The International Labour Organisation’s analysis of social transfers worldwide augurs well for a Citizen’s Income in the context of middle and low-income countries

by | Jun 9, 2011 | News

To support its campaign on the global extension of social security, in 2008 the International Labour Organisation (ILO) undertook a study of 126 research reports on tax-financed social transfer programmes (STs) operating worldwide. 62 programmes from 30 developing countries were analysed. These STs reach between 300 and 350 million beneficiaries – children, working adults, and elderly people – and represent a considerable proportion of the world’s poor. The results are available through the ILO’s online Matrix on the effects of social transfers (2009). 3 STs have emerged as a core component of poverty reduction strategies supported by international organisations such as the World Bank and a number of UN institutions. Thus their impact merits considerable interest.

This article outlines the current knowledge on the effects of STs in a way relevant to those interested in Citizen’s Income (CI). STs are not unlike CIs. They are non-contributory and tax-financed, and a considerable number of STs are unconditional and universal (across certain groups). The ILO study shows positive impacts of STs on a range of areas of human existence. The study therefore enables us to predict the kinds of effects that a CI could deliver in low and middle income countries.

The findings of the ILO matrix on social transfers

The ILO’s matrix was developed to support decision-making within ministries of planning and finance, mainly in developing countries. By ordering the unintended and intended effects of tax-financed STs in developing countries in relation to human development goals and the anti-poverty agenda, the matrix helps to inform national policy makers about the outcomes that could be realistically expected from STs and to guide investment in social security systems. Likewise, all those interested in CI might utilise the findings of the matrix to guide their arguments on the CI proposal.

Results

The table below gives an overview of the impacts of the STs. In the columns, the impact of STs in the specific sub-dimensions are documented. Programmes had a generally positive effect, 4 evidenced by the significantly higher scores in the ‘clear positive effect’ column for all but five of the sub-dimensions. Those sub-dimensions where the overall positive impact cannot be discerned are in grey text.

The conclusion of this article is that a majority of the social transfers studied clearly generate a range of positive effects in terms of enhancing human development, supporting the full utilisation of productive capacity, enhancing and stabilising consumption, and facilitating social cohesion and inclusion.

TABLE: Summary of the ILO matrix: Effect of social transfers

Impact dimension and sub-dimensions Number of programmes Total
with a clear positive effect with a clear negative effect with no evidence of effect where effect is unclear
1. Enhancing human development
Adult preventative health
Child labour
Child preventative health
Drop out rates
Educational attainment
Maternal preventative health
Reduction in the worst forms of child labour
School attendance
School enrolment		 1
6
7
4
9
3
1
12
13		 –
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–		 –
2
–
–
–
–
–
–
–		 1
2
–
1
1
–
–
–
–		 2
10
7
5
10
3
1
12
13
2. Supporting the full utilisation of productive capacity
Employability
Employment creation
Reduction of informality
Participation in the labour market
Productive activities		 1
4
–
5
15		 –
–
1
2
–		 1
1
–
–
–		 2
2
–
2
–		 4
7
1
9
15
3. Enhancing and stabilising consumption
Food expenditure
Income inequality
Income level and stimulation of consumption
Income stability and consumption smoothing
Long-term effects on income and consumption
Nutritional level
Satiation		 4
4
20
5
5
10
3		 –
–
–
–
–
–
–		 –
2
1
–
1
2
–		 –
–
3
–
–
–
–		 4
6
24
5
6
12
3
4. Facilitating social cohesion and inclusion
Empowerment
Intra-household relations
Social capital and solidarity		 14
4
4		 –
–
3		 1
–
–		 2
1
–		 17
5
7

This study shows that STs exhibit positive impacts on poverty, health and nutrition, the social status of recipients (notably women), economic activity and entrepreneurial small scale investments (notably in agriculture), and have avoided significant adverse effects on labour market participation of the poor populations which they serve. The studies also show that many families used part of the cash transfer to invest in small-scale agricultural activities, including the purchase of livestock. However, in the areas of adult preventative health, reduction in the worst forms of child labour, employability, reduction of labour market informality, and social capital and solidarity, the effect of STs is less obvious, either because there is no actual effect or because of limited research on the subject.

