The Basic Income Guarantee Experiments of the 1970s: a quick summary of results

So many countries are currently conducting or seriously talking about starting Universal Basic Income (UBI) experiments that it’s becoming hard to keep track. These are not the first experiments in UBI or other forms of Basic Income Guarantee (BIG). Namibia and India conducted UBI experiments in the late 2000s and early 2010s. And between 1968 and 1980, the U.S. and Canadian Government conducted five Negative Income Tax (NIT) experiments. They were the world’s first major social science experiments of any kind. They are worth reviewing because they provide not only inspiration and precedent but also relevant data and important lessons for the current experiments.

I’m working on a book (tentatively titled Basic Income Experiments: The Devil’s in the Caveats) drawing lessons from the ’70s experiments for the current round of experiments. This blog post previews a chapter from that upcoming book providing a review of results from the 1970s experiments. The chapter, in turn, draws heavily on my earlier work on BIG experiments including “A Failure to Communicate: What (if anything) Can We Learn from the Negative Income Tax Experiments” and “A Retrospective on the Negative Income Tax Experiments: Looking Back at the Most Innovative Field Studies in Social Policy.” Next week, I’ll make a blog post showing how poorly understood the NIT experiments were in the media at the time.

Labor market effects

Unfortunately, most of the attention of the 70s experiments was directed not at the effects of the policy (how much does it improve the welfare of low-income people) but to one potential side effect (how does it affect labor hours of test subjects). And so that issue takes up most of the discussion here.

Table 1 summarizes the basic facts of the five NIT experiments. The first, the New Jersey Graduated Work Incentive Experiment (sometimes called the New Jersey-Pennsylvania Negative Income Tax Experiment or simply the New Jersey Experiment), was conducted from 1968 to 1972. The treatment group originally consisted of 1,216 people and dwindled to 983 (due to dropouts) by the conclusion of the experiment. Treatment group recipients received a guaranteed income for three years.

The Rural Income Maintenance Experiment (RIME) was conducted in rural parts of Iowa and North Carolina from 1970 to 1972. It began with 809 people and finished with 729.

The largest NIT experiment was the Seattle/Denver Income Maintenance Experiment (SIME/DIME), which had an experimental group of about 4,800 people in the Seattle and Denver metropolitan areas. The sample included families with at least one dependent and incomes below $11,000 for single-parent families or below $13,000 for two-parent families. The experiment began in 1970 and was originally planned to be completed within six years. Later, researchers obtained approval to extend the experiment for 20 years for a small group of subjects. This would have extended the project into the early 1990s, but it was eventually canceled in 1980, so that a few subjects had a guaranteed income for about nine years, during part of which time they were led to believe they would receive it for 20 years.

The Gary Income Maintenance Experiment was conducted between 1971 and 1974. Subjects were mostly black, single-parent families living in Gary, Indiana. The experimental group received a guaranteed income for three years. It began with a sample size of 1,799 families, which (due to a large drop-out rate) fell to 967 by the end of the experiment.

The Canadian government initiated the Manitoba Basic Annual Income Experiment (Mincome) in 1975 after most of the U.S. experiments were winding down. The sample included 1,300 urban and rural families in Winnipeg and Dauphin, Manitoba with incomes below C$13,000 per year. By the time the data collection was completed in 1978, interest in the guaranteed income was seriously on the wane and the Canadian government canceled the project before the data was analyzed.

 

Table 1: Summary of the Negative Income Tax Experiments in the U.S. & Canada

Name Location(s) Data collection Sample size:

Initial (final)

Sample Characteristics G* t**
The New Jersey Graduated Work Incentive Experiment (NJ) New Jersey & Pennsylvania 1968-1972 1,216 (983) Black, white, and Latino, 2-parent families in urban areas with a male head aged 18-58 and income below 150% of the poverty line. 0.5

0.75

1.00

1.25

0.3

0.5

0.7

The Rural Income-Maintenance Experiment (RIME) Iowa & North Carolina 1970-1972 809 (729) Both 2-parent families and female-headed households in rural areas with income below 150% of poverty line. 0.5

0.75

1.00

0.3

0.5

0.7

The Seattle/Denver Income-Maintenance Experiments (SIME/DIME) Seattle & Denver 1970-1976,

(some to 1980)

4,800 Black, white, and Latino families with at least one dependant and incomes below $11,00 for single parents, $13,000 for two parent families. 0.75, 1.26, 1.48 0.5

0.7,

0.7-.025y,

08-.025y

The Gary, Indiana Experiment (Gary) Gary, Indiana 1971-1974 1,799 (967) Black households, primarily female-headed, head 18-58, income below 240% of poverty line. 0.75

1.0

0.4

0.6

The Manitoba Basic Annual Income Experiment (Mincome) Winnipeg and Dauphin, Manitoba 1975-1978 1,300 Families with, head younger than 58 and income below $13,000 for a family of four. C$3,800

C$4,800

C$5,800

0.35

0.5

0.75

* G = the Guarantee level.

