OPINION: Why Jay Hammond favored a larger dividend, higher taxes, and smaller government

It might be an exaggeration to say that former Alaksa Governor Jay Hammond, the person responsible more than any other for the Permanent Fund Dividend, was a republican thinker in the tradition of Rousseau or Jefferson. I certainly don’t know enough about his history to make this claim. But his reflections on the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF) and the Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) do echo some important themes from that nearly abandoned republican tradition, and may partly explain why Hammond was often at odds with others in the Republican Party over the dividend, taxes, and economic development. The success of the Fund and Dividend may suggest a model for leaders in any party who want to promote republican ideals of citizen participation, equality, personal independence, and government that serves the common good rather than special interests.

At a workshop in which I participated in Anchorage on the PFD in April 2011, the Alaskans who had for decades studied the Fund and Dividend, and participated in their creation, all agreed that distributive justice played no part in the debate, and thought that had the Dividend been framed as a way to reduce inequality or end poverty, it never would have passed. The primary case for the Dividend was that it would create popular support for the Fund, and thus prevent the legislature from wasting money. Nevertheless, it is clear that distributive justice informed Hammond’s thinking about the Dividend, and partly explains why he favored dividends over competing policy proposals.

This is most obvious in the proposal, which passed despite Hammond’s opposition, to abolish the income tax and fund Alaska’s government with oil revenue. Hammond would have preferred the continuation of income taxes while paying larger dividends from larger investments of oil revenue in the Fund. One reason is that by repealing the income tax, “you’ll cut the one string connecting the citizen’s pocketbook to the government purse, and see state spending soar….[By [e]liminating the income tax…[n]ot only will we reduce our means, we’ll cut the one prime restraint on government spending” (265). Paying taxes makes us vigilant about what is being done with our tax dollars. It helps to keep us engaged as citizens. If we stop paying attention, we also get robbed.

This is clear in the second reason Hammond gave for continuing income taxes, that has to do with distributive justice: Eliminating, capping, or reducing the possible dividends paid out to citizens, in order to abolish income taxes, has a regressive effect on income distribution. “The most regrettable aspect of income tax repeal is that it exerts pressure to invade the Permanent Fund to replace the money lost by income tax repeal [pressure that will grow as oil revenue declines—MH]. This, of course, will shift the burden for state spending entirely from those who can best afford to pay taxes—including the non-residents who make up about a quarter of our workforce—to the shoulders of each and every Alaskan, regardless of income. None would feel the burden more than the low and middle income groups” (266). In contrast, funding government from income taxes and permitting a higher dividend would give a bigger proportionate boost to the incomes of low and middle income groups.

Hammond points out that the abolition of income taxes in effect created hidden taxes. Proposals to cap dividends in order to allow more APF money to be used for government spending “equates with imposing a head tax on every Alaskan and only Alaskans—regardless of income…. it never makes more sense to cap dividends than to simply ratchet up taxes to raise the same amount. In effect, capping dividends taxes only—and all—Alaskans. Increasing most taxes spreads the burden to those best able to pay—and also includes transient workers who currently remove so much wealth from our state ” (320–22).

The dividend, according to Hammond’s estimate, “is but one half of the earnings derived from investments of roughly only one-tenth of their oil wealth.” If all the wealth were distributed in dividends, each Alaskan would receive an additional $6,000 per person per year (in 1993). By funding government with this oil revenue instead of from taxes, Alaskans are in effect paying a regressive head tax, falling heaviest on those who can least afford to relinquish this wealth. But because it is not taken out of their paychecks, the tax remains hidden. A large dividend would contribute to personal independence. Hammond speculates that “were every Alaskan annually granted his full per capita share of the wealth we could eliminate or vastly curtail all welfare programs, unemployment insurance and subsidies” (319).

The supporters of income tax abolition, he notes, are first of all the wealthy who stand to benefit from lower taxes more than they would gain from larger equal per capita dividends. Secondly, a legislature flush with money that no one is watching becomes a tool of special interests. Hammond says to proponents of income tax repeal,” “though you seem perfectly willing to cut down on the little guy’s ‘living’ by slicing social programs like welfare, you seem unconcerned about boosting ‘living’ for select interests through subsidies such as lower than market rate loans and other ‘hidden dividends’ not based on need. Some might call that ‘corporate welfare’” (265).

Thus we find another classic republican theme, promotion of the general good over particular interests, alongside Hammond’s concerns for personal independence, progressive taxation, and more engaged citizens. All of these ends are well served by a large dividend and funding of government through income taxes.