In light of these results, we can deduce that a CI could deliver similar effects in some instances. Consequently, the results can be used to support some aspects of the CI proposal. However, before the repercussions for a CI are discussed in detail, we need to explore a number of important caveats and knowledge gaps.

Methodological caveats and knowledge gaps

  1. The programme evaluations covered by this study do not represent an exhaustive list. Rather, the study covers those programmes that were easily accessible online and were Anglophone and to a lesser extent in Portuguese.
  2. There are problems in finding original sources online. In light of this, the study cannot be considered to be comprehensive, though the studies used are probably representative and give a good overview.
  3. The findings in the table are the result of a subjective chain of interpretation open to human error.
  4. The matrix suffers from knowledge gaps. For example, little is known about the effects of STs on non-beneficiaries, and little is known about the macroeconomic impact of STs on economic growth and about how this affects general redistributive mechanisms (formal and informal).
  5. The evaluations privilege quantitative measures over qualitative ones. This is a concern because the qualitative effects of STs (i.e. social bonds, capabilities, and human empowerment) may have a lot more to say about people’s well-being than quantitative measures.

The analysis presented here can therefore only be considered as indicative of the effects of STs.

To what extent does the ILO study support the Citizen’s Income proposal?

Thus far this article has cautiously suggested that the findings in the ILO matrix study augur well for CI, by indicating that it too can be expected to deliver a number of similarly positive effects. However, the message perhaps ought to be a little more mixed and nuanced, because the table better supports unconditional and universal transfers for children and the elderly (a CI for the young and the old) than for working age adults. A significant number of the STs that focus on active population groups are conditional and targeted (based on behaviour and income/wealth) and therefore one might suppose that their effects will be related to their conditional and targeted mechanisms.

Conclusion 1: Effects of social transfers for children and elderly support the case for a Citizen’s Income:

The findings on the effects of STs on children and pensions suggest that a CI could have similarly positive effects. It is possible to make this conclusion because a significant number of the STs for these two vulnerable groups were unconditional or universal across these groups and are therefore similar to a CI. The social pensions evaluated were not based on previous activity or earnings and are therefore essentially a Citizen’s Pension. Similarly, the South African Child Support Grant, which is unconditional, has encouraged human capital formation of the young and their future earnings (Agüero et al, 2007, p. 19). We could expect a CI to do the same for children. The results of social pensions and a number of other unconditional transfers support the expectation that a CI could generate similarly positive social and micro-economic effects.

Conclusion 2: Effects of social transfers for the active population deliver a mixed message for a Citizen’s Income

Apart from the pilot CI in Namibia, there are no studies on the impact of a CI on active population groups, simply because, with the exception of the Alaskan Permanent Fund, there is no fully-fledged CI that actually covers active population groups. 5 Secondly, the STs analysed in the ILO study differ from a CI because they are conditional. 6 It is therefore difficult to maintain with any certainty that the effect of a CI would be the same as for conditional and targeted STs.

Having said that, the findings of the Namibian pilot scheme do permit us an insight into how the active population group might react. For instance, according to the evaluation of this pilot, productive capacity of the active population group rose and economic activity rose, especially among women. In addition, own account work saw the largest increase, and particularly the tending of vegetable plots and the building of latrines, both of which increased the community’s health. The pilot scheme also seemed to stimulate more micro-economic activity, with new shops opening. These findings are important as they provide evidence that a CI does not act as a disincentive in the labour market (see Basic Income Grant Coalition, 2009; Torry, 2009). This is of great significance, as the argument that a CI would act as a disincentive to productive activity tends to be one of the biggest concerns of policy makers and governments with regard to STs for the active population. Having said this, one must also be cautious about using the Namibian pilot scheme as absolutely conclusive evidence on the potential effect of a CI on the active population because of obvious limitations in terms of replicating an actual fully-fledged society-wide CI.

The key impediment to using the table to support CI revolves around whether it is the conditional nature of many of the STs that is pivotal in producing the positive results they have delivered. Does conditionality make the difference? If conditionality is not the overriding factor, then perhaps we can conclude that the unconditional and universal nature of a CI could deliver results similar to those documented in the ILO matrix. There is not space here to discuss this debate in full, but suffice to say that the precise role played by conditionality in delivering positive outcomes is not clear. As the author of this article and the ILO have argued elsewhere, it is problematic to argue that conditionality is pivotal in producing the outcomes generated by STs (see ILO, 2010a).

