Barry Knight (editor), A Minority View: What Beatrice Webb would say now

Barry Knight (editor), A Minority View: What Beatrice Webb would say now, Beatrice Webb Memorial Series on Poverty, vol.1, Alliance Publishing Trust, 2011, 128pp, pbk, 1 907376 11 5, available from the Webb Memorial Trust, webb@cranehouse.eu

Beatrice Webb’s contribution to a Royal Commission on the Poor Law just over a hundred years ago was a Minority Report which set out five main principles:

  • Poverty has structural causes
  • Prevention is better than cure
  • Dependency should be avoided
  • Services should be integrated
  • The state, not philanthropy, is responsible. (p.11)

The Government of the time took no notice, but Beveridge had worked as a research assistant on the Minority Report and its findings clearly informed his own 1942 report on National Insurance.

The world is now different, but poverty persists, and the contributors to this collection of essays ask themselves: What would Beatrice Webb have said today? Their suggestions include minimum income standards, supporting poor children in working families (which does not mean enforced low-paying employment), restoring the Child Trust Fund, small-scale lending, raising the tax threshold, retaining universal Child Benefit, reducing labour-market disincentives (rather than regenerating poor neighbourhoods), affirmative action to address discrimination and exclusion, and the active pursuit of gender equality.

In his final chapter, the editor lists four definitions of poverty: ‘absolute low income … relative low income … material deprivation … index of multiple deprivation …’ (p.119): but these are all static concepts. A dynamic definition of poverty would be this: ‘A structural inability to create one’s own path out of poverty’. This definition reveals high marginal deduction rates and complex administrative and income uncertainty and continuity problems on changing one’s employment status to be the serious problems which they are.

Of particular interest is the number of suggestions which would reduce marginal deduction rates. Peter Kenway suggests ‘raising the level of the personal allowance to remove low earners from income tax altogether; raising the level of the income thresholds above which benefits and tax credits start to be tapered and/or council tax begins to become payable; reducing the rate at which tax credits and benefits are tapered away as earnings rise; … reintroducing a (lower) starting rate of income tax’ (p.56); and Jonathan Bradshaw calls for Child Benefit to remain universal and shows how effective it is at reducing poverty. Of equal interest is Steve Osborn’s finding that ‘the uncertainties created by the current benefits system and its implications for moving poor people into employment’ (p.80) is a serious problem.

If increasing inequality is a major problem, if income uncertainty across changes in someone’s labour market status are a problem, and if high marginal deduction rates are a major cause of poverty (and in the context of a dynamic understanding of poverty they are), then surely what Beatrice Webb would be saying today is what she said in 1909: that universal services are what’s required; and she would also be saying today that a universal unconditional income for every age-group would prevent poverty, would tackle some of poverty’s structural causes, would reduce dependency, and would integrate tax and benefits, and that it is the state’s responsibility to see that it happens.

Matthew C. Murray and Carole Pateman (eds), Basic Income Worldwide: Horizons of Reform

Matthew C. Murray and Carole Pateman (eds), Basic Income Worldwide: Horizons of Reform, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, xv + 271 pp, hbk, 0 230 28542 2, £57.50

This book is a most useful survey of international experience of Basic or Citizen’s Income, of benefits sufficiently similar to enable them to be regarded as on the way to a Citizen’s Income, and of significant legislative attempts at Citizen’s Incomes. The book complements Basic Income Guarantee and Politics, edited by Richard Caputo and recently published by the same publisher, with which it overlaps to some extent, but not too much. Both books are essential reading for anyone interested in how experience of Citizen’s Income, and debate about it, are developing worldwide.

Some of the material in the first part of the book will be familiar to readers of this Newsletter, but some will not be. The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend will be well known, but less well known will be some highly positive results from United States and Canadian Negative Income Tax experiments. This Newsletter has already reported stunning results from the Namibian Citizen’s Income pilot project, but less well known are the complexities of Brazil’s and Canada’s political economies and their effects on benefit reform.

The second part of the book describes Basic Income proposals for East Timor, Catalonia, South Africa, Ireland, Germany, New Zealand, and Australia. The overall impression is of a widespread global debate, different in different countries, but with lots of connections between the different national debates.

Murray’s concluding chapter is understandably effusive about the results of the Namibian pilot project, and about the brake on inequality provided by the Alaskan Permanent Fund Dividend. Conditional schemes, on the other hand, are found to lead to new inequalities (p.253), and tax credit and negative income tax schemes to have similar problems (p.255). Murray recognises the different effects of different political contexts, and this reviewer was particularly struck by ways in which more federal political arrangements, such as those in the USA and Brazil, can make the debate more possible locally but quite complex nationally.

