The news is written by Chen Xixi and modified by Furui cheng
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In the ‘International Basic Income Week’, we three sophomores in CUPL (China University of Political Science and Law) organized an online feature academic report about basic income with Furui Cheng, our academic tutor, on September 13, 2020. The participants included some juniors and seniors, and we are all from financial department of the Business School.
The seminar has two main agendas: the first is a presentation of one very good chapter about Social Dividend of Alaska ‘How Alaska helped Staunch be fouling by mismanaged oil wealth: a lesson for other oil rich nations’ in Jay Hammond’s autobiography by Yu Yang, Huang Xinyi, and Chen Xixi; the second is free comments and discussion of the social dividend governance mechanism. Here are the details of the seminar.
Chen Xixi:
Our report has mainly three aspects: the first part is the background, the second part is the operating mechanism, and the third part is some enlightenment for other countries.
Background 1: Alaska is a state rich in natural resources. In the beginning, oil producers mainly focused on some infrastructure projects, which had greatly expanded domestic spending and so caused inflation to soar and left a mountain of debt. So even though Alaska was rich in resources, the life of the poor did not improve at that time.
Background 2: Alaskan fishermen were dissatisfied with the monopoly that the Seattle tycoons actually enjoyed. When they used fishing gear, because this fishing monopoly benefited a few beneficiaries but sacrificed the interests of many people. Therefore, at that time, many fishermen had a very bad life and lacked services. So, there was a proposal to ban fishing nets, but it was overturned because of various unconstitutionality.
A report slide about several failed practices before the permanent fund
Background 3: The bumpy process of the permanent fund project. The first was that a tax system with the Bristol Bay Company as the main concept was proposed at that time. The main content of such a tax system was to deposit taxes in a relatively conservatively managed investment account, and then distributed a new dividend stock to residents every year. But in the end this tax system ended in failure.
Immediately after, two new regulations were proposed for use tax and the abolition of residential business tax. This was considered a transitional measure to compensate fishermen for their losses. Then such a new regulation was approved because it met the expectations of the people. Then, once again proposed to the legislature a tax system with the Bristol Bay Company as the main concept. But it still ended in failure.
And the country did not follow the concept of fair share distribution proposed by Bristol Bay Company to form a single investment portfolio, but formed companies in more than 200 villages and about 14 regions. Besides, the board of directors was composed of local leaders. This made many lawyers and people who made high salaries in the company happy. In the end, many companies were also on the verge of bankruptcy due to the lack of large capital investment, nepotism and rural policies. This model eventually collapsed. In fact, the failure of this model was mainly because his politics was not separated from the economy and so an independent financial operation system was not formed.
Then they further proposed a fair tax system. Its content was to first determine the state’s per capital property value, and then in this community, if there are some people whose revenue generated by the tax are less than they should be, the state will provide funds for the difference. Conversely, if the income generated by the resident’s 3% tax exceeds the excess income, the excess income will be owned by the state. According to such a fair tax system, all places would be levied the same tax, which meant that the impact on everyone is the same, whether it was the poor or the rich. However, such a fair taxation system eventually met with opposition.
Then, they passed the so-called Alaska permanent fund. It just cut the proposed 50% of the oil lease bonus, royalties and severance payment to 25%, and the severance payment, which accounted for about half of the oil wealth income, was canceled and flowed into the general fund instead. In this way, there was no way to form permanent financial assets. This was also the initial establishment of an Alaska permanent fund. Then they proposed dividend plan and annuity account. The main content of these two proposals was to pay dividends according to the length of residence of the residents. They were approved.
Finally, in 1980, the national government allocated funds to establish the Alaska State Permanent Fund. The bill also proposed that the board of directors is independently responsible for the operation of the permanent fund. In 1982, the Alaska State Legislature also passed a resource fund dividend plan, and then such a permanent fund was formally established.
Yu Yang:
Next, I will talk about the main ideas and governance mechanisms of the Alaska Permanent Fund.
Its main idea is to avoid excessive waste of resources by establishing a permanent fund. Extract a portion of the income from oil proceeds to the descendants of Alaskans, and convert some of the oil income into permanent and sustainable financial assets.
