The Pieces Fit, “Debunking the Top 5 Myths About the Universal Basic Income”

SUMMARY: The article addresses the following common arguments against UBI:

1) Isn’t that Communism?
2) You can’t make up new rights!
3) If people get a basic income nobody would want to work anymore!
4) Employment is a voluntary exchange between consenting parties
5) Basic Income sounds great, but we can’t afford it.

The Pieces Fit, “Debunking the Top 5 Myths About the Universal Basic Income”, The Pieces Fit, 12th June 2014.

Debunking the top 5 Myths about the Universal Basic Income

Debunking the top 5 Myths about the Universal Basic Income

The Basic Income Guarantee Becomes a Rorschach Test in the U.S. Media

The Basic Income Guarantee (BIG) recently became a part of a flurry of discussion on the internet and in the media, when Jesse A. Myerson, of Rolling Stone Magazine, included it in a list of “Five Economic Reforms Millennials Should Be Fighting For.” This ensuing discussion reveals a lot about the many different ways people see BIG.

The other reforms on the list were a guaranteed job, a land value tax, a sovereign wealth fund, and a public bank. Myerson framed the reforms as liberal, progressive ideas that should be especially appealing to the more-free-thinking millennial generation.

Soon after, Dylan Matthews, of the Washington Post, had the brilliant idea of reframing all five reforms as conservative proposals. Although his introduction clearly spelled out what he was doing, the reaction in comments and elsewhere was telling. Democrats tended to oppose the ideas, and Republicans tended to support them, even thought Democrats and Republicans who read Myerson’s piece had opposite reactions.

Ezra Klein, also of the Washington Post, wrote an article discussing the inconsistent reactions attributing it to framing (people react differently to a questions depending on how it was asked) and to trust (as a shortcut for paying closer attention, people often react differently to ideas depending on who supports or opposes those ideas).

A good example of framing came out between two other authors writing in response to Myerson. Before the two articles about framing were published, Matt Breuenig brought up Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend and made a favorable comparison between it and communism. John Aronno, of Alaska Commons, writing after but apparently without knowledge of the two articles about framing, responded to Breunig by arguing that the Alaska Dividend was not communism, but “the owner state.” That’s an excellent frame.

Emily Swanson, of the Huffington Post, got into the discussion by conduction a poll, purported to show, “What People Really Think Of Rolling Stone’s 5 Reforms For Millennials.” The poll could do nothing of the kind, but I’ll get to that. First, let’s see what it could do.

Swanson asked, “Would you favor or oppose expanding Social Security to every American, regardless of age, to guarantee a basic income to every American?” She found, among Americans as a whole, opposition beat support by a margin of 54 to 35 percent. Among people under 30, the margin was narrower, 44 to 40 percent. BIG was favored by 53 percent of black Americans, 54 percent of Democrats, and 19 percent of Republicans.”

What does all this say about BIG and its political prospects?

Start with Klein’s framing issue. Klein would be mistaken to attribute the difference in reactions solely to irrationality and intellectual laziness on the part of the readers of the two pieces. The two proposals were not identical. Matthews’s conservative version of the proposal stressed scrapping the welfare system and replacing it with BIG. Myerson said nothing about scrapping anything. Furthermore, Myerson stressed that the BIG should be enough for people to live on, while Matthews did not mention anything about how large it could or should be. It’s true that some BIGists—if I may use that term for supporters of BIG—propose replacing most or all of the welfare system with a BIG, and probably all BIGists agree that at least some welfare state programs can be replaced if the BIG is large enough. However, if a conservative stresses scarping just about everything the government is currently doing to help the poor to replace it with a BIG—of undetermined size—liberals have good reason to be skeptical. Similarly, if a liberal proposes an enormous new program without mentioning any disliked programs it could replace, people who believe in a smaller government sector have good reason to be skeptical.

Even if the Matthews’s conservative version of Myerson’s reforms isn’t quite as telling as Klien makes it out to be, the framing and trust issues are real, and they certainly explain part of discrepancy Klein recognizes. This issue poses a challenge for BIGists. It has something to offend everyone. People to the left-of-center might see it as great help to the poor, but they might see it as an underhanded strategy to undermine what we are already doing for the poor. People to the right-of-center might see it as a more cost-effective alternative to the welfare state, but they might see it as a major expansion of it, and they might think it is an affront to the work ethic. In America, people to the left-of-center might think that too, and even if they don’t, they might think that they should back some other program not vulnerable to the anti-work ethic allegation.

