them) under the previous benefit system; caring commitments; the desire to study; their partner’s work, their health/disability; and heir closeness to pensionable age.
Who would work less and who would work more ?
This section attempts to investigate what the effect of a BI might be on the employment behaviour of different groups in the population. Who would respond to a BI by offering more labour to the market – taking a job when they hadn’t before, or seeking longer hours? And who would respond to a BI by reducing their personal labour supply, dropping out of paid work or seeking shorter hours?
The method used here is first to consider which categories of people would gain from a BI introduced in the range of £70 to £90 per week for a working age adult, and which categories would lose through paying higher taxes to finance the BI. Both gainers and losers are categorised by their current employment status. They include full time workers, who can vary their hours only by doing overtime in some instances: and part-time workers or self-employed people, both of whom can in theory at least vary their working hours quite a lot, in the case of the part-timers possibly by changing jobs or taking two jobs. Then there are unemployed jobseekers (divided into those claiming JSA and those who are not claiming); people who are medically unfit for employment or whose job choices are heavily constrained by their health; people whose main activity is caring for relatives; students; and those who are still under pension age but wholly or partly retired. Most of these groups can be identified from the Labour Force Survey; however, the published data for 2016 do not identify all the categories in the table separately, and have been supplemented by published LFS data for earlier dates, and from other sources as detailed in the notes. There may be an unintended overlap, thus some double counting, for some categories. Thus the estimates of numbers are very rough, and may be regarded as guesstimates of the rough order of magnitude of numbers pending the possibility of access to the raw data which one could interrogate to provide better estimates of the numbers in these various categories. Further information about sources, and some caveats, is given in the note to the two tables below.
Table 1 shows roughly how many people are in each sub-group, and hazards a guess at what the effects might be for different sections of the labour force of a BI in the region of current JSA entitlement or not much higher. For clarity, those whom we can expect would be likely to raise their hours of work in response to a BI are highlighted in yellow and those whom we expect to reduce their hours in grey. This table suggests what might be the direction of change in offer of paid work to the market from each group, considering both the likely effects of the BI itself and the likely effects of higher taxes to pay for it, compared to the current system. The higher tax burden would of course impact on income groups above the ‘breakeven’ level where BI and income tax bill would be equal. Table 2 shows guesstimates for what might be the total effect on labour supply in terms of hours per week. It should be emphasised that this is highly speculative and needs to be informed by more research on labour supply elasticities and the gains/losses produced by a BI system compared to the current benefits system, as well as by interrogation of the Labour Force Survey and other large data sets to obtain better estimates of the numbers in each labour market category. The guesstimates of what proportion of people in each of the categories would respond by working more or less are mere hypotheses and not based on evidence. However, the table may serve to show the very rough orders of magnitude of the changes expected.
In Table 1 there are four quadrants; on the left side are those who are currently not in paid work and on the right side those who are employed or self-employed. In the upper half of the table are the ‘gainers’ from BI (‘G’ groups) and in the lower half the ‘losers’ who would pay more tax than their BI – that is, their income is above the breakeven point. These two variables – in paid work or not, gainers or losers, divide the table into four.
In the upper left quadrant(gainers from BI, not employed) we have those with non-economic reasons for staying out of the labour market, plus those most affected by the ‘poverty trap’ in the current benefits system. Unemployed people, if claiming benefit, would be more likely to enter work quickly because their BI would remove the poverty trap, although as noted earlier the effect of removing benefit conditionality would work in the opposite direction and modify this incentive effect. Unemployed people not claiming benefit would especially gain from a BI taking them out of the poverty trap if any money they earn currently results in a loss of JSA or tax credit for their partner. But the published LFS data do not tell us how many of them are in this kind of household situation. So the table makes a very arbitrary guess that half of the non-claimant unemployed are in this situation.
In the bottom left quadrant(non-employed ‘losers’ from BI) we have the ‘early retired’ and a few others who are not working by choice – taking a gap year, ‘housewives’ (or ‘househusbands’) without young children, etc. It is assumed that most of these, in particular ‘early retired’ people (those aged 50 to 64, not in paid work, nor disabled nor engaged in care ) are in the ‘loser’ category since they have decided they do not need earnings, so they are probably people of above average means due to wealth, partner’s income or early pension entitlement. Also in the bottom left quadrant, a few early retired people (defined as aged 50-64 and not working or claiming unwaged benefits) might respond to higher tax by thinking their money is no longer enough and they should take a part time job – or keep up some activity in their former profession. In the bottom right quadrant (employed or self-employed, ‘losers’) other workers aged 50 plus, if already partly retired and working part-time, might decide that the extra tax makes it no longer worth working and would retire completely. Also in this quadrant are some other part-time workers who are not carers, nor over 50, nor disabled nor students – it is assumed that they have non-economic reasons for their choice of paid hours and that a BI would probably not affect this choice.
