by Eduardo Abreu | Nov 5, 2017 | News
Ellen Brown. Credit to: Signs Of The Times
Writing for Common Dreams, Ellen Brown makes a case for how Universal Basic Income can be achieved without increasing Taxes or Inflation. At first glance, most will consider this not to be possible, but Ellen argues that through quantitative easing, in which money flows directly into the real economy instead of being put into banks, the opposite may turn out to be true. In line with her reasoning, the author quotes Nobel prize-winning economist, Joseph Stiglitz:
“When the government spends more and invests in the economy, that money circulates, and recirculates again and again. So not only does it create jobs once: the investment creates jobs multiple times.”
As a consequence of this economic growth, tax and fiscal revenues increase while demands for unemployment benefits and social programs to help the poor, which are paid by the government, go down. All this strengthens a country’s fiscal position. On the other hand, one might assert that getting “new money” into the economy, supply would grow too large and consumer prices shoot up irreversibly, leaving the central bank unable to retrieve its investment. At this point Ellen quotes Prof. Stiglitz again, who states that money issued by the government, through UBI, simply returns to it in fiscal revenues.
Ellen further elaborates this in the light of the “velocity of money”, the number of times a dollar is traded in a year, which in a good economy is around seven, which means that on each dollar, taxes will be paid seven times, as it changes hands. $1,00 traded seven times on a 26 percent tax results in $1,82 back to the government, more than it initially put out. Also, it is generally taught in economics class that, from the formula “MV = Py”, when velocity of money (V) and the quantity of goods sold (y) are constant, adding money (M) will drive prices up (P). What is not taught, as Prof. John Harvey, quoted by Ellen, pinpoints, is that V and y are not constant, meaning that demand and supply rise together, leaving prices unchanged.
Applying this logic, Ellen sets forth that new demand must precede new supply, that is, employers will add the workers needed to create more supply, once they know there is demand for their goods and services. This has implications for unemployment, for example, which is at 9,4 percent in the US as of January 2017, a condition which at the rise of many innovations may get worse.
Nevertheless, a concern with hyperinflation is thrown around in opposition to this form of injecting money into the economy, to which Ellen Brown quotes Prof. Michael Hudson, who states that most cases of hyperinflation in history stemmed from foreign debt services collapsing the exchange rate, not domestic spending, calling upon the example of post World War I Germany.
In short, UBI can create more demand and drive new productivity by paying a dividend for living in the 21st century, when automation frees us time to engage in more meaningful pursuits.
More information at:
Ellen Brown, “How to fund a Universal Basic Income without increasing taxes or inflation”, Common Dreams, 4th October 2017
by Patrick Hoare | Nov 4, 2017 | News, Research
In a paper released in October 2017, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has analysed the feasibility and effects of introducing a Universal Basic Income (UBI) in various economies, looking at how it might help ease destructive levels of inequality present in many societies around the globe.
The ‘IMF Fiscal Monitor: Tackling Inequality’ focused on how fiscal policy can help governments address high levels of income inequality (from here simply ‘inequality’) while minimizing potential trade-offs between efficiency and equity. As part of the second half of the discussion, the UBI was considered as a mechanism of fiscal redistribution currently being widely debated.
Underpinning the analysis of UBI were a number of premises. The first of these was the assumption that some inequality was inevitable within a market-based economic system. Even though data reveals a decline in the global levels of inequality over the last three decades, the increased inequality within certain economies has had adverse effects, not only in terms of social corrosion and political polarisation but also in terms of economic prosperity. As such, the inequality the report sought to address was the type that was specifically having a negative impact.
The second premise clarified that measures aiming to alleviate inequality should not come at the expense of achieving economic GDP growth. Supporting this, data was presented showing that between 1988 and 2008, across all types of economies, there had been an average growth of real income per capita across every income bracket, even if the increases had been greater for those earning more. It was also shown that an increase in overall growth between 1985 and 2015, in particular in East and South Asia and the Pacific Region, had coincided with huge reductions in relative poverty and absolute poverty, and, therefore, with increases in social welfare. With no clear trend between increased inequality and growth, and with various studies suggesting, contrarily, either that redistributive policies may slow growth or that redistributive policies may help growth (given that the marginal propensity to consume among the poor is higher), it was determined that, on balance, growth should not be unduly undermined.
