Financing a UBI from existing benefits

Financing a UBI from existing benefits

by | Mar 10, 2017 | Opinion

Written by: Rahul Basu

It is often argued that the existing system of benefits is riddled with flaws, and a universal basic income would be preferable. Arguments made include the high cost of administration, the errors of exclusion (target group not receiving the benefit), the errors of inclusion (people wrongly receiving the benefit), corruption, and the cost of access for the beneficiary, which includes time, effort, and suffering degradation at the hand of bureaucracy. What this explanation doesn’t specify is under what conditions is targeting preferable, and when is universalization better?

Let’s take a simple model to examine some scenarios. Assume that a country has 1,000 residents and a per capita income of $50,000. It pays a benefit to 200 people, 20% of its population. The benefit (say free food) for each person is $5,000, 10% of the average income of the country. This would cost 2% of the GDP:

 

Population x Average income = Total income of country (GDP)
1,000 x $50,000 = $50,000,000 or $50 million
20% of Population x 10% of Average income = (20% x 10%) of Total income of country = 2%
200 x $5,000 = $1,000,000 = $1 million = 2% of $50 million

For the moment, let’s assume no administration costs or costs of access. Let’s also assume that 80 people (40% of the target group) do not receive the benefits, and instead the same number of people outside the target group wrongly receive the benefit. And everyone receives the full amount or nothing at all. Therefore, the scheme is correctly benefiting only 120 people (12% of the population (40% x 20% or 120/1,000)), and only $600,000 or 60% of the money is well spent (1.2% of GDP (60% x 2% or $0.6 million / $1.0 million)).

Suppose we withdraw this benefit and universalize it. Then each person in the country will receive a benefit of $1,000 or 2% of average income ($1 million / 1,000 or $1 million / $50 million). If we examine individual scenarios, we can draw up the following table:

  Benefit UBI Difference Pop Total
Beneficiaries $5,000 $1,000 -$4,000 120 -$480,000
Excluded group $0 $1,000 $1,000 80 $80,000
Wrongly inclusion $5,000 $1,000 -$4,000 80 -$320,000
Remaining $0 $1,000 $1,000 720 $720,000
Total       1,000 $0

A few things jump out. More beneficiaries have lost (120) compared to those who have gained (80). The total amount going to the beneficiary group is now $200,000, a reduction of $400,000. Further, no beneficiary is receiving the full $5,000. And while 80 individuals correctly suffer a reduction in undeserved benefits, another 720 outside the beneficiary group are receiving $1,000.

The other aspect to consider is political. While everyone is receiving the same amount, 720 of the 800 net beneficiaries of the UBI are probably not strongly concerned by a 2% increase in income. However, the losers, while only 200, are more highly motivated to defend the benefit, as it is proportionately a greater loss. Further, the 120 rightful beneficiaries are likely to have below average income. This is the central political challenge in universalizing existing benefits.

Under what scenario would the errors be large enough for universalization to make sense? One basic threshold could be set at where the total money going to the target beneficiary group does not diminish. Under what circumstances does this occur?

Let the target group be T% of the population and the proportion correctly included under the benefit is C% of the target group. In this situation, when T% = C%, the total amount received by beneficiaries will be the same under the benefit and universalization. In other words, the proportion of the target group to the population is the same as the proportion of those receiving benefits to the target group.

Let’s examine our earlier example of a benefit of 10% of average income to 20% of the population. If only 20% of the target group is receiving the benefit (20% of 200 = 40), then universalization will keep the total amount received by the target group constant.

  Benefit UBI Difference Pop Total
Beneficiaries $5,000 $1,000 -$4,000 40 -$160,000
Excluded group $0 $1,000 $1,000 160 $160,000
Wrongly inclusion $5,000 $1,000 -$4,000 160 -$640,000
Remaining $0 $1,000 $1,000 640 $640,000
Total       1,000 $0

This is a fairly strong condition. If 30% of the population benefits, universalization makes sense if less than 30% of the benefit amount is actually received by the beneficiaries. In other words, 70% is stolen, or the cost of access is high. Such poor implementation is unlikely to be found in any developed economy for a significant benefit. It may be possible to find such benefits in developing countries where the corruption may be high, and cost of access may be significant for some groups.