One issue over which the editors seem to be somewhat confused is that of terminolog. In this book, ‘Basic Income’ usually means an unconditional and nonwithdrawable income for every citizen, but sometimes it means a class of benefit types of which an unconditional benefit is one member (e.g., p.251), which leaves the unconditional and universal benefit without a name. A similar problem arises in the introductory chapter, which lists some important questions: What form should the payment take? How much should it be? Should it be unconditional? Should it be universal? Can it be afforded? How should it be funded? Some of these questions are ‘controversial questions’ surrounding ‘Basic Income’ (p.2) if ‘Basic Income’ is understood as an unconditional, nonwithdrawable and universal income: but some are not. The question ‘Should the payment be universal?’ is a question about whether we should have a Basic Income. It is not a question about a Basic Income. Similarly, ‘Should the income be paid unconditionally?’ is a question about whether or not we should have a Basic Income. By the end of the introduction we are entirely unsure about what the term ‘Basic Income’ means.

I know that this has been said in these pages before, but it clearly needs saying again: clarity of definition is essential to rational debate.

Our position is this: A ‘Citizen’s Income’ or a ‘Basic Income’ is an unconditional, nonwithdrawable income for every individual as a right of citizenship. The terms should not be used for anything else. Other terms, such as ‘social dividend’ and ‘universal grant’ are equivalent, but only if they mean the same thing. (We do not use ‘Basic Income Guarantee’ because a guaranteed income can mean an income achieved by means-tested benefits.) Widespread agreement on the meaning of terminology would considerably help the clarity of debate, both individual national debates and the global debate, and it would have helped the editors and authors of the book under review to express themselves more clearly.

But having said all that: Murray and Pateman have provided us with a most useful collection of essays on some highly significant Citizen’s Income experiences and debates, and anyone interested in that debate should read this book.

Neil Fraser, Rodolfo Gutiérrez and Ramón Peña-Casas, Working Poverty in Europe: A Comparative Approach

Neil Fraser, Rodolfo Gutiérrez and Ramón Peña-Casas, Working Poverty in Europe: A Comparative Approach, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, xx + 342 pp, hbk, 0 230 29010 5, £60

This data-packed book is one of a series of publications to emerge from the EU-funded Programme on Reconciling Work and Welfare in Europe (RECWOWE). The programme’s context is the tensions between work and welfare –

the tension between employer demands for more labour market flexibility and citizens’ need for economic security; the tensions between the increased participation in paid work and the importance of family life, the greater fluidity in family relationships, and the greater flexibility in the labour markets; the friction between quantity and quality of the jobs to be created, between job creation and maintaining or improving the quality of employment and finally the conflicts raised by the need to adapt (industrial) social protection systems to new labour market structures (p.xviii)

and the programme’s task is to understand the relationship between work and welfare in the many different national contexts across Europe. This book’s task is to understand in-work poverty, and in particular the institutional and policy factors which affect it. The editors identify as particular worries the growing segmentation and casualisation of employment and the downward pressures on the wages of low-skilled workers (p.3).

The first part of the book offers comparative statistical analysis of the situation across Europe. Amongst the conclusions are that in the UK in-work poverty is caused both by partners’ low labour market participation and by low wages (p.32) and that in an era of high unemployment active labour market policies cannot on their own prevent poverty.

The second part contains chapters on various countries. The chapter on the UK concludes that working poverty is rising, that it is due mainly to low work intensity (p.91), and that means-tested in-work benefits have kept in-work poverty down to average European levels, which our earnings inequalities would otherwise have taken us above.

The third part of the book tackles cross-cutting themes and finds high mobility (in-work poverty is often transitory and recurrent) (p.199). Studied as individuals, women more often suffer in-work poverty than men (a fact not often noticed because so many women are in households with men) (p.229), that standard of living inequalities correlate closely to individual wage inequalities (p.246), and that in-work poverty is  higher amongst non-EU migrant workers than amongst migrant workers from within the EU (p.271). A chapter on the effect of tax and benefits policies on in-work poverty finds, unsurprisingly, that means-tested benefits mean that higher earnings often don’t translate into higher disposable incomes (p.281). It also suggests that there is a trade-off between redistribution and employment incentives, and finds that in-work benefits can cause a particularly acute disincentive problem for a household’s second earner, resulting in adverse effects on the incentive structure for couple households (p.302). The authors find that incentives are not an important determinant of employment rates amongst the low-skilled. In countries where work pays the least, in-work poverty is lower because general anti-poverty policies reduce in-work poverty as well as out-of-work poverty, and that in-work benefits most effectively increase employment and reduce inequality where wage inequalities are high. The authors ‘question the political pertinence of an instrument whose effectiveness is greatly reduced when approaching its apparent objective’. It is stating the obvious to suggest that in an economic downturn the priority should be generous universal unemployment benefits (p.302).