If both sides frame it in the way most favorable to them, perhaps a large coalition behind it is possible. If both sides frame it the way most negative to them, perhaps an equally large coalition against it is possible. Either way you present it, you risk one side tagging it as a proposal from that other untrusted side.

Now turn to Swanson’s poll. The results are actually good news for U.S. BIGists. The idea has been so far off the political radar for so long, just the fact that somebody is asking the question shows progress. The 19-point margin of 54 to 35 is a large deficit to overcome, but it is not insurmountable. It puts BIG at about the same place same-sex marriage was in 2002 (according to Nate Silver). Given the current early-stage of activism for BIG, we should expect a deficit to overcome.

However, Swanson’s poll cannot tell us what people really think about BIG or any of the other reforms she asked about. Swanson was reacting to Myerson’s piece only. She was not reacting to the articles that revealed the enormous framing problem, and she made no attempt to address the framing issue. It would be interesting to see the results of polls framing the question differently. But even this couldn’t tell us what people really think. As Swanson admits, people tend to react negatively to proposals of an enormous change from the status quo. There is some reason why democratic governments have the programs they do at any given time, and hopefully this has something to do with their popularity. People, using caution, tend to be skeptical of major unfamiliar proposed changes to the political system. As people learn more about BIG—which hopefully they will—they’re beliefs will likely change and solidify. What happens then depends on many factors including the framing and trust issues that Klein discussed and hopefully also good argument and well researched evidence.

All this discussion shows many options about how to promote BIG, but it doesn’t give any easy answer for what strategy will be most effective.

-Karl Widerquist, Doha, Qatar, January 27, 2014

Below are links to the articles related to the recent media discussion over this issue:

Jesse Myerson, “Five Economic Reforms Millennials Should Be Fighting For: Guaranteed Jobs, Universal Basic Incomes, Public Finance and More,” Rolling Stone, January 3, 2014.

Matt Bruenig, “A Spectre Is Haunting Alaska—the Spectre of Communism,” Policy Shop: Demos, January 5, 2014.

Matthew Bruenig, “Conservatives are losing their minds over economic reforms that already exist,” Salon, January 6, 2014.

Dylan Matthews, “Five conservative reforms millennials should be fighting for,” the Washington Post, January 7, 2014.

Ezra Klein, “The depressing psychological theory that explains Washington,” the Washington Post, January 10, 2014.

John Aronno, “Alaska’s Permanent Fund Isn’t Communism, It’s the Owner State,” the Huffington Post, 01/13/2014.

Emily Swanson, “Here’s What People Really Think Of Rolling Stone’s 5 Reforms For Millennials,” the Huffington Post, 01/13/2014.

-Patrick T. Fallon/Bloomberg via Getty Images via Rolling Stone Magazine

Opinion: Basic Income and the Ukrainian Revolution

To briefly outline what is going on in Ukraine, I would say “we have had enough, we want change.” Although I will have to disappoint all those who expect that basic income is a topic for the current Euromaidan protets in Ukraine, this article is about how basic income could help solve the conflict in Ukraine. First I will state my view based on my experience, and then I will suggest how to solve the conflict and how basic income could be a part of this solution.

How it started

Most media all over the world report about the events in Ukraine. They call it a pro-European protest and say it is connected with an association agreement between the European Union and Ukraine. In my opinion, this is not the whole truth because I think it is less about an agreement with the European Union but more about Ukrainians’ desire to be accepted as part of Europe and its community of shared (European) values.

Yes, the protests begun after the Ukrainian president announced a few days before a meeting in Vilnius that he would not sign the mentioned agreement even if the negotiations lasted for years. It is important to know that this agreement also contained a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), and the president said the Ukrainian economy would rather suffer than profit from the DCFTA.

Police tried to disperse protesters

Police tried to disperse protesters (11 December 2013).

A few days after the growing protests, in the early morning of 30 November 2013, special riot police troops used violence to disperse a small group of protesters. Videos of the operation were circulated all over the Internet. As a result, the protests swelled even more and after further clashes with police (in front of the parliament where even reporters were attacked) the main demand of the protesters changed into the resignation of the president and the government because the people had lost all trust in them.

This reaction can be understood as a breach of an unwritten social contract: the people in power can be corrupt, can enrich themselves and can rule with arbitrariness as long as they let others live their lives. But by using force against protesters they crossed the red line. People were afraid this could be the beginning of a police state.