Then keep resource revenue away from politicians to prevent politicians from wasting resource revenue on government operations and investment projects.
Beginning in 1976, Alaska’s referendum decided to set up a permanent fund to allocate at least 25% of the state’s oil resources and related income to the permanent fund, stipulating that the legislative department has full power to dispose of the income of the permanent fund, but the capital of the permanent fund, the legal department must keep it intact.
Then, in 1978, the legislature decided to establish two corporate entities, the Alaska Enterprise Investment Corporation and the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation. The Alaska Enterprise Investment Corporation mainly creates short-term benefits for Alaskan citizens and provides financing support for small and medium-sized production-oriented private enterprises and community development projects. Alaska permanent fund company has a large amount of income into the account, but the type of investment it can be given strict restrictions, that is, the prudent investment rules of the common law are used to guide investment. Then it was stipulated in the 1980 bill that 50% of the income from the leasing of mineral resources should be invested in the fund.
The establishment of a permanent constitutional amendment stipulates that at least 25% of the royalties from all natural resource income owned by the state shall be placed in the fund, and the fund shall only be used for investments that can bring asset returns. The implementation of the withdrawal rules means approximately 10% of oil revenue is placed in the fund, and other insignificant mineral revenues are also included. In addition to the royalty savings provided by the constitutional amendments, the size of the fund also increases with legal appropriations. The annual savings make up for the depreciation of the true value of the fund due to the effect of inflation.
Finally, the management of the fund belongs to an independent company, led by a carefully calculated board of directors, and is focused on maximizing the financial returns of the fund. The company’s operations are independent of state revenues and have not been involved in any disputes involving the optimal use of funds. The decision is controlled by the legislature.
The then Governor of Alaska, Jay Hammond, suggested that the annual income of the fund should be distributed according to the requirements of an Alaska Corporate Plan. Citizens of Alaska can enjoy the income of the fund every year. The distribution standard depends on the residence period of Alaska up to 25 years. Residents who live for one year can enjoy a share, and residents who live for two years can Get two shares, and so on. Half of the income of the Alaska Fund is equally distributed to each resident each year. In order to make the program sustainable, the Alaska permanent fund dividend is paid in the form of ordinary income rather than fund income. Citizens of Alaska can get a corresponding share from the permanent fund dividend distribution every year. This fund is composed of public oil revenues. As the fund appreciates, the scale of annual dividends also increases.
Huang Xinyi:
If other countries want to apply this model of Alaska, the government should consider the following three questions according to its own situation. One is whether the government has to decide whether to collect rents on privatized resources, and the second is whether the government has to decide whether to create a permanent fund. Third, the government has to decide whether to distribute dividends and what proportion of the proceeds will be used for dividends.
Next, I will take Iraq as an example to talk about how to extend the permanent fund to other countries. Historically, every revolution in Russia, China, France, and the United States was triggered by the gap between the rich and the poor. Take Iraq as an example Under Saddam’s rule, the upper-class lives are rich, the bottom lives are dirty, oil wealth makes a few people fat, but most people are still starving. Transferring part of the country’s oil wealth to citizens and reducing the gap between rich and poor may help prevent further chaos.
What should Iraq do? Alaska’s permanent fund has some major shortcomings, and Iraq should avoid repeating the same mistakes. For example, the dividend plan of Alaska failed to deposit all the state government income that Alaskans received from oil wealth into the people’s account, and did not use their income for other purposes than dividends. Instead, most of it went to the state government. When oil prices rose, the state government succumbed to the interim bill to abolish income taxes and squandered oil revenues. Therefore, the Alaska government today is facing a serious crisis and deficit gap. Iraq should handle this income more appropriately and deposit it in the people’s account or other purposes, instead of spending it lavishly by the government.
How should China learn from the Alaska permanent fund model? China’s resource-abundant regions can establish a distribution model similar to fund management to effectively manage resource returns, so that they can continue to increase in value. Fund income can be managed through investment companies for investment management, which can increase the value of the fund and turn the fund into a sustainable financial asset. The supervisory body of the fund can be supervised by another financial institution or such as the central bank. The account of fund income is open to residents of resource-based areas by investment companies on a regular basis.