In the top right quadrant of the table (in paid work, whether full or part time, gainers from BI) we have people who are employed (or self-employed) part-time because of caring or for health reasons, plus students. Many students can be expected to drop their part-time jobs if they had a BI, at least in term time, and this is important because there are over 2.3 million students employed part-time – they are a larger category than the unemployed. Then there are mothers who are in paid work part-time; they might be affected by the poverty trap associated with tax credits, and welcome the lower withdrawal rate of a BI, so they might seek longer hours. However research on American and Canadian experiments in offering something like a BI suggests that women with children tend to reduce their hours (or delay return to work) when offered a BI (Prescott et al. 1986, Hum and Simpson 1993). But if they are lone parents on benefit or their partner is not working (and therefore claiming income based JSA in the current system), they might work longer hours because they would no longer penalised by a loss of benefits from the household as their earnings rise. Blundell, Dias, Meghir and Shaw (2012,2015), when modelling the effects of the 1999 introduction of WFTC, found that more generous in-work benefits overall reduce mothers’ work offer to the market. The change from Family Income Supplement to WFTC in 1999 made the in-work benefits regime more generous with a lower ‘taper’ rate and by starting the taper at a higher level of income. This change was rather like what a BI would do since it offered, in effect, a higher ‘disregard’ of earnings and partial alleviation of the poverty trap. Modelling the introduction of WFTC showed a positive effect on lone mothers’ employment rates – but only very small unless they were home owners. For the much larger number of partnered mothers, there was a negative effect on employment rates of 2-3%, and also a negative effect on their hours. On balance it seems likely that the effect of a BI on the employment seeking behaviour of part-time-employed mothers would be a small reduction in the hours they offer to the labour market.
Table 2 attempts to gauge the rough orders of magnitude of these effects, to determine whether it is more likely that a BI would lead to a rise in aggregate labour supply or a fall. This second table takes each of the groups identified in Table 1 and hazards a guess at how large the effect per person in each group would be. Thus, having established hypotheses about the direction of labour supply effect in Table 1, Table 2 offers a guesstimate of how large these effects would be. It suggests that a BI for working age adults in the range of £70 to £90 per week, if all benefits for children and disabled people remain as now, would produce a substantial increase in labour supply, of 3.92 million hours or the equivalent of 98,000 full time workers. Compared to the overall 31.56 million people in paid employment or self-employment, this seems small – but in certain sectors and places where jobs are scarce, it could have a substantial effect on wage levels. As shown at the end of Table 2, there is a particularlylarge increase in labour supply forunskilled or entry level jobs – altogether possibly almost 12.3 million hours. This is a very powerful argument for keeping a minimum wage law in place.
The overall result is highly sensitive to the size of the effect on the unemployed, which is likely to be the largest of all the effects on separate labour force groups. Alongside the effect on the unemployed, there would be substantial effects on students and mothers. The potential increase in labour supply from the unemployed, if the BI reduced their number by one third, would be perhaps 21 million hours per week. But the contrary fall in labour supply from students might be over 11 million hours per week. This is useful to the job prospects of the unemployed, since they often compete with students for unskilled part-time jobs.
For mothers, the effects are particularly unpredictable and would depend a great deal on what regime is in place to help with childcare costs, as well as on the income tax rate. In the table, if a 5% increase is assumed in the number of working mothers and their average hours were 19 per week (as estimated by Alakeson, 2012), this would lead to an increase in labour supply of 2.09 million hours.
Full time workers who do not currently get WTC but who would gain from BI might reduce their overtime, which in aggregate amounts to a large effect even though paid overtime per person across the labour force is very small anyway in the current state of the economy. The full time workers who don’t gain from BI, but find themselves with a higher tax rate than before or in a higher tax band, might also do less overtime because of the disincentive effect. A guesstimate is a fall of 7.7 million hours per week, if say average overtime per worker was reduced from one hour to half an hour across all these full time workers.
At this level of BI few full timers would feel able to switch to part-time jobs, unless perhaps nearing retirement. But assuming a BI would mean a higher income tax bill for some groups, some early-retired workers might re-enter the labour force for ‘mini-jobs’ (‘unretirement’) and some might postpone their retirement. Others might reduce their hours, whether because they felt the BI enabled them to do so, or because if they were well paid and therefore in a higher tax band to pay for the BI, they felt deterred from continuing full time. These effects are small and comprise increases in hours from some older workers set against reductions from others – the net effect might be less than one million hours per week. (Effects on people over 64 are not considered here; however depending on the level of BI for people currently receiving state pension, there obviously would be some labour market effects in so far as some pensioners do also have jobs)
Conclusion
The interesting points shown by this series of guesstimates are that firstly whilst the effect of a BI on unemployed people’s job seeking and job acceptance is the largest effect, the effects on mothers, students and choice of retirement age are also important. Whereas much discussion of the labour market effects of BI has focussed on the unemployed or ‘prime age’ full time workers, the responses of other groups in the labour force may be of considerable impact on the likely change in overall labour supply. Despite the likely fall in students’ working hours, one would expect a large rise in labour supply will be at the lower end of the pay ladder, making the retention of a minimum wage very important. It must be emphasised that the guesstimates of both size and direction of the labour supply effects mentioned here are highly speculative, and no more than an initial sketch of the several different effects that need to be subjected to proper econometric modelling in order to assess what would really be the effects of introducing a BI.