There are some blind spots in his thinking. While he recognizes the legitimacy of government spending on the basis of need or “constitutional obligation”, he seems not very sensitive to the case to be made for government spending for public goods. There are some goods we all benefit from that the market will not deliver efficiently, no matter how much income we have. And his outlook is narrowly nationalistic, aiming for what is good for all Alaskans (not even all Americans), as is evident in the above quotations referring to non-Alaskans. (In his original dividend proposal, found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, Hammond wanted those who had lived in Alaska longer to receive larger dividends.) Why, one might ask, should Alaskans enjoy a large dividend because of Alaska’s oil, while Vermonters, say, with fewer resources, could only give themselves a much smaller dividend? Shouldn’t the unearned natural wealth of the United States be shared equally by all Americans? Or, to go a step further, shouldn’t the natural resources of the earth be shared equally by all of its inhabitants, not just those fortunate to be born on top of rich deposits of oil or other wealth? This of course is not a blind spot peculiar to Hammond or political thinkers in the republican tradition, and getting beyond it in practical politics will require the strengthening of institutions and an ethos of solidarity at the federal and global levels. As these emerge, the global community may have something to learn from the example of the Permanent Fund Dividend, including the thinking of its strongest advocate.

All references are to Jay Hammond, Tales of a Bush Rat Governor (Fairbanks/Seattle: Epicenter Press, 1994).

JAPAN: Parliamentary meeting on basic income

CORRECTION: On April 27th, 2011, members BIEN’s Japan affiliate (The Basic Income Japan Network—BIJN) held a “meeting at the parliament building” to demand basic income (BI) to people who affected by the earthquake, tsunami and the nuclear accident. A “meeting at the parliament building” is a Japanese term for an official meeting in a government building (though not literally in the parliament building) and at which at least one member of parliament attends. Several MPs and secretaries from both governing and opposition parties attended the meeting, as well as nearly 100 participants from the general public. Members of Basic Income Japan Network (BIJN) helped to prepare and present the statement demanding BI. BIEN supported the initiative with a solidarity messages signed by its co-chairs, supporting the demand for a BI for those who have been affected by the tragic events in Japan this year.

This is a correction an earlier article that mislabeled the meeting as a “parliamentary meeting.”

The English summary of the request made for the Japanese government is available on the following URL: https://bijp.net/newsinfo/article/252
BIJN is planning to have the second parliamentary meeting on 15 June, this time with a guest speaker from the Single Mothers’ Forum in Fukushima.

SCHULTE-BASTA, Dorothee (2010), Ökonomische Nützlichkeit oder leistungsloser Selbstwert? Zur Kompatibilität von Bedingungslosem Grundeinkommen und Katholischer Soziallehre

SCHULTE-BASTA, Dorothee (2010), Ökonomische Nützlichkeit oder leistungsloser Selbstwert? Zur Kompatibilität von Bedingungslosem Grundeinkommen und Katholischer Soziallehre, Freiberg: Zas, 2010.

Catholic social teaching is a body of doctrine developed by the Catholic Church on matters of poverty, wealth, economics, labor, social organization and the role of the state. Its foundation has been laid by Pope Leo XIII’s 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum, and ever since than it is distinctive in its consistent critique of modern social and political ideologies both of the left and of the right. In her now published Master’s thesis, Schulte-Basta, who studied Theology, Philosophy and Communications in Muenster and Berlin, analyzes this critique in terms of Basic Income, as one of the most popular alternative to a marked-based form of organization. Analyzing the compatibility of Basic Income and Catholic Social Teaching, she gives a detailed overview in the history of Catholic Social Teaching in general and especially on the genesis of the key principles such as human dignity, solidarity and subsidiarity. In a second step she aligns their essence to the fundamental values of Basic Income. Her study finds that Basic Income does not contradict those key principles but instead helps to implement them by realizing human dignity, implementing solidarity in society and enabling people to help themselves. The book, first German-speaking overview on this topic, comes with a preface by Birgit Zenker, head of KAB, Germany’s Catholic Workers Movement.

For futher information:
https://zas-freiberg.de/index.php/buecher/55-oekonomischenuetzlichkeit

Pro-BI book becomes best-seller in Germany

1000 Euro for everyone. Freedom. Equality. Basic Income is the title of a new book (€1.000 für Jeden: Freiheit. Gleichheit. Grundeinkommen in the original) by Götz W. Werner and Adrienne Goehler, published in August 2010. According to the Amazon.de website it is currently in place No. 1,563 of all books being sold, but in the category ‘Social Justice’ it is No. 1. It is clearly of considerable significance to find so much interest in a Citizen’s Income in a European country.