The proceeds of this resource fund can be used for the following investments. The first is the investment in human capital, through fund income to increase the level of human capital investment, promote the accumulation of human capital, increase the investment in education funds in resource-based areas, and cultivate technical and professional talents. Increase the supply of human capital and attract and retain senior talents through preferential conditions. The second is investment in technological innovation. Resource-based regions have a single industrial structure, are highly dependent on resources, and have relatively weak technological innovation capabilities. Fund proceeds are used to support technological innovation in resource-based regions. The third is the investment in urban infrastructure, using fund proceeds to invest in infrastructure in resource-based areas, especially urban infrastructure. The last is to support the development of private enterprises. Fund proceeds are used for investment in private enterprises in resource-based areas, encourage and support the establishment of private enterprises, and implement preferential policies for private enterprises.
In fact, the Alaska dividend model has many applications in various countries. I think the social dividend practice in Alaska has a general enlightening significance for the management of public resources. In fact, Venezuela, Brazil, South Africa, Israel and New Mexico in the United States have all advocated the establishment of social dividend like Alaska. Europe has a stronger movement to promote social dividends, which they like to call “basic income.”. The British government has officially run the children’s trust fund in 2004 to establish a capital account for every child born after January 1, 2004. In fact, many rural areas in China have implemented the community stock cooperation system for many years, which is the “local social dividend” based on the value-added income of collective land. In fact, the system conditions for implementing social dividend in China are more favorable than those in many countries, because we have a large proportion of public assets, and we do not need to make many complicated tax designs like other countries.
Furui Cheng:
Alaska’s social dividend practice is very important, not only because it is so far the only real human social policy on the way, not just as an experiment, but has been implemented for almost 40 years! Its implication to future public policy and the use of public resources may have similar importance to land revolution.
Why establish a social dividend fund? And how? What is the difference between this kind of funds and others in the aspect of governance mechanism? How to ensure the sustainability of the funds? How to decide the priority between Dividend and public services? How to avoid the expropriation of the capital and its revenue by different interest groups? And so on. In the process of answering these questions, we are doing this work in the context of reforms in the political, economic, legal, social and cultural spheres.
As undergraduates, I hope you are aware of the frontier issues, reflect on the classics, and foster the ability to change the status quo.
Innovations for Poverty Action has published a research paper, ‘Effects of a Universal Basic Income During the Pandemic’.
We examine some effects of Universal Basic Income (UBI) during the COVID-19 pandemic using a large-scale experiment in rural Kenya. Transfers significantly improved well-being on common measures such as hunger, sickness and depression in spite of the pandemic, but with modest effect sizes. They may have had public health benefits, as they reduced hospital visits and decreased social (but not commercial) interactions that influence contagion rates. During the pandemic (and contemporaneous agricultural lean season) recipients lost the income gains from starting new non-agricultural enterprises that they had initially obtained, but also suffered smaller increases in hunger. This pattern is consistent with the idea that UBI induced recipients to take on more income risk in part by mitigating the most harmful consequences of adverse shocks.
Mongolia is an East Asian country located between the two giant powers of the world: China in the South, and Russia in the north. As a classic example of a mineral-rich developing country, Mongolia has an export-driven economy in which 90% of the exports come from its minerals[1].
The country’s quick and vigorous action on preventing the spread of COVID-19 resulted in a notable success in fighting the pandemic so far. The country has relatively few cases with 310 confirmed cases and still no deaths in the middle of September 2020. But this success has come at a price.
According to the UN, in the first quarter of 2020, Mongolia’s economy contracted by 10.7 per cent, and government revenue fell by 8.6 per cent year on year, whilst expenditure went up 19.3 per cent[2]. On the other hand, the country struggles to boost its export-driven economy that is tightly tied to China. Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates show that Mongolia will suffer significant investment and consumption shocks in addition to negative global demand spillovers in 2020. In addition to that, there is mounting international debt[3].