If we now consider a considerably higher BI – say £150 per week – it is likely that some full time workers with no caring commitments and of ‘prime’ working age would reduce their hours to part-time, if their job conditions permitted that. There would probably be a demand for three or four-day a week jobs. Here the previous analysis about the trade-off between the hourly value of leisure and the wage rate comes into play.
If people did reduce their income from work it would erode the income tax base, which must be taken into account in assessing how large a BI would be affordable. Ensuring that a BI does not induce a fall in the tax revenue used to pay for it is one of several reasons why it would be desirable to fund it partly from non-income tax sources – such as taxes on personal wealth, land value tax, capital gains tax and corporation tax.
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At the World Economic Forum in January this year, four panelists were invited to talk about universal basic income (UBI): Professor Guy Standing (University of London), co-founder of BIEN and author of several books on UBI, Neelie Kroes, former minister in the Dutch Parliament, former EU commissioner, and current member of several boards, Amitabh Kant, CEO of the National Institution for Transforming India (NITI Aayog), and Professor Michael Sandel (Harvard University), author of “What Money Can’t Buy, the Moral Limits of Markets”.
According to Guy Standing, there has been much evidence gathered through foundational research on the feasibility, affordability and implications of UBI, but this research has been ignored for many years. Due to the realisation of the potential effects of automation, however, interest in UBI has recently increased. Automation is not Standing’s personal motivation though—he advocates for UBI for three main reasons:
It is a means of realising social justice in line with Thomas Paine, Henry George and others, who have claimed that public wealth is created over generations. Therefore, if private inheritance is permitted, we should also establish public inheritance as a social dividend of this public wealth.
It is a means of enhancing republican freedom: freedom from domination by figures of authority using their arbitrary power.
It is a means of providing people with basic security. It is not designed to eradicate poverty per se, but rather to address the issue of insecurity, which underlies the rise of populism we see today. It is known that mental health and mental development is improved by basic security.
Standing: “I wish people would look at the evidence rather than continue with their views. We have done pilots, covering thousands of people and most fundamentally we found that the emancipatory value of a basic income is greater than the money value.
It gives people a sense of control of their time, so that the values of work grow relative to the demands of labour. The values of learning and public participation grow, the values of citizenship are strengthened. We found evidence from UBI experiments showing that the values of altruism and tolerance are enhanced. At the moment, society is suffering from a deprivation of altruism and tolerance.”
When asked to explain the support for UBI from both left- and right-wing politicians, Kroes argues that the flexibility of the concept is a reason why there is an interest from both left- and right-wing political movements: it can either decrease or increase the role of the government, the level of the UBI can vary and there are a number of different ways to fund it.
As Kroes explains, the UBI could replace large parts of the existing welfare system and would require choices to be made in advance regarding which benefits would be cut. This specificity would make it more difficult to find support from politicians across the political spectrum, which is why Kroes suggests starting off with a more modest system that would more easily find political support and can be seen as a starting point.
“The least ideological arguments in favour of a UBI are coming from technical entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley at the moment”, Kroes continues, noting that “they are trying to defend their own future”.
Kant is asked to explain the attractions of a UBI from a governmental perspective. He explains that the huge rural employment guarantee scheme and the public distribution system in India are very inefficient, mostly due to corruption.
Furthermore, India is facing changes in the labour market, where low skill-low pay jobs are decreasingly necessary, while the demand for high skill-high pay jobs is increasing. This shift requires radical restructuring of the educational system to provide the right skills, Kant argues.
There are huge inequalities in India: one third of the population is living below the poverty line. These are the people that should be targeted with a UBI, and 1000 rupees per person per month would be affordable, says Kant. India also has a few specific advantages, he further argues. There is a huge infrastructure of biometric and mobile phone payment systems in the country. At the same time, India recently transformed its ‘black economy’ of almost 1 trillion US dollars (parallel to a 2 trillion US dollar formal economy) into a ‘white economy’. This resulted in a significant increase of government tax income, so there is enough money to potentially fund a UBI, Kant explains.
Kant suggests it would be best to provide people with a UBI in the form of an interest-free loan for a period of three years, ensuring the money is repaid and recycled so it can reach more people. Simultaneously investing in creating jobs on the back of domestic consumption would give this scheme a push.
In response to this, Standing argues that, “in our pilots in India, we found that people improved their nutrition, family health, schooling, schooling performance, and entrepreneurship. The consequence was that they were generating more income and lowering the public service costs, as they were healthier. I would be very wary about turning it into a loan, because a loan rewards the entrepreneurial and therefore would increase the inequality in the villages. Where there was a basic income, it didn’t sort out the potential winners from the losers, it increased community solidarity”.
