Basic Income Korea Network holds sixth General Assembly

Basic Income Korea Network holds sixth General Assembly

Looking back to the past, looking forward to the way ahead

The 6th General Assembly (GA) of Basic Income Korea Network (BIKN) was held in Seoul last Saturday. The GA, the highest decision-making body, is held every January, in which we examine the activities of last year and decide what activities we should carry out in the following year.

2017 was a watershed year for BIKN as well as for the politics in Korea. Popular resistance to the abuse of power and corruption of the former president and her coterie led to a snap presidential election in which Mr. Moon from the Democratic Party won. We have the most democratic government in a decade.

Grievances about social and economic inequality and insecurity have flowed under the popular resistance, although it was certainly an expression of the aspiration for democracy. Under these circumstances, interest and support for the basic income idea could be strengthened and become more prolific prolific. One of the more influential candidates presented basic income policy as an electoral promise.

BIKN had two main achievements in the turbulent year of 2017. Above all, the basic income agenda entered into the center of the public sphere. During this period, BIKN has been recognized as a prestigious institution around the discussion of BI. Secondly, we saw the quantitative growth of our organization, including an increase in individual and group membership, as well as the growth of local networks (chapter of BIKN). Now we have around 500 individual members, seven group members and six local networks.

Upon the those self-assessments, BIKN decided the following activities for the next year: we will spread understanding of the basic income concept through online basic income courses; we will make efforts to form basic income coalitions during the local elections this June in order to implement basic income policy; we will participate in the project to design experimental models for basic income which the government will commission this year (see another article); we will change BIKN into a corporation in order to secure institutional status.

We expect this year will be another watershed to realize the basic income idea.

Hyosang Ahn Executive Director of BIKN

UBI’s Impact on Work Culture: Not a Question for the Experimenters

UBI’s Impact on Work Culture: Not a Question for the Experimenters

My interest in basic income stemmed from the conjecture that such a policy could help to ignite a progression away from the culture of total work. However, there are many open empirical questions regarding the exact way in which a basic income would (or would not) influence work-related attitudes and behaviors.

One might hope that current and planned experiments will shed some light on this topic. My claim in this article is that this is not likely to be the case: the impact of basic income on work-related attitudes and behaviors is not readily amenable to experimentation.

 

1. Fixing the Viewpoint: Opposition to the Culture of Work

When I began casually following the basic income movement in 2015, and when I began volunteering for Basic Income News in November of that year, I was tentatively attracted to the policy as a means to subsidize lifestyles like downshifting and what I’d come to call anti-careerism – the rejection of idea that one’s life course should be structured and defined by a career path.

At that time, I was unaware of the movement’s budding interest in experimentation. I did not realize that the center-right federal government of Finland was about to declare its intention to fund an experimental trial of basic income, or that the provincial government of Ontario was also preparing to design and implement a trial of guaranteed minimum income.

I did not foresee the global surge of interest in experiments and pilot studies that would happen soon after the commencement of my volunteership. But happen it did, and thus, as a writer for Basic Income News, I was committed to expend considerable effort covering the current basic income implementation trials. Moreover, as a “just the facts” news reporter, it was my duty to report on them without allowing my own personal misgivings to show through (although I did have occasion to leak my skepticism in the Op-Ed section). As a result, I was often mistaken for someone with a genuine and favorable interest in basic income experiments.

Through it all, my main interest in basic income remained the conjecture that the policy might act as a subsidy for downshifting, anti-careerism, and working without pay, and thereby help to displace society’s overvaluing of selling labor for money. While such an “anti-work” approach to basic income is highly controversial, I will assume this perspective throughout the present article. (Those who do not share it may either accept it for the sake of argument or stop reading.)

Such an approach to basic income rests on untested empirical conjectures. In fact, however, many questions remain open. Would individuals living in a society with basic income come to hold different views about the role and importance of jobs? Would they fail to view an occupation or career as integral to self-identity? Would they deny that a high salary or professional advancement is essential for personal success? Would they ascribe greater value to self-development and social contributions that occur outside of paid work? Would they tend to prioritize activities that are rewarding in themselves over activities that contribute to professionalization and employability? To what extent would basic income actually enable people to lead lives without full-time or continuous jobs? It is sufficient to empower individuals to work fewer hours? (Probably not.) Would it permit some to withdraw from the labor market completely?

Some proponents take for granted that basic income would usher in a society in which the pursuit of passions is more important than paid work. Such optimistic predictions, however, must be moderated against the reality that the culture of work is deeply entrenched. When critics contend that it’s premature to “give up” on the goal of full employment, the normative assumptions behind their rhetoric should not be ignored: secure full-time jobs and careers remain central to the identity and self-worth of many who have them, and central to the goals and aspirations of many who don’t. Even more unsettlingly (in my view), many supporters enthusiastically maintain that basic income would not result in lower rates of employment–and might even increase work effort (as is the hypothesis behind Finland’s experiment, which is designed primarily to assess whether unemployed individuals would be more likely to accept work if their benefits were made unconditional). Some argue that it would act as a stimulus to business and grow the economy, never pausing to question the ethos of paid work and productivity.