A similarly ambivalent conclusion on the role of conditionality is made by Gabel and Kamerman, who state that researchers have not been able to attribute with absolute certainty the causality between effect and the conditional mechanism, because of the difficulty in disentangling the effects of the policy from other elements (e.g., the state of the labour market) (2008, p.18). One suspects that the motivation for conditionality is to satisfy the ‘paternalist twitch’ of governments and policy makers (Standing, 2002: 208) and public thirst for satisfying the social ethic of reciprocity. There is therefore plenty of scope for arguing that a CI could deliver similar outcomes in the absence of conditionalities.

Closing remarks

It is not clear that conditionality is crucial in achieving certain human development goals or for producing the positive effects that have been identified in the ILO matrix, so the study can be used to support a CI, provided caveats and limitations accompany any such argument.

What the findings of the matrix definitely support are those conditional programmes which many see as precursors to a society-wide CI. For example: in Brazil, Senator Eduardo Suplicy, a key proponent of CI, has argued that the Bolsa Familia ST is a first step towards a CI (2006). This is because the behavioural demands synonymous with the receipt of cash from conditional STs are easier to sell to the public and political class than is a CI. The greater political acceptability synonymous with conditional 7 STs could help to cultivate a political and public culture more receptive to STs and, therefore, to a CI at a later stage.

Just as significant as the results of the matrix study are those of the pilot CI in Namibia which has demonstrated positive results similar to those documented in the ILO matrix table across an entire community, including the active population. Particularly significant are the positive effects on labour market participation and productive capacity. The linking of the matrix and the findings of the Namibian case study can bridge the ‘unknown’ empirical dimension in the ILO study; given that hitherto no society-wide CI has really existed. Combining the results of the table and the Namibian case study justifies the expectation that a CI could produce similar effects to STs for the active population.

However, the current preference amongst governments and major international institutions (e.g. the World Bank) seems to be shifting toward conditionality, and this poses some concerns for those proposing universal and unconditional cash transfers. The political prospects of a CI would be better if the trend were against conditionality.

In conclusion: The ILO matrix confirms what many have suspected, that STs have a number of positive micro-economic and social effects. The matrix also offers proponents of CI reasons to feel optimistic that it too could produce similarly positive results.

Disclaimer: The author conducted the original research for this project as a consultant for the International Labour Organization. However, the responsibility for opinions expressed in this paper rests solely with the author and dissemination does not constitute an endorsement by the International Labour Organization of the opinions expressed in it.

Notes

1. This paper was originally submitted at the 13th International Congress of the Basic Income Earth Network in Sao Paulo, Brazil, June 2010. I would like to thank Armando Barrientos, Florence Bonnet, Philippe Marcadent, Nadine Ndeberi and Luis Soares for their assistance, and the ILO’s Social Security Department for financing the original research that features in this paper.

2. The author currently works as the Financial Crisis Monitor for the International Social Security Association.

3. The author of this paper was a member of a team that carried out the research that constituted the content of the ILO matrix. The ILO matrix project was supervised by Philippe Marcadent. The data contained in the matrix is discussed more analytically in the new ILO book: Extending social security for all: a guide through challenges and options (2010a) and in an ILO working paper entitled: Effects of non-contributory social transfers in developing countries: A compendium (2010b).

4. For a more detailed description of the methodology employed to calculate the scoring system that features in the table please see: Orton, I. 2010. Reason to be cheerful: How ILO analysis of social transfers worldwide augurs well for a basic income. www.bien2010brasil.com

5. And this differs from the standard proposed version of a CI in that it is an annual dividend, therefore one wonders how far it can replicate the income smoothing nature of those STs that are paid monthly.

6. A similar discussion for the way many STs are targeted could also be made, but there is not space here.

7. The reason for this acceptability is that conditionality conforms to the social norm of ‘reciprocity’ whereby in social contract type relationship the recipient adjusts his or her behaviour in a way acceptable to the rest of society.

