by Daniele Fabbri | Mar 11, 2019 | Research
Credit Picture: CC(Billy Wilson)
The International Labour Organization published a paper investigating Universal Basic Income (UBI) proposals in light of ILO standards.
With the ILO Social Protection Floors Recommendation (No. 202) providing relevant guidelines for the discussion on the adoption on UBI, namely:
“(i) adequacy and predictability of Universal Basic Income (UBI) benefits to ensure income security, set at least at the national poverty line; (ii) social inclusion, including of persons in the informal economy; (iii) social dialogue and consultation with stakeholders; (iv) enactment of national laws regulating UBI entitlements, including indexation of benefits; (v) coherence with other social, economic and employment policies, and (vi) sustainable and equitable financing”,
the paper shows how some models of UBI can be in accordance with ILO standards, while others cannot.
The paper consists of five parts:
1) Universal Basic Income: A tool for social justice or a strategy to dismantle social security?
In the complex and variegated scenario of UBI proposals, the paper identifies two main currents, one which sees UBI as a tool for social justice which would grant social security to all, and the other, neo-liberal or right libertarian in its concoction, which seeks to substitute the welfare state with a minimalistic safety net.
The first is designed to reduce poverty and inequality, promoting individual rights and freedom, giving people the opportunity to engage in forms of work not recognized by the market (domestic work, volunteering). It would also reduce the administrative costs of existing social protection systems, and increase workers’ bargaining power providing an exit option. The second is a way to reduce the complexity of the modern welfare state and the degree of involvement it requires from governments. For UBI to be an instrument of social justice, the first current is the one to follow.
UBI impact on poverty and inequality, on growth, on work and employment, and on gender inequality varies depending on how the policy is designed, what its source of financing is, and on which level it set at. It is thus complex to generalize its effects, and even for specific contexts in which experiments have been done it would be an error to imply that local effects would be the same once replicated on a larger scale.
The positive effect attributed to UBI is that of tackling the issues of increased social and economic insecurity, growing inequalities and the existing gaps in social protection coverage. The growing debate surrounding it “reaffirms the necessity and importance to provide every member of the society with at least a minimum level of income security which is essential to the realisation of human dignity”, principles that are at the hearth of the ILO Constitution and the Recommendation No. 202. UBI would thus represent the income component of the recommended social protection floor.
Social protection floors should guarantee “effective access to essential health care and basic income security throughout the life course, to allow life in dignity.” This means that UBI can’t represent the entirety of social protection floor, as a nonmonetary component would nonetheless be required, and that UBI would need to be integrated in the institutional settings of the state.
2) Benefit levels, adequacy and coverage
For UBI to be a solution to inequality and poverty it needs to be set at a level sufficient to meet at least people basic needs, and needs to be financed in a sustainable and equitable way. With Recommendation No. 202 requiring social protection floors to be set at “a sufficiently high level to enable individuals to live in dignity and to ensure effective access to essential goods and services” a possible benchmark is represented by national poverty lines.
UBI proposals vary greatly in the suggested benefit levels, but given that in most of them it would supplant social assistance benefits, following the guidelines set by the aforementioned recommendation, the level should be enough to allow access to a set of necessary goods and services. Proposals built taking this into account are promising, whilst those with benefits level set below the poverty line are not able to fulfill the promises of poverty and inequality reduction.
The amount provided via UBI cannot be uniform through the populations, as it wouldn’t be able to account for those in special need, and if the amount was to be uniform UBI would be required to coexist with other forms of social security benefits safeguarding those with specific needs. UBI would thus need to be integrated in the existing systems, in order not to leave individuals worse off, the paper states.
The paper also recommends that, in order to ensure adequacy over time, attention should be given to adjustments to changes in purchasing power and overall standards of living, as to ensure the adequacy of benefits over time. For UBI to maintain its effects over time, it would need to be indexed to inflation and wages.
UBI, a cash benefit, would nonetheless need to be complemented by effective access to services (e.g.: health, education). If UBI was to be financed via the reallocation of the budget dedicated to such services, it would have detrimental effects.
Even with universalism being often presented as one of the key features of UBI, some proposals restrict its coverage in two ways: 1) depending on the age of the recipient (children wouldn’t receive benefits in some instances, whilst older persons would be subject to different rules); 2) depending on the requisite of nationality, or that of residency after a minimum duration, in order to prevent migration.