We simply don’t know the long-term effects of basic income on work-related attitudes and behaviors. Given the myriad of unanswered empirical questions, one might guess that I would have been heartened to witness the unexpected onslaught of experiments that occurred during my volunteership with Basic Income News. But I was not: unfortunately, it is unlikely that the present wave of experiments will yield insight into the empirical concerns that interest me and others who approach basic income from the “anti-work” perspective.

 

2. Five Limitations of Experiments

I believe it’s possible that basic income could precipitate a mass transformation of work-related behavior and attitudes but, if so, it most likely occur through long-term, society-wide processes. Experiments, in contrast, are necessarily (1) limited in duration and (2) restricted to a subset of the population (rather than “universal”).

And experiments have other shortcomings. For instance, they must be (3) designed to prevent subjects from being financially worse off as a result of participation, whereas any “real-world” UBI would almost certainly be introduced in tandem with a funding mechanism that causes some individuals to be net payees. Finally, as existing experiments have been designed, the target populations (4) consist of low-income individuals, the unemployed, and/or welfare recipients, and (5) consist mainly of adults who have already been acculturated into the present society and its ethos of work and consumption.

 

2.1 Experiments are limited in duration.

Most of the current BI-related experiments are two or three years in length. In the United States, the non-profit YC Research plans to launch an experiment in which some participants receive cash transfers for five years. The only projects of longer duration are taking place in developing nations: GiveDirectly is providing a 12-year basic income to 40 villages in its major experiment in Kenya, and the Brazilian non-profit organization ReCivitas has introduced a “lifetime basic income” in the village Quatinga Velho (note that the latter is not an “experiment” in the scientific sense). Even if longer term experiments were affordable, the pressure to obtain results would generally militate against them.

The short-term nature of experiments poses at least two major shortcomings vis-à-vis our present interests:

First, the payments’ limited duration disincentivizes financially risky behavior, such as abandoning a job or career. We should expect that few individuals would choose to make radical changes to their work and life if they are guaranteed unconditional cash payments for only two or three years. A two- or three-year gap in employment might jeopardize not only one’s ability to return to one’s former job or career path but also one’s general future prospects in the labor market.

Secondly, let’s assume that some participants do radically alter their workforce participation despite the short-term nature of the experiment (e.g. they might use the money to help provide financial security during the process of downshifting from a lucrative full-time job, with the confidence that the experiment’s timeframe is long enough to permit them to settle into stable part-time employment or freelance work). Under a society-wide and permanent basic income, such “first movers” might inspire others also to seek alternatives to the norm of full-time permanent employment, initiating a sort of ripple effect whereby downshifting and other such alternative lifestyles gain in practice and acceptance. A two- or three-year experiment, however, is unlikely to be long enough to observe these more slowly accruing effects on social attitudes toward work.

Stated otherwise: a basic income might enable some individuals to voluntarily accept less money pay through work, reduce their time in the labor market, or even cease employment entirely (especially in the many non-USA nations in which benefits such as healthcare are not dependent on full-time employment). It might, for example, liberate those who had already been keen to adopt such a lifestyle (say, downshifting) but were restrained by, and only by, the lack of a stable financial safety net. Meanwhile, however, other would-be downshifters might remain hesitant. The latter group might include, for instance, those who have been held back by not only financial anxiety but also fear of social marginalization. Over time, however, an increased prevalence and visibility of downshifting could increase the lifestyle’s social acceptability, thereby reducing its stigmatization and rendering more attractive to more people (which would further increase its visibility and social acceptance, and so on).

Of course, this is purely speculative. Even if a basic income were to bring about increase in the number and visibility of downshifters (which itself is uncertain), this might lead not to social acceptance but to angry complaints about “parasitism” and further stigmatization. But the point is just that experiments are unlikely to reveal which outcome would transpire.

Indeed, moreover, some of the effects basic income on social attitudes toward work might develop over generations. Perhaps children and teens would develop less material-driven aspirations if they were to grow up in a society in which basic material security is taken for granted; perhaps they would place less weight on monetary considerations when choosing work or other projects and pursuits. Perhaps they would not internalize the moral imperative that one must “earn a living” through paid labor. Perhaps it would merely seem intuitive to them to conceptualize work and income as independent. Perhaps, in turn, they would conceive of the value of work in terms other than income, such as the good it brings to the world and the satisfaction it provides to the worker. Views that are counternormative in our own society might come naturally to those raised in world with universal basic income…

But we certainly can’t be confident about any of that, and experiments will not help.