All this, the failed agreement with the EU and the police attack that followed, was the final straw that broke the camel’s back because people were not satisfied with the situation in Ukraine.

New Year Tree in Kiev (December 2013).

The current situation

There are three main levels that help understand the current situation: a political, an economic and a social one. Of course, all these levels influence each other, and can be divided into several sublevels including the different versions of Ukrainian history.

Political situation

There is a huge chasm between the population and the political elite. That is why people do not trust institutions or parties. They are not politically apathetic, rather they have the feeling that the political elite does not rule for the population, which has no influence on this.

On the domestic political level, “families” (oligarchs) pull strings in their interests. Politics is often understood as a business in which investments must pay off. Thus, politics is closely tied to economic interests and is seldom connected to people’s will.

It seems to me that on the global political level various powers are trying to pull Ukraine in different directions. Here geostrategic, historical or economic considerations could play a role, but they are seldom consideration for the Ukrainian population.

Economic situation

No exaggeration, the state is facing a default. The IMF offered a program on the condition that the government increases natural gas prices for households. The government refused to fulfil these conditions because this would have also led to protests.

The unemployment rate is difficult to estimate because in some regions of the country a subsistence economy exists. And official salaries do not show the real income situation because people avoid taxes as they do not trust the state and its expenses. This makes it difficult to estimate the real economic potential of Ukraine.

In western and central Ukraine the main economy is agriculture; in eastern Ukraine the iron and steel industries dominate. Some companies are still part of the production chains that were established in the USSR, and their industrial facilities are often outdated and ailing.

Social situation

Barricade on a way to Maidan

Barricade on a way to Maidan (17 December 2013).

Corruption is a huge problem and it is, as I call it, “institutionalised.” I mean, on the one hand, if you want to get a lucrative position (e.g. as a border official), you need to pay money to get there; on the other hand, bribes are distributed (e.g. a traffic policeman stops a car and gets a bribe and he pays a part to his boss who pays again to his boss and so on).

In the education sector, marks can be “bought,” and in the medical sector, which is free according to the constitution, you often have to give a bribe to get medical treatment. A similar situation exists in the judicial system and in courts.

Pensions are low, and the social safety net is weak. It’s hard to survive without the support of family members or friends.

Experience of the Orange Revolution (2004)

Foreign media often report that the country is deeply divided and that there is a risk of civil war. This is attributed to different languages in the regions. I doubt that this is true because even Ukrainians whose native language is Russian feel that they are Ukrainian citizens. After the Orange Revolution of 2004 there have been attempts to unite the nation around a common language. In my opinion, this does not work. Rather a nation-building process should be based on common values.

Another experience I had during the Orange Revolution: people were ready for change and there was an atmosphere of departure. But the longer they had the feeling that nothing changed for them, the more they got back into their old rut and their “revolution-energy” fizzled out.

Nevertheless, the society has changed over the years. Gradually, a fragile middle class has developed. However, during the rule of the incumbent president the middle class feels more and more threatened.

Impressions of the Euromaidan’s daily life

Maidan means “place” in Persian. It is the main place in Kiev, which is also known as Independence Square, and it is where the protests are taking place. Some public buildings (e.g. the Town Hall and the Trade Unions House) have been occupied and are being used for “the management of the revolution.”

Tents have been pitched to give people from all over Ukraine additional space to sleep. Even people from all over the world are present or support the people on the Maidan.

The atmosphere is peaceful and full of solidarity. The Maidan is mostly self-organized – partly by veterans with their experience in wars. People share and donate food, clothes and money. Cafes, bars and restaurants are open to everyone who needs to warm up and take a break from the “revolution.”

Webcam picture of Maidan in Kiev

Webcam picture of Maidan in Kiev (29 December 2013).

The barricades, which the protesters built to protect them from possible police attacks, seem to be archaic. There is a stage, where bands play and other events take place (e.g. Euromaidan University), including programs. The place creates a surreal impression.

Webcams have been installed and an Internet station sends reports from journalists on the spot, with background information, rumours and interviews with experts. The “revolution” is broadcast live on the Internet.

However, when asked what they think about the future, people become silent because they are aware of the problems.