In their overall conclusions, the editors find labour market activation policies to be expensive and relatively ineffective, and the UK’s in-work means-tested benefits expensive and a source of disincentives, particularly for a household’s second earner: ‘Research … does not indicate a strong effect overall on employment levels in spite of claims to ‘make work pay’. This is likely to be affected by other aspects of the institutional context, notably benefits for those not working and the conditions attached to them.’ (p.314)

This comprehensive and thoroughly-researched book quite rightly offers no simple political programme for the reduction of in-work poverty. What it does offer is a sense of the complexity of this policy field, and a source of information and properly tentative conclusions which anyone attempting to develop policy in the field really ought to read.

OPINION: Why Austerity is the Wrong Answer to Debt: A Call for a New Paradigm

The debt crisis persists. Bankruptcy is more common now than ever before, with bankruptcy attorneys in Harrisburg PA, and attorneys all over the world, dealing with increasing numbers of clients searching for advice on their debts and money worries. In the US, the Eurozone, and the UK, politicians are implementing dire austerity packages in order to reduce government deficits. Greece and Italy may be in the worst position, but the phenomenon deeply affects the majority of developed economies.

The new circumstances have led to the increase in the need for a debt collection agency for most banks. On the other hand, debt can quickly become overwhelming for companies who rely on business finance to stay afloat. If you’d like to learn more about ensuring your cashflow management system is as robust as possible in order to keep your business at its best, take a look at these debtor management tips.

Faulty thinking

How has this come about? The popular answer trotted out as the daily news mantra that governments have been reckless, bankers have been greedy, and consumers have been overspending, is too simplistic. The problem has deeper roots and causes, and will continue unabated unless these are better understood and addressed by policy.

Current talk is entirely monetarist. Economics is reduced to some sort of meta-accountancy. Keynes is derided by people who have never read him. Leading economics media commentators often have no formal economics training or degrees. Economics degrees themselves have often been restyled as ‘economics, finance and business’ degrees. The British Chancellor of the Exchequer tells the nation that it ‘cannot afford’ economic activity, which has to be cut because we simply ‘don’t have the money’. But the real economy is about real resources of people, skills, infrastructure, technology, land. All of these are available.

Standing back for a moment, isn’t it curious that human societies allow the money that they themselves create as an artefact to serve the real economy, then allow it to dictate their real economic behaviour? The tail really is wagging the dog. In the present structure, governments must raise money from the bond markets, who insist on repayment at interest rates which these markets determine according to their own level of confidence. Thus society and its governments are entirely subject to the prescriptions of bond dealers and credit rating agency speculators, who have no remit or capability in social leadership and management. Curious again, that UK political comment which is so troubled about ‘handing sovereignty to Brussels’, and to non-elected technocrats, is entirely supine in handing far greater sovereignty to bond dealers and credit rating agencies. Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch are entirely unelected and lack any democratic accountability, and yet are allowed to sit in easy judgment on our total economies, and to determine their prospects and scope for action. We can thank Michel Barnier, the EC Internal Market Commissioner, for seeking to constrain them. He deserves our support.

Rethinking money

We need a new paradigm in which we understand money and financial agencies as servants rather than as masters of the real economy. Money is virtual, not real. It does not obey the laws of thermodynamics : it can be created or destroyed. Commercial banks do this regularly. They operate lending ratios whereby they lend a multiple of the deposits lodged with them. Market economies ‘print money’ all the time in this way as a regular practice. A sustained total run on the banks would always cause them to collapse. The system is supported only by confidence. The only rule is that the amount of money in circulation has to be matched by real output, if its value is to be maintained. To allow monetary factors to determine policy for the real economy is like trying to drive a car by bending its speedometer needle.

An alternative diagnostic

So what alternative diagnostic of the ongoing debt crisis is available? A thought experiment might help. In an imaginary totally automated economy with no workers, there would be no wages, and therefore no effective monetised demand. Goods and services would therefore have to be allocated by government to consumers by some voucher or shareholder mechanism. As Bob Crow, the RMT union leader put it in his ‘Lunch with the Financial Times’ interview in March last year, ‘if you have robots build cars, how are robots going to buy them?’.