 

2.2 Experiments are not “universal” in scope.

As I have written elsewhere, a bigger question than “What would you do if your income were taken care of?” is “What would you do if everyone’s income were taken care of?” What a financially self-sufficient individual would choose to do in a society of full-time workers is not necessarily identical to what that same financially self-sufficient individual would choose to do in a society in which everyone could afford to live without a job.

Experiments require a control group. This effectively prevents an experimental test of a truly universal basic income. Now, to be sure, some experiments do aim to include universality in their design. In GiveDirectly’s experiment, for example, the experimental units are not individual people but entire villages. In this major study, the treatment groups are each composed of communities in which all individuals are receiving unconditional cash transfers. An earlier experiment in the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh also implemented a basic income in several villages, using similar villages as controls. There is even precedent in the developed world: the much-discussed “Mincome” experiment, a negative income tax experiment conducted in Manitoba in the 1970s, used the town of Dauphin as a saturation site; every resident of Dauphin was unconditionally guaranteed a minimum income from 1974 to 1979, when the experiment was terminated.

No current experiment in the developed world, however, includes the use of a saturation site (even though Hugh Segal, the adviser to the Ontario pilot study, initially recommended it). In Finland, the experimental group consists of a random sample of 2,000 individuals who had previously been receiving federal unemployment benefits. Similarly, in the Dutch municipal experiments, participants have been randomly selected from current welfare beneficiaries residing in the respective cities, and Barcelona’s experiment involves a stratified sample of welfare recipients within one of the city’s most impoverished neighborhoods. In Ontario, experimental groups will be randomly selected from self-selected applicants, where eligible applicants are restricted to low-income individuals from three specific regions of the province. And YC Research has designed its experiment as a randomized controlled trial with a target population of low-income young adults in two regions of the US. (See this summary for more information on the design of the experiments.)

A consequence of these design decisions is that all of the above experiments will fail to capture social multiplier effects. For an example of social multiplier effects in the context of minimum income experiments, consider one of the most striking results from Dauphin: an increase in high school graduation rates. Last year, I attended a talk by Evelyn Forget, the scholar responsible for the analysis of the experiment, wherein she described survey data that revealed that the decisions of Dauphin teens to remain in school were due not only to the financial security of their individual families but also to the fact that their peers were able to stay in school as well.

We should expect that work-related behavior could also be susceptible to social multiplier effects. Like teenagers’ decisions to stay in school, adults’ decisions to withdraw from full-time employment might depend not only on their personal financial status but also on the actions of their peers. An individual with a personal source of passive income might be financially able to quit her job, and even desire to do so, but nonetheless choose to remain employed if – and because – her friends and coworkers stay in their jobs. She might, for example, believe that she would become socially isolated if she were to opt out of work while her peers remained in full-time employment. She might think about her lack of friends available before 5 pm on weekdays, or she might feel pressure to continue to earn enough money to continue to engage in costly dining, entertainment, and other activities with friends who remain lucratively employed. She might fear a lack of sympathy or understanding, even ostracism, if she were to become the only person within her peer group to abandon traditional employment.

Furthermore, as discussed above, the potential impact of basic income is not limited to the liberation of those who already desire to downshift; another possibility is that, through social multiplier effects, a basic income could generate this desire in those who had not previously considered the option. Our attitudes and aspirations are also influenced not only by our private circumstances but also by our observations of others’ choices lifestyles, and by our perception of what is socially acceptable. Some who now lack any interest in downshifting might develop one in the face of social or structural changes that legitimate or popularize the lifestyle.

Even experiments with saturation sites would be insufficient to permit us to assess all of these potential effects; the social, cultural, and economic forces that impinge on work-related attitudes and behavior vastly exceed the local scale.

 

2.3 Experiments exclude net contributors.

A “real world” basic income would almost certainly be introduced in conjunction with tax increases to help to finance the program, which would likely include higher income taxes on top earners. But researchers cannot ethically introduce manipulations that leave some subjects worse off as a result of the experiment. Consequently, tax increases cannot be part of experimental trials. This limits the ability to test how the full policy package would affect work-related behaviors. Even those that have studied taxes and come from financial education backgrounds such as through Northeastern University wouldn’t be able to test how different experiments could affect society and financial systems.

For one, it’s not basic income per se but redistribution – reduction of inequality – that carries the greater potential to curb the demand for positional goods. As mentioned above, a worker might hesitate to downshift if the maintenance of social relationships requires engagement in costly dining, drinking, entertainment, or luxury holidays. In a society with high inequality, a mere basic income might do little to reduce the demand for positional goods, limiting the temptation to downshift or opt out of paid work to live on a subsistence income. Many might continue to feel the need to wear nice clothing, drive a new car, and live in an affluent neighborhood to be taken seriously in society, and thus might continue to prefer greater earnings to greater leisure, despite the possibilities opened by the introduction of a basic income. Conversely, the less that one perceives one’s social status to depend on spending and consumption, the more one might be inclined to trade higher earnings for more leisure time. Policies that mitigate financial inequality, such as progressive taxes on wealth and income, help to address this barrier to downshifting.