A way out

Ukraine would not be facing a default, if people were paying their taxes and those in power were not using public funds for their own needs. It is about honesty and transparency in the tax system. And the often quoted “gas-question” affects mostly the industry because Ukraine has enough own natural gas for the population. Hence, Ukraine has no real economic problem. If one takes into account the grain harvest and other commodities, Ukraine is a rich country.

In the political sphere there are proposals to change the constitution from a presidential democracy to a parliamentary one. Of course, this step could help change the technical aspects of the young democracy, but it would not have any noticeable influence on the daily life of the people.

In my opinion and from my experience in Ukraine, the most important thing for the country now is to keep this “spirit of revolution” alive by a vision. People have to see and feel improvements.

The big question is how to create such a vision and who should be responsible for its realisation? An answer to the last question could be found in the demands of the people on the Maidan: resignation of the president and government and new elections. And an answer to the first question could be found in Ukraine’s prospect of becoming an EU member. However, taking into account the situation in some EU member states (e.g. Rumania, Italy, Spain, France… where recently protests have also been taking place), I doubt that it is the best vision.

In my opinion, Ukraine should make an inventory of the problems, how they are seen by the people from all regions of the country, including ideas as to how they can be solved. Additionally, there should be an inventory of the economy, in order to understand what works, what is ineffective and what is needed.

Georgia and Poland are good examples of how one can fight corruption. And the experience of other countries could help Ukraine deal with its problems in almost any area. Ukrainians are clever enough to solve their problems, if they are allowed to.

And what about basic income?

I spoke with people in Ukraine about basic income, and the reactions were different.

A taxi driver who drove me once to the border spoke about the difference between Soviet times and now. “In Soviet times we had empty shelves in the stores but money; today, we have full shelves, but not enough money to buy what is offered,” he said.

Left wing groups did not like the idea because they felt people would become dependent on the state and would not rebel against it, if they did not agree with its decisions. But they affirmed the idea of an egalitarian society, in which people should have equal opportunities. I also heard the usual objections (e.g. who would work if there received regular payments), as they are known in discussions all over the world.

When Marina Weisband from the German Pirate Party (she is of Ukrainian origin) visited the Ukrainian Pirate Party in Ukraine, basic income was also a topic. However, the participants in the meeting said that before considering such an option Ukraine had to solve other problems.

Once I had the opportunity to speak with the local director of the World Bank in Ukraine, and to my surprise he knew about basic income. But he rejected the idea because he could see no way in which it could work in practice.

I also spoke with the Brazilian ambassador in Kiev when we wanted to invite him to speak at a symposium about the Brazilian law on basic income. Unfortunately, he had no time to come, but he told us that sooner or later basic income would have to be introduced.

Some time ago, I found out that in Soviet time, seemingly as a reaction to the civil rights movement in the USA, basic income was discussed under the name of a “guaranteed minimum.” Thus, basic income is not an entirely new idea here.

I also know a Ukrainian philosopher who supports the idea. He invited us several times to his radio show on basic income (I made an interview with him, which I later published in my blog).

I also had the opportunity to talk with the top-managers of international companies and they were not against the idea. They said it was politicians, rather than them, who should deal with such issues. They also said that politicians would reject the idea for fear of losing power.

Based on this experience, I think, basic income could be a part of the mentioned vision. And, unlike communism, it is a concrete and practical idea. Some materials on basic income have already been translated into Ukrainian and Russian.

And what about the interfering powers?

All these “families” should be aware that their wealth is based on the prosperity of the population, too. From my experience, I think, Ukrainians do not begrudge others their wealth, if they are allowed to live their own lives (cf. the above mentioned “unwritten social contract”).

And regarding all these foreign powers, it has to be said that Ukraine is actually a sovereign state. It could go its own way and act as a bridge from Europe. What is happening now on the Euromaidan is the question of values, such as justice, equality and freedom. And in my opinion, the European Union, which triggered all these events, should also remember these values. If this happens, the Euromaidan will really earn its name – the European Maidan of Independence.

For further reading on the Ukrainian revolution:

Understanding the Outrage in Ukraine
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/understanding-outrage-ukraine/

Opinion: Birth of a nation:
https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op-ed/birth-of-a-nation-333459.html

Sociologists have published the portrait of Euromaidan:
https://maidan.in.ua/sociologists-have-published-the-portrait-of-euromaidan/

Interview with Stuart White: An Objection can be Valid Without Being Decisive

Interview with Stuart White: An Objection can be Valid Without Being Decisive

Stuart White is lecturer in political theory at the University of Oxford. He also writes for OurKingdom, and the UK section of openDemocracy for which he is editing a series on the theme of Democratic Wealth. At a summer school dedicated to basic income that took place in July in Braga, Portugal, Stuart gave six lectures ranging across many dimensions of the basic income debate.

