Book review of Birnbaum, Simon. 2012. Basic Income Reconsidered: Social Justice, Liberalism, and the Demands of Equality
Book review of Birnbaum, Simon. 2012. Basic Income Reconsidered: Social Justice, Liberalism, and the Demands of Equality. Basic income guarantee series. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 246 pp.
ISBN 978–0–230–11406–7
Published in Ethical Perspectives, vol.3, 2014, p.464-5.
Roberto Merrill (University of Minho)
In his book Basic Income Reconsidered: Social Justice, Liberalism, and the Demands of Equality, Simon Birnbaum builds a defence of an unconditional basic income which is based on three pillars: the first consists in a radical-liberal interpretation of John Rawls’ theory of justice, the second offers a reconstruction and defence of Van Parijs “jobs as gifts” argument for basic income, and the third proposes a definition of a work ethics which is not perfectionist and is compatible with state neutrality.
The book is divided in three parts.
The first part of the book, untitled “A Society of Equals: Radical Liberalism, Self-Respect, and Basic Income” is divided in two chapters, the first one being devoted to a defence of a rawlsian case for basic income, and the second chapter is an examination and refutation of the claim that only contributors are entitled to social rights. The general aim of the chapter is to defend an understanding of Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness, in particular Rawls’ theory of primary goods, including self-respect, which can be compatible with the promotion of a basic income as the best way to protect the status of the least advantaged as free and equals throughout their lives.
A first convincing strategy proposed by Birnbaum in arguing for a rawlsian case for basic income is to recall that John Rawls, following the work of James Meade on property-owning democracy, argued that justice must also achieve resource equalization ex ante rather than only corrective adjustments ex post. Ex post justice is what the welfare state in capitalist societies already does and it’s not working. A basic income should thus be considered as an adequate illustration of a public policy which contributes to realize the ideal of a property-owning democracy. Furthermore, according to Birnbaum paid work should not be considered as a necessary condition of rawlsian self-respect, otherwise it would imply a perfectionist conception of self-respect incompatible with liberal neutrality (Birnbaum, 2012:61).
Another convincing argument proposed by Birnbaum allowing to block a potential objection to a defence of basic income from the rawlsian conception of society as a system of cooperation is to distinguish two conceptions of cooperation: a thick and a thin one. A thick conception of cooperation implies both economic and political cooperation and a thin conception implies only one of them (Birbaum, 2012: 68). Furthermore, both economical and political cooperation can be thick or thin. According to Birnbaum, a thick conception of cooperation, which implies labour market participation is in tension with some of Rawls basic intuitions about justice and therefore should be rejected. If true, this clears the way for a compatibility between Rawls’ conception of social cooperation and a basic income, and thus for radical liberalism.
The second part of the book, untitled “The Exploitation Objection against Basic Income: Equality of Opportunity, Luck, and Responsibility”, is also divided in two chapters.
The first chapter consists of a review and a refutation of the main variants of the “exploitation objection” against the defence of a basic income such as formulated by Philippe Van Parijs in his book Real Freedom for All
, which, according to Birnbaum, offers the best defence against the exploitation objection. The main variant of the exploitation objection examined is the “restriction objection”, according to which the distribution of the pool of resources is only for those that are willing to work and are involuntary unemployed (Birnbaum, 2012: 34-35). In this chapter, Birnbaum examines Van Parijs’ controversial claim according to which employment rents, incorporated in wages of privileged jobs, must me considered as resources to which all are entitled. Birnbaum distinguishes a weak and a strong version of this objection and argues that Van Parijs “jobs as gifts” argument, according to which the employment rents should be considered as common resources to which all have an equal claim, survives the strong version of the restriction objection. However, this is only possible if some qualifications related to the “long term stability of justice” are incorporated to the argument. These qualifications are developed in the second chapter, in a clear and convincing reconstruction and defence of Van Parijs “jobs as gifts” argument for basic income. According to Birnbaum, if Van Parijs’ argument is to be successful in rejecting the exploitation objection, apart from accommodating the “stability of justice” clause, it also needs to accommodate some considerations regarding the social and economical conditions of basic autonomy (which are fleshed out in part one of Birnbaum’s book).
The third and last part of the book, untitled “The Feasibility of Basic Income: Social Ethos, Work, and the Politics of Universalism”, is divided in two chapters. The first chapter proposes a conception of a “work ethics” which is compatible with liberal neutrality. Contra Van Parijs, Birnbaum argues for a non obligatory work ethos which avoids any perfectionist implications, by proposing a wide definition of an ethos of contribution which includes activities that are not “productivist”. However, Birnbaum acknowledges that his anti-perfectionist definition of a work ethics, although having the advantage of being compatible with neutrality, also exposes itself to the structural exploitation objection, since it does not protect self-sacrificing individuals to be exploited by selfish ones (Birnbaum, 2012: 160). But this is not the freedom that liberal neutrality should protect, nor the freedom that radical liberal egalitarians seek to promote through the implementation of a basic income. For this reason Birnbaum tries to avoid this consequence of his redefinition of the work ethos by introducing the notion of a “minimal autonomy” to which all individuals must have access if they are to avoid ethical servility and make well informed choices about their life-plans (Birnbaum, 2012: 162). As a neutralist, one might worry here that Birnbaum’s minimal autonomy constraint implies a work ethos and a duty to contribute which after all may not be compatible with liberal neutrality, although it clearly is less perfectionist than the alternative of a strictly productivist ethos while at the same time resisting well to the exploitation objection.
The last chapter proposes an exploration of the political implications of radical liberalism, in practical policy issues, such as political legitimacy, environmental sustainability, and gender equity. The author explores these issues in a clear and well informed way. The book ends with a realistic proposal by arguing for a gradualist implementation of a basic income scheme. Overall, the book is a major contribution to the liberal egalitarian literature on basic income.