The essential result doesn’t change even if we assume that beneficiaries receive a part of the benefit (due to corruption or cost of access issues). In order to achieve the same total amount received by beneficiaries under universalization, the ratio of net amount received by beneficiaries to the total entitlement / spend should be equal or less than the ratio of beneficiaries to the population.

To take a simplified real life example, the Economic Survey of the Government of India discusses the desirability and feasibility of a UBI in depth. Appendix 2 of Chapter 9 estimates for the flagship Public Distribution Scheme (PDS), 36% was lost to corruption, 36% to the non-beneficiary group and 28% to the target group. It further estimates that 60% of the target group are receiving benefits, and that the target group is 40% of the population. Only 28% of the budget is being received by the target group of 40% of the population. Clearly, a UBI (which eliminates corruption as well), would ensure that 40% of the budget is received by 40% of the population that needs it most, which would be an improvement on the status quo. This assumes the budget is kept proportionate and numerous other considerations have been set aside (the entire food supply chain for example).

While these are examples, they bring out clearly the extreme inefficiency and corruption required to make substituting a benefit for a UBI a net positive for the target beneficiaries. There are other considerations of course.

Iran replaced its enormous fuel subsidy, which was largely benefiting the rich and industry, with a UBI of a lower aggregate amount. Similar subsidies that have been captured by the rich can be a fertile ground for such structures. The carbon tax + dividend proposal is one on similar lines. By not pricing carbon emissions, the rich are being provided a benefit by the state. A carbon tax eliminates the benefit, while the dividend universalizes it.

Advocates for replacing targeted benefits with a UBI have a high standard to meet, and must demonstrate that there is a net benefit from universalization of existing benefits.

 

About the author: Rahul Basu is a member of the Goenchi Mati Movement, which asks for minerals to be treated as a shared inheritance. Mining is the sale of the family gold. For fair mining, there must be zero loss mining, saving all mineral money in a permanent fund, and distribute the real income only as Citizens’ Dividend.

How basic income ends the poverty trap

How basic income ends the poverty trap

by | Feb 16, 2017 | Opinion

Written by: Derek Horstmeyer

Aside from the numerous societal benefits that Universal Basic Income (UBI) offers in the future as automation disrupts the nature of employment, we in the basic income movement should not forget the benefits it also offers in the immediate term.

Economists across the board, whether they focus on labor, corporate governance or environmental issues, love to see mechanisms and incentive systems designed so they are free of distortions. Our current national system in the US of assistance for the short-term unemployed and long-term unemployed is designed with incentive misalignment over different income levels. This is particularly evident on the lower end of the income distribution.

An individual who has just lost their job or an individual who continues to suffer long-term unemployment faces a daunting decision when posed with the prospect of taking on a new job. Many of these individuals may have been approached by executive search headhunters (PIXCELL – Chasseurs de Têtes Montreal Headhunters or a similar headhunter, for example) to take up a good position in a renowned company. On one hand, there are the wages associated with the new job and on the other there are is potential loss of federal and state assistance. CATO’s 1995 “The Welfare-Versus-Work Tradeoff,” estimates that a change in employment status from a part-time position (below the poverty line) to a full-time position at 18 dollars an hour might actually cost the individual a net of 5 to 10 thousand dollars a year due to a loss in state benefits.

These benefits that the individual may have to relinquish span numerous forms including cash assistance (Temporary Assistance to Needy Families), food assistance (SNAP), medical insurance (Medicaid) and housing assistance. And, one criticism of the Affordable Care Act is individuals just above the income cutoff for Medicaid are doing far worse when you consider the mandatory penalty they must pay as compared to those who are receiving Medicaid. It also might be worth thinking about those that do get Medicaid aren’t actually receiving the support for free. For instance, read over this article touching on avoiding medicaid estate recovery, a part of Medicaid some people look past or don’t even know about. If someone that was receiving Medicaid passes away, Medicaid could then actually legally possess your house to cover the costs, leaving living family members a lot worse for wear. The idea of these benefits and aids always seems to have some downfalls, but there can also be ways to navigate around them.