A more erudite version of the same concept comes from Professor Robert Solow, a distinguished emeritus professor at MIT and Nobel Economics Laureate, who points out that with burgeoning production from advanced technologies ‘the wage will absorb only a small fraction of all that output. The rest will be imputed to capital…the extreme case of this is the common scare about universal robots : labour is no longer needed at all. How will we then live? ….The ownership of capital will have to be democratised…(needing) some form of universal dividend…Not much thought has been given to this problem’ (in ‘Revisiting Keynes’ by Pecchi and Piga, MIT Press 2010, p92).

In this scenario, the total voucher spend by the government would represent an unavoidable debt which would never be paid off. We are not there, but we have strong elements of this scenario in our modern technological economies. The delinking of productivity and real wages makes debt inevitable, with people left trying to figure out how to dispute collections in an attempt to continue some sense of normalcy in their lives.

A general diagnostic for technologically advanced economies then emerges that whenever productivity exceeds real wages, and if the difference is not fed through to consumer demand via increased shareholder dividends or social transfer payments, then consumer demand will be insufficient to purchase output GDP. In this situation, which can and does occur, the shortfall in consumer demand can be made up by extended consumer credit and welfare payments, or output GDP can be cut in a recession. The diagnostic bears some resemblance to Marx’s and Keynes’s thinking on the implications for technology, automation and productivity on the economy, but should not be dismissed for this honourable association.

A recent history of the problem

2007 was the root of the present crisis. If we go back to UK economic data then, we find that between 2005 and 2007

  • GDP and consumption continued to grow but household disposable income flattened
  • in 2007 real household disposable income grew by only 0.1% whilst GDP grew by 3%
  • household disposable income reduced as a percentage of consumption from 78.2% to 74.7%
  • the gap was met by increased household credit which grew from £17bn to £55bn

This is shown in the following graphs (where ‘household borrowing’ refers to new household borrowing in each year):

The familiar dramatic increase in household credit is less apparent in the scale of the above GDP diagrams but is evident when graphed alone in the following diagram

£55bn new consumer debt in 2007 became essential to fund the purchase of output GDP. Without it GDP would have fallen due to decreased effective demand, and employment, wages and income would then have fallen as a consequence.

Vicious circles

The current system faces two alternative vicious circles, either that

1. increased productivity reduces the wage and household income element of GDP and this demand drop leads to a GDP recession

or 2. the demand gap is filled by increased consumer credit and government debt to fund welfare payments, which becomes un-repayable in the next period.

Neither is sustainable and leads to banks reducing consumer credit, and government cutting the real economy in the mistaken belief that this will eliminate its deficit. This is where we are now, and without a radical rethink, we will be chasing our tails for ever in the doomed attempt to write off deficits from an ever shrinking GDP. Those who call for increased government expenditure under a Plan B to raise GDP (which would have the effect of raising the tax take and reducing welfare payments and hence reducing the deficit) are derided by their critics who ask how it can be possible to incur debt to reduce debt. But the coalition’s Plan A insistence on cutting the economy to reduce the deficit has to explain how GDP can be increased by cutting GDP.

New thinking

An alternative paradigm is needed to frame an alternative policy. There is nothing wrong with the real economy. Its factories, transport and communications infrastructure, skilled labour, restaurants etc. are all fully operational and highly efficient. There is also plenty of real demand for goods and services, especially globally from developing country consumers. It is purely the financial system which is disabling the real economy, and it is the financial sector which therefore urgently needs re-engineering.

It is commonly said that banks lent too much credit in 2007, firstly in the US sub-prime mortgage market, and then widely in the UK economy. But the above analysis shows that £55bn of bank lending was exactly the right amount needed to purchase GDP output, a claim which is substantiated by the lack of inflation in goods and services markets both then and throughout the NICE decade. It is true that asset prices inflated, but this resulted from any credit beyond that £55bn. The £55bn consumer credit matched against GDP output was non-inflationary.

Distributive considerations

Productivity growth in excess of real wage growth, and the gap between consumer income and GDP output that this produces, has distributive consequences. Between social groups, it tends to disfavour the poor, who rely more on the wage element of income, who suffer the loss of low-skilled employment when automation displaces labour, and whose access to credit as a replacement for wages is weak. Welfare payments are their only recourse. Surprisingly, the Institute of Fiscal Studies report ‘Poverty and Inequality in the UK: 2011′ shows that increased welfare payments did overcome income disadvantage. According to the IFS study, child poverty at 20% is now the lowest since 1985, and pensioner poverty is currently lower than at any point in the last 50 years.