You were first skeptical about Unconditional Basic Income (UBI) before later becoming a supporter of UBI. What were the reasons for that skepticism  and what made you change your mind?

I first heard of basic income in the late 1980s while I was working briefly at the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) in the UK. The idea struck me as very interesting. Later I wrote about it in my doctoral thesis and then again in my book, The Civic Minimum, published in 2003.

Although I saw great attractions to the idea, I also saw at least one ethical objection, as many do: that an unconditional basic income allows people to receive a share of their society’s income without making a productive contribution in return. This fails – or at least looks as if it fails – an important reciprocity principle: if you willingly share in the resources generated through the productive contributions of your fellow citizens, then you have an obligation to make a contribution, if you are able to do so and have the opportunity, in return. If you claim a share of the income generated through this cooperative effort without contributing in return, when you are able to do so and have the opportunity, then you take unfair advantage of your fellow citizens; in one sense of the term, you exploit your fellow citizens. Basic income apparently allows us to exploit our fellow citizens in this way. (For a distinct but particularly compelling elaboration of this type of objection, I strongly recommend Gijs van Donselaar’s book, The Right to Exploit.)

I still think the exploitation objection is valid. But an objection can be valid without being decisive. This is because there are also ethical costs attached to making income support conditional on work or being willing to work. These costs are more morally troubling than the departures from reciprocity that basic income allows.

I still think the exploitation objection is valid. But an objection can be valid without being decisive.

I’ll try to elaborate this. In general terms, people have a very important interest in being able to avoid economic relationships – for example, with employers, with spouses, with state officials – in which they are so dependent for urgently needed resources that they become subject to domination. If I need this job to get a decent income, then the employer can use my dependency to establish power over me, a power that they can use at their discretion to influence how I act. Republican political theorists, such as Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner, argue that this kind of domination – this dependency on the arbitrary will of another – deprives us of freedom. Other political theorists, notably Robert E. Goodin, have discussed how situations of ‘vulnerability’ which have the sort of structure I have described can result in a specific form of exploitation.

Stuart White's book (published 2003)

Now the great merit of a basic income, I think – and this is a point stressed in particular by ‘republican’ advocates of basic income such asDaniel Raventos and Julie Wark and David Casassas – is that by unconditionally guaranteeing everyone an income in their own right, it works to limit and prevent these situations of dependency, vulnerability and domination. Even a modest basic income can give people that extra bit of financial independence from employers and spouses which can then translate into a reduced risk of dependency, vulnerability and domination. Carole Pateman makes a similar argument, focusing on the way basic income can democratise social relationships by increasing our independence from employers or, in the case of many women, from traditional male breadwinners.

The choice might be put like this. Let’s imagine a society, A, with a basic income. Because the basic income is unconditional with respect to work, this society might have some degree of reciprocity failure as some citizens choose to live on their basic income without working (though they could work if they chose to). But the basic income, precisely because it is unconditional on work, will help also to create a low level of vulnerability and domination in economic relationships. In society B, there is a much more work-conditional system of income support. There is consequently no reciprocity failure (at least from this source). But the work-test pushes people into the labour market and results in a higher level of vulnerability and domination. If we have to choose, I think A is clearly preferable as a society to B. In other words, some reciprocity-failure seems a price worth paying, ethically, to get rid of, or to reduce significantly, vulnerability and domination. This is what I mean by saying that the exploitation objection is valid but not decisive.

At one time I would have been more optimistic about evading this choice. I would have wondered whether we couldn’t design a system of social rights, with a strong degree of conditionality, but which nevertheless works to prevent vulnerability and domination as well as prevent reciprocity-failure. In essence, this was the agenda I explored in The Civic Minimum, and which I over-optimistically hoped could progressively emerge from New Labour’s social policy. I am less optimistic about this in practice now and am therefore more sympathetic to basic income.

where conditionality has taken us...

