UN: Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty urges ‘serious discussion’ of basic income

UN: Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty urges ‘serious discussion’ of basic income

A Special Rapporteur of the United Nations will hold a panel discussion on universal basic income and the future of human rights on Thursday, June 8, 2017.

Organized by Professor Philip Alston, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, the event will explore the potential for basic income to mitigate global economic insecurity. The panelists include two cofounders of the Basic Income Earth Network — Professor Philippe van Parijs (University of Louvain, Hoover Chair of Economic and Social Ethics) and Guy Standing (School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London) — in addition to Isabelle Doresse (People’s Universities in Northern Pas de Calais, ATD Fourth World) and Alex Praça (Human and Trade Union Rights Officer of the International Trade Union Confederation).

The panel will discuss a report prepared by Alston and submitted to the UN’s Human Rights Council. Alston’s report addresses the concern that “the human rights movement needs to address and respond to the fundamental changes that are taking place in economic and social structures at the national and global levels,” including precarious employment, automation, increasing inequality, and the obsolescence of traditional forms of labor market regulation.

As Alston describes the idea, a basic income “is explicitly designed to challenge most of the key assumptions underpinning existing social security systems”:

Rather than a system where there are partial payments, basic income guarantees a floor; instead of being episodic, payments are regular; rather than being needs-based, they are paid as a flat rate to all; they come in cash, rather than as messy in-kind support; they accrue to every individual, rather than only to needy households; rather than requiring that various conditions be met, they are unconditional; rather than excluding the well off, they are universal; and instead of being based on lifetime contributions, they are funded primarily from taxation.

The 20-page report describes each of these characteristics of a basic income, overviews the history of the idea, and describes various types of basic income and related policies, such as a negative income tax and cash transfers. Alston also lays out some examples of the possible cost of implementing a basic income scheme.

Alston holds that “the basic income concept should not be rejected out of hand on the grounds that it is utopian” and encourages further discussion of the policy as a means to alleviate economic insecurity and promote human rights and social justice. He additionally urges that the debate on basic income be united with that on social protection floors.

 

Further Viewing and Reading

The June 8 panel discussion will be broadcast live online here.

The full report on universal basic income of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights is available in the UN’s document repository or can be directly downloaded as a PDF here.


Reviewed by Genevieve Shanahan

Photo: Human Rights Council during 15th Session, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 UN Geneva

UK: Institute for Policy Research publishes “Exploring the Distributional and Work Incentive Effects of Plausible Illustrative Basic Income Schemes”

UK: Institute for Policy Research publishes “Exploring the Distributional and Work Incentive Effects of Plausible Illustrative Basic Income Schemes”

The Institute for Policy Research (IPR) at the University of Bath published its latest report on the effects of basic income — titled “Exploring the Distributional and Work Incentive Effects of Plausible Illustrative Basic Income Schemes” — on May 18, 2017.

Authored by IPR Research Associate Luke Martinelli, the report builds upon the working paper “The Fiscal and Distributional Implications of Alternative Universal Basic Income Schemes in the UK” (March 2017), in which Martinelli used simulation techniques to model four different types of basic income schemes (varying according to the amount of the benefit and accompanying changes in the tax and benefit system) and their effects on poverty and inequality.  

The new report carries out a more detailed analysis of basic income schemes set at the three levels found to be most plausible in the earlier report: the level of the tax saving implied by the UK’s personal income tax allowance (which it would replace); the level of the UK’s existing social assistance benefits (many of which would be replaced); the level of existing benefits plus premiums for the disabled.

In this new contribution, Martinelli examines the predicted impact of these schemes on financial work incentives, including both financial incentives to work at all and incentives to increase work marginally. Martinelli looks in greater detail at the distributional consequences of the basic income schemes, including the effect on women and disabled individuals.  

According to Martinelli, “Both of these elements are crucial to efforts to evaluate whether basic income has desirable effects and what types of design features would help make the policy politically feasible. The models we examine in this paper present a number of issues that basic income advocates will have to address as they think about implementation and policy design more closely.”

The report concludes that, with respect to distributional consequences, each scheme results in both winners and losers, stating, “Our core insight is that for the most part, even when particular groups gain (lose) on average, there are usually still non-trivial numbers of individuals and households who are worse off (better off).”