The sectoral distribution of GDP is also affected by automation. Manufacturing employment and real wages per unit of output will fall, and much of this employment is transferred to low wage service sectors of the economy, only some of which, like banking, are subject to automation and productivity improvement. From anecdotal evidence, increased low productivity, low-wage service sector employment has absorbed employment reduction in more automated manufacturing sectors, and masked the effect of productivity in reducing aggregate real wages. Population growth is another factor masking the demand deficiency resulting from the delinkage of productivity and real wages.

We could of course take the view that reduced consumption is exactly what we want as part of a new ascetic paradigm to conserve world resources. Competition for natural resources from China and India may well force this choice on us anyway. But if we do pursue this option, income redistribution to those newly unemployed through productivity gains unmatched by new demand will be an essential part of the paradigm. Some form of welfare payment which does not add to government debt would be needed.

A Citizen’s Income – the only route to stop debt being inevitable as productivity grows

If it is accepted that the delinkage of productivity and real wages will make an element of debt financing inevitable, then a possible way forwards is a non-repayable financial instrument, a universal credit. This would have to be non-repayable at both consumer and government level. Proposals for a citizen’s income are longstanding. Such an income would not be repayable by the consumer and could be financed without incurring government debt. This could be done by creating a public sector bank with a government deposit, and a lending ratio set to exactly meet the shortfall between output GDP made possible by increased productivity, and flat or declining real wages. If the £55bn incurred as consumer credit in 2007 had instead been funded in this way then the economy would not face the crisis that it faces today. We have to think outside the box. Calls for a plan B are stuck within the present paradigm. This new paradigm would re-engineer the financial sector and the management of inevitable debt. It would release the real economy from artificial financial constraint, and deliver sound finances built on productivity advances. It would also greatly enhance social cohesion.

Marion Ellison (ed.), Reinventing Social Solidarity across Europe

Marion Ellison (ed.), Reinventing Social Solidarity across Europe, Policy Press, 2011, xv + 270 pp, hbk, 1 847 42727 4, £70

Social solidarity is ‘a contested, fluid, multilevel and multifaceted concept within the European polity, civil society and the public realm.’ This volume treats this solidarity as ‘a lived experience, a shared learning experience and a normative construct,’ (p.11) at the heart of which is a conflict between the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact, with predictable inequalities resulting from competitive labour markets, and a European Social Model predicated on human rights and social protections from the inequalities generated by both a  globalizing economy and such policies as the Stability and Growth Pact. In the context of today’s austerity measures, the book seeks both an understanding of social solidarity in Europe and new means to create an enhanced social solidarity, nationally, within Europe, and globally. So is globalization a problem to solidarity? No. There has been no ‘race to the bottom’ amongst European welfare states, and people still find their solidarities in their families and communities. And yes, in the sense that national institutional solidarities now need to be supplemented by transnational ones, such as those generated by the EU.

Different chapters study what solidarity might mean in terms of social policy related to children, social movements (such as trade unionism), energy policy, immigration integration policy, and a European politics in which policy instruments might reduce rather than enhance social solidarity simply because the political process will always prioritise certain interests over others. The chapter which describes this last process is appropriately followed by one which shows that in post-communist European states the establishment of market economies has caused governments to discard such solidarities as predictable local labour markets.

A particularly interesting set of empirical results is represented by a table on p.219 which shows how people in different European countries differ in their attitude to government intervention to redistribute resources ( – the UK is midrange), but also that those differences are small compared to average EU acceptance of government intervention. The author of this chapter, Béla Janky, concludes that ‘Eurosceptic claims about the lack of any common ground for a Europe-wide social policy framework are unfounded’ (p.223).

The editor concludes that, whilst there are pressures towards increasing individualization and fragmentation, there are policy areas in which European social solidarity is more of a reality than it was (for instance, in energy policy), and it doesn’t seem unrealistic when he calls for a reinvention of social solidarity on a variety of levels.

Whilst books such as this can sometimes suffer from a sense of fragmentation born of the fact that each contributor has written about the subjects in which they personally are interested, the overall impression of this volume is that there is something called social solidarity and that in terms of its future there is everything to play for. Social solidarity at every level faces challenges, but there are also signs of increasing solidarity in particular policy areas, and that a broader social solidarity is perfectly possible.