by Courtney Hallink | Apr 20, 2020 | News
The Dutch government has implemented a new programme for self-employed individuals who have suffered a loss of income due to the COVID-19 pandemic – the Temporary bridging measure for self-employed professionals (Tozo). The new arrangement entitles individuals who are self-employed to up to 1050 Euros per month for single individuals or up to 1500 Euros per month for couples for a total of three months.
After the 2008 financial crisis, thousands of individuals who applied for unemployment benefits – known as Bijstand – had to sell their homes before they were able to qualify. A notable feature of the new arrangement is that an individual’s eligibility is not reliant on whether or not they own a house or have any other assets. This is seen as a step forward for those would like to see the adoption of a Basic Income in the Netherlands.
The new arrangement does not, however, meet the criteria for a Basic Income for a number of reasons. BIEN’s definition of a basic income is a periodic cash payment unconditionally delivered to all on an individual basis, without means test or work requirements. Under BIEN’s definition, a Basic Income has five key criteria: it is unconditional of income, there is no work requirement, it is individual, it is universal, and it is periodic.
It does not meet the first requirement as the new programme only includes individuals whose monthly income has fallen under the national minimum. It meets the second criterion in that there is no work requirement. It does not meet the third, fourth or fifth requirements as it is not individual (as less is paid to individuals in a couple) or universal, and it will only be provided temporarily. It is however quite generous as it is in line with the living wage.
While the new arrangement does not meet BIEN’s UBI criteria, it has helped to give UBI supporters the footing they need to push the Basic Income agenda further. Alexander de Roo, member of the Green Party and chairman of the Basic Income Network Netherlands, has written an open letter to Prime Minister Mark Rutte, calling for the adoption of a temporary UBI in response to COVID-19 and a permanent UBI to be implemented after the general election in March 2021.
The open letter referred to in this article can be found here. (Readers might wish to be aware that ‘Basisinkomen’ as used in this letter does not always accord with BIEN’s definition of Basic Income)
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by Malcolm Torry | Apr 9, 2020 | News, Opinion
There is a translation of this article into French.
A basic income is a periodic cash payment unconditionally delivered to all on an individual basis, without means test or work requirement (BIEN’s definition of Basic Income)
The coronavirus pandemic is causing huge suffering for those individuals who experience serious attacks of the disease, and for the families and friends of those who die from it. Everybody understands the social distancing measures that governments around the world are having to implement, because nobody wants health services to be put under so much pressure at any one time that those who need treatment cannot receive it. The global economy has been tanking as all sectors have had to shut down. Only two sectors – food and medicine – have really been keeping the economy afloat. As we all still shop for food, supermarkets have been a lifeline. However, an even bigger lifeline, quite literally, has been that of the medical industry. With medical devices and equipment such as needles and facemasks in such high demand, medicine has been keeping both people and the economy alive.
Governments have been doing what they can to protect employees’ incomes when their employers can no longer pay them, and to protect the incomes of self-employed people when their businesses have to cease trading either temporarily or permanently: but the measures put in place often struggle to protect the incomes of large numbers of workers in the informal sector and migrant workers.
Around the world we have seen legislators, journalists, think tanks, researchers, campaigners, and many others, calling for an emergency Basic Income. This is clearly to be welcomed. Also to be welcomed are changes to existing benefits systems that take them closer to being Basic Incomes. What is not to be welcomed is the use of the term ‘Basic Income’ for benefits that are not genuine Basic Incomes: that is, they are not ‘a periodic cash payment unconditionally delivered to all on an individual basis, without means test or work requirement’.
The reason for the increase in interest in Basic Income is that a genuine Basic Income would provide a secure layer of income when all other sources are either absent or insecure; it would inject demand into the economy and help us to avoid a recession; and because everyone would receive it, it would contribute to the social cohesion that every nation will need if it is to get through this crisis. It would not matter that Basic Incomes would be paid to people who didn’t need them, because it would be an easy matter to raise income tax rates on higher incomes so that those who already had secure incomes would not see their disposable incomes rise, and would be helping to pay for the Basic Incomes that everybody needed.
