Paul Basken, “Universal Basic Income: An Idea Whose Scholarly Time Has Come?”

Paul Basken, “Universal Basic Income: An Idea Whose Scholarly Time Has Come?”

Paul Basken has written an article about scholarly research on basic income for The Chronicle of Higher Education, a US-based news service aimed toward individuals engaged with higher education.

Despite concerns about job loss due to automation, and despite an increase in the popularity of basic income as a potential countermeasure, it is rare that university researchers in the United States seek (let alone obtain) funding for research projects on basic income. As Basken’s article points out, the National Science Foundation (NSF), the main federal agency sponsoring academic research, has not received a “surge in proposals for research on basic income” — nor has it made any strides to encourage such topics.

However, as Basken also notes, many scholars are themselves not sure what research could reveal about the implementation and effects of basic income, given the inherent limitations of experiments and simulations and the complexities of implementing the policy in practice.

Basken’s article features commentary from three scholars who have researched and written upon basic income: Michael C. Munger (Political Science, Duke University), Michael A. Lewis (Social Work, Hunter College), and Matt Zwolinski (Philosophy, University of San Diego).

Read the full article:

Paul Basken, “Universal Basic Income: An Idea Whose Scholarly Time Has Come?The Chronicle of Higher Education, March 9, 2017.


Reviewed by Robert Gordon

Photo CC BY 2.0 Stewart Butterfield

The job guarantee and automation

The job guarantee and automation

Michael A. Lewis

Silberman School of Social Work at Hunter College

In “Why a Universal Basic Income is a Poor Substitute for a Guaranteed Job,” Claire Connelly praises guaranteeing people a right to a job as opposed to guaranteeing them a right to an income. I’ve been involved in quite a few discussions, some of them debates, about the relative merits of basic income versus guaranteed jobs proposals. My position has always been that I have no problem, in principle, with guaranteeing someone a job. If guaranteeing jobs and an unconditional basic income were both financially and politically feasible, I’d be a proponent of both. But if I had to choose one of these policies over the other, I’d prefer the basic income. This is because I think guaranteeing people access to the resources they need to survive has priority over guaranteeing them the right to sell their labor. This, however, isn’t the debate I want to have here. What I want to do, instead, is raise a question about guaranteed jobs proposals: what would it really mean to guarantee someone a job? If those arguing that automation will result in a net loss of jobs for human beings are right, this question becomes especially salient.

Let me start by framing the question more precisely: under what conditions would the government, in its employer of last resort role, hire people? Connelly seems to be supporting the idea of government serving as a buffer stock mechanism. That is, it would step in to hire labor when private sector demand was low and, presumably, step aside when such demand was high. This would put a floor under the price of labor because private sector employers couldn’t, during economic downturns, use the threat of unemployment to get workers to accept lower wages.

As many readers of this site are no doubt aware, some have argued that automation is increasing rapidly and will only continue to do so. Now I’m no expert in this area. So I don’t know if these folks are right that we’re on the path to seeing robots take our jobs. But if they are, this would seem to cause a problem for the buffer stock idea.

The buffer stock approach seems based on a model of the economy where unemployment is due to periodic downturns. The public sector steps in to absorb the resulting labor surplus, but this is meant to be temporary. Once the economy starts growing again, and unemployment declines, public sector employment can contract, as those who worked in the public sector are absorbed by the private one. But automation isn’t supposed to work like that. Instead, there is a steady, but permanent, decline in many types of work as machines take our jobs. I know there’s a huge debate about whether other types of jobs will develop to replace the one’s lost to robots: but suppose such replacement doesn’t happen. Perhaps it’s premature to do so, but I wonder if guaranteed jobs proponents have thought about how their guaranteed jobs plan would work in such an environment. Would government indefinitely hire all those who’ve lost their jobs to machines?

On the ‘automation’ argument for basic income

On the ‘automation’ argument for basic income

Written by: Michael A. Lewis
Silberman School of Social Work at Hunter College and the CUNY Graduate Center

When I first became interested in the basic income, I was a graduate student studying welfare reform. For those who aren’t in the know, “welfare” is the more common name used in the U.S. to refer to a program called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and which used to be called Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). TANF and AFDC aren’t exactly the same programs, but they do have some key things in common: they provide financial support to low income persons, most of those who receive such support are women and children, and, I think it’s fair to say, both programs are somewhat controversial.

The controversy around welfare has to do with the fact that many of those who receive benefits are apparently “able-bodied” persons who’re thought capable of working (“working” in this context means selling one’s labor in return for a wage, instead of, say, taking care of one’s children, something many would regard as work). Yet not enough of those on welfare are working, according to a common belief among many U.S. citizens/residents as well as, apparently, politicians. So in an attempt to socialize welfare beneficiaries into understanding the importance of work, many of them are required to work in return for their benefits, a practice commonly called “workfare.” Many also remain poor, even after receiving benefits, because the financial support they receive is pretty meager.

