Review: Two Memoirs Tell the History of the Alaska Dividend

Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend is closer to a Basic Income than almost any other policy in the world today. The lessons of how it was created and how it became so popular and successful are extremely important to the Basic Income movement. Two autobiographies available now tell different parts of the story of the Alaska Dividend. One is by Jay Hammond, the governor who, more than anyone else, is responsible for creating the fund and dividend. The other is by Dave Rose, the first executive director of the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation.

Each book tells the story of its author’s life. These stories are interesting in their own right, reflecting the experience of many latter-day pioneers who came to Alaska from the lower forty-eight states before or in the early years of statehood. Hammond moved to Alaska after being a World War II pilot, and he lived the Alaskan experience as a ‘bush’ pilot, a wilderness guide, a homesteader, a legislator, a small-town Borough President, and governor. Followers of current U.S. politics will be interested to know that Sarah Palin took the name of her television show from ‘Jay Hammond’s Alaska,’ which ran for seven years in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

But followers of the Basic Income movement will be most interested in the inside accounts of how the Alaska Dividend was created and became the sound and solidly supported programme that exists today. Although the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF) is the source of revenue for the Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD), many non-Alaskans are unaware that the two are different programmemes created at different times by different kinds of legislation.

The events leading up to the creation of the fund began in 1955 when Alaska called a constitutional convention in advance of statehood. The constitution that was finally adopted proclaims that all of the natural resources of Alaska belong to the state for the benefit of the people.

One of the most important events which led to the development of the fund and dividend happened quietly in an office in Juneau in 1963. At that time, negotiations with the federal government over which lands would be transferred to full state ownership and which would remain federally owned had dragged on for several years. A geologist named Tom Marshall (according to Hammond) and/or the commissioner of natural resources, Phil Holdsworth (according to Rose), persuaded then-governor Bill Egan that there might be oil in far-northern Alaska. Egan then finished the land negotiations with the federal government by agreeing to take a ‘large, barren and unpopulated wasteland on Alaska’s Arctic Slope, near remote Prudhoe Bay.’ In 1967, oil was discovered under that barren, unpopulated wasteland.

Jay Hammond was elected governor in 1974, when, he says, ‘the scent of anticipated oil revenues wafted like musk in the halls of the state legislature’. Hammond was possessed with the idea of putting as much of that money as possible into a permanent fund that would pay dividends to Alaskans. The concept had been with him for a long time. Years earlier, as mayor of the small municipality of Bristol Bay Borough, he had tried unsuccessfully to create a similar programme at the local level using fisheries revenue.

Hammond had many reasons for favouring the fund and dividend. He thought that the temporary windfall should be saved rather than spent as it came in. He was afraid that the government would waste the windfall on poorly designed programmes or projects that would benefit only special interests or favored constituents. He wanted to make sure that every Alaskan would benefit from their jointly owned oil resources. And he hoped the dividend would help the poor.

After reading his book and speaking to him at the 2005 USBIG Congress, I still cannot say for sure how this idea came to Hammond and how he came to be so obsessed by it. He appears to have been influenced by the guaranteed income movement of the 1960s, but this does not fully explain where he got the idea for a state-owned fund paying dividends to all citizens.

Although Hammond was not the only person responsible for the creation of the fund and dividend, it is clear that it would not have happened without his single-minded pursuit of it for his entire eight years as governor. He made it his top priority. It was the object seemingly of every budget compromise he made from 1974 to 1982. The Alaska Dividend therefore owes its existence to the right person being in the right office at the right time.

The time was right not only because money was beginning to flow, but also because of public perception. Five years before he took office, in 1969, the state government had received an initial windfall of $900 million (six times the size of the state budget at that time) from the sale of leases for the right to drill. Some people at the time, including then-governor Keith Miller, argued that the state should invest the money and spend only the interest. But by 1974 all of that money was gone, and there was a widespread (if exaggerated) belief that most of it had been wasted. There was thus strong support for saving at least part of the expected oil windfall when Hammond began discussing the idea of a fund and a dividend with the legislature.

In 1976, after a series of compromises, Alaskans passed an amendment to the state constitution dedicating at least 25 percent of each year’s oil royalties to the new APF. It was a fraction of what Hammond wanted. Although he discussed many different figures, he at one time had hopes of dedicating 50 percent of all oil revenue to the fund. Royalties make up only about half of the state’s oil revenues. Therefore, the APF is only one-fourth as large has Hammond had wanted.