Concerning work incentives, each scheme sees a reduction in financial work incentives for most individuals. However, the distribution of effects was such that “we can imagine the effects of stronger work incentives on particularly sensitive groups to outweigh the more generalised effect of weaker work incentives over the wider population.”

 

Download the full report from IRP’s website:

IPR Report: Exploring the Distributional and Work Incentive Effects of Plausible Illustrative Basic Income Schemes” (Institute for Policy Research, University of Bath).


Reviewed by Dawn Howard

Photo: “Rough sleeper” in Taunton, England; CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 Neil Moralee

A list of controversial claims on both side of the UBI debate

In the process of cowriting a book about the upcoming Unconditional Basic Income Trials, I’ve been trying to come up with a list of the claims that tend appear in the debate. Below are two lists: first a list of supporters’ claims and then one of opponents’ claims. I gave each claim a name to make it easier to talk about them, but these names do not reflect any standard definition. I tried to order the claims in each list from the relatively more important or more common to the relatively less important or less common.

To say that a claim appears on the supporters’ or opponents’ lists is not to say that all supporters or all opponents agree on it. In fact, some of the claims contradict each other, which is to be expected, because different people support or oppose UBI for diverse reason. They might have little in common but their support or opposition to one policy proposal.

Supporters have claimed:

 

  • The freedom claim: UBI gives people greater freedom by giving them more effective power over their own lives.
  • The poverty claim: UBI (usually in combination with other policies) can eliminate poverty.
  • The anti-exploitation claim: UBI reduces exploitation in employment by giving all workers the power to refuse exploitive working conditions.
  • The welfare claim: UBI raises the welfare of net-recipients (by eliminating destitution, reducing poverty, increasing incomes of people near poverty, reducing inequality, and other effects) and many net-contributors (by removing the fear of destitution, improving their bargaining position in the market, and so on). To the welfare claim we could add many supporting claims, that UBI is good for physical and mental health, that it decreases homeless and malnutrition, that it decreases infant mortality, and so on.
  • The increased-worker-income claim: UBI increases in the income of workers directly by acting as a wage subsidy for lower-income workers and indirectly by creating market conditions likely to increase wages.
  • The better-working-conditions claim: UBI improves working conditions for many workers both by giving them the flexibility to move more attractive sectors and by creating market conditions likely to give employers incentive to improve working conditions.
  • The affordability claim: UBI at the desired level is affordable. (Most UBI proposals call for one high enough to eliminate official poverty or to raise incomes to 150% of the officially poverty level. Some call for meeting basic needs or to enable social participation and to secure a life in dignity. Some simply call for the highest sustainable UBI regardless of what that might be.)
  • The economic equality claim: UBI increases economic equality both by direct redistribution to lower income people and by creating market conditions where workers can command higher wages and better working conditions. (The taxes used to support it can also be formulated to increase equality.)
  • The social equality claim: UBI increases social equality by reducing social isolation of people with very low incomes, by reducing the stigmatization of people who benefit from redistributive programs, by reducing housing segregation, and by other means.
  • The poverty-trap claim: UBI encourages people on benefits to reenter the labor force in greater numbers than a conditional system, by ensuring they are always better off earning more private income than earning less.
  • The anti-ghettoization claim: UBI reduces (both personal and social) costs linked to high concentrations of poverty both by reducing housing segregation and by significantly raising average incomes in those communities.
  • The cost-effectiveness claim: UBI is relatively more cost-effective than traditional, conditional welfare policies (in achieving goals such as increasing equality, raising welfare levels of recipients, and so on).
  • The reduced-capture claim: UBI’s benefits are less likely to be captured by others (such as employers, landlords, and bureaucrats) than conditional welfare state policies.
  • The bureaucracy claim: UBI reduces the overhead cost associated with income support.
  • The labor-productivity claim: UBI increases labor productivity both by encouraging employers to substitute skilled for unskilled workers and by improving workers’ ability to enhance their skills and search for higher-productivity jobs.
  • The productive non-labor claim: UBI allows people to do more unpaid work (such as care work and volunteering), some of which is more productive (or socially valuable) than many forms of paid labor.
  • The politically-enabled-proletarian claim: UBI—by freeing low-wage workers from long hours and low pay—makes them a greater force for progressive social change on all other issues.
  • The acceptable-labor-supply-effect claim(s): if UBI causes a reduction in labor supply, it will be within acceptable levels, and/or if UBI causes a greater-than-desirable labor-supply reduction, it can be at least partially counteracted by other policies to increase labor supply or the demand for higher-wage employees.
  • The macro-stimulus claim: UBI, in combination with the taxes that support it, helps improve economic growth and reduce unemployment by helping to stimulate and stabilize aggregate demand.
  • The “degrowth” claim: UBI helps economies move away from overconsumption and overexploitation of resources.
  • Greater respect for people in need: UBI and other universal programs treat everyone with respect while many conditional programs treat virtually all recipients as suspected cheats, even if they fit almost anyone’s definition of the most truly needy.
  • The increased-overall-redistribution claim: UBI results in greater overall redistribution to the poor, because universal policies foster greater feelings of solidarity and support once in place