While the magnitude of the loss in state benefits that one suffers as their wages increase is debated, one thing that all economists agree on is that poverty traps are real. As an individual moves up the income ladder, there is a class of income where they would better off monetarily if they turn down a job (or a pay increase) because they must forfeit state benefits.

If we desire to have incentive alignment in our economic system, where every marginal amount of time worked by an individual leads to a marginal increase in total income, the poverty trap created by the welfare system is a major problem. Of course, there are a few ways to fix this issue. One is to just reduce the number of benefits that people receive on the lower end of the income distribution. This does not sound appealing seeing as the number of vulnerable people in the US may continue to increase as the nature of employment changes over time. The second way to handle this issue is to extend the ‘phase-out’ ranges, so people don’t lose as many benefits as they earn more income. This is more appealing, but only puts a band-aid on the issue and still allows for income ranges where incentive misalignment persists.

The third and final option is UBI. The beauty of universal basic income, paired with a negative income tax, is that these decisions to forgo work or a raise because of a loss in state benefits, are non-existent. In a UBI system, incentives are always aligned for the individual to accept a raise or to work an additional hour because it will always put more money in their pocket.

As work becomes more automated, it is important to highlight the wonders that UBI may serve us in the future. However, one should also not forget what UBI affords us today in terms of a system of welfare and assistance that is free of incentive misalignment.

About the author: Derek Horstmeyer is a professor at George Mason University School of Business, specializing in corporate finance. His research, which has garnered several awards, focuses on boards, governance and hedge fund activism. He has presented at conferences across the country as well as internationally, and is consistently rated a top professor by his undergraduate, MBA and EMBA students who have honored him with teaching awards.

Derek has a BS in Mathematics and Economics from the University of Chicago, an MS in Financial Mathematics from Stanford University and a PhD in Finance from the USC Marshall School of Business.

UBI needs peers to control services of general interest (part one)

UBI needs peers to control services of general interest (part one)

by | Feb 11, 2017 | Opinion

 

Written by: Katarzyna Gajewska

The argument that the system of peer production on a wide scale requires securing stable income for peers from the state is promoted, among others, by Michel Bauwens. In this article, I will argue that the reverse is also true. In order to be sustained, unconditional basic income (UBI) needs to be accompanied by changes in the realm of general interest services. This applies particularly to the domain of services of general interest that participate in the subsistence. Money transfer needs to be accompanied by de-commodification of subsistence measures.

Although UBI certainly would contribute to bettering the situation of the poor, it does not challenge the capitalist power relations. The domain of work and production is only one of the opportunities for the capitalist class to exploit inequalities and accumulate wealth. Other sources of wealth extraction are property rights, real estates, rent, access to natural resources, urban infrastructure, land grabbing. Elsewhere, I elaborate how, despite introducing a UBI, capitalist class domination would continue in the domain of subsistence1 and housing 2 if other elements of the system were preserved.

Technological unemployment due to robotization of production is indicated as one of the reasons for a UBI. Robotization would cause centralization of power in the hands of machine owners and technological elites. Since labor used to exercise influence on their wages through the threat of withdrawing from production, under the condition of technological unemployment it would lose its leverage.3 Therefore, adjusting the basic income to the level that enables a decent living would be increasingly difficult. On the other hand, the capital owning the means of production in the domain of services of general interest such as water, food, electricity, health or housing can demand higher prices once having dominant position, and there may even be additional costs for things like commercial water treatment products for businesses after the initial price is paid. Therefore, neoliberal pressure for privatization of subsistence-related services and goods is particularly dangerous. As a result of privatization, citizens can increasingly less meaningfully participate in the governance of general interest services, being left with the relatively passive roles of voter and client.4 The UBI movement needs to take this into account in formulating proposals for UBI reform, namely advocating for more democratic control over the means of subsistence.