** t = the marginal tax rate

Source: Reproduced from Widerquist (2005)

 

Scholarly and popular media articles on the NIT experiments focused, more than anything else, on the NIT’s “work-effort response”—the comparison of how much the experimental group worked relative to the control group. Table 2 summarizes the findings of several of the studies on the work-effort response to the NIT experiments, showing the difference in hours (the “work reduction”) by the experimental group relative to the control group in foregone hours per year and in percentage terms. Results are reported for three categories of workers, husbands, wives, and “single female heads” (SFH), which meant single mothers. The relative work reduction varied substantially across the five experiments from 0.5% to 9.0% for husbands, which means that the experimental group worked less than the control group by about ½ hour to 4 hours per week, 20 to 130 hours per year, or 1 to 4 fulltime weeks per year. Three studies averaged the results from the four U.S. experiments and found relative work reduction effects in the range of 5% to 7.9%.[i]

The response of wives and single mothers was somewhat larger in terms of hours, and substantially larger in percentage terms because they tended to work fewer hours, to begin with. Wives reduced their work effort by 0% to 27% and single mothers reduced their work effort by 15% to 30%. These percentages correspond to reductions of about 0 to 166 hours per year. The labor market response of wives had a much larger range than the other two groups, but this was usually attributed to the peculiarities of the labor markets in Gary and Winnipeg where particularly small responses were found.

 


 

Table 2: Summary of findings of work reduction effect

Study Data Source Work reduction*

in hours per year ** and percent

Comments and Caveats
Husbands Wives SFH
Robins (1985) 4 U.S. -89

-5%

-117

-21.1%

-123

-13.2%

Study of studies that does not assess the methodology of the studies but simply combines their estimates. Finds large consistency throughout, and “In no case is there evidence of a massive withdrawal from the labor force.” No assessment of whether the work response is large or small or its effect on cost. Estimates apply to a poverty-line guarantee rate with a marginal tax rate of 50%.
Burtless (1986) 4 U.S. -119

-7%

-93

-17%

-79

-7%

Average of results of the four US experiments weighted by sample size, except for the SFH estimates, which are a weighted average of the SIME/DIME and Gary results only.
Keeley (1981) 4 U.S. -7.9% A simple average of the estimates of 16 studies of the four U.S. experiments
Robins and West (1980a) SIME/

DIME

-128.9

-7%

-165.9

-25%

-147.1

-15%

Estimates “labor supply effects.” It goes without saying that this is different from “labor market effects.”
Robins and West (1980b) SIME/

DIME

-9% -20% -25% Recipients take 2.4 years to fully adjust their behavior to the new program.
Cain et al (1974) NJ -50

-20%

Includes caveats about the limited duration of the test and the representativeness of the sample. Notes that the evidence shows a smaller effect than nonexperimental studies.
Watts et al (1974) NJ -1.4% to

-6.6%

Depending on size of G and t
Rees and Watts (1976) NJ -1.5 hpw**

-0.5%

-0.61% Found anomalous positive effect on hours and earnings of blacks.
Ashenfelter (1978) RIME -8%

 

-27% “There must be serious doubt about the implications of the experimental results for the adoption of any permanent negative income tax program.”
Moffitt (1979a) Gary -3% to -6% 0% -26% to -30% No caveat about missing demand, but careful not to imply the results mean more than they do.
Hum and Simpson (1993a) Mincome -17

-1%

-15

-3%

-133

-17%

Smaller response to the Canadian experiment was not surprising because of the make-up of the sample and the treatments offered.

* The negative signs indicate that the change in work effort is a reduction

** Hours per year except where indicated “hpw,” hours per week.

NJ = New Jersey Graduated Work Incentive Experiment

SIME/DIME = Seattle / Denver Income Maintenance Experiment

Gary = Gary Income Maintenance Experiment

RIME = Rural Income Maintenance Experiment

Mincome = Manitoba Income Maintenance Experiment

SFH = Single Female “head of household.”

Source: Reproduced from Widerquist (2005)

 

 

All or most of the figures reported above are raw comparisons between the control and experimental groups: they are not predictions of how labor market participation is likely to change in response to an NIT or UBI. There are many reasons why these figures can’t be taken as predictions of responses to a national program. The many difficulties of relating experimental results to such predictions is a major theme in the book I’m writing. I’ll mention just four of them now.