Professor Sandel is asked to talk about the role of work and the importance of paid work. “We tend to think of work primarily as a source of income, but work is also a source of meaning, an identity. The debate about basic income forces us to debate about the social meaning of work,” he explains.
There are two basic arguments for a UBI that are fundamentally distinct, according to Sandel: the ethical argument, which suggests that one can still choose to work and contribute to society, and the compensatory argument (from Silicon Valley), which sends the message that one is compensated for accepting a world without work and contribution to society is no longer of value.
Standing responds to Sandel’s view: “We need to reconceptualise what we mean by work. I believe the technical revolution is actually creating more work. The only problem is that it is not being remunerated, so it is contributing to growing inequality. The reason why Silicon Valley types are worried is because they think income is going to the owners of the robots and the others are going to be without an income.”
“The affordability question is a very easy one to answer,” Standing replies to a question asked by the chair. “Somehow, with Quantitative Easing [QE], the US government managed to fund Quantitative Easing of 475 trillion dollars. If that money had been used to pay a basic income, every American household could have received 56,000 dollars. That is just one little example. But I strongly believe that we must frame basic income as paid from rentier capitalism and from rentierism. Because at the moment the corruption of capitalism about which I’ve written is primarily because the returns to property and intellectual property and the rentier incomes from natural resources are going to a tiny minority – and we need to be sharing that.”
Most of us are aware of the problems we are collectively facing: environmental issues, job losses or job insecurity, homelessness, increased violence, terrorism, an immigration and refugee crisis, overpopulation, poverty and famine.
What hardly anyone is talking about is that we are all connected, and as much as we may have separated ourselves by nationality, religion, cast, political parties etc., the fact remains that we are one humanity or, as some describe, “one human family”. The planet provides for all of us without making a distinction – food, water, air, oceans and land – our commons. Yet we have managed to privatize these essential resources for only one purpose: to make money and profit, thus determining who should have access and who should go without.
Humanity has become so complacent over the last few decades that 18 million people are dying every year in a world of abundance. They have become the forgotten people as we have normalized their plight in our minds, often with the words “poverty has always existed, it’s nothing new”. Yet that poverty is steadily growing in many countries, with more impoverished famines in the developing world and increased homelessness and foodbanks across the West. We don’t hear much of those either, unless we ourselves are affected. Yet these deprivations are directlyconnected to increased violence, immigration, a degrading environment, homelessness and overpopulation.
So, what is the answer? Demanding Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a Global Basic Income could be the solution we are looking for, as they go hand in hand.
On December 10. 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including Article 25 on the right to an adequate standard of living:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.
Sadly, Article 25 has never been implemented globally through appropriate government interventions and redistributive measures, but if it were, it would finally end poverty and create hope for millions of people for the first time. An Unconditional Basic Income, a periodic cash payment delivered to all on an individual basis to cover basic needs, would also be essential, because it will help make it all possible. It will finally guarantee the universal realization of Article 25.
Basic income is already widely debated around the world within some countries, such as Finland, Spain, Canada, Holland and Scotland having trial projects. Peter Bevan Baker of the Green Party on Prince Edward Island, Canada, stated positive effects of an Unconditional Basic Income that include: “Local economic growth, supporting entrepreneurship, reducing administrative, complexity and costs, improving working conditions, reducing crime, improving health, and helping to build vibrant rural communities” (source).
However, some free market thinkers argue for a fixed (basic income) amount per person in favor of scrapping all other social services, like unemployment benefits and housing benefits. Their argument is that it will save the government a lot of time and money in determining who qualifies for welfare and who does not. This might be an incentive for politicians, but at the same time it might worsen the situation of relatively disadvantaged, vulnerable, or lower-income people. Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), at last years General Assembly in Seoul, stated that it should not replace the compensatory welfare state, but rather complete and transform it into an emancipatory welfare system. Unconditional Basic Income Europe (UBIE) agrees with that statement, and both organizations advocate that there should be no means testing, but a guaranteed monthly or annual payment given to all.
In this way, a basic income is an emancipatory policy and will help us to strengthen democracy. The word ‘democracy’ originally comes from Ancient Greece and means ‘power of the people’. Unfortunately, this type of democracy does not exist anywhere in the world, but to get closer to this ideal, everyone on the planet should have a minimum degree of economic freedom to be able to choose how they want to live their own lives. It is the hope for every human being, given the social transformations it will unleash by enabling all people to plan for a secure future.
Of course, for an Unconditional Basic Income to work for everyone, the different living conditions of people around the world need to be considered. Some people live in dire poverty, with no roof over their head and no idea where their next meal is coming from. A small monthly income might make life a bit easier, but it will not be enough to lift them out of poverty once and for all. There is a growing sense of a new consciousness or awareness that we cannot separate ourselves from the cries of our brothers and sisters, no matter where they are in the world. Unconditional Basic Income was originally discussed only on national levels, but has since expanded in view to a global level, to include the most marginalized people.