The third condition stipulated that, given the limited fiscal space most economies operate within, simulations measuring the impact of a UBI should be performed under the assumption of budget neutrality. The vast drop in progressivity among the tax systems of the OECD member states, in particular the drop in the average top rate of personal income tax (PIT) from 62% to 35% between 1980 and 2015, does not seem to have been economically motivated, since during this period there was no evidence of: increased income tax elasticity; proportionally less income going to the top earners (the opposite was the case); increased support for the social welfare of the rich; decreased support for redistribution (the opposite was the case); or, a more progressive tax system being harmful to growth (there was some evidence to suggest the opposite could be the case). It was therefore accepted that this lower progressivity must be the consequence of political preference. As such, in order to control for various political perspectives, the funding for a UBI would have to come from a combination of spending cuts and increased taxes.
Following the establishment of such conditions, the central examination of the UBI was based around simulations of implementation within eight economies: Brazil, Egypt, France, Mexico, Poland, South Africa, the UK and the US. The choice of countries controlled for heterogeneity in geographical area, developmental stage (emerging market and advanced economies), and the generosity and progressivity of the countries’ current noncontributory transfers. The analysis of a UBI was then judged on whether it could increase coverage (the number of beneficiaries) and progressivity (those most in need benefiting proportionally more) of current redistributive programs, without impeding growth.
In almost all cases coverage increased, given the universality of UBI, however improvements in progressivity very much depended on the financing method and the existing level of progressivity within a particular economy. Where UBI was seen as a replacement for current benefit systems, countries with low progressivity but high coverage, such as South Africa, saw larger swathes of their lower earners suffer at the expense of a smaller percentage of beneficiaries within the same income category. In this circumstance, where consumption inequality is higher as a consequence of income inequality, progressivity as well as coverage could be improved if a UBI was financed by increased indirect taxation (consumption tax) rather than through cuts to the current system. In economies where both coverage and progressivity are already relatively high, such as the UK and France, replacing the current system with a UBI would be regressive. Similarly, even in a country where progressivity is high but coverage low, such as Brazil, the introduction of a UBI as a replacement would likely trade one off against the other, ultimately negatively affecting lower income households. In the situation where PIT among the top-earners is increased as a way of financing a UBI (altering the economic behaviour of these payers), the model calibrated to the US economy (moderate coverage and progressivity) found that, although efficiency, in terms of output forgone, was lower than against a system with indirect taxes, the PIT increase yielded greater overall welfare, especially where aversion to inequality was high. The final scenario, where simulations focused on comparing a UBI funded either directly, indirectly or through cuts, against the expansion of a benefit – the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the US – at the same fiscal cost, found that, due to the targeted nature of the EITC subsidy, welfare improvements were higher than would experienced under the implementation of a UBI.
In summary, The Fiscal Monitor concluded that a perfectly implemented means-tested system would always be superior to a UBI, since it would ensure the necessary coverage and provide the greatest level of progressivity within the bounds, constraints and conditions assumed. Therefore, in countries where there is a ‘good’ transfer program, the finance necessary to fund a UBI would be better used on improving the current system. That said, in reality, given the existence of imperfections in such systems, a UBI could be a powerful means of combating poverty and extreme poverty, especially in countries where both progressivity and coverage is poor. It was also noted that a UBI could be implemented for other reasons, such as in combatting job market disruptions associated with technological progress.
More information at:
IMF Publications, ‘IMF Fiscal Monitor: Tackling Inequality, October 2017’, International Monetary Fund website, October 2017
by Karl Widerquist | Oct 27, 2017 | Opinion, The Indepentarian
This essay is reprinted from OpenDemocracy, 18 October 2017
Support for unconditional basic income (UBI) has grown so rapidly over the past few years that some might think the idea appeared out of nowhere. In fact, activists have been floating the plan — and other forms of a basic income guarantee (BIG) — for over a century. It experienced a small wave of support between 1910 and 1940, followed by a down period in the 40s and 50s. A second and larger wave of support happened in the 60s and 70s, followed by another down period in most countries until the early 2000s. Today’s discussion began to take off around 2010 and has increased every year since. It is UBI’s third, and by far its largest, wave of support yet.
Pessimists might think that this wave will inevitably subside, just as prior movements did. History, however, doesn’t always stick to patterns. In a 2016 interview with Wired, Barack Obama predicted that “we’ll be having [the UBI debate] over the next 10 or 20 years”. He may be right.
The history of the UBI movement shows that today’s political context points to an increase in support. More and more activists – from more and more diverse political formations – are calling for UBI. They can now cite evidence from a number of empirical studies, conducted over years in a variety of locations, to demonstrate the programme’s benefits.