With ILO standards requiring states to provide “all members of society with adequate social protection” and with the principle of universality of protection being “at the core of the social protection floor concept, stipulating that everyone should enjoy at least a basic level of social security throughout their life course”, a UBI restricted to only nationals, or not granting sufficient benefits to meet children’s needs, would be insufficient to provide the required protection.
3) Costs, Affordability and Financing
The paper presents two scenarios for the cost estimates of UBI:
- A basic income transfer at 100 per cent of the national poverty line for all adults and children;
- A basic income transfer at 100 per cent of the national poverty line for adults and 50 per cent to children up to 15 years old.
Under scenario I. the global average cost as a percentage of GDP would be around 39.4%, with a cost of 79.1% of GDP for low income countries, 28% for lower middle-income countries, 22.8% for upper middle-income countries and 29.9% for high income countries.
Under Scenario II. the global average cost as a percentage of GDP would be 32.7%, with a cost of 62.3%of GDP for low income countries, 23.1% for lower middle-income countries, 19.8% for upper middle-income countries and 27.4% for high income countries.
One possible benchmark for adequacy of the benefit level supported by Recommendation No.202 is that of national poverty lines, but many UBI proposal are far below them. Even so, an UBI set at 25% of equivalent disposable income is nonetheless deemed unfeasible under the existing fiscal context. In order to provide benefit levels capable of reducing poverty and inequality, new financing sources need to be explored, among them the paper briefly explores:
- The reallocation of public expenditures
- Increasing tax revenues
- Lobbying for aid and transfers
- Eliminating illicit financial flows
- Using fiscal and central bank foreign exchange reserves
- Restructuring existing debt
A mix of the aforementioned would be needed, with an increase in tax revenues being central in order to assure progressivity to the policy. For low income countries, lobbying for aid and transfers may be a feasible method, as the estimate cost for the introduction of an UBI is just 0.68% of the global GDP, 3% of what has been spent by the G20 to rescue the financial sector in 2009.
Regressive proposals are not in line with ILO standards as they would further inequalities. Budget neutral proposals, which rely on cutting existing social benefits in order to provide a modest UBI coupled with social insurance, result in a social net loss which would exacerbate income and gender inequalities.
4) Who would benefit from UBI? Different implementation scenarios
The paper investigates three different scenarios for the implementation of an UBI, in order to find out which one could be beneficial to society to investigate winners and losers.
Only under scenario 1, which assumes the introduction of a UBI set at the level of the poverty line, the majority of the population is found to be net winner, thus reducing inequality.
Under scenario 2 a UBI is introduced in exchange for cuts in employers’ contributions to social security systems. This setting would reduce the capacity for social insurance to redistribute wealth across society. With net losers being among the lower and middle classes, and the net winners being corporations, this scenario is not in line with ILO standards.
Under scenario 3 UBI is introduced in exchange for the complete abolition of public social insurance:
“In this scenario virtually everybody is a net loser; the poorest will not receive anymore social assistance at the poverty line level; the low and middle classes, before covered by a better social protection system, now they will lose their accumulated social protection benefits. Eliminating public social insurance systems by a modest UBI, and promoting individual savings and private provision for those who can afford it, would reduce the potential for both vertical and horizontal redistribution, thereby exacerbating income inequality.”
5) Conclusion: Universal Basic Income in light of ILO standards
While UBI cannot be considered as a solution to all the problems of society, it can potentially act as a useful tool for closing coverage gaps and provide basic income security.
The benefit level should be set at a level sufficient to provide income security to everybody, particularly to those without other sources of income. The benefit should avoid discrimination towards those in special needs.
UBI by itself wouldn’t be enough to provide access to basic services, and it should be coupled with policies granting universal education, health care and social services. At the same time, contributory mechanism will have to remain in place, with public social insurance continuing to provide a level of social protection.
Progressive means of financing are essential in guaranteeing equity, sustainability and that UBI satisfies ILO standards. UBI implementation will need to follow a progressive realization, by setting standards and time frames: this calls for the creation of an ad hoc legal framework and effective governance and administration.