The biggest missing piece, from Hammond’s perspective, was the dividend. There is no mention of it in the amendment, which simply states that at least a minimum amount of certain kinds of mineral revenue would go into a fund of ‘income producing investments.’ It did not specify what these investments should be or how the returns would be used. Although these omissions were a disappointment to Hammond, according to Rose, the vagueness of the APF amendment was instrumental to its passage. It drew support from diverse groups, not all of whom would have supported a more clearly defined plan dedicating the returns to a dividend or anything else.

By both Rose’s and Hammond’s accounts, the dividend proposal was not popular with the public or with members of the legislature when Hammond started pushing for it in the late 1970s. The dividend got through thanks both to the strength of the governor’s office and to a long series of compromises made by a few dedicated legislators.

After a court challenge about how dividends were to be distributed, the final version of the dividend bill was passed and went into effect in 1982. It dedicated roughly half of the APF’s returns to the PFD. Unlike the fund itself, the dividend is not protected by a constitutional amendment. It is created by a simple majority vote of the state legislature. It is protected today, mostly, by its enormous popularity. According to Rose, a legislator proposed to do away with the PFD only six months after the first dividends went out. Rose writes, ‘His proposal had ample support in the Legislature, but when the public heard about it, everyone ran for cover.’ After just one dividend cheque, the PFD had a strong political constituency. After three or four cheques, it became politically inviolable.

But the fund was still not fully secure from diversion. The principal only had to be held in ‘income producing investments.’ There are many risky, politically motivated projects that can count as income producing investments. Many politicians wanted to use it for subsidized loans or infrastructure projects. Some wanted to restrict the APF to invest only in Alaskan assets. The legislature still has the power to intervene on any of these issues, but for the most part they have not. These issues have been resolved largely by the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (APFC), a body that was created in 1980 to manage the fund and dividend.

David Rose became the first executive director of the APFC in 1982. He made it his goal to follow the ‘prudent investor rule,’ a legal doctrine in which those who invest on behalf of others must seek the highest returns consistent with the safety of the investment. Investments with almost any other political goal are ruled out by the prudent investor rule, because they tend not to be the safest and most profitable. This rule was nominally established in APF legislation in 1980, but the law has few teeth. It takes the self-discipline of the managers and the oversight of public opinion to keep it in place. The state set up other programmes for subsidized loans and development projects. By the time Rose left office in 1992, the prudent investor rule was well established in precedent. The Alaskan public, wary that some bureaucrat might be blowing the source of their future dividends, paid close attention to the fund’s performance.

Even Rose felt the temptation to use the fund for political objectives. He tells one story from the late 1980s when the manager of Kuwait’s sovereign wealth fund came to him privately and suggested that the Kuwait fund, the APF, and two pension funds from the lower forty-eight states, should pool their assets and buy a controlling interest in British Petroleum (BP). Rose turned it down, of course, but not without some hesitation and daydreaming. It would have been a political move – not the move of a prudent investor.

These two books together lay out the long series of events between 1955 to 1992 that led to the APF being established in the Alaskan state constitution; the PFD being established by law; the prudent investor rule being established by law and precedent; and all being protected by public opinion. At the time of writing (January 2011), the APF is at more than $38.4 billion. The most recent annual PFD (October 2010) was $1,281 for every man, woman, and child in Alaska.

The dividend is safe for now because it continues to be one of the most popular programmes in Alaska, but that might not be true forever. The legislature has recently made several attempts to redirect the principal of the fund toward political projects, such as infrastructure investments, which show reduced commitment to the prudent investor rule. Alaskans were surprisingly resigned to the $12 billion the fund lost in the financial crisis of 2008-2009.

Furthermore, Alaska faces difficult budgetary times ahead thanks to decisions made when the oil started flowing. Back then, when Hammond was trying to create the dividend, he reluctantly and regretfully signed a bill to eliminate the state income tax. Looking at short-term effects only, the elimination of the income tax seemed like a great idea. The state simply didn’t need the tax, and it was making far more money in oil revenue than it needed to run the state budget. Hammond thought it would be much better to dedicate more oil revenues to the permanent fund and continue to finance most government spending through regular taxes. Eliminating the income tax would benefit Alaskans unevenly and temporarily. Dedicating an equal amount of additional money to the APF (and an accompanying dividend) would benefit all Alaskans permanently. Instead the state decided to live off temporary oil revenue.

Today nearly 85% of the Alaskan state budget is funded by oil. When those revenues run out there will be enormous pressure to redirect the PFD, and perhaps even APF principal, toward supporting the state budget. Furthermore, the state will be in the position of needing to find new tax sources just when the industry that dominates the state economy will be contracting. Perhaps natural gas will create a new resource boom just as the oil money begins to run out. Perhaps some other part of the Alaskan economy will take over. But it is clear that Alaska is in a more precarious position than it would have been if the state had saved more of its oil revenues.