Subsistence services in citizens’ hands: some inspirations

Representative democracy alone does not seem to prevent that services of general interest are privatized. Specific citizen mobilization around this issue is required. Three types of strategies can be pursued to bring more control over essential services: re-municipalization, overtake by citizen cooperatives, and commoning. I will give more space to the latter one because the two former have been described in other publications.

Remunicipalization

There are different models that incorporate the democratic dimension in the provision of services of general interest. For example, in water supply services privatization turned out to be dissatisfying for the customers both in terms of quality and prices. The book “HERE TO STAY: WATER REMUNICIPALISATION AS A GLOBAL TREND”5 analyzes examples of how this trend has been reverted by re-municipalization initiatives. It illustrates how significantly the quality can improve and prices lowered with the involvement of public authorities.

However, involving citizens in the process of decision making does not guarantee their influence on the final output. Incumbents’ initiatives in the realm of political participation do not seem to alleviate the democratic deficit. Participatory elements within the new public management and neo-Weberian state models can be motivated by the instrumental aim of overcoming resistance.6 Participatory and deliberative procedures can be used as ‘public relations’ tools by political elites to give citizens the illusion of engagement,7 so-called ‘participatory window-dressing.’8

Cooperatives

Citizens can organize to buy the infrastructure related to subsistence needs. In a small German town, Schoenau,9activists bought out electricity infrastructure to convert it into a cooperative of which citizens can buy shares. As an act of protest against the nuclear power, they turned to solar energy. Similar attempts have been undertaken by activists in Berlin to prevent the renewal of a contract with a multinational company of Swedish origin. Certainly, in the case of services that are sold on the market, there is a danger of degeneration of cooperative ideals due to the market pressure, which is quite common among worker and consumer cooperatives. Still it may be a better option in comparison to an accumulation of power in capitalist enterprises.

Commoning

The precariat, in the face of unresponsive state institutions, prefers the self-organized provision of services in order to become autonomous of these institutions.10 Heynen11 argues that the realm of social rights and the welfare state has diminished in recent decades in the US, so social movements have invented other forms of pursuing their struggles. Instead of trusting that delegation to the state will ensure the provision of public services and redistribution, activists create services themselves. For instance, Food Not Bombs produces and redistributes food. Furthermore, representatives of the recent generation of social movements believe that creating alternatives rather than reforming the system is a better way to bring about change, which reflects the mistrust of and awareness of the danger of cooptation by elitist politics and institutions.12 Activists focus on the ‘here and now’, practicing alternative forms of production and organization parallel to the state-based and market-based ones as everyday ‘revolutions.’13 For example, the domain of food-producing resources, although now mostly privatized, can be organized in a different way. In ancient times and still nowadays there are various communal arrangements in some parts of the world.14

In articles on People’s Potato, I describe a worker cooperative that coordinates the preparation of partly dumpster-dived food with the help of volunteers. Financed by fee levies, the meals are distributed for free. This type of the organization of food provision can be defined as peer production, which means a voluntary, spontaneous, and inclusive work contribution to produce a good or service in common that serves a broader community. Peers produce use value that is accessible even to those that have not contributed to its production. Initiatives such as Food Not Bombs or Incredible Edible follow similar philosophy. In the article on technological unemployment and work, I describe further initiatives of self-organized services: retirees time bank in Germany and subsistence cooperative in Catalonia.15 One could expect to optimize the costs and use of resources by restructuring production into commons. Las Indias’ Manifesto demonstrates potential gains that can be achieved by escaping the capitalist organization of production. Kibbutz movement managed to increase productivity and reduce the use of water in agriculture.16

Basic Income movement for other causes

“All we can ask of politics is to create the spaces in which the alternative social practices can develop.”17

Joining other movements in demanding the democratization of services, UBI movement could focus on a twofold struggle: mobilization against the privatization of services and for the re-appropriation of spaces for citizen participation and self-organization.