However, Mongolia is an interesting country that the world can learn some lessons from regarding the role of states in the ongoing health crisis of COVID-19. The country perhaps was the first developing country that introduced a resources-to-cash scheme[4], and with the COVID crisis this scheme is back on the agenda.
With the outbreak of COVID-19 during the winter of 2019-2020, Mongolian citizens were promised a cheque of up to 96,480 tugrugs (USD 34), but this promise was not a usual handout like in other countries. Mongolians who were born before April 11th 2014 are shareholders of a company called Erdenes Tavan Tolgoi (ETT) that manages a massive coal deposit on the state’s behalf; do these cash payments are dividends distributed by the company to its shareholders[5].
In 2019, the company made USD 1 billion and 30 million from its sales. For this reason, the dividend per share was calculated to be MNT 90, which results in MNT 96 thousand being given to each individual’s 1,072 shares. Minister D.Sumiyabazar said that the amount of the dividend will be raised further if the company’s revenue goes up[6].
As mentioned above, this resource-to-cash payment was not a new experience for Mongolians. In 2004, the government started to experiment with universal resource-financed payments for children. In 2010, the child-oriented payments were replaced with the new Human Development Fund (HDF) that was financed from mining dividends to provide a universal basic income that was paid monthly to every citizen. Mongolians monthly received MNT 21 thousand between 2010 and 2012 through the HDF. This experience provided a unique perspective on public ownership and revenue sharing in the mineral sector as citizens got a direct and equal share of their country’s wealth as co-owners of their country[7].
However, these payments were based on election promises and resulted in a vast deficit in the HDF as the expenditures were exceeding the actual mineral revenues[8]. In 2012, HDF was stopped and child-oriented payments were brought back.
On the other hand, in 2011, through a new scheme, every citizen received 1,072 shares in the ETT. Mongolians could use these shares for different purposes including tuition fees for students, health insurance coverage, or cash through a stock repurchase program by the government. Around 1.08 million Mongolians have kept all their shares and are entitled to a full dividend payout of MNT 96,480 (USD 34)[9].
Although these cash transfers have reduced poverty and inequality, and increased the transparency of the company’s actions and performance, the experience has taught the important lesson that it is not enough just to give cash payouts if the scheme is poorly designed and implemented[10]. As mentioned above, these cash payments have been used as tools to win elections, and this has resulted in an increased debt and an increase in inflation. In this regard, in 2019 the country passed an Election Law that prohibited the political parties from using the promise of cash transfers for elections.
Although the cash payments that were promised a few months ago are different from the previous cash transfers, as “The board (of ETT) has approved for the first time to distribute dividends to shareholders according to the Company Law. In the past, the state used its preferential rights to buy stakes from some people in cash. This time, it’s not a cash payout but a legal dividend distribution”, Minister D.Sumiyabazar said[11], we can still see something of the old tendency: a connection between elections and cash transfers.
On May 1, it was announced by the Minister of Mining and Heavy Industry that 100 thousand MNT was going to be distributed, but one month later there was still no payment. Erdenes Tavan Tolgoi company had already transferred 60 billion MNT to Mongolian Central Securities Depository but it is obvious that the government was holding it up due to the parliamentary election[12].
As we can see, the Mongolia experiment contains very important lessons in regard to the resource-to-cash payments. This experience underlines the importance of independent institutions from governments being tasked with the distribution of basic income type payments. If we understand these experiences and learn from them, it could provide a new perspective for governments in their fight with COVID-19.
Despite all kind of criticism regarding the government’s approach on resource-to-cash payments; people are losing their jobs, hopes, and voices all over the world, and this kind of resource-to-cash scheme gives a sense of certainty and security to people (without the burden of stigmatization), especially in such uncertain and volatile times.
COVID-19 doesn’t distinguish between rich or poor, and neither can we. More than ever we need schemes that don’t differentiate between people, because in these unprecedented times no-one knows if they will be the next one who is going to be affected by this crisis one way or another.