Opponents have claimed:

  • The reciprocity claim: UBI allows people to share in the benefits of social production without contributing their labor.
  • The exploitation claim: a tax-financed UBI redistributes income from workers to people who do not work, thereby exploiting workers.
  • The harm-to-workers claim: the taxes needed to support UBI financially harm workers, all things considered.
  • The unacceptable-labor-supply-effect claim(s): UBI causes an unacceptably large reduction in labor supply that is not easily counteracted by other policies.
  • The self-destruction claim: UBI increases self-destructive behavior in recipients.
  • The meaninglessness claim: UBI makes it possible for people to live lives that they will eventually find meaningless because paid labor is a central source life meaning.
  • The capture claim: many of the benefits of UBI will go to someone other than the recipients, perhaps because employers reduce wages, because landlords increase rents in low-income areas, because bureaucrats create overhead costs, etc.
  • The inflation claim: UBI causes inflation that is not easily counteracted by other policies.
  • The migration claim: UBI encourages immigration and/or migration into areas with UBI.
  • The unaffordability claim: UBI at the proposed level is prohibitively expensive.
  • The negative, relative cost-effectiveness claim: UBI is more expensive than other programs that can achieve similar goals.
  • The gender-role reinforcement claim: UBI helps maintain traditional gender roles by making it easier for women to remain out of the paid labor force while performing unpaid care work and other traditional women’s roles.
  • The macro-deterrent claim: UBI decreases economic growth by enabling reduced labor market participation and increasing costs.
  • The shut-door claim: UBI creates political pressure to restrict immigration and migration.
  • The bought-off-proletarian claim: UBI—by providing a minimal level of contentment for workers—reduces their effectiveness as a force to challenge the deeper inequalities and other social inequities in society.
  • The consumerism claim: UBI leads to even more environmental destruction because of increased consumption.
  • The decreased-overall-redistribution claim: UBI is (politically and/or economically) feasible only at such a low level and only accompanied by so many other social programs that it will leave low-income people worse off than traditional, conditional social policies.
  • The strategy-to-cut-redistribution claim: factions in government will use UBI as an excuse to cut other programs, then cut in a strategy that will lead to much less overall redistribution.

I compiled this list from general knowledge accumulated over years of reading about the UBI debate. It is bound to be incomplete. Many more claims (of various levels of relevance, certainty, and testability) are undoubtedly circulating in the academic and nonacademic literature on UBI. But I hope it captures a significant range of what is being said. This list is enough to demonstrate the difficulty of designing a trial and communicating its results in a way that successfully raises the level of debate over these claims. Some are things that can’t be tested. Some are things that can only be tested indirectly, partially, or inconclusively. Few if any of these claims can be directed tested with any accuracy in a trial.

I’m interested to know how comprehensive people think it is. Did I include all the relevant claims you can think of? Did I overblow any claims that don’t deserve to be on the list?

A stock image used to evoke thoughts of "experiments"

A stock image used to evoke a mental connect with the word “experiment”

OECD Releases Policy Note on Basic Income

OECD Releases Policy Note on Basic Income

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) released a policy brief on the costs of basic income schemes, its first on the topic, in May 2017.

The report, available for download from OECD’s website (“Basic Income as a Policy Option: Can it add up?”), has been published as part of a series on the Future of Work, which was launched in January 2016 following a policy forum in which over 300 participants convened in Paris to discuss and debate the impact of digitization upon jobs and the labor market. Previous publications in the OECD’s Future of Work series have dealt with such topics as automation, technological unemployment, job insecurity, and inequality; however, “Basic Income as a Policy Option” is the first to engage directly and specifically with the idea of basic income.  