What should also be taken into account is that most countries outside Europe do not have a comprehensive welfare system in place. This is another reason why many economic migrants are seeking a livelihood in Western Europe, where they would have the right to free medical treatments, housing and other benefits. If they had these basic social services guaranteed at home, they may never leave. Also, many developing countries do not have an adequate tax system in place to offer a functioning welfare system. Even with overseas aid going to many of these countries, the money flowing out to the more affluent parts of the world is usually much greater than the original donations given.
If it is not large corporations that harm these countries through illicit activity and profit repatriation, then it is often corruption at the highest level. Nigeria for example has a tremendous wealth of oil and minerals. Here the government officials live like kings, yet their people are one of the poorest in the world, with millions now facing the prospect of famine. Let us also not forget the numerous tax havens that many big companies use, which is equivalent to any other form of corruption. In all cases, money and resources is effectively stolen from the people that are in most dire need of it.
The list of corruption and exploitation goes on, endlessly. For all of these reasons, we urgently need to demand the human rights of Article 25 for everyone in the world, which is the key that will open the door to a truly Global Basic Income. Firstly, we must ensure that everyone has their basic needs covered, which means adequate housing, food, medicines etc., and an Unconditional Basic Income will safeguard the rest.
Over time, the guaranteeing of Article 25 and a basic income will mean that the world population will eventually stabilize, and people will no longer need to immigrate on a mass scale. Even the environment may be less exploited when illicit practices like poaching and sales of rare timber become much less common, or stop completely, as this has often been the only means for some poor people or villages to make a livelihood.
If enough people demand the full realization of Article 25, there will also be a huge knock-on effect on the wars that are everywhere being waged, as government spending must first cover the needs of its people before it can further invest in armaments.
Furthermore, food speculation must stop, as instead all countries work together to finally distribute the food to where it is most needed. For too long has food been used as a commodity in the financial sector, where it is often left to rot in the store houses of the West to increase its market value.
Pharmaceuticals will also have to change their profit-orientated ways of doing business, if we want to guarantee free or cheap healthcare for all citizens of this world.
The founder of Share The World’s Resources, Mohammed Mesbahi, has described in a new book how these drastic changes in government priorities can be brought about. In ‘Heralding Article 25: A people’s strategy for world transformation’, he writes that if we are waiting for our governments to do the job for us, we will be waiting for eternity, while most social and environmental trends are getting worse. Our only hope is to join together with millions of ordinary people in huge, continuous protests on a world-wide scale to demand from our governments the immediate implementation of Article 25, with the United Nations as the governing body to oversee and the organizational logistics.
For many people, such a plan of action may sound far too simple and even naïve, considering the complexity of political issues today. Yet there is nothing complicated about the fact that there is more food in the world than is needed, and yet people are dying of hunger. Governments all over the world are not serving their people, but instead they facilitate the profit interests of multinational corporations, which in turn exploit us. The only way to reverse this systemic injustice is through the people of the world uniting under the banner of Article 25. Not against capitalism or ‘the system’, which has also led us nowhere in the past, but through a simple demand for everyone’s right to a dignified life.
Of itself, an Unconditional Basic Income will not be sufficient to achieve an end to poverty. The hollow promise of economic growth and more jobs will also never work. The one ingredient that will make it possible is countless numbers of people rising up in peaceful protest with an engaged heart, and not just the intellect, for anything else will be short lived.
There are many groups that are doing tremendous good work for people and planet, and that should and must continue. But if we could unite even once a week and raise our voices for governments to implement Article 25 and a Global Basic Income, then we might start seeing some real changes.
It has been said that “Basic Income is not left or right but forward.” The policy is alleged to transcend the partisan divide, drawing support from progressives as well as conservatives and libertarians. However, Joe Chrisp, a PhD Candidate in the University of Bath’s Institute for Policy Research (IRP), argues that the reality is more complicated. (Chrisp’s dissertation, supervised by Professors Nick Pearce and Jane Millar, concerns the feasibility of universal basic income.)
First, some of the apparent agreement stems from the fact that some individuals and political parties use the term ‘basic income’ in a different or more expansive way than BIEN’s definition. Although they call them by the same term, the policies they support are actually distinct.
Second, even if individuals across the political spectrum mean the same thing by ‘basic income’, they sometimes have divergent and deeply entrenched views on acceptable funding mechanisms.
Finally, Chrisp points out that some argue that, in general, “right versus left” is no longer the best dimension by which to characterize political divisions. Instead, a “universalist versus particularist“ dimension might be more apt. In this case, even ifbasic income does draw support from both left and right, this does not entail that it transcends the most important political divisions in today’s society.
The Stanford University Philosophy Department organized the first in a series of events focusing on aspects of unconditional basic income. Facilitated by Juliana Uhuru Bidadanure, Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department of Stanford University, with an affiliation to the McCoy Center for Ethics in Society, the panel consisted of researchers in pilots and experiments of basic income: Guy Standing (Professorial Research Associate at SOAS, University of London; BIEN co-founder), Elizabeth Rhodes (Research Director of Y Combinator’s basic income experiment), and Joe Huston (Regional Director at GiveDirectly). The topic for the panel discussion was “What do people do when they are given cash with no strings attached?”