It’s tempting to think what might have been if Alaska had saved all of its oil revenue in a best-case scenario. Suppose the state had kept the income tax, put all its oil revenues into the APF, and spent only the interest. The APF would now be something in the neighborhood of eight-to-ten times its actual current size of $38.4 billion. For a best-case scenario, say $400 billion. Most financial analysts agree that one can withdraw up to 4% or 5% per year from an investment fund and still expect it to grow over time in real terms. Suppose the state was able to withdraw 5% each year, using half of it for dividends and half for the state’s operating budget. That would produce a dividend of $15,000 per person per year and $10 billion for the state budget. Current total state spending is only $10.5 billion per year. Thus, the state would only need to raise $0.5 billion from other sources this year, and it would be able to envisage the day when returns to the fund financed the entire state budget.

Enticing, but it is a best-case scenario, relying on the most optimistic assumptions on every issue. It ignores all of the financial risks and political, economic, and demographic barriers to maintaining such a system. It also ignores the fact that the state needed to spend some of the oil money as soon as it came in. It was a poor state with weak infrastructure and poor schools: it no longer is – thanks to the oil boom. Although some of the oil money was wasted, some of it was well spent. As Rose argues, ‘Until basic needs are met, such as education and public safety, the government has no business saving for the future.’ Alaska had to spend a lot to meet its needs at the time, but it could have saved much more than it has. If Hammond had got his way, the fund and dividend would be four times the size they are now.

The APF and PFD give us a model on which we can improve. The memoirs of Hammond and Rose help us to understand how we can do it.

Literature:

Dave Rose and Charles Wohlforth, Saving For the Future: My Life and the Alaska Permanent Fund, Epicenter Press, Kenmore, WA, 2008, 256pp, hbk, 978 0 9790470 4 6, $24.95, pbk, 978 0 9790470 5 3, $17.95.

Jay S. Hammond, Tales of Alaska’s Bush Rat Governor, Epicenter Press, Kenmore, WA, 1994, pbk, 340 pp, 978 0 945397 43 4, $17.95

OPINION: The Answer is Blowin´ in the Wind

Every time I read about the lives lost in the wars of Vietnam and Iraq, in the repression against movements pro-democratization in many Arabian countries, in the recurring conflicts at the borders of Israel and Palestine, in lamentable episodes that killed Chico Mendes, Sister Dorothy Stang, and the couple José Cláudio Ribeiro da Silva and Maria do Espírito Santo – defenders of the forests – and in the violence that occur in the outskirts of our metropolis, the beautiful lyrics of Bob Dylan, who turned 70 on Tuesday, May 24th, come to my mind, especially “Blowin’ in the Wind”, written in 1962.

Then, the Vietnam War was spreading absurdly. It seemed that mankind, including Chiefs of State of powerful nations, was hardly listening to the people who called the attention to the absurd of the wars and to how it would be better to solve great divergences among people and nations through the non-violence. There were great examples of this attitude as Leon Tolstoi, Mahatma Ghandi and Martin Luther King Jr., the latter always remembered for his beautiful words in “I Have a Dream”, of August 28th, 1963, when he claimed for the approval of laws assuring equality in civil rights among all the peoples as well as the Universal Suffrage:

This is no time to engage in the luxury of cooling off or to take the tranquilizing drug of gradualism…This sweltering summer of the Negro’s legitimate discontent will not pass until there is an invigorating autumn of freedom and equality… Let us not seek to satisfy our thirst for freedom by drinking from the cup of bitterness and hatred. We must forever conduct our struggle on the high plane of dignity and discipline. We must not allow our creative protest to degenerate into physical violence. Again and again we must rise to the majestic heights of meeting physical force with soul force.

Martin Luther King Jr. was one of those who built the conscience of the peoples of the world in a way to put an end to the long and suffered Vietnam War. In big cities, on the streets, in public squares, crowds decided to sing, many times led by Bob Dylan, Joan Baez, the group Peter, Paul and Marie and other great interpreters.

“How many roads must a man walk down
Before you call him a man?
How many seas must a white dove sail
Before she sleeps in the sand?
How many times must the cannon balls fly
Before they´re forever banned?
How many years can a mountain exist
Before it´s washed to the sea?
How many years can some people exist (as the Brazilian people, I think)
Before they´re allowed to be free?
How many times can a man turn his head
Pretending he just doesn´t see?
How many times must a man look up
Before he can see the sky?
How many ears must one man have
Before he can hear people cry?
How many deaths will it take till he knows
That too many people have died?
The answer, my friend, is blowin´ in the wind
The answer is blowin´ in the wind.”