First, the study participants were drawn only from a small segment of the population: people with incomes near the poverty line, about the point at which people are most likely to work less in response to an income guarantee because the potential grant is high relative to their earned income. Thus, the response of this group is likely to be much larger than the response of the entire workforce to a national program. One study using computer simulations estimated that the work reduction in response to a national program would be only about one-third of reduction in the Gary experiment (1.6% rather than 4.5%).[ii] Although simulations are an important way to connect experimental data with what we really want to know, the more researchers rely on them the less their reports are driving by their experimental data.

Second, the figures do not include any demand response, which economic theory predicts would lead to higher wages and a partial reversal of the work-reduction effect. One study using simulation techniques to estimate the demand response found it to be small.[iii] Another found, “Reduction in labor supply produced by these programs does tend to raise low-skill wages, and this improves transfer efficiency.”[iv] That is, it increases the benefit to recipients from each dollar of public spending.

Third, the figures were reported in average hours per week and very often misinterpreted to imply that 5% to 7.9% of primary breadwinners dropped out of the labor force. The reduction in labor hours was not primarily caused by workers reducing their hours of work each week (as few workers are able to do even if they want to). Moreover, few if any workers simply dropped out of the labor force for the duration of the study, as knee-jerk reactions to guaranteed income proposals often assume.[v] Instead, it was mainly caused by workers taking longer to find their next job if and when they became nonemployed.

Fourth, the experimental group’s “work reduction” was only a relative reduction in comparison to the control group. Although this language is standard for experimental studies, it doesn’t imply that receiving the NIT was the major determinate of labor hours. In fact, in some studies, labor hours increased for both groups, and the labor hours of both groups tended to rise and fall together along with the macroeconomic health of the economy—implying that when more or better jobs were available, both groups took them, but when they were less available, the control group searched harder or accepted less attractive jobs.[vi]

As I’ll show in my next article about the NIT experiments, most laypeople writing about the results assumed any work reduction, no matter how small, to be an extremely negative side effect. But it is not obviously desirable to put unemployed workers in the position where they are desperate to start their next job as soon as possible. It’s obviously bad for the workers and families in that position. It’s not only difficult to go through but also it reduces their ability to command good wages and better working conditions. Increased periods of nonemployment might have a social benefit if they lead to better matches between workers and firms.

Non-labor-market effects

The focus of the 1970s experiments on work effort is in one way surprising because presumably, the central goals of a UBI involve its effects on poverty and the wellbeing of relatively low-income people, and assessing these issues requires look at non-labor-market effects.

The experimental results for various quality-of-life indicators were substantial and encouraging. Some studies found significant positive influences in elementary school attendance rates, teacher ratings, and test scores. Some studies found that children in the experimental group stayed in school significantly longer than children in the control group. Some found an increase in adults going on to continuing education. Some of the experiments found desirable effects on many important quality-of-life indicators, including reduced incidents of low-birth-weight babies, increased food consumption, and increased nutritional content of the diet. Some even found reduced domestic abuse and reduced psychiatric emergencies.[vii]

Much of the attention to non-labor market effects focused not on the presumed goals of the policy but on another side effect: a controversial finding that the experimental group in SIME-DIME had a higher divorce rate than the control group. Researchers argued forcefully on both sides with no conclusive resolution in the literature. The finding was not replicated by the Manitoba experiment, which found a lower divorce rate in the experimental group. The higher divorce rate in some studies examining SIME-DIME was widely presented as a negative effect, even though the only explanation for it that researchers on either side were that the NIT must have relieved women from financial dependence on husbands.[viii] It is at the very least questionable to label one spouse staying with another solely because of financial dependence as a “good” thing.

An overall comparison?

Most of the researchers involved considered the results extremely promising overall. Comparisons of the control and experimental group indicated that the NIT was capable of significantly reducing the material effects of poverty, and the relative reductions in labor effort were probably within the affordable range and almost certainly within the sustainable range.

But experiments of this type were not capable of producing a bottom line. Non-specialists examining these results might find themselves asking: What was the cost exactly? How much were the material effects of poverty reduced? What is the verdict from an overall comparison of costs and benefits?

Experiments cannot produce an answer to these questions. Doing so would involve taking positions on controversial normative issues, combining the experimental results with a great deal of nonexperimental data, and plugging it into a computer model estimating the micro- and macroeconomic effects of a national policy. The results of that effort would be driven more by those normative positions, nonexperimental data, and modeling assumptions than by the experimental results that such a report would be designed to illustrate.