It is a significant problem that instead of paying Basic Incomes, governments are relying on increasing the coverage of existing means-tested benefits and on implementing new income-tested benefits. These benefits fall if earned income rises, so occasional and even permanent opportunities to earn additional income might be turned down because any increase in earned income would reduce benefit payments and could risk people losing their benefit claims entirely. A Basic Income would not fall if earned incomes were to rise, so any opportunity to contribute to the economy would be gladly taken, and there would always be an incentive to start the new businesses that any new economic situation would require.
Given the clear advantages of Basic Income, why are governments not implementing temporary or permanent Basic Income schemes? There might be several reasons for this. First of all, whether a country’s economy is more developed or less developed, there might simply be no mechanism available to enable the government to pay an unconditional income to every legal resident. What would be required would be a database that contained every individual’s name, contact details, date of birth, and bank account details. Given sufficient political will, many countries would be able to construct such a database within a fairly short period of time: but in the midst of this crisis it will generally be easier to use existing mechanisms to protect the incomes that can be protected fairly easily: through expansions of existing means-tested and contributory benefits systems; through using existing ‘pay as you earn’ income tax systems to enable employers to continue to pay employees who have been laid off; and to make grants to self-employed individuals on the basis of submitted annual accounts.
Where existing benefits systems are being used to maintain household incomes, the conditions for the receipt of benefits are often being relaxed: for instance, by no longer requiring stringent employment search requirements. Such changes are steps towards the complete unconditionality of Basic Income, and they are to be recognised as such, and are to be welcomed.
A trend that is not to be welcomed, though, is the use of the term ‘Basic Income’ for mechanisms that are not Basic Incomes. The recent short-lived experiment in Ontario was called a Basic Income, but it was household-based and therefore not ‘on an individual basis’, and it was income-tested and therefore was not ‘without means test’. It was not a Basic Income, and it should never have been called one. Similarly, during this crisis, governments are sometimes using the term ‘Basic Income’ for new or reformed benefits that are not Basic Incomes. This ought to stop, because it is misleading, and it makes rational debate more difficult to conduct.
So we should recognise and welcome the efforts that governments are making to adapt existing benefits systems so that they are closer in character to Basic Income; but we should point out that anything that is not a Basic Income will not exhibit the advantages that a genuine Basic Income would exhibit, and that if it is not a Basic Income then it should not be called one.
BIEN is gathering information from its affiliated organisations on their governments’ measures to protect incomes during the crisis, and in particular information on the extent to which those measures exhibit the characteristics of Basic Income, and the extent to which they do not.
In the meantime, information on the measures that governments are implementing can be found on the IMF website.
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by Karl Widerquist | Jan 14, 2020 | Opinion, The Indepentarian
I was recently asked whether the statement “Thomas Paine was a proponent of Universal Basic Income” is true. Although that statement is slightly controversial, it is true. Let me explain:
- Universal Basic Income (UBI) is a contested concept. Different people within the UBI movement use the term differently. The policy Paine advocates in “Agrarian Justice” fits most of the popular definitions of UBI but not narrowest one.
- The received definition of UBI (used by the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN) and the U.S. Basic Income Guarantee Network (USBIG)) includes five characteristics: a regular, individual, universal, and unconditional cash payment. Paine’s policy is only a regular payment for people who live beyond 50. So, it is a bit of a judgment call whether it fits BIEN’s definition. But the BIEN definition has usually been understood to imply that the income is life-long, and some leaders of BIEN have expressed interest in clarifying that it should be lifelong. For these reasons, you might hear someone denying that Paine supported UBI, but to say that would be to apply the narrowest definition of UBI as if it were the only definition in popular use today, and it would be inaccurate to do so.
- The difference between the policy Paine advocated and the narrowest definition of UBI is small and almost a technicality compared to the similarities. Therefore, it is often not worth the time and effort to explain the difference between Paine’s policy and the narrowest definition of UBI.