Indeed, looking at how conditionality has actually developed in the UK in recent years has been very instructive. The last Labour government reformed the out-of-work benefit for disabled people, introducing something called the ‘Work Capabilities Assessment’ (WCA). As bloggers such as Kaliya Franklin (‘Bendygirl’) and Sue Marsh have argued, and as I think is now widely agreed, the WCA in practice has been a human disaster. It has placed many disabled people under a great deal of stress and caused much suffering. Conditionality is hard to get right. Its ethical costs can be huge. (On this point, see also thispowerful article by Deborah Padfield.)

One reasonable response is to struggle to make conditionality rules better – fairer, more humane – and, related to this, to change policy-making in ways that give the citizens who stand to be most affected more power to shape the policy. I strongly support these goals. But an additional, perhaps longer-term response is to try to move towards basic income.

You were a prominent speaker at the Summer School on Basic income in Braga. Can you summarize the key messages you wanted to tell us?

The lectures were intended to serve as an introduction to the philosophical aspects of the debate around basic income. The first three lectures set out three ‘families’ of argument for basic income. The first family I called communist, drawing in particular on the classic article by Robert van der Veen and Philippe Van Parijs, ‘A Capitalist Road to Communism’. Communism, in their view, is not necessarily tied to public or common ownership of the means of production but is a matter of (1) how far society distributes its income according to need and (2) how far work is ‘unalienated’ (inherently satisfying). Basic income is proposed as a way of putting a capitalist society on a path towards gradually increasing communism in this sense.

The second lecture looked at the family of liberal arguments for basic income. Particularly important here is a set of arguments which focus on the fair distribution of natural resources and other scarce ‘external assets’. Fair distribution of these resources, which can be monetized by taxing and distributing their market value as a basic income, is seen as prior to the question of how we distribute the fruits of citizens’ work, and thus as lying outside the scope of the reciprocity principle.

And then, thirdly, there is the republican family of arguments, in particular the argument I sketched above that a basic income is necessary to prevent the loss of freedom through domination. I think all three families of argument have something to contribute to the case for basic income.

The republican argument connects, I think, with an important current of thought in contemporary political philosophy known as ‘relational egalitarianism’. Relational egalitarians, such as Elizabeth Anderson, argue that the demand for equality in not fundamentally about the distribution of things but about the quality of our social relations: about equality of status and the absence of relationships involving domination or oppression. In her very influential article, ‘What is the Point of Equality?’, Anderson is critical of basic income. But, for the reasons outlined above, one can see how this perspective might actually support basic income. There is also an overlap here with arguments for basic income, such as that by Pateman, which focus on how it might change power relations within the household – although, as Ingrid Robeyns has argued, there is a danger in contemporary circumstances that basic income will work to consolidate a traditional gendered division of labour in the household. She argues that basic income should be accompanied by other measures to address this risk.

Having set out the arguments for basic income, however, I then wanted to consider some challenges to it.

The fourth lecture therefore looked at the exploitation objection described above. I looked at the various ways one might try to defuse this objection. Here it is important to note that in some ways a basic income can make our society better in terms of reciprocity – for example, by providing an effective social wage for forms of productive contribution, such as forms of care work, which otherwise go unpaid in our society.

The fifth lecture considered the view that there is a better, perhaps more liberal alternative to basic income – namely, basic capital. Under this policy everyone gets a lump-sum grant in early adulthood rather than a basic income. Or else we could give people the freedom to convert their basic income into a large one-off grant. I argued that a modest degree of convertibility is desirable, though I think it should be limited in order to preserve the republican effects of basic income (in terms of preventing vulnerability and domination).

Finally, in the sixth lecture, I considered the challenge that this philosophizing is all very well but meaningless in practical terms because a basic income is just not feasible. I looked at some existing policy proposals and real-world policies and put forward the view that basic income is feasible, though it may be that we have to make use of a range of instruments and institutions to get it. I’ll say a bit more about this below.

What did you learn during these 3 days of discussions on basic income?

I was reminded firstly of some thinkers whose work I need to revisit, notably that of André Gorz. But also I learned a lot about the current economic and social context in which basic income is being discussed and the way it is connecting to contemporary needs and aspirations.

In some ways the immediate context is similar to the past. So, for example, interest in basic income grew in the 1980s in Europe in response to the return of mass unemployment. This is true today also, with some EU nations experiencing very high rates of unemployment, especially youth unemployment. Interest in basic income has also been connected to views about how to transition to an environmentally sustainable economy, and this also remains true today.

