by Micah Kaats | Nov 24, 2017 | News
In recent years, basic income has found support across the political spectrum. While some have justified it as a human rights issue, others believe it to be necessary in the fight against poverty and rising inequality. According to many supporters, these are sufficient justifications in their own right. However, many basic income proponents also cite the growing threat of automation to employment. Put simply, as robots become smarter and cheaper, more and more workers will find themselves out of a job, and basic income programs will be required to offset rising unemployment and job displacement. This view is particularly popular in Silicon Valley and has been championed by the likes of Elon Musk, Richard Branson, and Mark Zuckerberg. However, a new report from Pearson, an education publishing company, challenges this line of reasoning.
Pearson’s analysis, with help from researchers at Nesta and the Oxford Martin School, diverges from previous reports on automation (Frey & Osborne, 2013; Arntz et. Al, 2016; McKinsey, 2017; Richard Berriman, 2017) in two key respects. While previous studies have tended to focus exclusively on the potentially destructive effects of automation, Pearson’s report also incorporates the potential for growth in jobs and skills that may be complemented by automation. The study also considers how automation may interact with seven specific global trends to affect supply and demand in the labor market over the next decade: (1) environmental sustainability, (2) urbanization, (3) increasing inequality, (4) political uncertainty, (5) technological change, (6) globalization, and (7) demographic change.
Pearson’s report relies on a combination of expert testimony and, perhaps fittingly, machine-learning. Two panels of artificial intelligence experts in the United States and United Kingdom were asked to rate the future prospects of thirty occupations in the context of the seven global trends identified by the researchers, and to report on how certain they were in their predictions. This information was then fed into machine-learning algorithms, along with data from the U.S. Department of Labor, to generate predictions for more than 1,000 occupations in the United States and United Kingdom.
Using this model, the researchers at Pearson reached the following six conclusions:
- 20% of the workforce are in occupations that will shrink.
This figure is smaller than previous high-end estimates of 47% (Frey & Osborne, 2013), but also larger than more conservative estimates of 9% (Arntz et. Al, 2016). In line with previous findings, Pearson reports that routine, physical or manual abilities will become less valuable over time. However, Pearson also notes that certain sectors typically considered doomed by automation such as agriculture, trades, and construction, may actually show pockets of job growth where new skills are required to complement new technologies. So, it can be said that there cannot be a complete elimination of people in the workforce. Instead, building skill sets to work alongside automated machines could be the way to go. For example, with large industries adopting newer technologies and automation to improve the production process, an automation parts supplier could be the need of the hour, as there will always be a requirement for people who have the necessary knowledge to handle new machines and implement efficient functionalities.
- 10% of the workforce are in occupations that will grow.
Specifically, the researchers argue that jobs involving judgment and decision making, teaching, active learning, interpersonal skills, complex problem-solving, originality, fluency of ideas, and systems thinking will all grow in value. Jobs in high demand will include teachers and education professionals, sports and fitness workers, caregivers, managers, hospitality workers, legal professionals, and engineers. Occupations in the public sector, as well as those resistant to globalization, emerge as particularly resilient. Further, jobs in the construction sector and those that involve outdoor manual work could also need constant manpower, as we see companies such as Crane Renovation Group reaching out to potential workforce to increase hiring and provide consistent jobs. Pearson also points out that jobs and skills that will become more valuable are not specifically confined to any one particular income bracket or skill level.
- 70% of the workforce are in occupations where their future is uncertain.
- So-called “21st century” skills will experience higher demand.
- Both knowledge and skills will be required for the future economy.
- Occupations can be re-designed to pair uniquely human skills with technology.
A global leader in education publishing itself, Pearson argues for sweeping reforms to education systems so that they may adapt faster to the changing needs of labor markets, and begin offering more flexible pathways to employment including credentials and microdegrees. Pearson also advises business leaders to start thinking of ways to redesign roles to balance technological and human resources. Finally, the researchers encourage individuals to develop skills that are “uniquely human” and commit to becoming lifelong learners.
However, the report is not without limitations and the researchers note the large degree of uncertainty baked into any analysis of job creation, which is notoriously more difficult to predict than job destruction. Critics have also argued that Pearson greatly underestimates the difficulty of implementing public and private reforms in the context of the political and social turbulence accompanying severe job displacement.