- The only missing characteristic of the narrowest definition of UBI is that the income should be life-long. In that sense, Andrew Yang’s proposal also fails to meet the narrowest definition of UBI.
- The oldest-know proposal that fits the narrowest definition of UBI was written by a man named Thomas Spence, who was writing a sympathetic response to Paine—showing a way to take the idea a little farther. Paine, as far as I know, never responded to that proposal. He might well have viewed it positively.
- Many people who are widely accepted as leading advocates of UBI not necessarily advocate it under the narrowest definition of it. Martin Luther King and Milton Friedman are prominent examples.
- Paine is almost universally recognized as a founder of the UBI movement even by people who prefer the version the narrow definition.
- The size of the payments that Paine suggested were very large for the time. The initial payment of 15 pounds that people were supposed to receive when they came of age, Paine argued, would be enough for them to by land and become farmers, thereby achieving two central goals of many members of the UBI movement: to compensate people for the fact that wealthy people own all the resources and to give them the power to say no to unacceptable employment offers.
- Paine supported the policy he described in Agrarian Justice for the same reasons that more radical UBI proponents support UBI. His use of these arguments implies that he would be sympathetic to proposals convert his idea to life-long income.
- Therefore, if he were alive today, Paine would be recognized not only as a UBI supporter, but as one of the more radical UBI supporters. It is accurate to say he’s a UBI supporter, and even inaccurate to suggest otherwise without explaining the technicality of that suggestion.
by Guest Contributor | Oct 24, 2019 | Opinion
For the past 3 years, my primary goal has been to get the Liberal Party of Canada to include Unconditional Basic Income (UBI) on its electoral platform. (Support for this policy is already in the official Party program.) The election was held on Monday, October 21st and UBI was never mentioned. My ultimate goal is to see UBI implemented in my lifetime.
I ended up fighting on two fronts and losing on both.
The first front consisted of my lobbying efforts within the Liberal Party. I was hoping I could convince them to include a promise to implement UBI as a commitment to the electorate should they win re-election. When I got cold feet and neglected to contact the guy who was writing the platform, my project was probably doomed. Plus, several weeks into the 6-week election campaign I changed strategies. On September 19th an independent report by UBIWorks was published. It presented the case that the Canada Child Benefit was a UBI. I stopped presenting Basic Income as an experimental policy to be tested and, instead, argued that it was a fait accompli in Canada, hiding in plain sight. My efforts to get the press to ask questions and to stimulate debate among the Liberal candidates came to nothing.
Despite high-level contacts within the Party, I had the impression that my message was not getting through to the right people. In hindsight, it is equally possible that my suggestion was being heard loud and clear in the right quarters and that appealing to their electoral self-interest rather than their consciences was spot on the best approach. After all, while I was emphasizing the economic impact of the Child Benefit for GDP growth, job creation, corporate profits, and tax revenue, the platform kept droning on about poverty reduction, a subject that people would rather not think about because they find it depressing and it makes them feel guilty. Perhaps Liberal strategists, who were staking their reputations on their message, simply rejected my proposal as not being something that would, at this point in the campaign, help them win reelection. Was this a mistake that partially explains why the Liberals lost their majority in the House of Commons? It would be pretentious of me to suggest this.
However, today’s flop may yet bear fruit in the next electoral cycle in 4 years. This is what cooler heads than mine thought from the outset.
While all this was going on, a second front was opened with my allies in the Basic Income community. To bolster my position that UBI already existed in Canada under another name, I tried to convince famous people in the movement to lend their credibility to this argument. I was flabbergasted by the strong and nearly universal resistance I encountered: no, the Canada Child Benefit could not be called a Basic Income, full stop.
While two or three people got on board immediately, most of the cognoscenti insisted that what I was advancing was inconsistent with the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN) definition of UBI for a variety of reasons. Theoreticians and experimentalists alike, as well as activists, flatly refused to go along with my plan to leverage this unique opportunity to change the narrative about UBI. I thought: “I’m caught in a paradigm shift, as it happens!”