Whichever strategy experimental reports take, nonspecialists will have difficulty grasping the complexity of the results and the limits of what they indicate about a possible national policy. No matter how well the experiment is conducted, the results are vulnerable to misunderstanding, misuse, oversimplification, and spin. My blog post next week will show how badly this happened when the results of NIT experiments were reported in the United States in the 1970s.

[i] G. Burtless, “The Work Response to a Guaranteed Income. A Survey of Experimental Evidence,” in Lessons from the Income Maintenance Experiments, ed. A. H. Munnell (Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1986). M.C. Keeley, Labor Supply and Public Policy: A Critical Review (New York: Academic Press, 1981). P.K. Robins, “A Comparison of the Labor Supply Findings from the Four Negative Income Tax Experiments,” Journal of Human Resources 20, no. 4 (1985).

[ii] R.A. Moffitt, “The Labor Supply Response in the Gary Experiment,” ibid.14 (1979).

[iii] D.H. Greenberg, “Some Labor Market Effects of Labor Supply Responses to Transfer Programs,” Social-Economic Planning Sciences 17, no. 4 (1983).

[iv] J.H.  Bishop, “The General Equilibrium Impact of Alternative Antipoverty Strategies205-223,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 32, no. 2 (1979).

[v] Robert Levine et al., “A Retrospective on the Negative Income Tax Experiments: Looking Back at the Most Innovative Field Studies in Social Policy,” in The Ethics and Economics of the Basic Income Guarantee, ed. Karl Widerquist, Michael A. Lewis, and Steven Pressman (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).

[vi] Karl Widerquist, “A Failure to Communicate: What (If Anything) Can We Learn from the Negative Income Tax Experiments?,” The Journal of Socio-Economics 34, no. 1 (2005).

[vii] Levine et al, 2005.

[viii] Levine et al, 2005; Widerquist, 2005.

EUROPE: Haagh delivers keynote lecture on Basic Income at World Health Organization

EUROPE: Haagh delivers keynote lecture on Basic Income at World Health Organization

BIEN Chair Louise Haagh delivered a keynote lecture on basic income at a World Health Organization (WHO) forum on October 6, which was held as part of the 2017 European Health Forum Gastein (EHFG).

Haagh, a Reader in Politics at the UK’s University of York, joined Nico Dragano (Institute of Medical Sociology, Düsseldorf University Hospital) and Mariana Dyakova (Deputy Director, Policy Research and International Development, Public Health Wales) to discuss social and economic determinants of health and well-being and their implications for public policy.

Organized by WHO, the public health agency of the United Nations, the forum explored approaches to the goal of improving health and well-being for all, as set out in the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

In her lecture, Haagh defends basic income as a democratic response to the inefficacy and dysfunctionality of present systems of welfare. Based on research in the UK and Denmark, she argues that the use of sanctions has negative impact on health, well-being, and work incentives. She goes on to present evidence that economic security has a positive effect on intrinsic motivation to work, and discusses the findings of Manitoba’s Mincome experiment with respect to hospitalization rates, mental health, and education. Finally, Haagh outlines present challenges in reforming the welfare state.

A full session on basic income is tentatively planned for the 2018 EHFG, Haagh reports.

For more information, including a video of all three keynote lectures, see: Transformative approaches for equity and resilience – Harnessing the 2030 Agenda for health & well-being (EHFG).


Reviewed by Russell Ingram

Photo: World Health Organization Headquarters and Flag, CC BY-ND 2.0 United States Mission Geneva

17th BIEN Congress in Lisbon, Portugal

17th BIEN Congress in Lisbon, Portugal

The 17th BIEN Congress took place in Lisbon, Portugal from the 25th to the 27th of September. The focus of the congress was on “Implementing Basic Income.” The 150 presenters represented 33 countries, with more countries represented in the additional 380 audience members. According to Karl Widerquist, Vice-Chair of BIEN, this may have been the largest BIEN Congress since Brazil in 2010.  The Congress included keynote presentations by BIEN co-founders Guy Standing and Philippe Van Parijs, in addition to keynote presentations about several Basic Income pilot programs, reflecting the congress’s focus on implementation, and from several political figures who are advocating for Basic Income in their respective countries.

The first day of the congress took place at the Portuguese Parliament (Assembleia da República), and as Standing said: “I am sure I speak for many of the co-founders, and many of them are here, that when we set up BIEN 31 years ago we never anticipated that we would be in a place like this in 2017.” The second and third days were held at ISEG, Lisbon School of Economics and Management, a beautiful venue that used to be a convent (Convento das Inglesinhas, restored by architect Gonçalo Byrne) that has kept many of its original architectural features and now hosts the university’s post-graduate programs.  