Rising inequality and an economic system that seems designed against ordinary people has radicalised voters in recent years. Nationalist-populist movements are trying to redirect this frustration against immigrants and people of colour, but the left can take advantage of this moment to build support for UBI and create a truly universal welfare state.
The first wave
UBI dates back more than two hundred years, but enough people were discussing it in the early twentieth century to constitute a wave – or at least a ripple – of support. The idea was still new enough that most advocates had little knowledge of each other and all tended to give their versions of the programme a different name.
Some supporters of Henry George’s land tax suggested that proceeds be distributed in cash. Bertrand Russell and Virginia Woolf both praised the idea in their writings without naming it. In 1918, Dennis and E. Mabel Milner started the short-lived ‘State Bonus League’, and, in 1920, Dennis Milner published what was likely the first full-length book on UBI, Higher Production by a Bonus on National Output. James Meade and G. D. H. Cole – who coined the phrase “basic income” – wrote favourably about it in the 1930s.
Major C. H. Douglas called it a national dividend and included it in his ‘social credit’ programme. In 1934, the Louisiana senator Huey Long debuted his ‘share the wealth’ programme: he seems to have come up with the idea on his own, as there’s no evidence he was influenced by the ideas spreading around the United Kingdom in those years. The plan might have served as the basis for his presidential run had Long not been assassinated in 1935.
These early UBI advocates managed little direct influence on legislation. In 1935, the Social Credit Party of Canada took power in Alberta, but did not move to implement Douglas’ proposed dividend. After World War II, most welfare states adopted a conditional model, which provides assistance only to those who fit into some category of need, such as old age, disability, unemployment, single-parenthood, absence of market income, and so on. Truly universal programmes are few, far-between, and small. Discussion of a full UBI programme largely fell out of mainstream political discussion for more than two decades.
The second wave
The second wave took off in the early-to-mid 1960s. At that time, at least three groups in the United States and Canada began promoting the idea. Welfare rights activists mobilised people frustrated by inadequate and often demeaning conditional programmes. Futurists saw UBI as a way to protect workers from disruptions to the labour market caused by the computer revolution. Finally, many prominent economists – some leftists and some from the burgeoning libertarian movement – agreed that a basic income guarantee represented a more effective approach to poverty than the conditional and means-tested programmes of the New Deal era. BIG would simplify and streamline the welfare system while also making it more comprehensive.
The mainstream media first noticed UBI around the time Lyndon B. Johnson declared a “war on poverty”. Politicians and policy wonks began taking up the idea, and the Canadian government released several favourable reports on the “guaranteed annual income” in the 1970s.
For a short time, many saw some kind of guaranteed income as an inevitable next step in social policy: a compromise everyone could live with. Leftists viewed it as the culmination of the welfare system that would fill in the remaining cracks. Centrists and conservatives saw it as a way to make the social safety net more cost-effective.
In 1971, the US House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed a bill introducing a watered-down version of the ‘negative income tax’ (NIT), yet another variant of the idea. It missed becoming law by only ten votes in the Senate. The next year, presidential nominees from both major parties endorsed some form of BIG: Richard Nixon supported NIT, and George McGovern UBI. Interestingly, the fact that both nominees’ held essentially the same position made BIG less of an issue in the campaign than it might otherwise have been.
Nixon’s NIT never got another vote. It died partly because it had no groundswell of support outside of the welfare rights movement. None of its proponents made a serious push to sell the proposal to the public at large. Even BIG supporters viewed Nixon’s version with scepticism, seeing it as a top-down, centralised initiative. Letting it die cost the politicians who backed it very little, so they allowed the idea to fade from public discourse.
While neither the United States nor Canada introduced full UBI programmes, the second wave of UBI support had some major successes. Both countries conducted five implementation trials, and the United States created or expanded several more limited programmes, like the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Alaska Dividend. These policies not only helped a lot of people, but their relative success provided convincing evidence to push social programmes toward universality.
Politicians like Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher dramatically changed the conversation around the welfare state in the early 1980s. They successfully vilified recipients as frauds. As a result, many people stopped talking about how to expand or improve the welfare system and started talking about how to cut it. The left largely went on the defensive in response, and stopped criticising the conditional model.