Some argued that the Child Benefit was not universal because it was only earmarked for kids. Yang’s Freedom Dividend which excludes minors still qualifies as a UBI, though. Others claimed it violated individuality because it was given to families, as though it makes any sense to hand $500 to a toddler. However, most objected on the grounds that the Child Benefit is means-tested. This was the breaking point where everything I was trying to do simply collapsed. I never saw it coming.
The Canada Child Benefit is not means-tested, it is income-tested. People outside Canada are colour-blind to the distinction. Income-testing is just not part of their paradigm. Means-testing is an evil policy tool that allows bureaucrats to arbitrarily deprive vulnerable people of funds and services that they need and have a right to receive. It grinds them into the ground and makes an example of them to terrorize everybody else. Income-testing is a horse of another colour.
In Canada, we have a progressive tax system just like the one Adam Smith himself proposed: “It is not unreasonable that the rich should contribute to the public expense, not only in proportion to their revenue but something more than in that proportion.” That is why no one questions the practice of taxing back from the rich funds equivalent to the Child Benefit from which they derive no important advantage and thereby recover some of the cost of a program, which is immensely useful for everybody else. Conscientious objectors to means-testing will insist that even when this claw-back is done specifically for the purpose of recouping UBI, it does not infringe on the principle of universality because it is done in separate operations, the right hand not knowing what the left hand is doing. In Canada, we tend to view this as an elaborate and unnecessary fiction. Covering up the mechanism does little to hide the process which serves no other purpose than to claw back UBI from the rich.
In the FAQ on the BIEN definition of Basic Income, we read under the caption Is Basic Income paid irrespective of income?
“Taxable “means” may need to be taxed at a higher average rate in order to fund the basic income. But the tax-and-benefit system no longer rests on a dichotomy between two notions of “means”: a broad one for the poor, by reference to which benefits are cut, and a narrow one for the better off, by reference to which income tax is levied.”
The second notion is used universally to assess the Canada Child Benefit, which is why we use the term income-tested and not means-tested. My argument failed to convince. How it is possible, on the one hand, to clearly distinguish the two notions and, on the other hand, still insist on using the same term to describe them?
I think we are confronted with two incommensurable competing paradigms in both the political sphere and the academic domain. The old paradigms have accumulated a thick crust of unresolved problems such that business-as-usual can no longer operate smoothly. In politics, poverty reduction continues to dominate social policy discussions even though it no longer provides useful solutions. In the UBI academic community, a rigid definition stifles progress towards implementation by ensuring that the ideal program remains unattainable. I will be fleshing out this argument at a later date.
I have not lost hope that the politicians will eventually learn to frame UBI as a powerful economic stimulant and an entitlement for all Canadians, especially the middle class. The academics too, will at some point loosen their church-like grip on orthodoxy and accept a leading role in promoting social justice, down in the trenches.
However, I would hate to end up like Moses, who never did reach the promised land, and spent 40 years not getting there. I do not have that kind of time. I will be quickly making new friends in the party that holds the balance of power and leveraging these connections to achieve my goal of seeing Unconditional Basic Income implemented for all, in my lifetime.
Pierre Madden
WhatsApp/Cell: +1 514 238-0044
https://www.basicincomemontreal.org/
https://www.revenudebasevilleray.com/
https://www.patreon.com/PierreMadden
by Karl Widerquist | Sep 27, 2019 | News
An early version of a book, Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend: Examining its Suitability as a Model, is now available for free download on my personal website. A summary, from the first chapter of the book (2012), is reprinted below. If you want to cite or quote it, please see the published version:
Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend: Examining its Suitability as a Model, edited by Karl Widerquist and Michael W. Howard. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012
Every year, every Alaskan gets paid. Every man, woman, and child receives a dividend as a joint owner of Alaska’s oil reserves. Alaskans are free to use this money as they wish with some potentially putting it towards a home improvement project. After all, if your looking for metal buildings Alaska is your place to find them. In 1956, Alaska ratified a constitution recognizing joint ownership of unoccupied land and natural resources. In 1967, North America’s largest oil reserve was discovered in publicly owned areas on Alaska’s North Slope. In 1976, the state government voted to dedicate a part of its yearly oil revenues to a state investment fund, called the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF). In 1982, the state government voted to distribute part of the returns from that fund as a yearly dividend, called the Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD), sometimes called “the Alaska Dividend.” In 2008, the dividend reached a high of $3269,[1] which comes to $16,345 for a family of five. More often in recent years, the PFD has been between $1000 and $1500 per person, which comes to between $5000 and $7500 for a family of five.