Nevertheless, despite these limitations and the challenges that lie ahead, Pearson’s researchers remain optimistic about the future of work. They summarize their findings rather succinctly: “The bottom line of our research, we can all stop agonizing about machines taking our jobs.”
You can download the full report here, or visit the microsite.
by Karl Widerquist | Nov 21, 2017 | Opinion, The Indepentarian
The devil’s in the details is a common saying about policy proposals. Perhaps we need a similar saying for policy research, something like the devil’s in the caveats. By this, I mean that the evidence any particular piece of research can provide is only a small part of the evidence people need to fully evaluate policy proposals. Non-specialists involved in the debate over that policy are often unable to translate caveats about the limits of research into a firm grasp of what that research does and does not imply about the policies they want evaluated. Therefore, even the best scientific policy research can leave nonspecialists with an oversimplified, or simply wrong, impression of its implications for policy.
For example, popular media reports about medical research often leave people in the United States today with the impression that the medical professionals make widely swinging recommendations about prevention and treatment of diseases, when medical consensus is actually slow to change and even slower to reverse a change once made. It is possible that the misperception of an erratic medical consensus exists because nonspecialists don’t have the background to understand the difference between a medical consensus and an oversimplified or sensationalized report of one study.
Whatever the problems of this type are with medical research, they are likely to be much greater with social science research in general and Universal Basic Income (UBI) experiments in particular. At least some medical research is fairly straightforward. Many medicines affect people only on an individual basis, and all we might want to know about a medicine is whether it is safe and effective. In many cases, medical research can address that question directly in a controlled experiment, and hopefully, it’s not too difficult to communicate the results to nonspecialists.
Although medical experiments might not always be this straightforward, UBI experiments can never be straightforward. I believe this problem is so big that I’m working on a book, provisionally titled Basic Income Experiments—The Devil’s in the Details, to discuss the enormous difficulty of conducting a UBI experiment that successfully raises the level of political debate over UBI.
UBI has complex economic, political, social, and cultural effects that cannot be observed in a controlled experiment. Researchers conducting experiments know that experimental evidence alone cannot fully answer the big questions about UBI: does it work? Is it cost-effective? Should we introduce it on a national level? They have to be content with making a small contribution to a large body of knowledge about UBI. When research is conducted of, by, and for specialists, mutual understanding of the limits of research usually requires no more a simple list of caveats, many of which can go without mention in a group with a great deal of shared, specialized knowledge.
The same is not true when policymakers and citizens make up part of the audience of research—as they do for research on major policy issues such as UBI. Citizens and policymakers want answers to the big questions mentioned above; they understandably try to interpret experimental results in light of those questions. But as I will argue throughout the book, they have great difficulty understanding what UBI experiments do and do not imply about those big questions. The devil is in the caveats.
Most academic specialists are professionals at writing for other academics within the same specialty but amateurs at communicating with nonspecialists. The book argues that these communications barriers affect not only how specialists report their research to nonspecialists but also how they design and conduct it.
It is no coincidence that UBI experiments are getting underway just after an enormous growth in the discussion of UBI in many countries around the world. In that environment, one of the goals of UBI experiments is—or ought to be—to raise the level of debate over UBI. The book will argue that past experiments have a mixed record in raising the level of debate over UBI: although all of them have provided valuable evidence, some have succeeded in raising the level of debate, and some have been so misunderstood that they might well have had an overall negative affect on the level of debate. This effort to raise the level of political debate (like the UBI debate) requires knowledge and skills that researchers have no special training to do and creates risks that research aimed purely at other researchers does not have, including the vulnerability to spin, misuse, sensationalism, or oversimplification.
The goal of the book is help researchers, policymakers, citizens, journalists, and anyone else interested in UBI experiments bridge gaps in understanding between them to help the experiments succeed in the goal of raising the level of debate. I hope that this effort will be valuable to researchers designing, conducting, and writing about UBI experiments, to policymakers commissioning and reacting to experiments, to journalists reporting on experiments, and to citizens involved in the debate or simply interested in the topic of UBI.