This is a matter of common sense, totally within our reach to accomplish, even with much effort and determination. It is obvious that, in order to reach the conditions for living with less violence in our society, in order to end the need for wars to solve the fundamental mankind problems, we must put into practice the tools of economic and social policies that mean the use of principles of justice, as the ones elaborated by philosopher John Rawls, in The Principles of Justice (1971).

Thus, we could realize a shared feeling of fraternity, which effectively would be recognized by the society, resulting in a much higher level of civility.

So, to create a civilized and fair society, we must take into consideration values that are not only the search of self interest, to take advantages in everything. It´s clear that all of us want to develop and we also want the progress of our beloved ones. I teach my sons and pupils to consider the value of ethics, of the search for truth, of fraternity, of solidarity, of freedom and of democracy. And what are the tools consistent with these values? One example would be extension of good opportunities in education to every child, every youth and every adult who did not have good opportunities of education. A good public health service for all. The accomplishment of an agrarian reform, in a country still unequal in its land property conditions. The incentive to the cooperative forms of production and to the participation of the workers in companies’ profits. The expansion of micro credit opportunities. And the implementation of social inclusion programs that may bring a higher level of freedom and dignity to all the human beings.

According to the conclusion reached by a growing number of economists and philosophers of the five continents at the 13th International Congress of Basic Income Earth Network, Bien, held at USP in 2010, the tool that would contribute for this objective in a high level is a Citizen´s Basic Income, regardless the person’s origin, race, age, gender, civil, social or economic condition.

Fortunately the National Congress approved and President Lula sanctioned, in 2004, the Law 10.835/2004, to institute the Citizen´s Basic Income step by step, under the criterion of the Executive Power, starting with those who need most, like the Bolsa Familia does, until the day when everybody, including foreigners living in Brazil for five years or more, has the right to receive an income, as enough as possible, to meet the vital needs of everyone.

It will be great if President Dilma Rousseff announce this upcoming November the implementation of the Citizen´s Basic Income, during her term until 2014, as approved by consensus by the IV Nation Congress of the Workers’ Party, in February, 2010. We will sing with much joy and significance: “The answer is blowin´ in the wind”.

OPINION: FEDERAL INCOME SUPPLEMENT: FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE FOR ALL

INTRODCUTION

Over the decades economists have suggested many forms of minimum income, most recently the Basic Income Guarantee or BIG which is an unconditional regular payment from the government to everyone. The objective of this paper is demonstrate the financial feasibility of a specific $12,000 per year per person U.S. federal government program financed entirely by cutting only existing federal welfare associated programs and changing the federal personal income tax to a flat rate of 16.2% but allowing no deductions. This program would not add to nor reduce the federal deficit. Other potential avenues for federal deficit reduction such as defense, Medicare, Medicaid, foreign aid, wealth taxes or gas taxes have not been preempted.

FEDERAL INCOME SUPPLEMENT

The Federal Income Supplement (FIS) program would take the form of an unconditional taxable government payment of $12,000 each year to every adult US citizen. The cost would be approximately $2.6 trillion per year for the 218 million recipients. Half would come from eliminating multiple forms federal welfare and reduction of other federal programs. The other half would come from a 16.2% flat rate personal income tax with no deductions. For the sake of greater income equality, Progressives would give up sacred social programs such as Social Security and welfare. Libertarians would buy into income redistribution for the sake of major reductions in the size of government. It would not increase the federal deficit.

A convenient truth is that not everyone needs to work. Full employment is not necessary for the production of sufficient goods and services for everyone. Not everyone needs to work fulltime, but everyone needs money to buy these goods and services

This Federal Income Supplement (FIS) is a straightforward uncomplicated solution with little government intrusion and little opportunity for fraud, abuse or bureaucracy. It is similar in concept to the current Alaska Permanent Fund annual dividend and a proposed Basic Income Guarantee (BIG).