Karl Widerquist (left) Michael W. Howard (right)
The Alaska Dividend is one of the most popular government programs in the United States. It has helped Alaska attain the highest economic equality of any state in the United States. It has coexisted with, and possibly contributed to, the state’s growing and prosperous economy. And, seemingly unnoticed, it has provided unconditional cash assistance to needy Alaskans at a time when most states have scaled back aid and increased conditionality.
The Alaska fund and accompanying dividend seems to be a model worthy of imitation and adaptation. This book examines whether and how the Alaska Dividend is a model that can and should be imitated and adapted for circumstances elsewhere. It is an “edited volume” with authors who differ in their level of enthusiasm for (or skepticism of) the Alaska model. But we believe that the evidence provided by this book shows that the combination of policies we call the Alaska model is worthy of examination by other states, nations, and regions.
What is the Alaska model?
The “Alaska model,” as we use the term here, does not refer to the whole of Alaskan state government policy, nor to even to the whole of its oil revenue policy. It refers only to elements in the combination of APF and PFD. Although the APF is the source of revenue for the PFD, the two are different programs created at different times by different kinds of legislation. The APF is a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF)-a pool of assets collectively owned by the members of a political community usually invested into interest-generating assets. It was established by a constitutional amendment that did not specify what was to be done with the returns to the fund. The PFD is the policy of devoting the APF’s returns to a dividend for all Alaskan citizen residents. It was created by a simple act of the state legislature. Many nations and regions have SWFs, but only Alaska’s SWF pays a regular dividend to citizens. Many nations and regions provide some form of cash benefits, but so far, only Alaska pays a regular cash dividend to all of its residents.[2] The APF and the accompanying PFD link a resource-revenue-management policy with a progressive social policy. As an SWF, the APF helps to ensure that the state will continue to benefit from its oil after its reserves are depleted. As a dividend, the PFD helps every single Alaskan make ends meet each year without a bureaucracy to judge them.
We call this unique combination the Alaska model. It consists of three elements: (1) resource-based revenue (2) put into an SWF or some other permanent endowment, (3) the returns of which are distributed as a cash payment to all citizens or all residents. The extent to which a policy has to contain all three of these elements to qualify as following the Alaska model is not so important. But we will discuss the importance of each of these elements separately.
(1) Resource revenue.
The argument for the Alaska Dividend is simple and powerful: the oil, by right, belongs to all Alaskans. The PFD is an efficient and effective way to ensure that every single Alaskan benefits from it. If that argument works for Alaska’s oil, why not Maine’s fisheries, South Africa’s diamonds, Hong Kong’s real estate, Oregon’s forests, America’s broadcast spectrum, or the world’s atmosphere? Governments have allowed private, for-profit exploitation of these and many more resources, claiming that we will all benefit from the jobs and economic activity they create. But do we? Does a homeless person in Denver benefit from the gold being mined in Colorado? Does a shanty dweller in Johannesburg benefit from the diamonds being mined in South Africa?
The PFD has made sure that every single Alaskan has benefited from the state’s oil industry. Whatever benefit they might or might not get from more jobs or increased economic activity, every Alaskan can point to the dividends they’ve received since 1982 and say, I got this benefit from the state’s decision to exploit its oil reserves. Not many other programs do that, but many more could.
The case for taxing natural resources is at least as good, and probably far better than the case for taxing any other source of wealth. Resource taxes have the benefit of discouraging overuse of scarce resources. If properly employed, they can be an important part of a green environmental management strategy, giving people the incentive to reduce their consumption of scarce resources to sustainable levels. Yet, few if any countries in the world employ resource taxes in this way. Resources are often given away by governments to individuals and corporations who sell them back to the public with value added, but the sellers capture not only the value they add but also the natural resource value along with it.