Bibliography

Agüero, J.; Carter, M.; Woolard, I. 2007. The impact of unconditional cash transfers on nutrition: The South African Child Support Grant. International Poverty Centre, Working Paper No 39.

www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0002780/Unconditional_CT_SA_IPC_39_Sept2007.pdf

Basic Income Grant Coalition. 2009. Basic income grant pilot project assessment report, April 2009. www.bignam.org/Publications/BIG_Assessment_report_08b.pdf

Gabel, S. & Kamerman, B. 2008. Do conditional cash transfers work? The experience of the U.S. and developing countries. Presented at RC19 Stockholm 2008, The Future of Social Citizenship: Politics, Institutions and Outcomes. www2.sofi.su.se/RC19/pdfpapers/Gatenio-Gabel_Kamerman_RC19_2008.pdf

ILO. 2009. Matrix on the effects of social transfers. www.socialsecurityextension.org/gimi/gess/ShowWiki.do?wid=59

ILO. 2010a. Extending social security to all: A guide through challenges and options. Geneva: ILO.

ILO. 2010b. Effects of non-contributory social transfers in developing countries: A compendium. Geneva: ILO.

Orton, I. 2010. Reasons to be cheerful: How ILO analysis of social transfers worldwide augurs well for a basic income. www.bien2010brasil.com

Standing, G. 2002. Beyond the new paternalism: Basic security as equality. London and New York, Verso.

Torry, M., 2009. ‘Can unconditional cash transfers work? They can’, Citizen’s Income Newsletter, 2009/1, pp.1-3
www.citizensincome.org/resources/newsletter%20issue%202%202009.shtml#Namibia

OPINION: Why Jay Hammond favored a larger dividend, higher taxes, and smaller government

by | May 30, 2011 | Opinion

It might be an exaggeration to say that former Alaksa Governor Jay Hammond, the person responsible more than any other for the Permanent Fund Dividend, was a republican thinker in the tradition of Rousseau or Jefferson. I certainly don’t know enough about his history to make this claim. But his reflections on the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF) and the Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) do echo some important themes from that nearly abandoned republican tradition, and may partly explain why Hammond was often at odds with others in the Republican Party over the dividend, taxes, and economic development. The success of the Fund and Dividend may suggest a model for leaders in any party who want to promote republican ideals of citizen participation, equality, personal independence, and government that serves the common good rather than special interests.

At a workshop in which I participated in Anchorage on the PFD in April 2011, the Alaskans who had for decades studied the Fund and Dividend, and participated in their creation, all agreed that distributive justice played no part in the debate, and thought that had the Dividend been framed as a way to reduce inequality or end poverty, it never would have passed. The primary case for the Dividend was that it would create popular support for the Fund, and thus prevent the legislature from wasting money. Nevertheless, it is clear that distributive justice informed Hammond’s thinking about the Dividend, and partly explains why he favored dividends over competing policy proposals.

This is most obvious in the proposal, which passed despite Hammond’s opposition, to abolish the income tax and fund Alaska’s government with oil revenue. Hammond would have preferred the continuation of income taxes while paying larger dividends from larger investments of oil revenue in the Fund. One reason is that by repealing the income tax, “you’ll cut the one string connecting the citizen’s pocketbook to the government purse, and see state spending soar….[By [e]liminating the income tax…[n]ot only will we reduce our means, we’ll cut the one prime restraint on government spending” (265). Paying taxes makes us vigilant about what is being done with our tax dollars. It helps to keep us engaged as citizens. If we stop paying attention, we also get robbed.

This is clear in the second reason Hammond gave for continuing income taxes, that has to do with distributive justice: Eliminating, capping, or reducing the possible dividends paid out to citizens, in order to abolish income taxes, has a regressive effect on income distribution. “The most regrettable aspect of income tax repeal is that it exerts pressure to invade the Permanent Fund to replace the money lost by income tax repeal [pressure that will grow as oil revenue declines—MH]. This, of course, will shift the burden for state spending entirely from those who can best afford to pay taxes—including the non-residents who make up about a quarter of our workforce—to the shoulders of each and every Alaskan, regardless of income. None would feel the burden more than the low and middle income groups” (266). In contrast, funding government from income taxes and permitting a higher dividend would give a bigger proportionate boost to the incomes of low and middle income groups.