Elinor Ostrom argued in favor of creating institutional arrangements ‘for cooperative housing and neighborhood governance (…) to facilitate co-productive efforts for monitoring and exercising control over public spaces.’18Kooiman presents a model of ‘societal governance,’ a mix of self-governance, co-governance, and hierarchical governance.19

Bovaird predicts that the governance system may evolve into ‘self-organizing policy and service delivery systems – ‘governance without government.”20 The progressive theories of public administration have a vision of public administration that is ‘collaborative, facilitative, or transformational social role in support of citizen emancipation and self-governance.’ This type of re-conceptualization of the role of public administration has a longer tradition in the feminist movement and in the 2000s several authors have postulated this direction of change.21 In an academic article, I propose a change to the tax system. Taxpayers could allocate certain part of the due taxes to the organizations of their choice. In this way, the organizations can plan their yearly budget and produce as much as the collected sum allows.22 Also laws facilitating the access to unused spaces would make it easier for the self-organizing groups to start commons projects.

The example of People’s Potato, which struggles against corporate monopoly in food provision at Concordia University in Montreal, illustrates that the mobilization although it requires true determination, can begin now, case by case. I summarized the relations between People’s Potato, commercial food providers, and the university administration in another article:

“People’s Potato discovered that part of kitchen space previously used by Sodexho/Marriot was vacant, while the major part was overtaken by Chartwells. They started to use this space for their cooking. For another two years, People’s Potato struggled with the administration to get official use of the space. It is equipped with all necessary industrial kitchen facilities. The university charges the Potato for some repairs, like painting or heavy maintenance, but they pay all of their other utilities, such as garbage removal, electricity and hot water. The status of the collective within the university structure is ambiguous and there is always a fear of losing support from other organizations and the kitchen space as no official contract has been signed. “23

Instead of waiting for a more serious debate on UBI among political elites where activists could present a more encompassing reform, the change can arise from single initiatives. Späth and Rohracher point to the power of local experiments, which can mobilize actors. Niches, spaces protected from economic pressures can develop into full-fledged models for change. The local level change is possible in ‘off the radar’ spaces for interests of dominant economic actors. In this way, it is easier to overcome the problem of nested interests preventing change. Furthermore, institutional voids can enable introducing new practices.24

 

About the author: Katarzyna Gajewska is an independent writer. She has a PhD in Political Science and has published on alternative economy and innovating the work organization since 2013. You can find her non-academic writing on such platforms as Occupy.com, P2P Foundation Blog, Basic Income UK, Bronislaw Magazine and LeftEast. For updates on her publications, you can check her Facebook page or send her an e-mail: k.gajewska_comm@zoho.com. If you would like to support her independent writing, please make a donation to the PayPal account at the same address!

 

References:

1Gajewska, Katarzyna (2014): Technological Unemployment but Still a Lot of Work: Towards Prosumerist Services of General Interest. Journal of Evolution and Technology 24(1): 104-112.

2Gajewska, Katarzyna (May 2014) : UBI and Housing Problem, https://basicincome.org.uk/2014/05/housing-power-land/

3Gajewska, Katarzyna (2014): Technological Unemployment but Still a Lot of Work: Towards Prosumerist Services of General Interest. Journal of Evolution and Technology 24(1): 104-112.

4 Elinor Ostrom, “A Communitarian Approach to Local Governance,” National Civic Review (Summer 1993): 226-233.

5HERE TO STAY: WATER REMUNICIPALISATION AS A GLOBAL TREND :https://www.tni.org/files/download/heretostay-en.pdf

6 William N. Dunn and David Y. Miller, “A Critique of the New Public Management and the Neo-Weberian State: Advancing a Critical Theory of Administrative Reform,” Public Organization Review 7 (December 2007) 345-358, 355.

7 Léon Blondiaux, “L’idée de démocratie participative: enjeux, impensés et questions récurrentes,” In M.-H. Bacqué et al. (eds), Gestion de proximité et démocratie participative. (Paris: La découverte, 2005). Léon Blondiaux and Yves Sintomer, “L’impératif délibératif,” Politix 15.57 (2002): 17–35.