Additionally, policies that stymie the ability to become “filthy rich” might discourage those who would otherwise be inclined to choose jobs and careers based primarily on their prospects for financial gain. Sufficiently high income taxes could reduce the role of monetary incentives in selecting work. Limitations on wealth acquisition might push some would-be profiteers to instead seek work that they could find non-monetarily rewarding.

Such effects could enhance the ability of a “basic income plus tax reform” package to transform work-related attitudes and behavior; however, they are bound to be missed in experiments.

 

2.4 Existing experiments are restricted to low-income populations.

So far, we have focused on limitations that are destined to afflict all basic income experiments, merely in virtue of the nature of experiments. Let’s now turn to a contingent design decision that constrains all current experiments in developed nations: in each experiment, as mentioned above, the target population contains only individuals who are low-income and/or receiving social assistance or unemployment benefits or other benefits or with incomes falling below a certain level.

To be fair, none of the existing experiments have been inspired by questions like “Can basic income provide a subsidy for downshifting?” or “Would basic income promote the acceptance and desirability of lifestyles outside of full-time employment?” On the contrary, most are motivated by the desire to determine whether unconditional cash transfers would be more effective than existing programs in addressing poverty or unemployment. In this light, these choices of target populations seem reasonable. But these choices make the experiments less congenial to the questions of those who are interested in the ability of basic income to facilitate a reduction in paid work.

A test of a policy’s potential to foster downshifting only makes sense if experimental subjects are drawn from a population of people who have the potential to downshift, and “downshifting” typically implies a reasonably well-paying position from which one shifts down. Thus, for an experiment to address our key interests, the target population should encompass individuals who are currently employed in relatively well-paying jobs. An experiment limited to the unemployed will tell us little about a policy’s ability to promote voluntary reduction of working hours. An experiment limited to the poor will tell us little about a policy’s ability to promote voluntary reduction of earnings and consumption.

The inclusion of “successful” workers among test subject is also important with respect to the question of whether basic income would reduce the stigma associated with the receipt of public benefits or, more precisely, voluntary “benefit scrounging” (which is, in essence, just a pejorative term for what I’ve been politely describing as “using a basic income to subsidize downshifting”). Quite likely, the “scrounging stigma” is too strong to disappear during the course of a short-term experiment in any case. If a basic income were to play a role in reducing the stigma, however, it would almost certainly not be by allowing poor and unemployed individuals to live upon government subsidies while they voluntarily opt out of the search for full-time jobs. Unfortunately, such an outcome (however desirable) seems much more likely to feed existing stigmas and stereotypes than to combat them.

In contrast, basic income might have a greater and more favorable cultural impact if it subsidized downshifting among individuals in relatively well-paying jobs and promising career paths – among those, that is, who embody conventional images of success. Society accords respect and admiration to those in lucrative careers, which makes such individuals uniquely well-positioned to attract curiosity, perhaps even sympathy, if they were to spurn the life of traditional employment and choose to rely upon government monies to meet their basic expenses (which is not to say that they would not also elicit the scorn or many others). Admittedly, the idea that basic income could lessen the stigma of “benefits scrounging” is far-fetched. The point at hand, however, is simply that existing experiments are not designed in a way that can adequately illuminate how far-fetched.

 

2.5 Experimental subjects have already “come of age” in the culture of work.

Each of the existing experiments is focused on effects on adults who have already been acculturated into the dominant work ethic. It is possible, however, that some of the social and cultural effects about basic income would result from its influence on younger generations. Perhaps teenagers would internalize different attitudes toward work if they were to come of age under an unconditional guarantee of financial security – not necessarily taking for granted that a core defining features of “adulting” is to find employment at a full-time job in order to earn a living. Perhaps young adults would formulate different personal goals and ideals of success if they did not face an immediate need to earn money through a job.

In a past feature article for Basic Income News, I speculated that entering adulthood with a work-independent college stipend – which shared some commonalities to a five-year “basic income” – could have played a large role in solidifying my own rejection of the ethic of (paid) work. For example, by allowing me to continue to dedicate myself to schoolwork without worrying about paid work, it might have helped to “prevent me from unlearning” that the fact that an activity is unpaid does not imply that the activity is not worthwhile, rewarding, or hard work – or that it’s not the best use of one’s time.

To some extent, this is just to repeat the point that experiments are too limited in duration to capture multi-generational effects of a policy. In principle, though, one could design a short-term study to test the effects of a guaranteed income on a cohort of young adults at critical transitional phases, such as leaving home for college or leaving college for “the real world” (i.e., usually, either a job or the search for one). But existing experiments are not this.

 

3. Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, then, I expect the current wave of experiments to shed little light on the question of whether, or to what extent, basic income would promote a cultural shift towards a decreased valuation of paid work. Any apparent evidence that basic income would not have such an effect (e.g. a lack of observed change in workforce participation or self-reported attitudes toward work) could be explained as an artifact of the limitations of experimental design.