In 1980 the United States and Canada cancelled the last of their implementation trials, Canada stopped analysing the data it had spent years and millions of dollars collecting, and for the next 30 years mainstream American politics engaged in virtually no discussion of any form of BIG. Fortunately, as I discuss below, the results of those trials eventually re-emerged as important proof of the idea’s potential.
Between the waves
While discussion waned in North America, it slowly grew in other parts of the world. In 1977, a small Dutch party started a trend when it endorsed UBI in parliament. The next year, Niels I. Meyer’s book Rebellion from the Center launched a substantial wave of support in Denmark. The proposal gained traction in other countries as well, including post-apartheid South Africa. For the most part, however, discussion of UBI programmes took place outside the political mainstream, where its slight upward trend attracted little notice.
Academic attention began to grow in this period, especially among European scholars. The Belgian philosopher Philippe Van Parijs reinvented UBI in 1982 with no prior knowledge of the previous waves. He eventually connected with other supporters – including Guy Standing, Claus Offe, Annie Miller, Hermione Parker, and Robert van der Veen – and together they established the Basic Income European Network (BIEN) and convened the first BIEN Congress on 4-6 September 1986. From this point on, UBI, rather than NIT, dominated the political discussion of BIG.
The academic debate grew substantially between the mid-1980s and the mid-2000s, especially in the fields of politics, philosophy, and sociology. In 1984, supporters launched the first national UBI network in the United Kingdom; by the time BIEN changed its name to the Basic Income Earth Network 20 years later, activists had organized at least two dozen national groups.
Yet UBI stayed mostly outside the political mainstream, making the movement feel more like a discussion group than a political action network. Even the activist contingent concentrated more on discussion than action, believing that they had to increase public awareness before they could implement their proposals. This feeling actually distracted supporters from how much their movement had grown.
The third wave takes off
The third wave of basic income activism hit the mainstream in 2015 or 2016, but volunteers at Basic Income News had been noticing substantial increases in media attention since at least 2011. And in some places, the crossover began even earlier than that.
In 2006, at the BIEN Congress in South Africa, Zephania Kameeta, then the Lutheran Archbishop of Namibia, slammed his fist on the podium and announced, “Words, words, words!” UBI conferences had seen many passionate calls for action, but they were almost always accompanied by appeals for someone else to take action. This time, the speaker already had an action plan under way: the Namibian BIG Coalition was raising funds to finance a two-year implementation trial.
This project coincided with a smaller one in Brazil, and a much larger one followed in India in 2010. These tests attracted substantial media attention and helped inspire the privately and publicly funded experiments now under discussion or underway in Finland, Scotland, Canada, the United States, and Kenya.
At about the same time that Kameeta spoke in Cape Town, a national UBI wave was beginning to swell in Germany. Prominent people from across the political spectrum –Katja Kipping, Götz W. Werner, Susanne Wiest, and Dieter Althaus – all began to push different basic income proposals in a very public way.
Unlike most previous waves of support, this one inspired broad activism, which has only grown. In 2008, UBI networks in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria jointly organised the first International Basic Income Week, which has subsequently grown to become a worldwide event with actions taking place as far away as Australia and South America.
The financial meltdown and subsequent Great Recession sparked a new climate of activism. Public attention turned to poverty, unemployment, and inequality, and UBI supporters suddenly had a much better environment for activism.
Two citizens’ initiatives got under way in Switzerland and in the European Union in the early 2010s. In the former, Daniel Häni and Enno Scmidt successfully collected enough signatures to trigger a national vote. The EU movement eventually recruited organisers in all member states. Although neither ultimately won, they built an infrastructure to support activism across Europe and brought a tremendous amount of attention to the issue, which in turn sparked additional activism and attracted more support.
One of the contemporary movement’s most important features is that support now comes from many different places and from people who do not necessarily work together, follow similar strategies, or adhere to the same ideology. Indeed, today’s activists are motivated by a number of different issues and sources.
Mirroring the 1960s futurism discourse, many advocates point to automation and precariousness as reasons to enact the programme. High unemployment, the gig economy, and the pace of automation threaten large segments of the labour force. Whether or not the need for human labour is decreasing, the labour market has become extremely unstable. Labour leaders, activists, academics, and tech entrepreneurs have all proposed UBI in response, making this issue one of the prime drivers of recent interest in UBI.
For the first time, environmentalism has played a major role in this activism. Two of the most popular proposals for combating climate change are the tax-and-dividend and cap-and-dividend strategies, both of which involve setting a price on carbon emissions and distributing the revenue to all citizens. Other environmental groups, such as “Degrowth” and Canada’s “Leap Manifesto,” see UBI as a way to counteract excessive consumption and the depletion of resources.