Juliana Bidadanure
Bidadanure opened by setting a definition for unconditional basic income: cash, given individually, unconditionally, and universally, so people can enter an existence free from economic insecurity. She flagged some of the most common concerns around a universal income policy –too many people will withdraw from the work force, or it can be wasteful, taking away from government investments in poverty, education, roads, etc.
The Speakers
Guy Standing
First up was Guy Standing to discuss his research results from a pilot of universal basic income in India. Standing provided some background, saying he is pleased there is an explosion of pilots around the world; however, he warned that while pilots teach us how to form policy and legitimize our agenda, we don’t need pilots to pursue universal basic income on the basis of social justice, freedom, and basic security for all. This is something we can pursue now.
The pilot in India took a year to plan, working with the local governments, and registering background data on over 11,000 people in 20 villages. Standing stressed that conceiving of the survey required envisioning the possible stories that might come out of the data so that the metrics were in place both before and after the test. Eight villages were selected to participate, 12 other villages were used as the control group, data was collected from everyone at 6 month intervals through the trial, and the cash was paid out for 18 months. Data was also collected 2 ½ years after the pilot. Results were gathered by independent data collectors.
Standing outlined the changes that took place in the villages that received the basic income:
Residents invested in improvements in sanitation and housing
Weight relative to age, for especially girls, improved dramatically
Spending on alcohol, tobacco went down
Health care spending increased, incidents of ill health decreased, and the health status of the disabled improved (because they were able to pay for continual medicine with no breaks in treatment)
Spending on schooling went up, with the greatest improvements for girls
Registration and attendance in schools improved for teenage girls
Men worked more, and earned income increased for those getting the basic income
The only group where there was a reduction of labour was children
The best result, in his opinion, was that the emancipatory value of the basic income. When people needed cash due to an illness or an accident, they were able to use the liquidity and pool together to cover the costs, rather than borrow at 50 percent from the money lender (as they had done previously). The basic income kept people out of debt bondage.
In January 2017, the government of India included a special chapter on basic income in its Economic Survey, which referred to these pilots.
Next up was Elizabeth Rhodes from Y Combinator. A Silicon Valley based venture capital firm, Y Combinator provides seed money and advice to tech start-ups. In 2015 they started Y Combinator Research, a non-profit research lab. Their motivation behind sponsoring and executing a basic income pilot came from their president, Sam Altman. He, as well as many others in Silicon Valley, are concerned about current struggles in the US with growing inequality, unpredictable employment, deep poverty, the gig economy and the fact that the existing safety net is based on work. With millions looking for borrowing options like high risk payday loans, falling into deeper debt which they probably spend a lifetime to pay back, and the decrease in job security over time, it became important to come up with a solution. They are especially concerned about the potential worsening of these struggles as workers are increasingly displaced from their jobs through robotics and AI.
Y Combinator’s pilot is in the design phase, and Rhodes explained its context as one step in a larger agenda, cautioning that the current specs may change. Rhodes took care to note it is not an ideologically driven study, but rather a study of a promising potential solution in the name of social science. It will not be a test of the effects of universal basic income, but the effects of individual cash transfer, missing the community level effects, but focusing on the individual level effects, due to the practicality of the expense of making the study community level. The study currently planned in Oakland, California, will include 2000 to 3000 participants, who will have a variety of demographic backgrounds, range in age from 21 to 35, and whose household incomes will not exceed the area median. Of these, 1000 will receive $1000 a month for 3 years (5 years for a smaller test group). The rest will be the control group. Quantitative data will be collected and a large subset will be followed up with a qualitative component as well.
The Y Combinator study will look closely at the central question “What do people do when they are given cash with no strings attached?” in the context of the US. The research plans on collecting before-and-after data on the follow metrics:
How does it affect time use?
Work hours
Entrepreneurial/ gig employment/ self employment
Education/ training
Do parents spend more time with their children?
Do people volunteer more? Get involved in their community?
How do cash transfers affect physical and psychological well being?
Health and mental health
Subjective well being
Healthy behaviors like cutting back on smoking and drinking, improving fitness and diet
Decrease in stress
What is the effect on financial health?
Payday lending, title lending, savings, credit cards
Do political and social attitudes change?
Inner-group prejudice
Economic conservatism
Are there network and spill-over effects?
Are people helping friends and family?
Outcomes for children
Possibly grades, test scores
Any effect on crime?
Rhodes concluded by noting they would be looking at sample size to see which metrics would end up being statistically significant, but the goal would be to address these questions.
Joe Huston
Last to present was Joe Huston, from GiveDirectly, a non-profit that gives unconditional cash transfers directly to the extremely poor people living in Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda. Over the last 5 plus years of operations GiveDirectly has transferred over 135 million dollars through their program. GiveDirectly’s most common model is giving 3 lump sums (total roughly $1000), transferred through mobile phones over a 5 month period, to the poorest people in each village. They have been building a body of evidence of the effects of cash transfers, over the last 5 years, over 65,000 households, and are able to speak to the question “What do people do when they are given cash with no strings attached?”