 

Evelyn Forget, photo by Luis Gaspar

Starting the keynote session on Basic Income pilot programs, Evelyn Forget’s presentation was about the differences between the narratives attached to several Basic Income experiments. She underlined that different narratives will create different criteria of success. For example, Finland’s narrative is about long-term unemployment and incentivising return to work. In this case, the experiment will be successful if people return to work. Ontario’s narrative is about social justice and a gap in benefits for adults because of the new reality of precarious work and poverty issues. Their goal is to expand the welfare state. Silicon Valley’s Y Combinator’s narrative started out as an utopia put forward by private individuals who wondered what would happen once automation freed people to do what they want. Forget stressed that “context matters” in pilot programs, and she suggested that when we bring together all these shared experiences, we can create newer and richer narratives.

 

After Forget’s insights, there were several presentations about specific pilot programs being developed. Karen Glass, from the experiment in Ontario, Canada, described the pilot program as a type of Negative Income Tax program, since the payments decrease as the recipients start working. The Ontario project applies to households and encompasses individuals aged 18 through 64, who have been residents of the region for one year. The pilot provides a guaranteed annual income of $17,000 dollars per individual and $24,000 per couple, which is 75% of the low income measure. The success criteria are not focused primarily on work incentives, but on recipients’ improved health, reduction in anxiety and the ability to make ends meet. Elizabeth Rhodes from Y Combinator, a seed investment company, talked about the contours of what this private experiment wants to achieve. Y Combinator has already financed a feasibility study in Oakland. and now plans to select 3000 participants who will receive 1000 dollars per month, some for three years and others for five. There is an income cap in the selection and they will be undersampling higher incomes. Presently the program is considering selecting subjects  21 to 40 years in age. The pilot intends to evaluate well being, mental and physical health, social and civic engagement and social networks effects as well as effects in the children of the participants. The research team has been piloting and testing their methods with a smaller group of participants.

photo by Enno Schmidt

Joe Huston spoke about the experience of GiveDirectly in Kenya. GiveDirectly has raised funds privately and has been distributing them to around 100 people, but once the project is fully launched there will be up to 26,000 people receiving some type of cash transfer. The pilot is divided into three groups, one group will receive a monthly payment for 12 years, another for 2 years and yet another will receive a one time cash grant of the same amount. The 100 people who are receiving a monthly Basic Income already have reported on their experiences, and, as Huston says,many have reported they did not reduce their work efforts; instead, many have several projects that need to be completed (such as paying for school and building a house), so they need to work. Others have pulled their Basic Income payments together in something called “table banking” and give a larger sum to each member at a time so that more can be achieved. Giving to individuals as opposed to households has had the emancipatory effects that are often theorized: because each person receives an equal amount of money, it is easier to solve household disputes. Regarding how the money is spent,  Huston says that Basic Income debates seem to oscillate between saying that people will become lazy bums or startup engineers; however, both extremes are inaccurate and do not apply to what is happening in the village so far. Huston explains that when walking from house to house in Kenya one can see a diversity of life choices: “Irene spent some in purchasing a goat for about $12 and kept some of the money as savings. Eric spent most of his money in a fishing net, saved some of the money and bought small fish like anchovies for a snack. Frederick spent most of the money in school fees.” So far, each person used the money as is more adequate in their particular circumstances.

 

Photo by Enno Schmidt

On the political arena there were several important participants. From Germany, Cosima Kern spoke about the new Basic Income single issue party, and explained that since Germany has no direct democracy (in contrast to Switzerland) this is a way to force Basic Income into the political arena. The Basic Income party had almost 100,000 votes in the election that took place on day before the Congress, which Kern said is a good result for a new party. Enno Schmidt talked about the referendum in Switzerland and also underlined that the 23% vote for Basic Income was a great first result, reminding everyone how it took 17 years of discussion in Switzerland for women to have the right to vote. Lena Stark spoke about the new political party in Sweden in the same vein as the German party; they plan to run for elections in September 2018. Ping Xu presented the situation in Taiwan with the help of Tyler Prochazka. Taiwan has the highest housing costs and the lowest birth rates, and would be an ideal site for a full implementation of Basic Income. From Japan, the ex-Minister of Agriculture, Masahiko Yamada, spoke about the importance of Basic Income in his country, which is facing new economic challenges that urgently need to be addressed.