Two additional proposals, called ‘quantitative easing for the people’ and ‘helicopter money’, are pushing central banks to stop giving money away to private banks and start giving it directly to every citizen. They believe their proposal would constitute a more equitable and effective economic stimulus programme. Although they do not use the term, distributing money directly to the people is essentially a temporary UBI.
Some private groups are trying to bypass central banks entirely by creating non-government digital currencies, and some of these groups have announced their intentions to provide their users with a UBI in the new currency.
At the same time, new evidence has convinced people of UBI’s radical potential. Evelyn Forget, of the University of Manitoba, received grant funding to analyse the data from Canada’s NIT experiment. She released her findings in 2011, just as new implementation trials and citizens’ initiatives were getting off the ground. They received a great deal of press attention and helped spark new interest in the programme in Canada and beyond. This increased media attention has built the movement even further. Seemingly every major news outlet has published something about UBI. And, in a sure sign of the movement’s newfound strength, opponents have started attacking it.
A couple of years ago, it remained unclear whether the third wave would match the size and reach of the second. Now the answer is obvious: grassroots support and international media attention are larger than ever, and the third wave represents the first truly global basic income movement. According to Philippe Van Parijs, “the big difference between the first two waves and the third one is that the third one quickly became international”. The first two did not extend beyond the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, but the third wave already involves major campaigns on all six inhabited continents.
How far can the third wave go?
The left should recognise that past UBI movements entered mainstream conversation when people worried about inequality and unemployment, and then subsided when public attention turned to other issues or when other ways of addressing poverty became dominant. The second American wave ended in the United States not in the prosperous economy of the mid-1980s but in the troubling times of the late 1970s, when right-wing politicians convinced large numbers of people that redistributive programmes had become overly generous.
The biggest danger to the third wave appears to be growing nationalism. If politicians can convince voters to blame immigrants for growing inequality, they can effectively distract people from mobilising around better social policies.
Despite these dangers, basic-income activists should feel encouraged: each wave has been larger than the last. With every resurgence, UBI has had a more developed proposal than the time before, and activists have been better prepared to address people’s concerns about poverty, inequality, and unemployment. The fact that academics had continued to study and activists had continued to promote UBI during its unfashionable years gave it recognition as a viable alternative when inequality once again became a dominant policy discussion.
Meanwhile, dissatisfaction with the conditional welfare model has been growing for over a century. This system is based on the idea that everyone who can work should and only those who really cannot work should receive help. All others are undeserving.
Conditionality has not made the welfare state more generous or less vulnerable to attack. Many who work still live in poverty, as do many who receive benefits. Opponents have successfully chipped away at welfare for more than 40 years, largely by vilifying any group that meets the conditions for need.
The conditional system also hurts workers. By making welfare requirements so stringent, we have made all employees more dependent on their employers. Dependent workers have less power, making it harder to demand good wages and decent working conditions. It is no coincidence that middle-class income has stagnated over the same period that the welfare system has declined. Despite enormous productivity gains, most workers now work more hours for less pay.
Conditional welfare systems are built on paternalistic assumptions that force people to prove their right to survival. UBI might not always gain steam as fast as it has in the last few years, but those shortcomings won’t disappear, and they provide a good reason for people to look seriously at UBI.
-Karl Widerquist, writing in Doha, New Orleans, and Morehead City in 2016 and 2017
Occupy Oakland “We are the 99%” protests in 2011.
by Kate McFarland | Oct 22, 2017 | News
The Government of Macau has completed the most recent distribution of its annual wealth dividend, providing most residents of the city with an unconditional cash grant of about US$1,200.
The Macau Special Administrative Region (SAR), an autonomous region of the People’s Republic of China, is a resort city with lucrative tourism and gambling industries (described by Lonely Planet as the “Vegas of China” and a “mecca of gambling and glitz”). Macau is a host to many gambling and betting establishments and is said to rival Malasyain online gambling scene as well – such as the popular Kiss918 app. Those who can’t make the trip out to Macau or Vegas may want to see what gaming options they have available to them online – they could look into the afformentioned gambling apps or try something similar with sports betting sites like www.bangthebook.com. That said, the city’s lottery industry has helped to finance its Wealth Partaking Scheme (WPS). Initiated in 2008 and renewed each successive year, the WPS provides a cash dividend to all Macau residents.