The GiveDirectly pilots focused on the poorest people and gave lump sums. Huston started with an explanation of the purpose of the pilots: they have seen in other tests around the world that cash is very functional; it removes the bulk of the costs of delivering the aid, and people can spend it in ways that improve their lives. For example, in some cases they have seen that when young women are given money, they get married later, become pregnant later, and have lower rates of HIV. In others, they have seen people investing in assets or increasing earnings. In GiveDirectly’s research, they consistently do not see people stopping working or an increase in gambling, alcohol or other “temptation goods.” They have seen the effects of the cash transfers having a longer term effect as well: even after the cash transfers have stopped, income is up, investment in assets are up, and decreases in malnutrition and improvements in mental health remain.
Huston explained that GiveDirectly is interested in the current debate around basic income. As their tests have show with lump sum cash transfers, there is evidence to expect positive outcome from an ongoing cash transfer, yet there is much debate and many hypotheses, especially among economists, about how human nature will respond to a basic income over a long period of time (for example, will it lead to alienation and idleness?). GiveDirectly wants to participate in gathering evidence on these questions in order to prove or disprove some of the theories.
GiveDirectly has added a basic income pilot, a change from previous work, in that instead of giving only to the poor, this test will be universal; all adults within the village will be treated the same. Forty or so villages will receive cash, a basic minimum level of subsistence (based on local poverty levels), for a period of 12 years. GiveDirectly wants to look at this long-term program versus the effects in a short 2-year program. How does this change the way families make decisions? They also want to see the effects of monthly income structure as opposed to lump sum transfers. Does it motivate people to make different choices? And they want to compare giving universally versus giving to the poorest. What are the community outcomes? Do they see a reduction in crime or conflict? Do communities take on projects together? Huston notes that the pilot will use randomization and control villages to have reference points. GiveDirectly would like to frame this debate around the evidence that comes out of this pilot. They are hoping this data can help inform different policy goals in societies.
In closing, Huston showed a chart from Brookings depicting the decreasing total cost of closing the poverty gap, and the increase in foreign aid over the years on a global scale. The chart gives a clear picture that the aid needed to close the poverty gap is available; we just need to deliver it effectively to the poor. GiveDirectly has evidence that cash transfers are very effective, and they look forward to testing universal basic income as the method of payment. Huston explains the proof of the former claim this way: before we go into a village there will be a larger portion of their society living in extreme poverty; when we leave, no one will, and that shows a direct mechanical way that basic income mitigates poverty.
Panel Discussion
The facilitator, Bidadanure, then changed gears to the panel discussion focused around the question of what people might do with cash in several counterfactual scenarios: basic income vs nothing, basic income vs microfinance, and basic income vs investment in children and education?
Standing answered that he think the counterfactuals involve paternalism of various sorts.
For example, in India the welfare system has provided subsidized food, kerosin, wheat, sugar, etc., and repeatedly the government has admitted that something like 93% of every rupee spent on the programs never manages to reach the recipient of the aid. The government subsidized fuel, which amounted to 3 or 4% of GDP. If they were to spend 3 to 4% of GDP on basic income, that would be half the poverty line.
In addition a very common issue or concern in both developed and developing countries has been the labour requirement, where recipients only get income when they do paid labour. There has been a tradition in developing countries of not giving cash transfers. In 1999 the World Bank had no records of cash transfer programs; now there are hundreds of pilots. These pilots have tested, and are testing, targeting (only to the poor) or conditionality (on sending one’s children to school or paid work) against universal programs.
Standing believes that targeted or conditional programs are very paternalistic; they don’t allow the recipient to decide what is best for themselves and their families. This kind of targeting can also create poverty traps, where people lose their benefits as soon as they get some kind of income. This is seen in developed countries and impoverished countries. Universal programs are more progressive at affecting the income distribution and lead to better outcomes.
Rhodes added that many people in this discussion are worried that if people aren’t working, where are they going to find meaning? So one alternate idea is subsidizing work for people who are able to work. Y Combinator is not able to test it in its study, but that can be a counterfactual.
Huston, agreeing with the other panelists, noted that we are used to complicated programs to help the poor, and we should instead ask what would happen if we took the money that we are spending trying to help the poor and just gave it to them.
Bidadanure’s next question was, “Do targeted benefits created resentment or a stigma in a community that we don ´t see with universal programs?”
Huston noted that GiveDirectly discusses this a lot internally. They have mainly done programs with targeted benefits where between 40% and 80% of each village has received benefits, but will start a universal program, where everyone in the village will receive benefits. GiveDirectly has not seen resentment or stigma outweigh the happiness factor in the targeted programs, likely because the criteria for who gets benefits are clear and understandable to the community.