A resource tax is literally a user fee. Anyone who takes possession of a resource makes it unavailable for others. The tax represents a payment for the burden imposed on others. This justification for resource taxation is more closely associated with “left-libertarianism,” discussed in chapters of this volume by Ian Carter, Alanna Hartzok, and Gary Flomenhoff. But as we will argue in a later chapter resource taxes are also consistent with liberal-egalitarian, utilitarian, and other theories of justice.
Of course, not every country has as much oil as Alaska, but one of the key lessons of this book is that a country does not have to be “resource rich” to have a resource dividend based on the Alaska model. We make this argument fully in the final chapter of this book. Here we preview only a small part of that argument.
One reason we know that a country does not have to be resource rich to have a resource dividend is that every country and every region has valuable resources. Later chapters of this book will show that the total value of natural resources (including not only mining, fishing, and forestry but also land value, the broadcast spectrum, the atmosphere, etc.) is surprisingly high even in areas not thought of as being resource rich. Gary Flomenhoft (this volume) shows that even “resource poor” states, such as Vermont, can create a substantial resource dividend.
Another reason we know that a country does not have to be resource rich to have a resource dividend can be seen from what a small part of Alaska’s resource wealth actually goes to supporting the fund. Alaska has many valuable natural resources, but the APF is supported almost entirely by taxes on oil. These taxes are extremely low by international standards, and only about one-eighth of the state’s total oil revenue goes to supporting the APF. Thus only a tiny fraction of Alaska’s resource wealth is used to support the PFD.
(2) A permanent endowment
Alaska introduced the APF largely because Alaskans knew that oil drilling would provide a very large but temporary windfall. They wanted to extend the period in which that windfall would benefit Alaskans by putting some of it away into a permanent fund. The APF was one of the first SWFs. Today many resource-exporting nations have them. Some nations have funds more than 10 times the size of the APF.
We see the essence of the Alaska model as a strategy to make sure that the system functions as a permanent endowment, but an SWF is not the only mechanism that can do so. To some extent treating resource taxes as user frees does so on its own. Some resources are capable of producing a permanent stream of revenue from user fees. These include land, the broadcast spectrum, and renewable resources. Such resources do not need to put revenue into a fund to function as a permanent endowment, and the Alaska model can be employed with only the first and second elements. Other resources produce only temporary resource streams. No nation can produce oil forever. Pollution taxes will hopefully discourage pollution. For revenue from sources like these to produce a permanent endowment, a mechanism such as an SWF is necessary.
(3) A cash payment to all citizens
To some extent the dividend was a way to sell ordinary Alaskans on the idea of a permanent fund. But to some extent the motivation for the fund was to support the dividend. Some of the lawmakers who created these programs, particularly Governor Jay Hammond, were influenced by the movement for what is now known as a “basic income”-a small unconditional income for every citizen to help them meet their basic needs. At the time, the policy was best known as the “guaranteed income” or the “negative income tax.” It was widely discussed by policymakers in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s. Hammond had unsuccessfully proposed a similar policy on a local level when he was a mayor of Bristol Bay Borough, and he very much saw the APF as an opportunity to create a basic income.
Basic income is a widely discussed topic in the academic literature in social science and philosophy. Researchers have examined the political and economic feasibility of the idea, its likely effects, and the ethical arguments for and against it. The United States and Canadian governments have conducted five social science experiments to see how a very similar policy would work. The Indian government will soon begin its own experiment. Basic income comes and goes in political popularity. It has recently appeared on the political agenda in Germany. It has considerable grassroots support in southern Africa today, and the Brazilian government is officially committed to phasing it in, although no timetable for moving beyond the first stage of the phase-in has been set. It is currently popular with Green and left-leaning parties in Europe, but its support (much like the support of the Alaska Dividend) often cuts across party and left-right divides.