Moreover, “systematically assessing implications for the broader policy context is essential for a UBI to positively contribute to social justice and inclusive development”. UBI cannot be a stand-alone policy, but needs to work in concert with labour market institutions, and the potential interactions that could arise call for further studies.
“The momentum gathering behind the idea of a UBI can help to spur a discussion on how to respond to existing economic and social changes in a more effective and empowering way based on social solidarity and while ensuring social justice outcomes for all.”
Final remarks
The paper is clear in defining Basic Income and in discussing its potential advantages, clarifying that different UBI designs would bring very different end results.
The paper also provides a comprehensive list of experiments, proposals, and pilots, and does a service by calculating the proportions of national poverty lines that their Basic Incomes represent. This is done calculating the gross cost of UBI, which however says little about its net costs.
Much attention is devoted to proposals that eliminate current benefits, a practice that, as the authors of the paper themselves suggest, is not in line with ILO standards.
Rather than investigating a particular mean of financing and its potential effects, the paper follows a more general approach, and highlights that further studies are needed in order the understand the practical implications of UBI, nonetheless being clear about its potential to be a powerful instrument for the enhancement of social security and the reduction of poverty and inequality.
More information at:
Isabel Ortiz, Christina Behrendt, Andrés Acuña-Ulate, and Quynh Anh Nguyen, “Universal Basic Income proposals in light of ILO standards: Key issues and global costing“, Social Protection Department, International Labour Organization, Geneva, 2018
Citizens Basic Income Trust, “ILO paper on Citizen’s Basic Income and ILO social protection floors” 7th December 2018
by Ian Orton | Jun 9, 2011 | News
To support its campaign on the global extension of social security, in 2008 the International Labour Organisation (ILO) undertook a study of 126 research reports on tax-financed social transfer programmes (STs) operating worldwide. 62 programmes from 30 developing countries were analysed. These STs reach between 300 and 350 million beneficiaries – children, working adults, and elderly people – and represent a considerable proportion of the world’s poor. The results are available through the ILO’s online Matrix on the effects of social transfers (2009). 3 STs have emerged as a core component of poverty reduction strategies supported by international organisations such as the World Bank and a number of UN institutions. Thus their impact merits considerable interest.
This article outlines the current knowledge on the effects of STs in a way relevant to those interested in Citizen’s Income (CI). STs are not unlike CIs. They are non-contributory and tax-financed, and a considerable number of STs are unconditional and universal (across certain groups). The ILO study shows positive impacts of STs on a range of areas of human existence. The study therefore enables us to predict the kinds of effects that a CI could deliver in low and middle income countries.
The findings of the ILO matrix on social transfers
The ILO’s matrix was developed to support decision-making within ministries of planning and finance, mainly in developing countries. By ordering the unintended and intended effects of tax-financed STs in developing countries in relation to human development goals and the anti-poverty agenda, the matrix helps to inform national policy makers about the outcomes that could be realistically expected from STs and to guide investment in social security systems. Likewise, all those interested in CI might utilise the findings of the matrix to guide their arguments on the CI proposal.
Results
The table below gives an overview of the impacts of the STs. In the columns, the impact of STs in the specific sub-dimensions are documented. Programmes had a generally positive effect, 4 evidenced by the significantly higher scores in the ‘clear positive effect’ column for all but five of the sub-dimensions. Those sub-dimensions where the overall positive impact cannot be discerned are in grey text.
The conclusion of this article is that a majority of the social transfers studied clearly generate a range of positive effects in terms of enhancing human development, supporting the full utilisation of productive capacity, enhancing and stabilising consumption, and facilitating social cohesion and inclusion.