Originally published by Open Democracy. 14 August 2020, under the title, “Basic income could virtually eliminate poverty in the United Kingdom at a cost of £67 billion per year”
Universal Basic Income (UBI) – a policy that would provide a regular, cash income to every citizen without means test or work requirement – is surprisingly inexpensive. The United Kingdom could introduce a full UBI (one large enough to live on) for just £67 billion per year or 3.4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), according to a study Georg Arendt and I recently completed.
Attention to UBI in the United Kingdom has increased substantially as the Scottish Parliament discusses experimenting with it and as policymakers discuss it as a temporary measure to boost the economy during the Covid-19 outbreak. While a pilot project can examine some of the effects of UBI, this kind of study is necessary to determine how much it is likely to cost.
The cost of UBI is often exaggerated because many authors focus on its ‘gross cost’: the size of the UBI times the population. The gross cost of UBI is not a cost in any meaningful sense, because it ignores the great extent to which the new taxes people pay to support UBI are cancelled out by new money they receive in UBI. The real cost of UBI is the ‘net cost’ – the amount people receive or pay after subtracting the amount they pay themselves. The net cost of a full UBI for the UK is only about one-third its gross cost.
Our study is based on data from the 2014/15 UK Family Resource Survey. It uses microsimulation analysis from the European Union’s EUROMOD Tax-Benefit Model to subtract out the amount people pay themselves and determine the cost of a roughly poverty-level UBI of £7,706 per adult and £3,853 per child.
Key findings of the study include:
The cost of a full UBI for the United Kingdom is £67 billion per year or about 3.4% of GDP.
This figure is the net cost – the real cost – of a UBI scheme of £7,706 for adults and £3,853 for children. This assumes a 50% income tax rate for net beneficiaries integrated into the UK tax-and-benefit system in a way that ensures the majority of UK citizens benefit from the transition and no one in the bottom 20% of the distribution of income is financially harmed by the loss of programmes replaced by the UBI. Although net beneficiaries’ tax rate increases, they receive more in UBI than they pay in additional taxes.
This UBI scheme adds only 39% to the cost of the UK’s existing benefits system (not including the spending on the National Health Service), and an 8.7% increase in the UK’s total government spending (£67/£771 billion).
This UBI scheme is a net financial benefit to most households in the lower 70% of the UK income distribution, making it an effective wage subsidy (or tax cut) for millions of workers and their families.
The average benefit over the existing system for each net-beneficiary family is £4,056.
Under this scheme, the percent of UK families with incomes below the current official poverty line would drop from 16% to 4% and poverty among children and the elderly would all but disappear.
The net cost of this UBI scheme – the gross cost minus the amount people pay to themselves (£155 billion), and ignoring the costs and benefits of integrating the UBI into the existing tax and benefit system – is about one-third (35.4%) of its often-mentioned but not very meaningful gross cost (£438 billion).
Also subtracting the cost of existing programmes that can be replaced by UBI without financially harming anyone in the bottom 20% of the income distribution makes the net cost only about 15% of the programme’s gross cost.
This UBI system eliminates absolute poverty (e.g. as it is measured in the United States) from the UK.
According to a 2015 piece in the Guardian, the UK currently spends over £93 billion per year on corporate subsidies and tax breaks. If so, the UK could entirely fund a UBI by eliminating corporate subsidies and tax loopholes. No increase in individual taxes would be necessary, and the government would still have £26 billion available for corporate subsidies.
Countries with similar per capita income and similar tax-and-benefit systems should expect the cost of UBI to be a similar percentage of their GDP.
Those remaining in poverty under the scheme would be much closer to the poverty line than they are now and would have enough to get by in combination with other government payments and services. Therefore, we conclude that a UBI of this size would eliminate absolute poverty in the United Kingdom, a powerful result for less money than Parliament currently spends on corporate subsidies and tax breaks.
The EU Commission has said from the 25th September 2020 signatures can be collected from EU residents in connection with a new European Citizens Initiative. If the European UBI family succeeds in gathering 1 000 000 signatures, divided among a minimum of seven countries, then ECI delegates will be able to present a proposal to the European Commission which, if approved, would hopefully convince EU governments to start paying Basic Incomes to all of their citizens.