 

Ronnie Cowan, Photo by Luis Gaspar

Finally, the Scottish MP Ronnie Cowan inspired the audience with his privileged viewpoint regarding how politicians tend to operate and the heartfelt way that Scotland is pursuing their Basic Income pilot programs. Mr. Cowan said that politicians rely on experts, but experts and academic often disagree, and politicians need facts and figures, which is why experiments are so important. With pilot schemes, we can monitor outcomes; they can be used to tell if “people are happier, more socially engaged, eating healthier, if kids are doing better at school, we can measure the benefits against the cost.” Mr. Cowan concluded:  “Basic Income really comes alive for me when we consider it’s for everyone. It is not means tested. It is not subject to the disability test. It removes stigma. It creates choice and it’s absolutely dripping in humanity.”

 

Guy Standing and Philippe Van Parijs, photos by Enno Schmidt and Luis Gaspar

The two main keynote speakers, Guy Standing and Philippe Van Parijs, also captured the audience’s interest with their presentations. Standing celebrated the 800 year anniversary of The Charter of the Forest, a piece of legislation that was valid for 754 years, only repealed in 1971. Standing argued that the commons defended in The Charter of The Forest have been plundered upon for hundreds of years, and Basic Income is a way to bring back the commons. He defended the position that Basic Income should be seen as a social dividend based in the commons and land tax, not something that will send income tax through the roof. Van Parijs spoke of the right to work and the duty to work. He argued that even though many see Basic Income as an attack on these, it actually facilitates both. Basic Income can organically encourage part-time work and therefore job sharing, thus promoting the right to work. Basic Income can also allow for the duty to work to be expressed in a meaningful way that includes paid and unpaid jobs. According to Van Parijs, the duty to work cannot mean simply doing something for a salary; it should be viewed more widely as a duty to participate in society in a meaningful way. Basic Income can liberate people to participate in such a way by either allowing them to chose paid work that is more meaningful, or by choosing other unpaid useful work. If we eliminate the idea that people have to work in whatever they can to survive, the morality of what one chooses to do will come to the forefront, allowing the duty to work in a more meaningful way to become center stage as far as human activity is concerned.

 

The keynote presentations wrapped up with Eduardo Suplicy from Brazil, ex-Senator and long time defender of Basic Income, and Francisco Louçã, member of the left wing party Bloco de Esquerda in Portugal. There were also many other local Portuguese participants, as well as a slew of media attention related to the congress (which will be discussed in a future Basic Income Newspiece). The congress also included 37 parallel sessions, among others, Malcolm Torry’s presentation on Defining Basic Income, sessions on Degrowth, Digital Economy, Communicating about Basic Income, and many other topics, as well as two films, Christian Todd’s Free Lunch Society and Rena Masuyama’s Film Project, the first fiction film about Basic Income produced in Japan. Summaries of all the sessions provided by the chairs should be available in about one month at the Portuguese Basic Income Site, for now there are papers and presentations and videos of the event available of the site.

 

 

More information:

 

See the program and available Papers and Abstracts for the 17th BIEN Congress here.

See Videos of all the plenary sessions here.

 

Institute for Policy Research releases “Assessing the Case for a Universal Basic Income in the UK”

Institute for Policy Research releases “Assessing the Case for a Universal Basic Income in the UK”

The Institute for Policy Research (IPR) at the University of Bath has released a policy brief titled “Assessing the Case for a Universal Basic Income in the UK”.

The 94-page policy brief surveys the rise in popularity of the idea of universal basic income (UBI), especially in the UK context, and examines its feasibility and possible implementation strategies.

The report’s author, IRP Research Associate Luke Martinelli, draws upon his previous microsimulation studies, including “The Fiscal and Distributional Implications of Alternative Universal Basic Income Schemes in the UK” (March 2017) and “Exploring the Distributional and Work Incentive Effects of Plausible Illustrative Basic Income Schemes” (May 2017). He supplements his own work with the simulation analyses of other researchers, including Malcolm Torry (Citizen’s Income Trust) and Howard Reed and Stewart Lansley (Compass) in the UK and Olli Kangas (Kela) in Finland. Martinelli argues that microsimulation techniques, which can be used to model the economic effects of UBI at a national level, allow researchers to address questions about the feasibility and desirability of UBI that are out-of-reach by “real-world” experiment–given that the latter “do not test for the crucial effects of accompanying tax changes, nor examine how changes in income and behavioural responses would be distributed across different demographic groups in the case of a truly universal payment” (p 16).

In Chapter 3 of the policy brief, Martinelli applies these simulation studies to the question of the affordability of UBI. Investigating both full and partial UBI schemes, Martinelli investigates the fiscal implications of the policy for the UK government, taking into account potential adjustments to the existing tax and benefit system, as well as their consequences for poverty and inequality. Overall, Martinelli finds that data “appear to suggest” that “it is possible to design a UBI such that it is both affordable and adequate” (emphasis in original), with the most feasible option being a partial UBI on top of existing means-tested benefits (p 48). However, he issues several notes of caution in interpreting this (apparent) consequence.