Hammond points out that the abolition of income taxes in effect created hidden taxes. Proposals to cap dividends in order to allow more APF money to be used for government spending “equates with imposing a head tax on every Alaskan and only Alaskans—regardless of income…. it never makes more sense to cap dividends than to simply ratchet up taxes to raise the same amount. In effect, capping dividends taxes only—and all—Alaskans. Increasing most taxes spreads the burden to those best able to pay—and also includes transient workers who currently remove so much wealth from our state ” (320–22).

The dividend, according to Hammond’s estimate, “is but one half of the earnings derived from investments of roughly only one-tenth of their oil wealth.” If all the wealth were distributed in dividends, each Alaskan would receive an additional $6,000 per person per year (in 1993). By funding government with this oil revenue instead of from taxes, Alaskans are in effect paying a regressive head tax, falling heaviest on those who can least afford to relinquish this wealth. But because it is not taken out of their paychecks, the tax remains hidden. A large dividend would contribute to personal independence. Hammond speculates that “were every Alaskan annually granted his full per capita share of the wealth we could eliminate or vastly curtail all welfare programs, unemployment insurance and subsidies” (319).

The supporters of income tax abolition, he notes, are first of all the wealthy who stand to benefit from lower taxes more than they would gain from larger equal per capita dividends. Secondly, a legislature flush with money that no one is watching becomes a tool of special interests. Hammond says to proponents of income tax repeal,” “though you seem perfectly willing to cut down on the little guy’s ‘living’ by slicing social programs like welfare, you seem unconcerned about boosting ‘living’ for select interests through subsidies such as lower than market rate loans and other ‘hidden dividends’ not based on need. Some might call that ‘corporate welfare’” (265).

Thus we find another classic republican theme, promotion of the general good over particular interests, alongside Hammond’s concerns for personal independence, progressive taxation, and more engaged citizens. All of these ends are well served by a large dividend and funding of government through income taxes.

There are some blind spots in his thinking. While he recognizes the legitimacy of government spending on the basis of need or “constitutional obligation”, he seems not very sensitive to the case to be made for government spending for public goods. There are some goods we all benefit from that the market will not deliver efficiently, no matter how much income we have. And his outlook is narrowly nationalistic, aiming for what is good for all Alaskans (not even all Americans), as is evident in the above quotations referring to non-Alaskans. (In his original dividend proposal, found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, Hammond wanted those who had lived in Alaska longer to receive larger dividends.) Why, one might ask, should Alaskans enjoy a large dividend because of Alaska’s oil, while Vermonters, say, with fewer resources, could only give themselves a much smaller dividend? Shouldn’t the unearned natural wealth of the United States be shared equally by all Americans? Or, to go a step further, shouldn’t the natural resources of the earth be shared equally by all of its inhabitants, not just those fortunate to be born on top of rich deposits of oil or other wealth? This of course is not a blind spot peculiar to Hammond or political thinkers in the republican tradition, and getting beyond it in practical politics will require the strengthening of institutions and an ethos of solidarity at the federal and global levels. As these emerge, the global community may have something to learn from the example of the Permanent Fund Dividend, including the thinking of its strongest advocate.

All references are to Jay Hammond, Tales of a Bush Rat Governor (Fairbanks/Seattle: Epicenter Press, 1994).

JAPAN: Parliamentary meeting on basic income

by | May 27, 2011 | News

CORRECTION: On April 27th, 2011, members BIEN’s Japan affiliate (The Basic Income Japan Network—BIJN) held a “meeting at the parliament building” to demand basic income (BI) to people who affected by the earthquake, tsunami and the nuclear accident. A “meeting at the parliament building” is a Japanese term for an official meeting in a government building (though not literally in the parliament building) and at which at least one member of parliament attends. Several MPs and secretaries from both governing and opposition parties attended the meeting, as well as nearly 100 participants from the general public. Members of Basic Income Japan Network (BIJN) helped to prepare and present the statement demanding BI. BIEN supported the initiative with a solidarity messages signed by its co-chairs, supporting the demand for a BI for those who have been affected by the tragic events in Japan this year.

This is a correction an earlier article that mislabeled the meeting as a “parliamentary meeting.”

The English summary of the request made for the Japanese government is available on the following URL: https://bijp.net/newsinfo/article/252
BIJN is planning to have the second parliamentary meeting on 15 June, this time with a guest speaker from the Single Mothers’ Forum in Fukushima.