To help people bridge these gaps, the book has to explain how many significant barriers there are to conducting experiments that successfully raisr the level of debate. So, I will have a lot of negative things to say, but that should not distract readers from my overall enthusiasm for UBI experiments. They are worth doing, and worth doing well in all relevant ways. And to readers who are unenthusiastic about UBI experiments, I say, they are coming; it’s important to make the best of them.
A meeting during the Indian pilot project, c. 2011-2013
by Basic Income Earth Network | Nov 18, 2017
BIEN | Research Depository Research Posts Research index Congress papers Research depository This research depository is in the early stages of development. The aim is to make available research that has not appeared as BIEN Congress papers (which will be found on the...
by Karl Widerquist | Nov 15, 2017 | Opinion, The Indepentarian
This essay was originally published in the USBIG NewsFlash in December 2001.
As I was putting this newsletter together, the National Bureau of Economic Research officially announced that the U.S. economy has been in recession since last March. The delay in the diagnosis is nothing unusual because a downturn is not considered a recession unless it lasts for a significant period of time. But the point at which a recession is recognized is a good moment for reflection on the performance of the economy. Even though the United States is in a recession right now, the long-term performance of the economy as a whole over the last 20 years has been quite good. The expansion that ended in March lasted for exactly 10-years—the longest in U.S. history—and it came after a short and mild recession in the early 1990s, which followed a long, stable expansion during the 1980s. The last 20 years have had the most stable growth in U.S. economic history. The growth was not particularly rapid, but there is a lot to be said for stability. The economy may decline by a few percentage points over the course of the recession, but an economy that grows by 2 or 3 per year during economic expansions can weather the occasional downturn. Thus, although there are worrying signs on the horizon (such as a persistent trade deficit and a high and growing level of indebtedness), the verdict on the performance of the U.S. economy as a whole over the last 20 years has to be largely positive.
Good performance of the economy as a whole does not necessarily mean that it has performed well for all individuals. If one judges the success of an economy by the well being of its less advantaged individuals the performance of the U.S. economy has been terrible over the last 20 years. Real wages at the low-end of the wage spectrum have stagnated or even declined slightly. Usually, poverty declines slowly during expansions and increases quickly in recessions, but there has been no lasting progress in reducing poverty since the early 1970s. The official poverty rate has been stuck in a range between 11% and 15% since the early 1970s. There was an extremely rapid decline in poverty in the 1940s and again in the 1960s, but it has not been repeated since. The ’40s, ’50s, and ’60s were marred by frequent recessions, but individuals across the economic spectrum were able to count on gains during the expansions that would more than make up for losses during recessions. The ’70s were a period of instability in which the less advantaged lost ground, and since then there has been no return to the progress experienced earlier.
Why were the experiences of the less advantaged so different during the good economic times of the ’80s and ’90s than they were in the ’40s, ’50s, and ’60s? The difference is largely one of government policy. The earlier period saw the GI Bill, the fruition of Social Security, the expansion of AFDC and Medicare, increases in the minimum wage and the creation of Food Stamps and Medicaid. Since the early 1970s, many of these programs have been canceled or allowed to lapse or have been effectively cut by not being adjusted for inflation. These programs were not the best possible programs for fighting poverty, but they were all we had, and rather than being reformed, they’ve largely been cut with little or nothing to replace them aside from TANF, which seems to make welfare so unpleasant that jobs without living wages are preferable. TANF has been declared a success simply because it has reduced the number of families on welfare. The success of TANF should be measured instead by whether it reduces poverty and whether it makes children healthier and happier and whether it helps them grow into better-adjusted adults. Should it be any surprise cutting nearly every program designed to aid the poor should slow or stop the progress we had been making toward the reduction of poverty? Something else is needed if poverty reduction is our goal.