Arguably, however, the biggest problem with experiments is not that they most likely won’t show considerable reduction in workforce participation (and yet for reasons that are inconclusive) but that many of the policy’s own proponents don’t want them to. When committed supporters of basic income demand more experiments, as often happens these days, they aren’t doing so because they want to decide for themselves whether to endorse the policy; they already have. The hope, generally, is that experiments would produce results that allay the fears of skeptical policymakers, such as the commonplace “fear” that basic income would cause a decrease in workforce participation. As many supporters are fond of pointing out, previous experiments have not shown a marked decrease in workforce participation, or have shown a decrease only within population segments where reducing work hours is socially acceptable (e.g. school-age teenagers or mothers of young children). This attitude toward basic income experiments only recapitulates society’s overvaluation of paid work.

The policymakers who assess experiments for “failure” or “success” will do so relative to the norms and values of the status quo. Political speeches and media reports are likely to portray any observed decrease in labor force participation as evidence of the failure of the policy, as happened when a negative income tax was tested in several cities in the United States in the late 1960s and 70s. My impression, based on two years of intense work in the basic income movement, is that many supporters realize this but call for experiments nonetheless, believing that the trials will in fact yield outcomes that are “successful” relative to the norms and values of the status quo.

Hence, in addition to being unlikely to produce interesting or useful results, basic income experiments may also threaten to reinforce these norms and values in the minds of advocates and other readers. And, from the standpoint as critic of the culture of work, this is not only unhelpful but dangerous.

 


Photo: banned :: The Golden Book of Chemistry Experiments CC BY-NC 2.0

Alternatives to Citizen’s Basic Income

Alternatives to Citizen’s Basic Income

Discussion of alternatives to Citizen’s Basic Income are increasingly debated, so we are here publishing for the first time a paper prepared in 2015 for a consultation organised by some of the UK’s major charities on options for reforming the benefits system.

Introduction

This short article outlines three options for the reform of the UK’s tax and benefits system: Tax Credits, Negative Income Tax, and Citizen’s Basic Income.

The descriptions and discussions assume that both the tax unit and the benefit unit are the individual and not the household. The complexities related to household-based options would require additional description and discussion.

Tax Credits

( – real ones: not what the Government calls ‘tax credits’)

A credit is allocated to every individual. If someone is earning nothing, the full credit is paid. As earnings rise, the credit is withdrawn. At the point at which the credit is exhausted, Income Tax starts to be paid. (A Tax Credit that is withdrawn as unearned income rises is theoretically a possibility, but the administration would be even more complicated than for the version described here.)

In the diagram, the credit is worth £x per week. As earnings rise, the credit is withdrawn, so net income rises slower than earned income. At earnings of £y per week (the break-even point), the credit has all been withdrawn. Above this point, Income Tax is paid.

The diagram assumes that the rate at which the credit is withdrawn is the same as the tax rate. If the rates are different then the slope of line EF is different above and below earnings of £y per week.

Administration

The tax credit can be administered by the Government or by the employer. If the Government administers the Tax Credit, then the employer must provide regular and accurate earnings information to the Government, as with the current Universal Credit. If the employer administers the Tax Credit then, if someone moves between employers, their Tax Credit administration has to be transferred between employers. If they have a period of unemployment, then administration of the Tax Credit has to be handed to the Government and then on to the new employer. If someone has two employments, then the employers have to decide which of them will administer the Tax Credit. And if someone has occasional other earnings, then their employer needs to be informed so that the Tax Credit can be withdrawn accordingly.

If every working age adult receives the same Tax Credit then neither their employer nor the Government needs to know any personal details. If people in different circumstances receive different levels of Tax Credit then their employer and the Government will need to know individuals’ circumstances in order to allocate the correct credit.

Our current income tax system is cumulative. An annual amount of income is not taxed. Each week, or each month, the employer has to calculate how much tax to deduct so that, by the end of the year, the correct amount of tax has been deducted. With Tax Credits, the tax system would be non-cumulative. Each week, or each month, the correct amount of the Credit would need to be paid in addition to earnings, or no Credit would be paid and earnings would be taxed. A non-cumulative system requires a single tax rate, so anyone paying higher rate tax would need to pay additional Income Tax at the end of the tax year.

Negative Income Tax

Income Tax deducts money from earnings above an earnings threshold, and a Negative Income Tax pays money to the employee below the threshold: so a Negative Income Tax scheme functions in the same way as a Tax Credit scheme. The only difference is in the specification. A Tax Credit scheme specifies the amount to be paid out when there are no earnings, along with a withdrawal rate as earnings rise. For a Negative Income Tax, the threshold is specified along with tax rates above and below the threshold. If the rates above and below the threshold are the same, then for earnings below the threshold, the same amount is paid out for earnings of £z below the threshold as would be collected in tax on earnings of £z above the threshold.