As we will see in later chapters, not everyone agrees about the extent to which the Alaska Dividend fits the definition of a basic income. Usually, a full basic income is defined as an unconditional income, large and regular enough to meet a person’s basic needs. The Alaska Dividend is neither regular in size nor large enough to meet a person’s basic needs. But it is regular in timing and unconditional. So, it constitutes only a partial, irregular basic income. But it is the only version of basic income currently in practice in the Western industrialized world.
We (the editors of this book and the authors of this chapter) became interested in the Alaska model because of our interest in basic income. We’re excited to see an idea-so controversial in theory-has proven to be effective and extremely popular in the one place it has been tried. The Alaska model shows not only how basic income works, but also how the unique attributes of the Alaska model can be designed to work well elsewhere. The Alaska model is not perfect, but it is a successful strategy on which to build something better.
Employing the Alaska Model
By endorsing the Alaska model, we do not mean that governments should replace everything they do with the combination of a resource taxes, fund and dividend. We mean only that they should examine it as a possible addition to their toolkit. It’s only being used by one government, but it has proven to be more popular and more effective than many things that governments all around the world are doing. Certainly, it’s a policy that other governments should take a look at.
A preview of the book
The three parts of this book evaluate the Alaska model and discuss whether and how it can be adapted for other areas.
Chapters in Part One provide the background necessary to evaluate the Alaska model. Cliff Groh and Greg Erickson examine the unlikely history of the APF and the PFD and explain how the two programs work in practice. Scott Goldsmith discusses the impact of the dividend on Alaska’s society and economy.
Chapters in Part Two examine the ethical and political case for using the Alaska model as a tool for social justice. Jim Bryan and Sarah Lamarche discuss the political consequences of linking natural resource wealth and basic income, and how this policy combination can serve justice for future generations. Ian Carter presents the resource dividend as a left-libertarian economic policy. Christopher Griffin discusses the PFD as a practical application of the theoretical idea of Stakeholding. Stakeholding is a variation of the universal, unconditional grant idea. It differs from basic income in being delivered as a large lump sum grant rather than as a steady flow of smaller payments. Almaz Zelleke criticizes the extent to which the Alaska model, structured as a resource dividend, can be thought of as the practical implementation of basic income or even a step toward it. Jurgen de Wispelaere and David Casassas argue that the Alaska model, as it stands, is of limited value in promoting Civic Republican objectives. Steve Winter criticizes the Alaska Dividend for making recipients complicit with the oil industry. In the final chapter of Part One, we (Widerquist and Howard) respond with a chapter addressing the concerns of the authors in this section, and a discussion of why the link between resource taxation and basic income is important for different theories of social justice.
Chapters in Part Three discuss empirical questions about how the Alaska model can be adapted to be used most effectively in other states, nations, and regions. Gary Flomenhoff provides a detailed empirical investigation of the resource tax revenue available in the state of Vermont. He finds that even the resource-poor state of Vermont can raise $2000 (and possibly much more) for each resident each year. Michael Howard looks at the cap-and-dividend approach to global warming as a version of the Alaska model applied to pollution control. Karl Widerquist proposes personalizing the Alaska model into what he calls “Citizens’ Capital Accounts.” Alanna Hartzok argues that any dividend program based on an SWF has a strong responsibility for socially responsible investing, and presents evidence the APF currently fails to live up to that goal. Michael A. Lewis addresses the issues of fund and risk management, which will be important if the Alaska model is to further economic security of recipients. Angela Cummine discusses whether other existing Sovereign Wealth Funds (particularly in the Middle East) should move toward an Alaska-style dividend. Greg Erickson and Cliff Groh discuss the challenges to the APF and PFD in Alaska today and the extent to which the model can be expanded and improved within Alaska.
In the concluding chapter, Howard and Widerquist respond to the concerns of authors in Part Three and discuss six lessons they take away from the Alaska experience.
[1] Including a one-time supplement of $1200 from that year’s state government budget surplus.
[2] Iran is currently in the process of phasing in a regular dividend.
Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend: Examining its Suitability as a Model, edited by Karl Widerquist and Michael W. Howard. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012