As a graduate student, I thought workfare, as well as the low level of benefits provided to recipients was a very unjust way of assisting poor persons; I also thought we could do better (in fact, I still think these things). My entry into the world of basic income was because I believed it a more just way of addressing poverty than welfare and related programs.

Once I started studying basic income and meeting others interested in the idea, I heard other justifications for it. It would enhance freedom, it would allow people to engage in care work if they so choose, it would give people an income representing their share of commonly owned natural resources, it would be a way of replacing some or all of the welfare state (which, of course, assumes there is something wrong with the current system), etc. But the argument that seems to have caught on the most, at least in the U.S., is the idea that a basic income will become necessary as robots/machines take our jobs.

I have to admit that part of me has been a bit concerned about the degree to which the automation argument seems to dominate basic income discussions. My worry is that as we spend so much time debating who’s right about whether robots will take most, or perhaps all, of our jobs and, therefore, whether there’ll be a need for a basic income, other arguments for such a policy get “crowded out” of the discussion. Yet as I’ve voiced this concern, mainly to myself, I’ve also wondered why this argument for a basic income seems to have caught on in a way that others haven’t?

I think part of the answer has to do with where I started—U.S. citizens/residents worry a lot about the degree to which healthy people work to take care of themselves (and their families) and are quite skeptical about policies they believe will allow people to shirk this responsibility. But I think another part of the answer has to do with the role of race in our society. I suspect that in the minds of many citizens/residents the degree to which a basic income would allow people to shirk their obligations to work would vary by race. To put it bluntly, I suspect many assume that black and brown people would be more likely to shirk this responsibility than whites would be. If I’m right about all this, then perhaps it shouldn’t be surprising that the U.S. isn’t naturally the most fertile place for the basic income idea to take hold. But why would it take hold in the form of the automation argument? I think the answer here might be pretty simple. If machines are about to take all our jobs, then automation represents a relatively indiscriminant force. That is, “hard working white people” might be threatened just as much as “lazy shiftless brown ones” are. Perhaps this has been enough to get white folks to take notice of a policy that perhaps could address the problem.

About the author: Michael A. Lewis is a social worker and sociologist by training whose areas of interest are public policy and quantitative methods. He’s also a co-founder of USBIG and has written a number of articles, book chapters, and other pieces on the basic income, including the co-edited work The Ethics and Economics of the Basic Income Guarantee. Lewis is on the faculties of the Silberman School of Social Work at Hunter College and the Graduate and University Center of the City University of New York.

A response to ‘The dangers of a basic income’

A response to ‘The dangers of a basic income’

Michael A. Lewis

Silberman School of Social Work at Hunter College

A recent post, by Nathan Keeble, which appears on the Mises Institute’s website is titled The Dangers of a Universal Basic Income. The main danger seems to be that a basic income (I’m paraphrasing) would provide non-productive people with an income they would not have to work for. “Non-productive” in this context isn’t synonymous with lazy, shiftless, or anything like that.

The non-productive among us could be very busy writing poetry, composing music, playing it, or engaging in other pursuits. What makes one non-productive isn’t a lack of effort or initiative but the lack of a market for their goods or services. That is, if you create or produce something no one wants to buy, you’re non-productive. The problem with a basic income is that it would subsidize such activities. According to the Mises article, this is bad because it would allow people to continue such non-productive pursuits, instead of trying to figure out how to do something there’d be a market for. The result, Keeble writes, is that a society with a basic income would be less productive and experience a lower level of social welfare than a society without one.

I think this is a questionable line of reasoning because it’s based on the shaky assumption that the market is the sole determinant of what’s productive. If someone wants to buy your good or service, you’re productive; if not, you’re not. This is an extremely narrow view.

Consider folks who’re currently employed in factories that make cigarettes, firearms, sugary snacks, or alcoholic beverages. There are huge markets for all of these activities. But if a basic income were enacted, folks working in the above industries reduced their labor supply, and this resulted in a decrease in the production of cigarettes, handguns, Twinkies, and liquors; it’s not clear to me this would amount to a net reduction in social welfare. This is because there’s evidence that all these goods contribute to serious public health problems. And if people spent less time producing cigarettes and more time making art, even if there weren’t markets for their work, this might amount to a net increase in social welfare.

What does or doesn’t contribute to net changes in social welfare is far too complex to be reduced to what people are willing to buy in the marketplace.