However, there are newer technological and economic developments, particularly around the internet, which arguably add something new to the context, and I am still struggling to get my head around these aspects of the current situation. The basic claim is that technological change, which is inherently liberatory in its potential, threatens a long-term loss of employment and increased precarity – unless a basic income is introduced to provide everyone some underlying economic security. There is, for example, the emergence of the sharing or collaborative economy. This seems liberatory in some ways, but also to carry great dangers in terms of loss of jobs and, as Guy Standing would perhaps point out, increased precarity. So there’s a need to ask whether we can get the liberatory benefits without the precarity or with less precarity. And maybe this is where a basic income fits in. (Good articles on these themes include that by Lui at the Simulacrum blog, and these by Alex Hern and Aaron Peters.)

I found the School very helpful in getting more of a grasp on this cluster of issues, though I am still very much at the start of the learning curve.

Your last lecture was on the feasibility of UBI. Do you think it is, and if so are there any chances for UBI to be implemented in Europe in the coming years? And what should be done to grow the movement?

Roughly speaking, in my sixth lecture at the Summer School, I distinguished three roads to a basic income.

The first, very direct route is through reform of the tax-benefit system. The Citizen’s Income Trust in the UK have put forward one interesting proposal here for redirecting the existing public spend on cash benefits and tax reliefs into a basic income. It gets you a basic income which I think is about 50-60% of the UK poverty line for working age households.

The second, more indirect route is to establish some kind of public investment fund and pay citizens a share of the annual return on this fund. The Alaska Permanent Fund, discussed by Karl Widerquist and Michael Howard, is a familiar model here.

Thirdly, and even more indirectly, we might try to get at something like a basic income by promoting a wider dispersion of private wealth. Insofar as private wealth is more widely spread, more people are able to enjoy an income from such wealth, an income that is independent of the sale of their labour-power. Many governments subsidise the accumulation of private wealth, but often in ways that benefit the more affluent (e.g., through tax relief). There are, however, other ways of supporting asset accumulation that are more inclusive such as the Child Trust Fund policy under the previous UK government.

One might think of these, respectively, and with a nod in the direction of James Meade and John Rawls, as the welfare state, liberal socialist and property-owning democracy roads to basic income. My view is that we should be open-minded about using any of the roads, and that achieving a generous basic income, or equivalent, might require us to use two or even all three of them.

In terms of political feasibility, I think the liberal socialist and property-owning democracy routes are currently easier in nations like the USA and the UK, though I am not sure about elsewhere in Europe. This is because they work with and through the dominant ideology of ‘property rights’ rather than through the tax-benefit system.

However, I suspect that getting a reasonably sized basic income requires substantial use of the tax-benefit system. Here we come back, in a political context, to the anxieties I discussed above under the heading of the exploitation objection. There is a lot of work to be done, at least in the UK, to prepare the ground for basic income via the tax-benefit system given how hostile many of the public seem to be to people getting ‘something for nothing’ through the benefits system. The way forward is to publicise basic income and to try to re-balance the public debate by increasing awareness of the ethical costs of conditionality (and of means-testing).

fight the cuts largeAlso, it is possible that basic income looks more compelling when presented as just one part of a new, different vision of society – if it is offered as part of a qualitatively new way of living. This can perhaps help shift the discussion out of the domains of fear and resentment, where so much discussion of benefits is today in the UK, into a space that is more about hope and confidence in the future.

In terms of growing the movement? I am not en expert on that, but all I would say is that you are right to put it in terms of developing a movement. A movement is not just a network of people sharing ideas, crucial as this is. It is also a network which campaigns for its ideas. This campaign has to be directed, moreover, not only at elites, but, for the reasons just given, at the wider public, at fellow citizens.
I think since 2011 we have seen, in Europe and elsewhere, the start of an attempt to move beyond a reactive, anti-cuts movement to one that is constructive – a movement that talks in terms of creating a world better than the one we had before the crash rather than just stopping cuts (important as this is). Basic income is a powerful idea that can contribute to this movement for an alternative.

In the EU context in particular, Philippe Van Parijs has made an interesting argument that a ‘Eurodividend’ – a modest basic income financed from a value added tax – could function as a new, much-needed form of solidarity. The European Citizens’ Initiative on Basic Income is very welcome, and provides an excellent focus for developing an EU-wide campaigning network.


1st Photo courtesy Stanislas Jourdan

3nd Photo courtesy of Boycott Workfare

4th Photo courtesy of baaker2009