8 Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, “Countervailing Power in Empowered Participatory Governance,” in Deepening Democracy (London/New York: Verso, 2003), 265.

9Elektrizitätswerke Schönau Netze, https://www.ews-schoenau.de/

10 Christophe Trombert, “Expertise professionnelle et contre-expertise militante dans l’accès aux droits sociaux: tension à front renversé autour du général et du singulier,” SociologieS, Théories et recherches, 25 June 2013. URL : https://sociologies.revues.org/4360

11 Nik Heynen, “Cooking Up Non-violent Civil-disobedient Direct Action for the Hungry: ‘Food Not Bombs’ and the Resurgence of Radical Democracy in the US,” Urban Studies 47(6 2010): 1225–1240.

12 cf. Day, “From Hegemony to Affinity.”

13 Marco Silvestro and Pascal Lebrun, “La révolution à l’échelle humaine, une radicalité actuelle concrète,” Argument 12 (Spring-Summer 2010).

14Vivero, Jose Luis (2015) : Transition Towards a Food Commons Regime: Re-Commoning Food to Crowd-Feed the World, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2548928

15Gajewska, Katarzyna (2014): Technological Unemployment but Still a Lot of Work: Towards Prosumerist Services of General Interest, Journal of Evolution and Technology 24(1): 104-112.https://jetpress.org/v24/gajewski.htm

16Las Indias’ Communard Manifesto, https://lasindias.com/the-communard-manifesto-html

17Gorz, A. (1999): Reclaiming Work: Beyond the Wage-based Society. Cambridge: Polity, p. 79.

18Ostrom, Elinor (1993): A Communitarian Approach to Local Governance, National Civic Review Summer, 226-233, 232.

19Kooiman, J. (2000): Societal Governance: Levels, Modes, and Orders of Social-political Governance. In Jon Pierre (ed.) Debating Governance: Authority, Steering and Democracy, (pp. 138–64). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

20Bovaird, Tony (2005): Public governance: balancing stakeholder power in a network society. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 71(2), 217–228, p. 226.

21Stout, Margaret (2010): Back to the Future: Toward a Political Economy of Love and Abundance, Administration & Society 42(1): 3–37.

22Gajewska, Katarzyna (2014): Peer production and prosummerism as a model for the future organization of general interest services provision in developed countries: examples of food services collectives. World Future Review 6(1): 29-39.

23Gajewska, Katarzyna (30 June 2014): There is such a thing as a free lunch: Montreal Students Commoning and Peering food services. P2P Foundation Blog, https://blog.p2pfoundation.net/there-is-such-a-thing-as-a-free-lunch-montreal-students-commoning-and-peering-food-services/2014/06/30

24P. Späth, H. Rohracher (2012): Local demonstrations for global transitions – Dynamics across governance levels fostering regime change. In: European Planning Studies 20(3), pp. 461-479.

 

Che Wagner, “The Swiss Universal Basic Income Vote 2016: What’s Next?”

Che Wagner, “The Swiss Universal Basic Income Vote 2016: What’s Next?”

by | Feb 11, 2017 | News

The following is an abstract from Che Wagner, the co-director of the Swiss Campaign for Basic Income, for his Medium article “The Swiss Universal Basic Income Vote 2016: What’s Next?“

On June 5, 2016 all Swiss citizens were asked if they would like to amend their federal constitution with a Universal Basic Income (UBI). The proposal was declined, but the campaign not only prepared us for future discussions on social welfare in Switzerland, it also gave us the key insights for how we can talk about the future of work and income in general.

In analyzing the voting results along with representative surveys asking voters why they voted for/against UBI, we learn about how much it matters how we speak about UBI and in what context of contemporary society. Additionally, with those reflections we are able to detect some patterns of “key groups” who might play a major role in pushing the framework of UBI further.