The policy report considers the cost of a universal basic income paid to all individuals below their country’s normal retirement age, looking in detail at the financial implications of such a policy in Finland, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The benefit as conceived would be taxable and take the place of most existing cash benefits and allowances, but it would not replace public services, such as health and education, or benefits related to special needs.

Using a simulation analysis (based on the EUROMOD), the authors conclude that a basic income financed at the level of current  spending would fall far below the poverty line. Correspondingly, a basic income adequate to reduce poverty would require substantial increases in taxation. Even in the latter case, moreover, the policy might not significantly reduce poverty and might leave many worse off as compared to existing programs of social welfare.

The models do not take into account any possible changes in employment rates, working hours, or earnings that might result from the instituting of a basic income, nor do they take into account any reduction in spending due to a lowering of administrative costs.

In addition to the simulation analysis of the costs of basic income, the authors discuss, in general terms, other potential risks and drawbacks of the policy, and suggest alternative forms of social assistance such as more targeted policies and a participation income.

In a recent post in his Basic Income News blog The Independentarian, BIEN Vice-Chair Karl Widerquist cites the new OECD report as an example of a mistake that he believes to be common in the calculation of the (alleged) costs of basic income schemes: confusing the gross cost with the net cost.

 

Read the policy brief:

OECD (May 2017) “Basic Income as a Policy Option: Can it add up?”, Policy Brief on the Future of Work, OECD Publishing, Paris.

 

See also:

OECD (May 2017) “Basic Income as a Policy Option: Technical Background Note Illustrating Costs and Distributional Implications for Selected Countries”, OECD Publishing, Paris.


Reviewed by Dawn Howard

Photo CC BY-NC 2.0 OECD (From OECD Forum 2016: The Digital.Economy & the Future of Work)

 

‘Mincome Experiment’ documentary will investigate 1970s experiment

‘Mincome Experiment’ documentary will investigate 1970s experiment

The crowdfunding campaign for “The Mincome Experiment” can be found here.

The Mincome Experiment is a documentary that is as much a story about basic income as it is about human socioeconomic evolution throughout the years. Vincent Santiago, the director for the documentary, first heard that University of Manitoba professor Dr. Evelyn Forget was looking for volunteers to digitize the results of the 1970s Mincome experiment. While Santiago did not consider himself an experienced social activist, he was nevertheless keen to study possible measures to prevent government excesses that he believed could lead to growing social inequality and injustices. Santiago was convinced that basic income and open government were foundations that could help prevent social inequality and injustice.

The Mincome experiment and the concept of basic income caught Santiago’s imagination, and he took a passionate interest in seeking out more information. He finally talked to Dr. Forget on April 2014. Another opportunity arose soon after to interview then-Conservative Senator Hugh Segal, a very vocal and strong basic income advocate in Canada. Vincent Santiago read about and researched basic income and talked to economists and others. In the process, he discovered several interesting side stories not widely known, even within Canada.

Santiago wanted to make the Mincome experiment into a documentary. He soon realized there was so much story to be told. He looked into the various forms of basic income and decided the film should be told as an engaging narrative about human socioeconomic evolution. Intertwined into the historical and visionary backdrop is the concept of basic income and its role. Of the film, Santiago said:

While the Mincome experiment is very much the central theme of the documentary, the documentary also looks into other basic income experiments and the various forms and possible implementation. I’ve started calculating the various ways to pay for it and how to implement them.

The promotional trailer created for the crowdfunding campaign asks various questions typically uttered by people who are cynical or against basic income. That is because Santiago did not want to make a film only for those already familiar with basic income. He wanted to create an entertaining and fun documentary that also draws in the skeptics by presenting facts, without shying away from common ridicule and prevailing concerns.

Another project that occupies Santiago’s time is creating a low-cost, no commission fee platform for crowdfunding, curating, and showcasing creative works. With this platform, which first went into development in 2012, Santiago is now launching the crowdfunding campaign for his documentary. The Mincome Experiment project is still a long way from reaching the stated fundraising goal, but the team remains confident the amount can be reached. Efficient use of the funds would allow the project to include more engaging footage and animation for the documentary, ensuring that it will capture and convince audiences worldwide.

The crowdfunding runs until June 15, 2017 and can be found here.

Written by the team behind “The Mincome Experiment.”