An interesting review of this book appears in the January Review of Books in Sp!ked. The first half of the review is factual and informative and is reproduced below (with permission from Sp!ked. You can read the original dated Friday 28 January 2011 at www.spiked-online.com/index.php/site/reviewofbooks_article/10136/ )

The idea that the state should give everyone a basic income has seized the imagination of Germany’s middle class and politicians.

by Johannes Richardt (head of PR and communications at Novo Argumente publishing house)

At the moment, more than €1 trillion flows into the more or less state-controlled German welfare complex every year. Representing one third of German GDP, this vast amount of money covers every social benefit, from child allowance to health insurance. If the economic stats were not striking enough, of the 80 million people living in Germany only 40 per cent earn a wage. So a large proportion of the population is dependent either partially or wholly upon the state.

But the German welfare state does not just provide a financial safety net. It also seeks to regulate the behaviour of benefits claimants through various forms of lifestyle intervention, such as dictating how much claimants should be allowed to spend on cigarettes. In this regard, the so-called Hartz IV legislation, passed in 2005 by the then ruling Green-Social Democrat coalition, is important. Named after its originator, Peter Hartz – then a social democratic trade unionist and manager of part state-owned Volkswagen before being imprisoned for embezzlement in 2007 – Hartz IV effectively revised the status of the unemployed. They were no longer citizens in need of assistance while out of work: they were deemed welfare dependent. They were no longer people fallen on hard times, but fully capable of getting back into work: they were psychologically dependent upon welfare and incapable of getting back into work.

Hartz IV not only produced a new form of state dependency; it also sought to prepare these damaged citizens for work. To this end, a new sector of senseless and unproductive labour for about 1.5 million of the unemployed benefits claimants was created (thus removing them from unemployment statistics). Under the pretext of empowering the unemployed by psychologically preparing them for the labour market, these benefits claimants are forced into absurd and degrading activities run by highly subsidised companies with Orwellian-sounding names like Neue Arbeit [New Work]. One example of this absurd work-for-work’s-sake philosophy is the Toys Company. In more than 60 factories around Germany, the formerly unemployed people work for an extra €1 per hour on top of their out-of-work benefits, recycling second-hand toys for poor children. One task is to check the completeness of second-hand puzzles. ‘The record for completing the 5000-piece puzzle is just 10 days’, explained Toys Company’s manager, ‘although unfortunately we found out that three pieces were missing’. Götz Werner and Adrienne Goehler refer to this example in their new book 1000 € für Jeden. Freiheit. Gleichheit. Grundeinkommen. (€1000 Each. Liberty. Equality. Basic Income.) They argue for a new model of state welfare distribution which would replace the bureaucratic, behaviour-management regime of Hartz IV with one based on a simple premise: the state would pay everyone a basic income.

At first sight their central idea of a basic income for everybody seems quite charming: Every citizen gets €1,000 from the state every month from cradle to grave. As Werner, the billionaire founder of a drugstore chain, and Goehler, president of the Hamburg Art Academy, note, €1000 represents more than just a living wage. They argue that it also enables people to participate in the cultural life of society.

Because this would be an amount that every person would be legally entitled to, there would be no more degrading means tests and interventions in the lives of benefits claimants. The welfare bureaucracy as Germans know it would be redundant: the unemployed would be freed from doing compulsory labour promoted by the state, and the rest of society would be freed from the imperative of wage labour provided by the market. Income would be separated from work. As one would not need to sell one’s labour in order to guarantee an income, the authors argue, people could choose their line of work, for whom they want to work and for how long. This would lead to a new society in which self-realisation, creativity and compassion replace the existential fears created by the current rat race.

The German political class is partially sympathetic to the idea of a basic income. Hence, with the exception of the Social Democratic Party (plus trade unions), all parties represented in parliament have been discussing various models of basic income at some point in the past few years. For instance, in its party programme, the liberal Free Democratic Party calls for a Bürgergeld (Citizen’s Income), an amount paid out whenever necessary but low enough to maintain the incentive to work. Elsewhere, the Greens call for a Bedarfsorientiere Grundsicherung (needs-based basic provision), and even within the conservative Christian Democrat Party there is support for a Solidiarisches Bürgergeld (solidarity citizen’s income).

… Support for the idea [also] comes from the German middle class. Campaign groups with names like ‘Freedom Instead of Full Employment’ and ‘Federal Agency of Income’ have emerged, advertising their ideas on various websites, in films and at events and demonstrations. It is important to note that support for a basic income does not come from unemployed and poorly educated low-wage employees. It comes from privileged and educated young professionals with middle-class backgrounds who, working in poorly-paid, insecure positions in the media and cultural sector, hope for an unconditional basic income to make their lives that little bit more secure. This is no struggle for abundance for all. For these metropolitan types, a basic income promises security, opportunities for self-realisation and psychological well-being.