SCHULTE-BASTA, Dorothee (2010), Ökonomische Nützlichkeit oder leistungsloser Selbstwert? Zur Kompatibilität von Bedingungslosem Grundeinkommen und Katholischer Soziallehre

by | May 18, 2011 | Research

SCHULTE-BASTA, Dorothee (2010), Ökonomische Nützlichkeit oder leistungsloser Selbstwert? Zur Kompatibilität von Bedingungslosem Grundeinkommen und Katholischer Soziallehre, Freiberg: Zas, 2010.

Catholic social teaching is a body of doctrine developed by the Catholic Church on matters of poverty, wealth, economics, labor, social organization and the role of the state. Its foundation has been laid by Pope Leo XIII’s 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum, and ever since than it is distinctive in its consistent critique of modern social and political ideologies both of the left and of the right. In her now published Master’s thesis, Schulte-Basta, who studied Theology, Philosophy and Communications in Muenster and Berlin, analyzes this critique in terms of Basic Income, as one of the most popular alternative to a marked-based form of organization. Analyzing the compatibility of Basic Income and Catholic Social Teaching, she gives a detailed overview in the history of Catholic Social Teaching in general and especially on the genesis of the key principles such as human dignity, solidarity and subsidiarity. In a second step she aligns their essence to the fundamental values of Basic Income. Her study finds that Basic Income does not contradict those key principles but instead helps to implement them by realizing human dignity, implementing solidarity in society and enabling people to help themselves. The book, first German-speaking overview on this topic, comes with a preface by Birgit Zenker, head of KAB, Germany’s Catholic Workers Movement.

For futher information:
https://zas-freiberg.de/index.php/buecher/55-oekonomischenuetzlichkeit

Pro-BI book becomes best-seller in Germany

by | Apr 30, 2011 | News

1000 Euro for everyone. Freedom. Equality. Basic Income is the title of a new book (€1.000 für Jeden: Freiheit. Gleichheit. Grundeinkommen in the original) by Götz W. Werner and Adrienne Goehler, published in August 2010. According to the Amazon.de website it is currently in place No. 1,563 of all books being sold, but in the category ‘Social Justice’ it is No. 1. It is clearly of considerable significance to find so much interest in a Citizen’s Income in a European country.

An interesting review of this book appears in the January Review of Books in Sp!ked. The first half of the review is factual and informative and is reproduced below (with permission from Sp!ked. You can read the original dated Friday 28 January 2011 at www.spiked-online.com/index.php/site/reviewofbooks_article/10136/ )

The idea that the state should give everyone a basic income has seized the imagination of Germany’s middle class and politicians.

by Johannes Richardt (head of PR and communications at Novo Argumente publishing house)

At the moment, more than €1 trillion flows into the more or less state-controlled German welfare complex every year. Representing one third of German GDP, this vast amount of money covers every social benefit, from child allowance to health insurance. If the economic stats were not striking enough, of the 80 million people living in Germany only 40 per cent earn a wage. So a large proportion of the population is dependent either partially or wholly upon the state.

But the German welfare state does not just provide a financial safety net. It also seeks to regulate the behaviour of benefits claimants through various forms of lifestyle intervention, such as dictating how much claimants should be allowed to spend on cigarettes. In this regard, the so-called Hartz IV legislation, passed in 2005 by the then ruling Green-Social Democrat coalition, is important. Named after its originator, Peter Hartz – then a social democratic trade unionist and manager of part state-owned Volkswagen before being imprisoned for embezzlement in 2007 – Hartz IV effectively revised the status of the unemployed. They were no longer citizens in need of assistance while out of work: they were deemed welfare dependent. They were no longer people fallen on hard times, but fully capable of getting back into work: they were psychologically dependent upon welfare and incapable of getting back into work.