During recessions, people often voice opposition to direct anti-poverty policies, arguing that the best way to help people is to get the economy moving again. During expansions, the argument is usually to keep it moving or to get it moving faster. They say, “a rising tide lifts all boats,” and everyone benefits from economic growth. But the lesson to learn from the last twenty years of economic expansion is that these arguments are simply false. The incomes of low-wage workers stagnated during the good economic times of the ’80s and ’90s because policy turned against the redistribution of income, but they increased during the good economic times of ’40s, ’50s, and ’60s because policy favored increased redistribution of income. There is no inherent mechanism in a capitalist economy to ensure that everyone will share in the fruits of economic growth. I believe that a basic income guarantee is essential to ensure that everyone shares in our economic success. This and other strategies for better distributional equity will be discussed at the First Congress of the U.S. Basic Income Guarantee Network. I invite you to join us.
Karl Widerquist, New York, NY, December 2001.
by Kate McFarland | Nov 8, 2017 | News
In an interview with BBC News, Nobel Laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz warned that basic income (citizen’s income) should not be the current priority of the Government of Scotland.
On September 5, First Minister Nicola Sturgeon announced that the Scottish Government would provide funding for basic income trials in the regions of Fife, Glasgow, North Ayrshire, and Edinburgh, where pilot studies of the policy had received the support of local authorities.
During October’s Inclusive Growth Conference, Sturgeon reaffirmed the government’s commitment to supporting trials of basic income, despite acknowledging that the policy might prove infeasible in the end:
Despite the fact that this has some critics, we are going to work with interested local authorities to fund research into the feasibility of a citizen’s basic income scheme.
I should stress our work on this is at a very early stage. It might turn out not to be the answer, it might turn out not to be feasible.
But as work and employment changes as rapidly as it is doing, I think it’s really important that we look and are prepared to be open-minded about the different ways in which we can support individuals to participate fully in the new economy [1].
Stiglitz, who has served as an economic advisor to the Scottish Government since 2012, believes that pursuing a basic income would represent misaligned priorities in light of Scotland’s fiscal constraints. Instead, the distinguished economist urges the government to prioritize benefits targeted to those who need them most, job creation to ensure a job to all who want one, and a livable income for all who work full-time.
When asked about the UK’s interest in basic income during an interview with the BBC’s Sunday Politics Scotland, he replied:
I think the point of a citizen’s income is that it recognizes rights of ordinary individuals–that supporting individuals, social protection, is not aimed at those who have been left behind, but is a basic part of our society.
But I do worry about two things. One, as you say, there are fiscal constraints. Should the scarce money be used to give everyone a basic amount, or should it be targeted at those who have particularly strong needs? I think there needs to be some targeting.
Secondly, over the long run, our responsibility as a society is to make sure that everybody who wants a job can get one. And the underlying problems of the lack of employment and lack of adequate pay–anybody who works full time ought to have a liveable income–those are the issues that, in the long run, we need to address.
Stiglitz has previously been hailed in the basic income community as one of a long Nobel-winning economists who have (reportedly) endorsed basic income. His presumed endorsement took place at the World Summit on Technological Unemployment in February 2015, when he was asked if he supported basic income as a policy response to technological unemployment, and replied “Yes, that’s part of the solution,” before going on to stress that basic income alone is not a complete solution.
In October 2016, Stiglitz again said that “the idea of a basic income is a good idea” in response to a question from Vox reporter Ezra Klein (“What you do think about a universal basic income in America?”). He added, however, that he had not yet made up his mind about the question of whether it is better to target limited resources to those most in need:
If you don’t have a lot of resources, isn’t it better to try to target the limited resources you have at those who really, really need it, the people who are disabled, the people who are elderly without other sources of income, a variety of people who are seriously disadvantaged. The problem with the universal basic income is that you give a flat amount to a large amount of people, and that means, because you have so many people, you can’t give as much as you would to help those who most need it.
He went to note that, “on the other side of the coin, those who most need it have difficulty in navigating the bureaucracy” — a problem that would be avoided by a basic income.
It appears, then, that Stiglitz has not changed his mind on basic income so much as determined that, in Scotland and the UK, fiscal constraints and the need for targeted benefits outweigh the advantages promised by universality.
Watch Stiglitz field a question basic income on Sunday Politics Scotland:
[1] Quoted in Tom Martin, “Sturgeon vows to press ahead with radical benefits overhaul, despite official warnings,” Express, October 21, 2017 (accessed October 27, 2017).
Photo: “Old Scotland” CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 Tatters ✾