As the system is essentially the same as a Tax Credit scheme, the same diagram applies. Different rates above and below the threshold would result in the EF having different slopes above and below earnings of £y per week. Administrative considerations would be the same as for Tax Credits.

Citizen’s Basic Income

A Citizen’s Basic Income is an unconditional income paid to every individual by the Government, and it is not withdrawn as earnings rise. Tax is paid on all or most earned income.

 

In the diagram, a Citizen’s Basic Income of £x per week is paid to everyone. All earnings are taxed. The line EF shows the net income.

(The diagram assumes that a single tax rate is charged on all earnings.)

Administration

The Government pays a Citizen’s Basic Income to every individual, the amount depending only on the person’s age ( – larger amounts could be paid to older people as a Citizen’s Pension, and lower amounts to children and young people). Employers would continue to administer Income Tax via PAYE as they do now.

(A variant is a Participation Income. This would require fulfilment of a ‘participation condition’ before receiving it. The graph would be the same as for Citizen’s Basic Income, but only for those receiving it. The participation conditions would need to be specified and each individual’s fulfilment of them would have to be monitored. This would result in considerable administrative complexity, and would also mean that many of a Participation Income’s effects would be closer to those of means-tested benefits than to those of a Citizen’s Basic Income.)

Comparison

Negative Income Tax, Tax Credits, and Citizen’s Basic Income, all generate the same net income diagram, so all three schemes would reduce marginal deduction rates (the total rate of withdrawal of additional income), would incentivize employment, and would enable families to more easily to earn their way out of poverty.

The differences between the schemes are administrative.

(For more detailed discussion of all of these options see Malcolm Torry, The Feasibility of Citizen’s Income (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 214-230.)

A BASIC INCOME SUPPORTER’S VIEW OF THE SALES TAX MOVEMENT (from 2008)

This essay was originally published in the USBIG NewsFlash in February 2008.

The unexpected success of Mike Huckabee in the Republican primaries has given a substantial boost to the small movement to replace all federal taxes with a national sales tax with an accompanying tax rebate in the form of a partial basic income (see story above). The basic income movement has been almost an entirely left-of-center movement since the 1980s, made up of mostly of people who want an equal society with much better, freer lives for the poor. I believe that most basic income supporters would like to have an ally on the other side of the political divide. Is the sales tax movement such an ally? Although I have no doubt that a basic income as small as the one proposed by the sales tax movement would be better than no basic income at all, there are two main reasons why the sales tax movement promotes something that is very difficult for most basic income supporters to endorse.

First, the stress of the sales tax movement is almost entirely on the benefits of income tax relief to try and discover if there is anything that could be done to help them. The tax rebate is included almost as an afterthought to cushion the blow on the poor, who currently pay little or no income taxes and would stand to lose significantly by a shift to sales taxes. Any motivation to help provide basic economic security is left out of the movement’s literature. The poor are expected to work, and adequate work is assumed to be available in the job market. As the sales tax movement sees it, the poor only have one problem-the government makes them pay taxes. If the government rebates their taxes, private employment provides everything they need. Even if we disagree with the motives of sales tax advocates, and even if their basic income is far too small, it is better to get some of what we want than nothing. That is, as long as the cost is not too high, which brings me to the next reason.

Second, sales tax advocates would only support a small basic income as part of a shift to the national sales tax, which supporters call “the fair tax.” But the sales tax has significant problems. The three most obvious measures of an individual’s economic standing are income, wealth, and consumption. Any one of these measures could provide a base for taxation: an income tax is obviously a tax on income; capital gains, wealth, and inheritance taxes fall on wealth; and a sales tax falls on consumption. What difference would it make to base federal taxation on sales? Savings (i.e. the accumulation of wealth) is the difference between income and consumption. If you make $30,000 and save $3,000, you spend $27,000. An income tax would tax you based on how much money you make; a sales tax would tax you based on the portion of that money you spend that year. Sales tax advocates call this fair because it encourages savings and because it supposedly taxes people how what they actually consume rather than on what they are able to consume. If someone is self-employed, paying their taxes can be a stressful thing when the tax month comes, and with the new changes, they may find themselves confused about how to do this if they sort their own taxes out, that is why the use of resources like Golden Apple Agency accounting services or services closer to their location, are used to support them during this time with any tax changes.

For most of us, there is no a big difference between income and savings. The poorest people tend to spend all of their income, and members of the middle class are lucky if they can put away 10 percent. But at higher levels of economic well-being, there is an enormous difference. The richer one is; the less one spends as a percentage of income. Therefore, the “fair” tax is regressive, making after tax incomes between the middle class and the wealthy less equal than before tax incomes. Supporters argue (fairly) that it will be no more regressive than the current system with all of its exemptions, but the sale tax is simply not a mechanism capable of making the system progressive. A government financed by a national sales tax will allow families to accumulate more and more wealth and the power that goes with it. They will be able to pass that wealth down for generations and generations with no interference from income or wealth taxation.