Bulgaria suffers from a number of problems, and in particular population loss and economically active citizens leave the country for better opportunities elsewhere. Angel Petrov writes:
The population decline carries long-term economic costs. Over time, a shrinking workforce becomes unattractive to investors and unable to subsidise the pension and healthcare needs of an ageing population.
All government ‘aid’ described below is highly bureaucratised and full of conditions, and in addition the funds are often paid late due to the complicated and sluggish administrative processes citizens are subjected to. The aid consists of:
Cash payments of €192 only for families with 14 year old children for the duration of the state of emergency (2 or 3 months)
over 2 months the unemployment fund will pay 60% of the income of the employees from sectors most heavily influenced by the COVID-19 crisis for up to three months. In addition to employers in sectors where operations have been suspended as a result of the social distancing measures (tourism, sports, culture, etc.), any other employer that can prove a 20% y/y drop in revenue in March is also eligible for the 60% salary subsidy.
The measure has been extended until 30th of September 2020.
This is the main stimulus. However, the working population has doubts that the administrative process will be efficient enough (it is expected that most companies will receive the aid in October and November 2020). Furthermore, many small and medium businesses don’t have the means to pay 40% of the salaries. Some critics see this policy as supporting big companies which will absorb the unemployment caused by the lack of help for small and medium companies.
To date (1st August 2020) 129 million leva (64,5 million EUR) have been distributed to 8400 employers, that is 13% of the 1 billion leva (511 million EUR) allocated by the government. Close to 35% from these people have taken aid only for one month.
On the 10th of April the Bulgarian Central Bank enacted a moratorium on debt repayments. Overall the number of people who have debts in Bulgaria is almost 3 million. By the 10th of May, 102 000 have applied for temporary cancellation on payments (usually 6 months) towards their loans, and 80 300 have been approved. Changes in these numbers are expected.
The processes are not transparent, efficient and timely
The measures are conditional and selective and not universal
Most of the governments support is expressed in loans rather than direct payments
In conclusion the measures so far have the potential to create another wave of workforce immigration towards Western countries, weakening further the economic future of Bulgaria because:
The case for a UBI emergency pilot in Bulgaria
The unnecessary agony of the Bulgarian nature and people can be prevented, and UBI is a key step that can be collectively taken to compensate over three generations who have given their talents, energy and time towards creating shared wealth spreading beyond the country borders. It’s time for common dividends to be distributed to their rightful owners.
Bulgarian UBI advocates are working hard to unite the people around the idea that once social and economic stability is achieved through unconditional payments of around 1000lv (500 EUR) Bulgarians will have the time and capacity to build a new system that meets their needs and corresponds to a consensus based on democratic values. Due to the inflexibility of the national currency (it is tied to the euro), the dominant proposal on how to implement Basic Income in Bulgaria at the moment is by restructuring the tax system and national budget in a way that will pay the UBI bill with the collection of Value Added Taxes and Excise Taxes paid by the sellers. The idea is for every Bulgarian citizen with an active address registration to own a bank card issued by the Bulgarian Central Bank which will serve people as a payment method to be used to receive a Basic Income that would meet basic needs like rent, utility bills, food, clothes etc.
A UBI emergency pilot hosted in Bulgaria would not a utopia, and the EU could rescue its reputation by supporting it. It is an opportunity to trial universal basic income on a national level using the Bulgarian state financial infrastructure to distribute funds to the people.
The EU Commission would also have a vested interest in embracing the project, as the positive results would increase cohesion and trust, and would give hope to other states that the European experiment is not another way to practice concentration of power.
It’s time for evolution not only for Bulgaria but also for the EU. UBI is a win-win solution and will literally bring Bulgaria back to life. People outside long to return to their roots and work for the wellbeing of their parents and the next generations. The EU owes this to the people of Bulgaria and Bulgarians owe it to themselves, their ancestors, the children, and the European natural environment that happens to be surrounded by Bulgarian borders. We have too much to gain and nothing to lose.