TABLE: Summary of the ILO matrix: Effect of social transfers
| Impact dimension and sub-dimensions |
Number of programmes |
Total |
| with a clear positive effect |
with a clear negative effect |
with no evidence of effect |
where effect is unclear |
| 1. Enhancing human development |
|
|
|
|
|
Adult preventative health
Child labour
Child preventative health
Drop out rates
Educational attainment
Maternal preventative health
Reduction in the worst forms of child labour
School attendance
School enrolment |
1
6
7
4
9
3
1
12
13 |
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
– |
–
2
–
–
–
–
–
–
– |
1
2
–
1
1
–
–
–
– |
2
10
7
5
10
3
1
12
13 |
| 2. Supporting the full utilisation of productive capacity |
|
|
|
|
|
Employability
Employment creation
Reduction of informality
Participation in the labour market
Productive activities |
1
4
–
5
15 |
–
–
1
2
– |
1
1
–
–
– |
2
2
–
2
– |
4
7
1
9
15 |
| 3. Enhancing and stabilising consumption |
|
|
|
|
|
Food expenditure
Income inequality
Income level and stimulation of consumption
Income stability and consumption smoothing
Long-term effects on income and consumption
Nutritional level
Satiation |
4
4
20
5
5
10
3 |
–
–
–
–
–
–
– |
–
2
1
–
1
2
– |
–
–
3
–
–
–
– |
4
6
24
5
6
12
3 |
| 4. Facilitating social cohesion and inclusion |
|
|
|
|
|
Empowerment
Intra-household relations
Social capital and solidarity |
14
4
4 |
–
–
3 |
1
–
– |
2
1
– |
17
5
7 |
This study shows that STs exhibit positive impacts on poverty, health and nutrition, the social status of recipients (notably women), economic activity and entrepreneurial small scale investments (notably in agriculture), and have avoided significant adverse effects on labour market participation of the poor populations which they serve. The studies also show that many families used part of the cash transfer to invest in small-scale agricultural activities, including the purchase of livestock. However, in the areas of adult preventative health, reduction in the worst forms of child labour, employability, reduction of labour market informality, and social capital and solidarity, the effect of STs is less obvious, either because there is no actual effect or because of limited research on the subject.
In light of these results, we can deduce that a CI could deliver similar effects in some instances. Consequently, the results can be used to support some aspects of the CI proposal. However, before the repercussions for a CI are discussed in detail, we need to explore a number of important caveats and knowledge gaps.
Methodological caveats and knowledge gaps
- The programme evaluations covered by this study do not represent an exhaustive list. Rather, the study covers those programmes that were easily accessible online and were Anglophone and to a lesser extent in Portuguese.
- There are problems in finding original sources online. In light of this, the study cannot be considered to be comprehensive, though the studies used are probably representative and give a good overview.
- The findings in the table are the result of a subjective chain of interpretation open to human error.
- The matrix suffers from knowledge gaps. For example, little is known about the effects of STs on non-beneficiaries, and little is known about the macroeconomic impact of STs on economic growth and about how this affects general redistributive mechanisms (formal and informal).
- The evaluations privilege quantitative measures over qualitative ones. This is a concern because the qualitative effects of STs (i.e. social bonds, capabilities, and human empowerment) may have a lot more to say about people’s well-being than quantitative measures.
The analysis presented here can therefore only be considered as indicative of the effects of STs.
To what extent does the ILO study support the Citizen’s Income proposal?
Thus far this article has cautiously suggested that the findings in the ILO matrix study augur well for CI, by indicating that it too can be expected to deliver a number of similarly positive effects. However, the message perhaps ought to be a little more mixed and nuanced, because the table better supports unconditional and universal transfers for children and the elderly (a CI for the young and the old) than for working age adults. A significant number of the STs that focus on active population groups are conditional and targeted (based on behaviour and income/wealth) and therefore one might suppose that their effects will be related to their conditional and targeted mechanisms.
Conclusion 1: Effects of social transfers for children and elderly support the case for a Citizen’s Income:
The findings on the effects of STs on children and pensions suggest that a CI could have similarly positive effects. It is possible to make this conclusion because a significant number of the STs for these two vulnerable groups were unconditional or universal across these groups and are therefore similar to a CI. The social pensions evaluated were not based on previous activity or earnings and are therefore essentially a Citizen’s Pension. Similarly, the South African Child Support Grant, which is unconditional, has encouraged human capital formation of the young and their future earnings (Agüero et al, 2007, p. 19). We could expect a CI to do the same for children. The results of social pensions and a number of other unconditional transfers support the expectation that a CI could generate similarly positive social and micro-economic effects.