The following direct savings and increased income tax revenues would finance the entire cost:

1. Elimination of all Federal welfare programs
2. Elimination of Social Security
3. Elimination of Federal unemployment benefits
4. Elimination of Minimum Wage laws
5. Elimination of Farm Subsidies
6. Elimination of Federal subsidies for student loans
7. Elimination of Federal retirement breaks for employers and employees
8. Elimination of Federal financial benefits for married couples
9. Elimination of Federal tax exemptions for “non-profits”
10. A flat 16.2% Federal income tax rate and elimination of all deductions

The benefits would be:

1. Elimination of poverty
2. Elimination of unemployment
3. Maintenance of a viable economy with only partial employment producing enough goods and services for everyone
4. Decoupling of old age income from employment
5. All citizens would pay federal income tax, becoming stakeholders with greater interest
6. Elimination of the bulk of retirement tax breaks going to the wealthiest
7. Security for people of any age or any circumstance who are not employed
8. Elimination of the minimum wage would make the US labor more flexible and competitive in the global market
9. Drastic simplification of the tax code

It is different from welfare or unemployment as it is paid out to everyone. There is no stigma. It is not lost by working. It is different than a negative income tax because it is issued as a separate payment similar to how Alaska pays oil dividends to each resident. It can be characterized as a birthright, a common share of America that pays a dividend, or as an inheritance, or as a trust fund.

Financial Summary (in billions)

Tax revenue from supplemental payments themselves $ 352
Increased revenue from a 16.4% flat tax rate and elimination of deductions 1136
Eliminations of Social Security 755
Reduction of Discretionary Programs (Education, HUD, etc.) 200
Reduction of Mandatory Programs (Commerce, Agriculture, etc.) 165
TOTAL (revenue increases + spending cuts) $2,608

Please note that all these program reductions are at the Federal level and do not necessarily affect any welfare programs at the state or local level. Also, these program reductions for FIS only affect welfare related programs. This FIS program does not reduce or increase the federal deficit. Other federal programs such as Defense, Medicare, Medicaid, and Foreign Aid are not affected. Cost reductions in these Federal programs are still available for reducing the federal deficit.

CALCULATIONS

Tax Revenue from federal supplements themselves
Adult Citizens in US
   Total US Resident Population 2009
   Less
307,000,000  (1)
   US Resident under 5 2009 21,000,000  (1)
   US Resident 6-9 2009 21,000,000  (1)
   US Resident 10-14 2009 20,000,000  (1)
   US Resident 15-19 2009 22,000,000  (1)
   Foreign Born under 5 263,000  (2)
   Foreign Born 5-14 1,600,000  (2)
   Foreign Born 15-24 3,730,000  (2)
Total 218,000,000  US Adult Citizens
Federal Income Supplement 12,000  $/year per adult
Total Federal Income Supplement payments 2.62 trillion  $/year
Tax rate 16.2%
   Flat rate no deductions
   Income, cap gains & interest same rate
Tax Revenue from tax on FIS payments 424,000,000,000  $/year
Current Tax on Social Security Benefits
   Total SS payments 720,000,000,000  $/year (3)
   Income tax rate paid, marginal 10%  Estimate
   Current tax revenue from Tax on SS benefits to be 72,000,000,000  $/year
   subtracted to avoid double counting tax revenue
Net Tax Revenue increase from tax on FIS payments 352,000,000,000  $/year

Additional Tax Revenue from a flat income tax rate and no deductions
Personal Income (PI) 2008 12,547,000,000,000 (4)
Capital gains in 2010, not included in (PI) 504,000,000,000 (5)
Social Security/Medicare contributions not included in (PI) 1,004,000,000,000 (4)
Total taxable personal income under FIS 14,055,000,000,000      
Flat tax rate with no deductions 16.2%      
Tax Revenue from flat tax rate and no deductions 2,277,000,000,000      
Obama 2012 proposed budget personal income tax revenue 1,141,000,000,000 (3)
Net increase $1,136,000,000,000

Replace Social Security with FIS

Eliminate Social Security Retirement 762,000,000,000 (3)
Eliminate Social Security Admin 7,000,000,000 (6)

Reductions in Discretionary Spending from Obama 2012 Proposed Budget (1)

Reductions in Dept. of Agriculture 10,000,000,000
Eliminate Dept. of Education Discretionary 74,000,000,000
Eliminate SBA 2,000,000,000
Reduce Health Discretionary 60,000,000,000
Eliminate HUD 49,000,000,000
Reduce Dept. of Labor Discretionary 5,000,000,000
Total Discretionary Reductions $200,000,000,000

Reductions in Mandatory Spending from Obama 2012 Proposed Budget (1)

Agriculture 116,000,000,000
Commerce 2,000,000,000
Social Security Admin 47,000,000,000
Total Mandatory Reductions $165,000,000,000

CONCLUSION

The numbers can work. Real incomes would be increased by more than 50% for individuals now receiving maximum welfare benefits, those making minimum wage and students with federal loan support. Middle-income individuals would realize a modest net income increase that would decline to zero for those making about $125,000 per year. Individuals now making over $125,000 would realize a lower net income.