One cautionary note concerns the fact that the simulation studies use only static models, which do not provide for possible changes in labor market participation resulting from the introduction of UBI. In Chapter 4, however, Martinelli examines the labor market effects of UBI in detail, again drawing upon simulation studies. Here, he considers the results of studies that model the impact of UBI schemes on financial work incentives, concluding that UBI does significantly improve incentives, especially for low-income groups and recipients of means-tested benefits (although, as the author admits, monetary incentives are “by no means the only factor affecting labour supply decisions,” p 63). In this chapter, Martinelli supplements the simulation analysis with empirical findings from previous experiments on unconditional cash benefits (including, especially, from the negative income tax experiments conducted in Manitoba in the late 1970s). He also reviews a range of theoretical considerations, including the prima facie tension between the positions of UBI supporters who see the policy as a way of incentivizing employment (e.g. as contrasted to means-tested benefit schemes) and those who advocate the policy as providing an “exit option” from employment.

In the final chapter of the policy brief, Martinelli scrutinizes implementational challenges facing UBI in the UK, including complications building political coalitions around the idea. As Martinelli stresses, apparent political consensus around UBI is likely to dissolve when specific policy implementations are issue. In concluding the report, he urges supporters of UBI not to demand a full basic income immediately, but instead to consider an incremental approach. As potential first steps, Martinelli mentioned a small universal payment (“partial basic income”) or a basic income restricted to certain age groups (e.g., as suggested by Malcolm Torry, young adults or adults nearing pension age).

 

The full report can be downloaded here:

Luke Martinelli, “Assessing the Case for a Universal Basic Income in the UK”, Institute for Policy Research, September 2017.


Reviewed by Russell Ingram

Photo (Bath, England) CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 David McKelvey

The OECD and the problems of basic income

The OECD and the problems of basic income

According to the OECD, basic income (BI) is not an effective tool for reducing poverty. However, the outcome would depend on the model chosen for implementing a BI system, as well as the changes made in other parts of social protection.

 

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published in May a Policy Brief paper studying the feasibility of a basic income model in four OECD countries, one of which was Finland.

On June 16, Kela organized a seminar in which Herwig Immervoll, a senior economist at the OECD, discussed the findings of his study and analysed the strengths and weaknesses of a BI scheme. After the seminar, the national broadcasting company YLE reported: “Universal basic income might increase poverty and inequality”.

Apart from Finland, the OECD study includes France, Italy and the United Kingdom. The analysis was done with the help of the EUROMOD microsimulation model. In each country, the starting point for the analysis was to take all existing spending on social cash-transfers together and see what level of BI they would amount to. Eventually, the level of BI was set near the existing levels of guaranteed minimum-income benefits for single individuals in each country, adjusted so that it would not increase the public expenditures.

In Finland, this resulted a BI of 527 euros for the working age adults and 316 euros for children and youth under 18 years of age. Those entitled to old-age pensions within the current main statutory retirement age (in Finland over 65-year-olds) were excluded from the BI model.

In the BI model used in the OECD analysis, all existing working-age benefits (including social insurance benefits) apart from cash transfers for housing and disability would be abolished. Also, the zero-rate tax bands of income-tax schedules and equivalent tax-free allowances would be abolished, and all income-tax thresholds would be shifted downwards by a corresponding amount. BI would be made taxable under personal income taxation alongside other taxable incomes.

The OECD model would create many gainers and losers

The most important outcome of the OECD study is that the simulated BI model would strongly impact the income distribution in all studied countries. However, the effects vary greatly among the countries.

In all income groups, the BI model would create many gainers and losers. It would change the net income of most people in one way or another. It would lift some groups out of poverty and thrust others below the poverty line.

The simulated BI model would increase the income level of those small income groups who are currently not receiving any social benefits, or whose benefit level is very low. In turn, those receiving earnings-related benefits or several means-tested benefits would see a decline in their standard of living.

In Finland, those below 65-years-old receiving old-age pensions and single parents with low incomes would be among the losers of the model. The middle-income earners instead would generally benefit from the model.

The conclusion of the OECD is that particularly in countries with a comprehensive social protection BI is not an efficient tool for reducing poverty, since it does not target the benefits effectively. According to the OECD, a budget-neutral BI would not be distributionally neutral. High enough to be socially and politically meaningful and fiscally realistic, a BI would still require tax rises as well as reductions in existing benefits.

A very low basic income, instead, would have little other significance but increase poverty.