All holders of a Macau Resident Identity Card are eligible to receive the WPS payments, including both permanent and non-permanent residents have been, although payments to permanent residents have been higher in each year of the program’s existence. Some people have chosen to take said payments and, instead of going to the local options, go online to www.paybyphonebillcasino.uk and similar options online. Considering the comfort of staying inside from this, it makes sense.
According to the Macau SAR government, the purpose of the scheme is to “share the fruits of economic development with general public”. However, researchers such as Bruce Kam Kwan Kwong argue the underlying motive of the scheme was simply to “stabilize the political atmosphere” in the face of large May Day protest rallies and other civil unrest.
On July 3, Macau SAR announced the 2017 WPS, under which permanent residents were entitled to 9,000 patacas (about US$1,200 or €950) and non-permanent residents to 5,400 patacas (about US$670 or €570). The amount of the payment has remained unchanged since 2014 (when the amount was increased from 8,000 patacas in 2013 and 7,000 patacas in 2012).
Disbursement of the payment was completed on September 15, with a total of 688,079 checks having been distributed (278,558 by direct transfer and 409,521 by mail). As of September 17, 264,758 of the mailed checked had been honored. Between honored checks and direct transfers, over 543,000 residents of Macau have already received the 2017 WPS dividend. (The Macau SAR government’s announcement does not state how many of these checks were sent to permanent versus non-permanent residents.) As of its 2016 census, Macau has a total population of 650,834.
For additional details concerning the disbursement and eligibility of the 2017 WPS, see Furui Cheng’s July 27 report in Basic Income News: “Wealth Partaking Scheme: Macau’s small UBI“.
Is Macau’s Wealth Partaking Scheme a Basic Income?
The answer is contentious, and, in part, a matter of semantics [1]. Certainly, the WPS shares salient characteristics of a basic income: it is paid in cash, universal and unconditional for all residents, and not means-tested. (Unlike, for example, Singapore’s Growth Dividend, the amount of the WPS dividend does not vary according to income level.)
On the other hand, it may be dubious to say that the WPS provides “regular” payments to residents. As a matter of fact, the WPS has been distributed annually since the scheme’s initial enactment in 2008. However, it is not guaranteed, and it might be more accurate to describe the annual payments as successive one-off grants. Karl Widerquist explained Basic Income News report on the 2014 dividend, “The government has now set the president that the Wealth Partaking Scheme will be in effect every year, but each year it has been created with one-time legislation without a promise of renewal. The amount, timing, and existence of the redistribution have to be renegotiated each year.” This continues to hold true in 2017.
Furthermore, while the most “official” definitions of ‘basic income’ (including BIEN’s) do not stipulate that the amount of the payment is stable, it might be argued that this it is implicitly accepted that it must be so (perhaps pegged to inflation on GDP). The amount of the WPS has historically not been stable, and was even cut significantly in the second year of the program’s existence (from 4,000 to 3,000 patacas for permanent residents).
Finally, the most contentious semantic dispute in the basic income community, arguably, is that regarding whether the term implies that the amount of the payments is high enough to secure at least a basic subsistence-level existence. Even if the WPS qualifies as a basic income on all other criteria (although this itself dubious), the dispute renders the final verdict a matter of definition. The amount of 9,000 patacas per year is far too low to meet minimal living expenses. According to Numbeo’s cost of living calculator, for example, the average monthly rent for a one-bedroom apartment is about is well over 7,000 patacas in the city center and about 6,000 patacas outside of the center [2]. For comparison, the average monthly net salary is over 14,000 patacas, and Macau’s only current minimum wage legislation, for cleaners and security guards, establishes a minimum salary of 6,240 patacas per month. Thus, on some definitions of the term (although not BIEN’s), Macau’s WPS would thereby fail to count as a basic income (although it might still be called a “partial basic income”).
At the least, Macau’s WPS, like Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend, is an example of a universal dividend program with some salient similarities to a “pure” basic income (the latter of which exists nowhere in present physical reality).
[1] While BIEN has voted to establish a specific definition of basic income, I have recently argued that an inclusive, umbrella organization should abstain from accepting a singular definition of ‘basic income’.
[2] The average price of draught beer is 35 patacas, meaning that the 2017 WPS would not even be sufficient to finance a daily draught beer.
Reviewed by Russell Ingram
Photo: Casino in Macau, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 Bailey Cheng