Notes:

1 Resident Population by Sex and Age 198-2009, US Census Bureau
2 Table 42 Foreign Born Population 2009, US Census Bureau
3 Table S-4 Obama Proposed Budge 2009, Office of Management and Budget
4 Table 2.1, Personal Income and Its Disposition Bureau of Economic Analysis
5 Table 4.3 Actual and Projected Capital Gains Realizations and Tax Receipts, Congressional Budget Office.
6 Social Security Administration, Pg. 165, Obama Proposed Budget 2009, Office of Management and Budget.

OPINION: Why Jay Hammond favored a larger dividend, higher taxes, and smaller government

It might be an exaggeration to say that former Alaksa Governor Jay Hammond, the person responsible more than any other for the Permanent Fund Dividend, was a republican thinker in the tradition of Rousseau or Jefferson. I certainly don’t know enough about his history to make this claim. But his reflections on the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF) and the Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) do echo some important themes from that nearly abandoned republican tradition, and may partly explain why Hammond was often at odds with others in the Republican Party over the dividend, taxes, and economic development. The success of the Fund and Dividend may suggest a model for leaders in any party who want to promote republican ideals of citizen participation, equality, personal independence, and government that serves the common good rather than special interests.

At a workshop in which I participated in Anchorage on the PFD in April 2011, the Alaskans who had for decades studied the Fund and Dividend, and participated in their creation, all agreed that distributive justice played no part in the debate, and thought that had the Dividend been framed as a way to reduce inequality or end poverty, it never would have passed. The primary case for the Dividend was that it would create popular support for the Fund, and thus prevent the legislature from wasting money. Nevertheless, it is clear that distributive justice informed Hammond’s thinking about the Dividend, and partly explains why he favored dividends over competing policy proposals.

This is most obvious in the proposal, which passed despite Hammond’s opposition, to abolish the income tax and fund Alaska’s government with oil revenue. Hammond would have preferred the continuation of income taxes while paying larger dividends from larger investments of oil revenue in the Fund. One reason is that by repealing the income tax, “you’ll cut the one string connecting the citizen’s pocketbook to the government purse, and see state spending soar….[By [e]liminating the income tax…[n]ot only will we reduce our means, we’ll cut the one prime restraint on government spending” (265). Paying taxes makes us vigilant about what is being done with our tax dollars. It helps to keep us engaged as citizens. If we stop paying attention, we also get robbed.

This is clear in the second reason Hammond gave for continuing income taxes, that has to do with distributive justice: Eliminating, capping, or reducing the possible dividends paid out to citizens, in order to abolish income taxes, has a regressive effect on income distribution. “The most regrettable aspect of income tax repeal is that it exerts pressure to invade the Permanent Fund to replace the money lost by income tax repeal [pressure that will grow as oil revenue declines—MH]. This, of course, will shift the burden for state spending entirely from those who can best afford to pay taxes—including the non-residents who make up about a quarter of our workforce—to the shoulders of each and every Alaskan, regardless of income. None would feel the burden more than the low and middle income groups” (266). In contrast, funding government from income taxes and permitting a higher dividend would give a bigger proportionate boost to the incomes of low and middle income groups.

Hammond points out that the abolition of income taxes in effect created hidden taxes. Proposals to cap dividends in order to allow more APF money to be used for government spending “equates with imposing a head tax on every Alaskan and only Alaskans—regardless of income…. it never makes more sense to cap dividends than to simply ratchet up taxes to raise the same amount. In effect, capping dividends taxes only—and all—Alaskans. Increasing most taxes spreads the burden to those best able to pay—and also includes transient workers who currently remove so much wealth from our state ” (320–22).

The dividend, according to Hammond’s estimate, “is but one half of the earnings derived from investments of roughly only one-tenth of their oil wealth.” If all the wealth were distributed in dividends, each Alaskan would receive an additional $6,000 per person per year (in 1993). By funding government with this oil revenue instead of from taxes, Alaskans are in effect paying a regressive head tax, falling heaviest on those who can least afford to relinquish this wealth. But because it is not taken out of their paychecks, the tax remains hidden. A large dividend would contribute to personal independence. Hammond speculates that “were every Alaskan annually granted his full per capita share of the wealth we could eliminate or vastly curtail all welfare programs, unemployment insurance and subsidies” (319).