Lastly, the question remains: What’s next? In the case of Switzerland, there were strong indications that most voters want the debate about UBI to continue, even if they voted against the proposal. One way to continue would be to set up trials or experiments on local levels and survey’s show a high approval rate for that. Lately, there had been a series of meetings and discussions about setting up experiments in various places in Switzerland. But there still remains the question: what would be a set-up that would make sense – both on a political agenda and a international scientific agenda. It will be most crucial to discuss premise and purpose before the set-up is done. For the UBI debate is certainly a global phenomenon and will leave marks on both sides of the Atlantic.

For the full article:

Che Wagner, “The Swiss Universal Basic Income Vote 2016: What’s Next?“, Medium, Feb. 8, 2017.

Comments on Jacobin’s “The UBI Bait and Switch”

by | Jan 30, 2017 | Opinion

“The UBI Bait and Switch” by Bruenig, Jauhiainen, and Mäkinen: A Critical Response

By Otto Lehto, political economist, King’s College London; former chairman of BIEN Finland (2015-2016).

A recent article in Jacobin Magazine on the Finnish UBI experiment is mostly an accurate and well-researched piece of journalism. I was especially impressed by its fastidious attention to detail in its account of the timeline of events leading up to the experiment. However, as someone well-acquainted with Finnish UBI experiment, allow me to bring another perspective on the matter. Jacobin Magazine has all the right to be as firebrand leftist as it wants to be. No question, the rhetoric of the commentary is in line with its socialist ethos. But I would just like to point out a few things that are inaccurate or misleading.

I, too, have written about the government’s proposal in harsh and unforgiving tones in the past, so I really can’t fault them for that. The experiment, let us not mince words, is badly mangled, expert advice is ignored or distorted, and the government coalition’s commitment to any form of basic income is half-hearted, with the gracious exception of a few MP’s. The narrow focus on reducing unemployment and increasing workforce incentives is unfortunate. It becomes tragic when one realises that this ideological agenda drowns out the human rights perspective.

But this is where it gets tricky to fully agree with the Jacobin article’s apocalyptic spin. It describes the current experiment as a “UBI-as-workhouse nightmare”. Now hold on a minute. A workhouse is a place where you must work in exchange for basic amenities. This is a preposterous description of the UBI proposals and experiments underway today. Even under the most critical lens, the (partial) UBI model under experimentation in Finland, while obviously targeted too narrowly and with too many exclusions, significantly reduces the “workhouse nightmare” nature of the benefit system.

What are we to make of the conundrum? It would be useful to separate the general political ambitions of the Sipilä government and the UBI experiment itself. The Sipilä government has an admittedly “schizophrenic” attitude towards basic income. While, on the one hand, it is committed to seeing through the UBI experiment, it is simultaneously, via other channels, pushing for stringent workfare conditionality. These draconian practices – nonsense baked in the tears of unemployed people – are truly deplorable, even from the point of view of austerity itself, i.e. even if one believes the anti-Keynesian line that one must balance the budget when national output is down. The proposed and enacted cuts are disproportionately hurting poor people, relative to the cuts affecting the mid income and high income sectors. The richest people have even been given delicious tax cuts, while students, pensioners, sick people, disabled people and others have suffered.

All that is worth criticising. Some other enactments of the government, like drastically deregulating the opening hours of stores, or shaking the stiff and moribund government monopoly on alcohol sales, I personally find most welcome developments. But all things considered, the general direction of the austerity program, and the government’s attitude towards poor people, leaves a lot to be desired. But I would argue that one shouldn’t judge the UBI experiment on this basis.

I will concede that the general ethos of the Sipilä government certainly permeates the parameters of the experiment. The limits of the experiment were decided after the 2015 elections. The result is a predictable beast built upon the sorrowful soil of a Protestant work ethic that fetishises work incentives and bemoans the metaphysical sinfulness of laziness. It involves the misguided and conscious exclusion of people who are either too old or too young, or who are not currently recipients of the mainline unemployment benefit. This distorts the experiment from the start.