The outcomes of BI depend on reforms in taxation and social protection

How the findings of the OECD study are to be interpreted in the Finnish context?

Perhaps the most important issue that the research sheds light on is the fact that there are many institutional challenges in implementing a BI system, and those challenges differ among countries due to their different systems of social security and taxation.

As the OECD report (p. 5) notes, BI as an idea is simple, but the existing social protection systems are not. Therefore, there are grounds to argue that the same model of BI does not fit everywhere. If a reform such as BI were to be carried out, it needs to be adjusted to the existing institutions of social protection and taxation in each country separately. The parameters of the model should be adjusted so that it will not produce excessive changes in people’s incomes.

The greatest problems of the OECD’s microsimulation are that the income taxation is not changed to correspond with the BI model, and that the existing systems are demolished by the same means everywhere without examining the structures of social protection in each country separately. Due to this, BI seems to have unpredictable effects to income distribution.

The income distribution produced by a BI model can be influenced by adjusting the parameters of taxation and social security. In his presentation at the Kela seminar, Herwig Immervoll mentioned that tax reforms should be discussed in parallel with BI. Indirect taxes, such as environmental or value added taxes, have often been proposed as a complementary source for financing a BI scheme, combined with income taxation.

However, the OECD report does not mention these alternatives, and the premise seems to be that taxation in any form should not be increased.

In Finland, as well as in many other countries, some organisations and individuals have launched models of BI adjusted to the local context. Their objective has often (yet not always) been to not radically alter the income distribution or cause reductions in people’s after-tax incomes, especially in the lowest income groups. Microsimulation has been employed at least in the models of partial BI by the Green Party and the Left Alliance, and in the preliminary study for the national BI trial conducted by Kela.

In these models, BI is linked with a reform in income taxation that is designed so that radical changes in after-tax incomes will not occur in any income group. The aim is also to make the models budget neutral, that is, to cover the costs of BI by reforms in taxation and replacing the existing benefit systems. In these models, the old system will be abolished only in those parts where the level of benefits is lower than the BI.

One of the problems with the BI trial currently underway is that due to time constraints, the taxation reform proposed by the research team that designed the experiment was not included.

Will Finland implement a BI?

Though there exist BI models in Finland that would technically allow implementation of a BI system without radical changes in income distribution or public financing, the road of BI will probably be rocky even here.

The preparations of the BI experiment scheme revealed many institutional challenges in implementation of a BI model. The greatest obstacles for a BI are, however, ideological.

In Finland, BI has gained interest especially as a possibility to improve the incentives for paid work. The possibility to combine wages with social benefits more smoothly than today is an issue that no party opposes. Yet, many still find it morally wrong to give people money with no obligations. The opponents of BI fear that the “free money” would reduce people’s willingness to work and give a moral legitimacy to not apply for jobs.

If the only, or at least the most important function of BI is to improve work incentives, the great promises of BI may not be fulfilled after all. The preliminary studies for the BI trial revealed that BI models do not always unambiguously remove incentive traps, if parts of the old social security stay intact.

However, it seems likely that in Finland, as well as in other industrialised countries, the social security will be reformed in a direction that may contain some elements of BI, but not necessarily a ‘pure’ BI model.

If the political thinking emphasizing the labour supply and austerity in public economy prevail, the prospects for more generous BI models seem to be low. In the framework of current economic policies, the implementation of a BI would most probably mean at least demolishing large parts or other forms of social security.

BI as a social dividend?

The OECD report (p. 8) ends up recommending some kind of ’partial’ alternative of a BI model. One option mentioned is a possibility to introduce BI as a separate system from the existing social protection, whose function would be to share the benefits of globalisation and technological progress more equally.

This idea of ‘social dividend’ has often appeared in BI discussions. The state of Alaska is already giving an annual share of the permanent fund based on oil revenues to each citizen as a social dividend. There is similar thinking linked also to the idea of “helicopter money”, originally introduced by Milton Friedman, a cash transfer paid by the central bank to people’s accounts to stimulate consumer demand in economic downturns.

Considering BI as a social dividend would locate it in a new frame, where its function would not be to fix the problems of social security systems, but to distribute purchasing power also to those who lose their jobs or end up in low paid precarious jobs in the labour market turmoil caused by digitalization.

If BI were paid on top of other social benefits, its level could even be lower, or for instance connected to macro economy indicators. In that case, it could also be used to stimulate economies in downturns.

 

Johanna Perkiö
M.Soc.Sc., Doctoral Candidate
University of Tampere
email: johanna.perkio(at)uta.fi

 

Original article:

Johanna Perkiö, “The OECD and the problems of basic income“, Kela, June 30, 2017.