Sales tax advocates say that it is fair to tax people on what they actually consume rather than their potential to consume. Yet, the holding of wealth takes up resources that other people might as much as consumption does. If my family holds land as wealth, we block anyone else from using that land, but we would pay no sales tax on it. Under a sales tax, if a middle class man spends $50 to buy his son a baseball glove, he pays tax. But if a wealthy man spends $50 million to buy his son a professional baseball team-that’s investment spending, not consumption-he pays no tax. This is the “fair tax” in name only.

Even so, a national sales tax could be part of an overall progressive system if it was accompanied by a substantial basic income and some kind of tax that hits large dynastic family accumulations of wealth. Inheritance taxes and capital gains taxes don’t actually do that job very well, but there are two taxes that could, a tax on land value or a tax directly on wealth holdings (see Top Heavy by Ed Wolff). However, I fear that sales tax advocates would resist any changes in their preferred system that would make it progressive.

-Karl Widerquist, Oxford UK, February 2008

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‘Me too’ and the basic income guarantee

‘Me too’ and the basic income guarantee

On the evening of Sunday January 7, 2018, The Golden Globes Awards program aired. For those who may not know, this is a U.S. television program which airs each year and highlights the accomplishments of actors, directors, and others in the TV and movie industries. This year’s awards program was the first to be aired since the revelations about movie producer Harvey Weinstein surfaced.

For those who may not follow events in U.S. popular culture to the extent I do, Harvey Weinstein was a major Hollywood movie producer. It was revealed that he sexually harassed a number of women or engaged in other sexual transgressions. After it was revealed that he’d engaged in such behaviors, a number of other women came out to accuse other powerful men of sexually inappropriate behaviors of various kinds. In fact, a few of these revelations have had political ramifications.

In one case, they led to the resignation of U.S. Senator Al Franken, a Democrat from Minnesota. In another, they resulted in Doug Jones being the first Democrat the state of Alabama has sent to the U.S. Senate in 25 years. This cascade of revelations, following upon those about Harvey Weinstein, has been dubbed the “me too moment.”

Initially, much of the attention paid to the “me too moment” or, as some would argue, “me to movement” was focused on relatively privileged actors in Hollywood, although they weren’t necessarily that privileged when the sexual transgressions occurred. But eventually someone pointed out that movie stars or would-be stars aren’t the only working women who deal with sexual harassment and assault. Those working in restaurants, hotels, and other low wage industries do so on a daily basis, and whilst some can find a sexual harassment attorney, it can be difficult on their income to do so.

In fact, I’ve heard it said that women in low wage industries suffer the most. That’s because they can’t challenge those men they work with who engage in sexually inappropriate behaviors. Such challenges might result in these women losing their jobs. While listening to a discussion about the “me too movement” on the British Broadcasting Service (BBC), I heard a guest say that the way to empower women on the job is to pay them higher wages. Now I support paying women higher wages, but that might not be the best way to empower them to challenge sexually abusive men they work with. In fact, paying women more, although helpful in other respects, might make it harder for them to challenge such men.

As Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne point out in this paper, the cost of losing one’s job increases with one’s wage. Think about it. Suppose someone is volunteering their services. A volunteer is effectively working for a wage of 0 cents per hour. If this person decides not to volunteer, there is no pecuniary cost of doing so because they don’t forgo any money by ceasing to volunteer. The more money one makes from selling their labor, the more they give up if they quit their job. This is what I meant when I said “the cost of losing one’s job increases with one’s wage.” Quitting one’s job is, of course, one way of losing it.

Now suppose a woman is being sexually harassed on the job. There are a few of ways she might challenge this behavior. She could directly confront the person, she could report them to her boss, she could quit, or she could even contact some Colorado labor lawyers to get their opinion on the matter. Employment law is a tricky business but if a woman is being sexually harassed, something needs to be done. Some of these interventions on her part might get her fired. But is that morally correct? Should someone be fired if they are merely just bringing up the fact that they are being sexually abused? Quite a lot of people would argue this, and with the help and expertise of Employment Solicitors, the correct decision on whether this could be an “unfair dismissal” will soon be known. Of course, that’s if the woman wants to keep her job in the first place. If she quits, she’d lose her income just as she would if she were fired. And the bigger her income or wage was, the bigger the loss from being fired or quitting.

I think that if we want to empower women in their dealings with abusive employers, a way to do so is to provide them with a source of income they don’t have to sell their labor to receive. And the bigger we could get this non-wage income, the more we could empower them. This is because the income loss from quitting or being fired for challenging sexual abuse at work, would be made up to some extent by the non-wage income. Knowing this is the case might embolden women in their dealings with sexually abusive employers and co-workers. A generous BIG, assuming we could afford it, could serve this function well.