Hartz IV not only produced a new form of state dependency; it also sought to prepare these damaged citizens for work. To this end, a new sector of senseless and unproductive labour for about 1.5 million of the unemployed benefits claimants was created (thus removing them from unemployment statistics). Under the pretext of empowering the unemployed by psychologically preparing them for the labour market, these benefits claimants are forced into absurd and degrading activities run by highly subsidised companies with Orwellian-sounding names like Neue Arbeit [New Work]. One example of this absurd work-for-work’s-sake philosophy is the Toys Company. In more than 60 factories around Germany, the formerly unemployed people work for an extra €1 per hour on top of their out-of-work benefits, recycling second-hand toys for poor children. One task is to check the completeness of second-hand puzzles. ‘The record for completing the 5000-piece puzzle is just 10 days’, explained Toys Company’s manager, ‘although unfortunately we found out that three pieces were missing’. Götz Werner and Adrienne Goehler refer to this example in their new book 1000 € für Jeden. Freiheit. Gleichheit. Grundeinkommen. (€1000 Each. Liberty. Equality. Basic Income.) They argue for a new model of state welfare distribution which would replace the bureaucratic, behaviour-management regime of Hartz IV with one based on a simple premise: the state would pay everyone a basic income.

At first sight their central idea of a basic income for everybody seems quite charming: Every citizen gets €1,000 from the state every month from cradle to grave. As Werner, the billionaire founder of a drugstore chain, and Goehler, president of the Hamburg Art Academy, note, €1000 represents more than just a living wage. They argue that it also enables people to participate in the cultural life of society.

Because this would be an amount that every person would be legally entitled to, there would be no more degrading means tests and interventions in the lives of benefits claimants. The welfare bureaucracy as Germans know it would be redundant: the unemployed would be freed from doing compulsory labour promoted by the state, and the rest of society would be freed from the imperative of wage labour provided by the market. Income would be separated from work. As one would not need to sell one’s labour in order to guarantee an income, the authors argue, people could choose their line of work, for whom they want to work and for how long. This would lead to a new society in which self-realisation, creativity and compassion replace the existential fears created by the current rat race.

The German political class is partially sympathetic to the idea of a basic income. Hence, with the exception of the Social Democratic Party (plus trade unions), all parties represented in parliament have been discussing various models of basic income at some point in the past few years. For instance, in its party programme, the liberal Free Democratic Party calls for a Bürgergeld (Citizen’s Income), an amount paid out whenever necessary but low enough to maintain the incentive to work. Elsewhere, the Greens call for a Bedarfsorientiere Grundsicherung (needs-based basic provision), and even within the conservative Christian Democrat Party there is support for a Solidiarisches Bürgergeld (solidarity citizen’s income).

… Support for the idea [also] comes from the German middle class. Campaign groups with names like ‘Freedom Instead of Full Employment’ and ‘Federal Agency of Income’ have emerged, advertising their ideas on various websites, in films and at events and demonstrations. It is important to note that support for a basic income does not come from unemployed and poorly educated low-wage employees. It comes from privileged and educated young professionals with middle-class backgrounds who, working in poorly-paid, insecure positions in the media and cultural sector, hope for an unconditional basic income to make their lives that little bit more secure. This is no struggle for abundance for all. For these metropolitan types, a basic income promises security, opportunities for self-realisation and psychological well-being.

It is to the fears and prejudices of this post-material milieu that the book €1000 Each speaks. In this way, the book exemplifies the rampant social pessimism so prominent in contemporary Western societies. The authors describe the insecure working conditions of the ‘creative class’, surviving on short-term contracts and project work, as the future for a society that has given up on the goal of well-paid and meaningful work for everyone. According to the authors, only a minority of people will earn their money in secure, long-term work. The rest of us will be left to the fate currently endured by the creative class, the ‘vanguard of precarious conditions’.

Referring to American sociologist Jeremy Rifkin’s 1995 book The End of Work, Werner and Goehler argue that the advance of globalisation, automation and rationalisation has led to a post-industrial society in which production can no longer serve as the basis of societal wealth. Economic growth, they assert, ‘is a dead duck’. Instead, Werner and Goehler urge us to focus on creativity as ‘the only remaining, sustainably exploitable resource of the twenty-first century’. This is why they argue for a basic income. Because to tap into this resource of creativity, while avoiding the social unrest that will come with the shortage of constant, paid work, requires everyone to be accorded a level of material security.

This is where the first half of the review ends. The second half of the review is highly critical of the whole idea of a Citizen’s Income: ‘Basic income, low aspiration: The idea that the state should give everyone a basic income has seized the imagination of Germany’s middle class and politicians. Their enthusiasm is testament only to the poverty of their ambition’ is the full title of the review. In the next issue of the Citizen’s Income Newsletter these anti-CI views will be reproduced and critically examined.