The supporters of income tax abolition, he notes, are first of all the wealthy who stand to benefit from lower taxes more than they would gain from larger equal per capita dividends. Secondly, a legislature flush with money that no one is watching becomes a tool of special interests. Hammond says to proponents of income tax repeal,” “though you seem perfectly willing to cut down on the little guy’s ‘living’ by slicing social programs like welfare, you seem unconcerned about boosting ‘living’ for select interests through subsidies such as lower than market rate loans and other ‘hidden dividends’ not based on need. Some might call that ‘corporate welfare’” (265).

Thus we find another classic republican theme, promotion of the general good over particular interests, alongside Hammond’s concerns for personal independence, progressive taxation, and more engaged citizens. All of these ends are well served by a large dividend and funding of government through income taxes.

There are some blind spots in his thinking. While he recognizes the legitimacy of government spending on the basis of need or “constitutional obligation”, he seems not very sensitive to the case to be made for government spending for public goods. There are some goods we all benefit from that the market will not deliver efficiently, no matter how much income we have. And his outlook is narrowly nationalistic, aiming for what is good for all Alaskans (not even all Americans), as is evident in the above quotations referring to non-Alaskans. (In his original dividend proposal, found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, Hammond wanted those who had lived in Alaska longer to receive larger dividends.) Why, one might ask, should Alaskans enjoy a large dividend because of Alaska’s oil, while Vermonters, say, with fewer resources, could only give themselves a much smaller dividend? Shouldn’t the unearned natural wealth of the United States be shared equally by all Americans? Or, to go a step further, shouldn’t the natural resources of the earth be shared equally by all of its inhabitants, not just those fortunate to be born on top of rich deposits of oil or other wealth? This of course is not a blind spot peculiar to Hammond or political thinkers in the republican tradition, and getting beyond it in practical politics will require the strengthening of institutions and an ethos of solidarity at the federal and global levels. As these emerge, the global community may have something to learn from the example of the Permanent Fund Dividend, including the thinking of its strongest advocate.

All references are to Jay Hammond, Tales of a Bush Rat Governor (Fairbanks/Seattle: Epicenter Press, 1994).

Review: BIEN-Suisse, Le financement d'un revenu de base inconditionne

BIEN-Suisse, Le financement d’un revenu de base inconditionnel, Seismo, 2010, 204 pp, pbk, 2 88351 049 4, 38 SFr

We normally only review books in English, but with this edited collection we make an exception, not because it contains translations from our own publications, but because it is a sustained argument for the necessity and feasibility of a Citizen’s Income.

Peter Ulrich’s preface suggests that if Switzerland is to experience a society of citizens then it needs more equal incomes and more permeable social class boundaries. Increasing automation and the demands of sustainability will between them mean that not everyone will be employed full-time, so a Citizen’s Income will be needed to provide for the necessary more equal incomes and to enable everyone to be employed part-time. Ulrich recommends that 25% of Swiss GDP (the same proportion as is spent on income maintenance in Switzerland today) should be spent on providing every Swiss citizen with a Citizen’s Income of 1,500 SFr Citizen’s Income. Higher taxes would make a Citizen’s Income of 2,500 SFr per month possible.

Bridget Dommen-Meade’s introduction to the book summarises the chapters and links their discussions into an argument for a Swiss Citizen’s Income’s feasibility. Then come three chapters arguing for the feasibility of a Citizen’s Income in Switzerland: Bernard Kundig’s insightful study of long-term changes in the economy and in Swiss society leads into an argument for a Citizen’s Income funded by an increase in consumption taxes and flat income tax; Albert Jörriman suggests a mechanism which would result in the employed giving back an amount equal to the Citizen’s Income, and he suggests how provision for unemployment and disability might relate to a Citizen’s Income; and both Kundig and Jörriman suggest that a Citizen’s Income of 2,500 SFr per month should be feasible. [This is approximately £1,500 per month or £18,000 per annum]; and Jörriman argues that a Citizen’s Income of this level would not discourage paid employment and would encourage self-employment and co-operatives (p.81). Daniel Hani and Enno Schmidt argue for the same level of Citizen’s Income and also argue for funding by an increase in consumption taxation, and emphasise the additional labour market choices in which a Citizen’s Income would result.

The next few chapters are translations of published material about other countries. Marc de Basquiat argues for the feasibility of a Citizen’s Income of €12.60 per day in France; Ingmar Kumpmann and Ingrid Hohenleitner suggest a phased implementation of a Citizen’s Income in Germany, so that the effects on national income can be evaluated; and Pieter le Roux argues for a Citizen’s Income of R100 (about £10) per week per adult. He shows that even though a consumption tax increase considered by itself would be more regressive than an income tax increase, when considered alongside the establishment of a Citizen’s Income it would be progressive. The other two chapters are a translation of Anne Miller’s article on minimum income standards in the third issue of the Citizen’s Income Newsletter for 2009 and the Citizen’s Income Trust’s introductory booklet.