ALASKA’S BIG PARODIED IN THE SIMPSON’S MOVIE (from 2007)

This essay was originally published in the USBIG NewsFlash in November 2007.

 

Public awareness of BIG took a small step forward this summer when the Simpsons Movie made a joke about it. Homer and his family are greeted at the Alaskan border by an official who says, “Welcome to Alaska. Her ares a thousand dollars. We pay everyone in Alaska to let us destroy the environment.” It’s not the most flattering joke, but it makes a fair point about the oil-based dividend. Although taxes on the extraction of fossil fuels might be a good way to give firms an incentive not to over-exploit them, and although a BIG might be a good thing to do with those revenues for many reasons, a resource-linked BIG might make people more willing to accept environmentally damaging resource exploitation—thus partially counter-acting the exploitation-discouraging effects of the taxes. This is underlying moral behind the Simpsons’ joke, but it was funnier when they said it.

12.5% of state oil taxes go into the APF, which is invested in stocks and bonds. A portion of the returns on the fund are distributed to Alaskans each year. Of course, the Alaskan government does not pay people when they arrive in the state; Individuals must be residents in the state for a full year to be eligible for to receive dividends from the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF). But this is fairly within the confines of the writers’ license for a cartoon.

In one way the cartoon significantly understates the generosity of the APF Dividend. The APF gives the same dividend to every man, woman, and child in the state. Because of recent increases in the stock market to nearly 40 billion dollars, the principal of the APF grew by more than 17.1% for the fiscal year, according to Scripps Howard News Service. Because of this and recent years’ gains, the APF Dividend went up significantly again this year. APF checks this October and November were for $1,654, according to the Juneau Empire. The Simpsons arrived in Alaska with a family of five, and so the border guard could well have said, “Welcome to Alaska. Here’s $8,270.” In other words, the actual figure is eight times more generous the figure mentioned in the movie.

According to the Associated Press, “for many residents, the check is no joke. It means getting caught up on bills and supplementing income that for some is a week-to-week living in Alaska, where the cost of living is high in part because of its distance from shipping centers in the Lower 48 states.” People who have lived in Alaska since the first Dividends went out in 1982 have received a lifetime total of $27,536 in APF Dividends.

It is doubtful that mention in the Simpsons Movie will spark a campaign for a National Permanent Fund based on resource use throughout the United States. However, Albertans have been eyeing the APF with envy for years. Alberta is a Canadian Province a few hundred miles southeast of Alaska. Alberta has also had large oil revenues, but it lacks a mechanism like the APF to ensure that all Albertans benefit from them.

Allan A. Warrack, of the University of Alberta, writing in The Edmonton Journal on October 15, 2007, called for an Alaska-style dividend for Alberta. The province has a fund based on oil revenues, called the Heritage Fund, which was set up for similar reasons as the APF—to smooth out the province’s gains from the boom-and-bust oil industry. But there is one important difference. The Heritage Fund pays no dividends to individuals. Its earning go solely into the province’s general revenues. According to Warrack, this fact has caused Albertans to take much less interest in their fund than Alaskans. Much less has been invested in the Heritage Fund than in the APF, and Warrack argues, it has been less well managed. Warrack writes, “For about a quarter-century, the Alberta Heritage Fund was static in nominal value, [and] fell in purchasing power due to inflation.” The APF has steadily increased in both real and nominal value.

Warrack mentions that Alberta actually had a social dividend in the 1930s, under the government of the Social Credit party. Although it was short lived, the dividend was popular. Alberta tried it again with a one-time payment in 2005. Warrack writes, “Some right-leaning citizens viewed the government cash payments favourably because it meant there would be ‘less for the government to waste.’ Some left-leaning citizens favoured the payments on grounds of social equity—equal payment amounts meant the needy would get the same amount as the rich, though the value to the needy would be much higher. Still others said: ‘Just gimme the dough!’” Perhaps someday the joke will be, “Welcome to Alberta. Here’s 10,000 Canadian Dollars, eh?”

But even as Albertans envy the Alaska Dividend, Alaska lawmakers are coming under increasing pressure to divert dividend funds into general state spending. Each U.S. state receives a significant amount of funding from the U.S. Federal government based partly on the perceived needs of the state. According to Hal Spence, writing for the Peninsula Clarion and Morris News Service-Alaska, Federal lawmakers are reluctant to give money to the Alaska, when they perceive that it can afford to give large amounts of money away to residents each year. Spence believes this pressure will grow as the APF increases.

Warrack’s editorial can be found online at: https://www.cwf.ca/V2/cnt/commentaries_200710120811.php.
Information on the APF can be found on line at:

Home

Hal Spence’s story is on line at:

https://www.alaskajournal.com/stories/081907/hom_20070819001.shtml

And he can be reached at hspence@ptialaska.net.

-Karl Widerquist, Oxford, UK, November 1, 2007