But here’s something to consider. The only people for whom the current UBI experiment is a significant welfare-reduction are people who fulfill all of the following criteria: 1) they happen to be long-term unemployed, 2) they happen to be taking part in the UBI lottery and 3) they happen to have received a slightly higher level of benefit from the state in the past. The diversity of benefits in Finland translates to a diversity of levels of income security, with some people relatively well-off while others receiving pennies (if anything at all). The universal UBI level of approximately €560 can be a reduction to people who have received approximately €650 in the past. The UBI is topped off with housing benefits and other types of discretionary benefits. But a few will obviously be net losers in any equalizing scheme. This is understandable. But this hardly qualifies as a “workhouse nightmare.” In fact, the reduction in quantity comes with many obvious upsides that may or may not compensate for the marginal reduction in the absolute level of welfare income for some people.

Even with net-losers mixed in with net-gainers (in a yet-to-be-determined proportion), the proposed UBI model is an improvement over the current system in almost every respect: 1) it is given automatically and without hassle (for the duration of the experiment), 2) it provides a long-term safety net (a steady shower rather than a drizzle of sporadic benefits) and 3) it is not withheld from people who take up part-time or full-time work (thus improving work incentives). I will surely not need to enumerate for my audience the other well-known benefits of a non-utopian UBI system.

In fact, since the tax system hasn’t (yet) been reformed to account for the UBI system, those lucky participants in the experiment who find employment, full-time or part-time, will also gain significantly in terms of post-tax income. To this extent the experiment is arguably too generous. The tax system obviously needs to be reformed as well, since money doesn’t just grow on trees.

But there’s another thing. Some of the aims of the utopian left, as evinced by this piece, are just contradictory or confused. One cannot simultaneously call for more legal power to the unions, in the style of the old corporatist model of the Nordic welfare state, and to call for a truly universal basic income guarantee. This, however, is the paradoxical cry of the Jacobin piece, whose logic I simply cannot comprehend. The power of the unions has been traditionally very strong in Finland. This has meant, e.g., the legally protected collective bargaining of wages and benefits. For all the good this has brought to industry-insiders, this has meant very little for people outside the framework. It has created a natural opposition between “inside” and “outside” groups: the “insiders” being the members of the protection racket of the unions and the employer’s associations, who receive good and generous benefits, while the “outsiders” being all the other people that fall outside the “standard” model of employment. The insiders have received semi-automatic and hassle-free benefits for a long time, while outsiders have suffered from the “workhouse nightmare” of the discretionary welfare bureaucracy. The guarantee of a non-union-based unemployment and sick leave benefit scheme in the form of a UBI naturally chips away at the monopolistic power of unions to determine who deserves what, when and under what conditions. This is a good thing.

Out of the four demons conjured by the authors of the Jacobin article in the concluding paragraph – “forcing unemployed workers into bad jobs while undermining organized labor, earnings equality, and the welfare state” – the first one, about forcing people into bad jobs, is simply false (nobody is forced under the UBI system to accept any bad jobs, either de jure or de facto); the second one, about undermining organized labor, is actually a mixed blessing (since it actually helps “outsiders” gain benefits at a cost to “insiders”); the third one, about earnings equality, is something that the authors give no reason to think is threatened by the experiment (and indeed, it seems like a complete throwaway line); and the fourth point, about undermining the welfare state, is a tad question-begging.

The real question is, which structures should be reformed and which not. The existing welfare state has obviously failed in many ways to provide effective welfare for all people, and it is impossible to reform the system (for the better) without breaking a few eggs.

If the accusation is levelled at the other stuff the Sipilä government is doing, or the broken moral compass of the austerity crowd, the accusation sticks much better. But I have tried to show these should be kept separate. The UBI experiment is, indeed, severely compromised as a result of a confluence of factors. It survives, barely, within narrow ideological bounds. But the important thing is that the experiment tests the waters for a paradigm shift – slowly, ineluctably.

Even a compromised UBI marks a steady improvement over the status quo in almost all conceivable dimensions. And those are just the conceivable dimensions.

Reviewed by Kate McFarland

Photo: Finland’s “frozen waves”, CC BY-ND 2.0 Marjaana Pato