Standing is a strong advocate for running universal pilots instead of giving benefits to randomly selected individuals. He explained that if one member of a household of five gets the income, and the rest don’t, it will be worth a lot less to that individual than a household of one. Additionally, once it becomes know that an individual is getting this money, family and friends in need may come looking for assistance. Referring to his pilot in India, he said that the importance of examining community and network results cannot be overstated. Standing did note, on the issue of migrants, that the India pilot did block migrants from joining the universal basic income program; only residents of the village at the time the pilot started (except for new babies) were included. Children got half the amount of parents, given to the mother.
Next, Bidadanure focused on the panelists’ experience with politicians and local governments.
GiveDirectly works with the Kenyan government to gain permission to be there, and to work together to extract policy questions or possible lessons that could drive their cash transfer programs. The Kenyan government currently runs 4 cash transfer programs that are focused on the most vulnerable portion of the populations: the disabled and the elderly. They have see means testing as easier to pass, so they are interested in the results of the universal pilot to see how different demographics respond when given cash. In general, do people who can work, stop working? Also of interest to the Kenyan government is the difference between individuals receiving cash versus their current program where cash is delivered on a household level.
Rhodes explained that they Y Combinator has found it difficult to get permission to give people money. The organization is working with the California state government, and even the federal government, to look at the implication of this cash transfer in terms of taxes and other benefits. They are securing waivers to allow people to keep Medicaid, and the process has been challenging.
Standing noted that it took him 3 or 4 years to get through the Indian and Namibian bureaucracy. This negotiation is very difficult. Standing explained that he was involved with negotiating the program in Finland, which did not end up according to his vision. He is currently involved in discussion around the possibility of a big pilot in Fife, Scotland, where his best ally to date is the Police Chief of Fife, who sees the possibility of crime reduction in that part of Scotland as a result of the pilot. Similarly, in the Netherlands 25 municipalities are working through negotiations with bureaucracy, but have put the work on ice until the country’s elections in April. Difficulties in negotiating with local governments will teach you a lot of humility, says Standing.
Q&A from the Audience
Adding a few minutes to the session for question and answer, Bidadanure turned the floor over to a line of interested audience members:
What are you excited to see in the upcoming studies?
Huston stated he is excited about the number of questions they will start to see answers for — not just will people work less, for example, but will we see more risk taking and entrepreneurialism? He is interesting in seeing the studies talk to each other, where are they consistent, where we see differences. Rhodes added that the studies are being developed to enable data sharing and analysis.
Standing is excited to see momentum grow around the search for a new income distribution, and warns that dangerous waters lie ahead due to the growing income inequality. He is excited about the release of his new book, The Corruption of Capitalism, which calls for a new income distribution system, where Universal Basic Income can be an anchor in that new system.
What is the reason for not requiring a contribution? Shouldn’t everyone getting income be cooperative, or contributing in society? And why give to millionaires?
Standing tackles this question on principle: if you say a person has to do some form of labour, or something like 35 hours of care work, you immediately become paternalistic, you immediately lead to inclusion errors and exclusion errors, and then you have to have bureaucrats monitoring it. Additionally it distorts the labour market, which can lower wages for low-skilled labour. He warns against creating a system of bureaucracy that has to be monitored; that introduces social engineering. Standing sees no danger in giving to millionaires, since you can just tax it back.
Will any of these tests look at “in-kind benefits” up against UBI?
Huston noted that this is an exciting field of research, thinking about giving one group of people $1,000 cash versus giving another group of people $100 worth of tuition, food stamps, etc. GiveDirectly is planning a test in Rwanda where they would look at giving cash up against giving medicine, peanut butter, etc. There is a lot of evidence around giving cash and not a lot about the effects of other types of transfers. Rhodes added that in the US it would likely need to be a government run study to be practical.
Are micro loans as or more empowering than direct aid? Is there research on this?
Huston answered that there has been a lot of research on this, and the results were disappointing. People will start more businesses, but you don’t see that flow through into the aspects that we care about like higher incomes, or higher overall welfare. Additionally, the cost of collecting the loans back from the recipient has proven to be counterproductive.
How do you choose the threshold of $1000? What constitutes a basic income? Why cap at some high income level?
Rhodes answered this question for the Y Combinator pilot: $1000 is the current level set by Y Combinator in the planning phase, obviously the cost of living is different in Oakland versus rural Louisiana. The income cap is to see results, giving $1000 a month to someone earning $200,000 a year isn’t going to make a big difference for them.
Have you seen inflation in your pilots?
Standing has not seen that, quite the opposite. In low income communities, the income that comes into people’s pockets increases demand for products and services, and therefore the supply is increased. What he saw in the Indian villages, for example, is that unit prices went down, and farmers’ income went up, because more people entered the market.
If necessity breeds innovation, what happens to society?
Huston answered briefly that capital is also useful for breeding innovation.
Next in the Series
See the event here. The room was full, and we ran out of time to answer questions from the audience, which indicates the interest in this topic and may indicate an interest for the rest of the series that will focus on basic income and feminism, basic income and unions, basic income and racial justice.
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The next event is on April 12th: Philippe Van Parijs will discuss his forthcoming book Basic Income: A Radical Proposal for a Free Society and a Sane Economy.