The chapters which advocate consumption taxes as a method of financing a Citizen’s Income give pause for thought to those of us in the UK who have for so long assumed that reduction of income tax allowances and possibly adjustment of income tax rates would be the best method. Also of interest are discussions about the labour market effects of a Citizen’s Income. If a partial Citizen’s Income is likely to provide greater employment market incentives than a full Citizen’s Income then it should be possible to find an optimum level of Citizen’s Income, though probably only from practical experience of different levels. As Dommen-Meade suggests, the long-term effects of a Citizen’s Income are more important than the short-term ones. She thinks the Swiss welfare system ripe for major change, and that a Citizen’s Income is the way to do it. ‘We are convinced …’ (p.27).

Perhaps the most significant finding is that in every European country studied a partial Citizen’s Income is found to be feasible. This raises again the question as to whether a pan-European partial Citizen’s Income might be possible. Not only would this offer all of the benefits which a Citizen’s Income in each country would offer, but it would also promote the efficiency of the European labour market, to the benefit of every European economy. The discussions of funding in the book suggest that such a pan-European Citizen’s Income should be funded by a European consumption tax collected nationally.

Such a Citizen’s Income would probably require Switzerland to join the EU: but that’s another discussion.

Review: Vladimir Rys, Reinventing Social Security Worldwide

Vladimir Rys, Reinventing Social Security Worldwide, Policy Press, 2010, x + 126 pp, hbk 1 847 42643, £60, pbk 1 847 426406, £19.99

This book is the fruit of a lifetime of academic research and administrative experience in international social security policy. Rys worked for thirty years for the International Social Security Association (ISSA) and for half of that time as its General Secretary, and there can be few people with such a broad geographical and historical overview of the evolution of social security (here understood as financial benefits and also state insurance-funded health provision) and of the challenges facing it.

The first part of the book offers an international history of social security, a discussion of the economic and ideological context of the current debate, and some current trends:

‘… a series of shifts in emphasis on different elements in the existing structures and different roles assigned to specific actors. Thus, the state, while reducing its direct involvement in running social security schemes and providing social welfare benefits, is at the same time greatly increasing its powers when it comes to regulating occupational or private arrangements. Simultaneously, … there is an obvious shift of responsibility back to employers and different forms of occupational welfare, back to families and their supporting role, and also back to the individual and their personal capacity to save for rainy days’ (p.55)

The second part of the book builds on Rys’s previous publications on the sociological study of social security policy, and in particular discusses the ISSA’s contribution to the development of a method which goes ‘beyond the descriptive accounts of the institution as contained in legislative texts and [explains] why it is organised the way it is and why it functions the way it does’ (p.77). Such a method contributes to policy debate by suggesting which proposals might be feasible and which not. The different components of the method are discussed: the demographic, the economic, the sociological, and the political, the study of ideas, ideologies, laws, institutions and administrative techniques, and the study of the ways in which ideas are disseminated. The method is then applied to a variety of contexts, and particularly to eastern Europe ( – Rys is Czech).

The third section of the book is entitled ‘Reinventing social security in time of economic crisis: foundations of a new political consensus’ and argues for transparency about expenditures and present and future benefit levels and that only a renewed emphasis on social insurance can halt the privatisation of social security:

‘The principle of social insurance appeals partly to the rational self-interest of the individual, assuring them of access to benefits not normally attainable through private means, but also partly to their natural sentiment of solidarity and respect for other human beings’ (p.116)

As Rys suggests in his introduction, ‘it would be irresponsible, in the light of recent experience, to entrust [social insurance] to private arrangements’ (p.2).

Whilst rather too much of this book is of the ‘We did this at the ISSA’ variety, there is plenty of useful material here, and, above all, a sustained and rational argument for the importance of social insurance. However, Rys’s own career investment in the development of today’s systems leads him to neglect developments in which he has been rather less involved. It simply isn’t true that ‘no new social protection mechanism has been invented to deal with new risks and socially precarious situations’ (p.1). ‘Basic income’, ‘citizen’s income’ and ‘Child Benefit’ don’t appear in the index, and neither do ‘universal’ or ‘universalism’. Recent experience in Namibia suggests that universal provision might be precisely the new mechanism which the current crisis needs.