About the author: Michael A. Lewis is a social worker and sociologist by training whose areas of interest are public policy and quantitative methods. He’s also a co-founder of USBIG and has written a number of articles, book chapters, and other pieces on the basic income, including the co-edited work The Ethics and Economics of the Basic Income Guarantee. Lewis is on the faculties of the Silberman School of Social Work at Hunter College and the Graduate and University Center of the City University of New York.

Image: Mises Crest – By ConcordeMandalorian – Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=31860282

Work, meaning, and the basic income

Work, meaning, and the basic income

Written by: Michael A. Lewis

Silberman School of Social Work at Hunter College

Back in the 1990s, I co-founded a group of academics and activists (some were both) called United States Basic Income Guarantee Network (USBIG). Since then, I’ve written a number of papers, book chapters, and other things in which I’ve argued for a basic income. I’ve also taught public policy courses where we’ve discussed this idea. Having been at this now for about twenty years, I’ve found that those skeptical about a basic income typically raise at least one of four objections: a basic income is unaffordable, it would be hyperinflationary, “able-bodied” people shouldn’t be given something for nothing (which is what a basic income would do), or it would lead to a decline in work. This last objection typically has two dimensions.

One is that we need people to work because we need them producing the goods and services which sustain us all. The other is that people need to work for themselves because it provides social connections and a sense of purpose and meaning in their lives. Although the first three objections, as well as the first dimension of the fourth, are important, I’ll focus here only on the second dimension of this fourth objection. It typically goes like this.

Work, by which these folks really mean the sale of labor in return for a wage, is good for people. One reason it’s good for them is because it provides a source of income. But it’s also good for them because, as stated earlier, it provides social connections, as well as a sense of purpose and meaning in their lives. Implementing a basic income would allow people to obtain income without their having to work for it, and this would likely result in their working less than they would in a world without such a policy. Less work would result in more social isolation, as well as less purpose and meaning in people’s lives.

There’s an obvious response to this objection articulated by David Mosciotra. Many, perhaps most, people don’t work for social connections, meaning, and purpose — they work for money. And they may be able to find more connections, meaning, and purpose spending less time at work and more pursuing hobbies, socializing with friends and family, pursuing more education, etc.

I wholeheartedly agree with Mosciotra on this point and have said similar things many times during discussions I’ve had with people about basic income. But, as I listened to people state this objection, another thought has often occurred to me. Let’s assume for the moment that people do work for social connections, purpose, and meaning in their lives, in addition to income. If this is so, why worry much about a basic income leading to a significant decline in work?

People’s basic income allotments would be paid in currency not units of social connection, purpose, and meaning (whatever this means). That is, people would be able to work less and not lose as much income from doing so as they would now. But if people worked less because they received a basic income, the number of social connections, sense of purpose, and meaning they’d lose, could be substantial, depending on how connected they are at work, versus how connected they’d be if they reduced their labor supply, and how the degree to which they work for purpose and meaning compares to the degree to which they work for income. If those who state this objection are correct that people work mainly, or largely, for social connection, purpose, and meaning, we shouldn’t expect much of a decline in work effort from a basic income. This is because a basic income would only replace some of the income people receive from work and none of the social connection, purpose, or meaning they receive from it. But if people don’t work mainly for social connection, meaning, and purpose, then we’re back to the point about how those who object to a basic income on these grounds appear to be misguided about what actually motivates people to work. In either case, one wonders how seriously we should take this objection. I’m inclined to think not very seriously at all.

The only sense I can make of this objection, and it isn’t much, is that work does provide people with social connections, purpose, and meaning but they aren’t aware of this. That might explain why simply getting some of their income from work replaced by a basic income would result in a significant decline in work. This line of thinking strikes me as pretty odd. It contends that people are currently engaging in an activity which gives them a sense of purpose and meaning, as well as allows them to connect with others.

Purpose, meaning, and social connection sound like very deep and profound things; they also sound like things people would be aware of. Yet, supposedly, millions of people are engaging in hours and hours of an activity which connects them to others, while also providing a sense of purpose and meaning in their lives, without them knowing that this is going on. That’s why giving them money they don’t have to work for could result in a substantial reduction in labor supply. This argument doesn’t strike me as very plausible. But I’m open to being convinced otherwise.

About the author: Michael A. Lewis is a social worker and sociologist by training whose areas of interest are public policy and quantitative methods. He’s also a co-founder of USBIG and has written a number of articles, book chapters, and other pieces on the basic income, including the co-edited work The Ethics and Economics of the Basic Income Guarantee. Lewis is on the faculties of the Silberman School of Social Work at Hunter College and the Graduate and University Center of the City University of New York.