It is to the fears and prejudices of this post-material milieu that the book €1000 Each speaks. In this way, the book exemplifies the rampant social pessimism so prominent in contemporary Western societies. The authors describe the insecure working conditions of the ‘creative class’, surviving on short-term contracts and project work, as the future for a society that has given up on the goal of well-paid and meaningful work for everyone. According to the authors, only a minority of people will earn their money in secure, long-term work. The rest of us will be left to the fate currently endured by the creative class, the ‘vanguard of precarious conditions’.

Referring to American sociologist Jeremy Rifkin’s 1995 book The End of Work, Werner and Goehler argue that the advance of globalisation, automation and rationalisation has led to a post-industrial society in which production can no longer serve as the basis of societal wealth. Economic growth, they assert, ‘is a dead duck’. Instead, Werner and Goehler urge us to focus on creativity as ‘the only remaining, sustainably exploitable resource of the twenty-first century’. This is why they argue for a basic income. Because to tap into this resource of creativity, while avoiding the social unrest that will come with the shortage of constant, paid work, requires everyone to be accorded a level of material security.

This is where the first half of the review ends. The second half of the review is highly critical of the whole idea of a Citizen’s Income: ‘Basic income, low aspiration: The idea that the state should give everyone a basic income has seized the imagination of Germany’s middle class and politicians. Their enthusiasm is testament only to the poverty of their ambition’ is the full title of the review. In the next issue of the Citizen’s Income Newsletter these anti-CI views will be reproduced and critically examined.

Review: Vladimir Rys, Reinventing Social Security Worldwide

Vladimir Rys, Reinventing Social Security Worldwide, Policy Press, 2010, x + 126 pp, hbk 1 847 42643, £60, pbk 1 847 426406, £19.99

This book is the fruit of a lifetime of academic research and administrative experience in international social security policy. Rys worked for thirty years for the International Social Security Association (ISSA) and for half of that time as its General Secretary, and there can be few people with such a broad geographical and historical overview of the evolution of social security (here understood as financial benefits and also state insurance-funded health provision) and of the challenges facing it.

The first part of the book offers an international history of social security, a discussion of the economic and ideological context of the current debate, and some current trends:

‘… a series of shifts in emphasis on different elements in the existing structures and different roles assigned to specific actors. Thus, the state, while reducing its direct involvement in running social security schemes and providing social welfare benefits, is at the same time greatly increasing its powers when it comes to regulating occupational or private arrangements. Simultaneously, … there is an obvious shift of responsibility back to employers and different forms of occupational welfare, back to families and their supporting role, and also back to the individual and their personal capacity to save for rainy days’ (p.55)

The second part of the book builds on Rys’s previous publications on the sociological study of social security policy, and in particular discusses the ISSA’s contribution to the development of a method which goes ‘beyond the descriptive accounts of the institution as contained in legislative texts and [explains] why it is organised the way it is and why it functions the way it does’ (p.77). Such a method contributes to policy debate by suggesting which proposals might be feasible and which not. The different components of the method are discussed: the demographic, the economic, the sociological, and the political, the study of ideas, ideologies, laws, institutions and administrative techniques, and the study of the ways in which ideas are disseminated. The method is then applied to a variety of contexts, and particularly to eastern Europe ( – Rys is Czech).

The third section of the book is entitled ‘Reinventing social security in time of economic crisis: foundations of a new political consensus’ and argues for transparency about expenditures and present and future benefit levels and that only a renewed emphasis on social insurance can halt the privatisation of social security:

‘The principle of social insurance appeals partly to the rational self-interest of the individual, assuring them of access to benefits not normally attainable through private means, but also partly to their natural sentiment of solidarity and respect for other human beings’ (p.116)

As Rys suggests in his introduction, ‘it would be irresponsible, in the light of recent experience, to entrust [social insurance] to private arrangements’ (p.2).

Whilst rather too much of this book is of the ‘We did this at the ISSA’ variety, there is plenty of useful material here, and, above all, a sustained and rational argument for the importance of social insurance. However, Rys’s own career investment in the development of today’s systems leads him to neglect developments in which he has been rather less involved. It simply isn’t true that ‘no new social protection mechanism has been invented to deal with new risks and socially precarious situations’ (p.1). ‘Basic income’, ‘citizen’s income’ and ‘Child Benefit’ don’t appear in the index, and neither do ‘universal’ or ‘universalism’. Recent experience in Namibia suggests that universal provision might be precisely the new mechanism which the current crisis needs.