Conclusion 2: Effects of social transfers for the active population deliver a mixed message for a Citizen’s Income
Apart from the pilot CI in Namibia, there are no studies on the impact of a CI on active population groups, simply because, with the exception of the Alaskan Permanent Fund, there is no fully-fledged CI that actually covers active population groups. 5 Secondly, the STs analysed in the ILO study differ from a CI because they are conditional. 6 It is therefore difficult to maintain with any certainty that the effect of a CI would be the same as for conditional and targeted STs.
Having said that, the findings of the Namibian pilot scheme do permit us an insight into how the active population group might react. For instance, according to the evaluation of this pilot, productive capacity of the active population group rose and economic activity rose, especially among women. In addition, own account work saw the largest increase, and particularly the tending of vegetable plots and the building of latrines, both of which increased the community’s health. The pilot scheme also seemed to stimulate more micro-economic activity, with new shops opening. These findings are important as they provide evidence that a CI does not act as a disincentive in the labour market (see Basic Income Grant Coalition, 2009; Torry, 2009). This is of great significance, as the argument that a CI would act as a disincentive to productive activity tends to be one of the biggest concerns of policy makers and governments with regard to STs for the active population. Having said this, one must also be cautious about using the Namibian pilot scheme as absolutely conclusive evidence on the potential effect of a CI on the active population because of obvious limitations in terms of replicating an actual fully-fledged society-wide CI.
The key impediment to using the table to support CI revolves around whether it is the conditional nature of many of the STs that is pivotal in producing the positive results they have delivered. Does conditionality make the difference? If conditionality is not the overriding factor, then perhaps we can conclude that the unconditional and universal nature of a CI could deliver results similar to those documented in the ILO matrix. There is not space here to discuss this debate in full, but suffice to say that the precise role played by conditionality in delivering positive outcomes is not clear. As the author of this article and the ILO have argued elsewhere, it is problematic to argue that conditionality is pivotal in producing the outcomes generated by STs (see ILO, 2010a).
A similarly ambivalent conclusion on the role of conditionality is made by Gabel and Kamerman, who state that researchers have not been able to attribute with absolute certainty the causality between effect and the conditional mechanism, because of the difficulty in disentangling the effects of the policy from other elements (e.g., the state of the labour market) (2008, p.18). One suspects that the motivation for conditionality is to satisfy the ‘paternalist twitch’ of governments and policy makers (Standing, 2002: 208) and public thirst for satisfying the social ethic of reciprocity. There is therefore plenty of scope for arguing that a CI could deliver similar outcomes in the absence of conditionalities.
Closing remarks
It is not clear that conditionality is crucial in achieving certain human development goals or for producing the positive effects that have been identified in the ILO matrix, so the study can be used to support a CI, provided caveats and limitations accompany any such argument.
What the findings of the matrix definitely support are those conditional programmes which many see as precursors to a society-wide CI. For example: in Brazil, Senator Eduardo Suplicy, a key proponent of CI, has argued that the Bolsa Familia ST is a first step towards a CI (2006). This is because the behavioural demands synonymous with the receipt of cash from conditional STs are easier to sell to the public and political class than is a CI. The greater political acceptability synonymous with conditional 7 STs could help to cultivate a political and public culture more receptive to STs and, therefore, to a CI at a later stage.
Just as significant as the results of the matrix study are those of the pilot CI in Namibia which has demonstrated positive results similar to those documented in the ILO matrix table across an entire community, including the active population. Particularly significant are the positive effects on labour market participation and productive capacity. The linking of the matrix and the findings of the Namibian case study can bridge the ‘unknown’ empirical dimension in the ILO study; given that hitherto no society-wide CI has really existed. Combining the results of the table and the Namibian case study justifies the expectation that a CI could produce similar effects to STs for the active population.
However, the current preference amongst governments and major international institutions (e.g. the World Bank) seems to be shifting toward conditionality, and this poses some concerns for those proposing universal and unconditional cash transfers. The political prospects of a CI would be better if the trend were against conditionality.
In conclusion: The ILO matrix confirms what many have suspected, that STs have a number of positive micro-economic and social effects. The matrix also offers proponents of CI reasons to feel optimistic that it too could produce similarly positive results.
Disclaimer: The author conducted the original research for this project as a consultant for the International Labour Organization. However, the responsibility for opinions expressed in this paper rests solely with the author and dissemination does not constitute an endorsement by the International Labour Organization of the opinions expressed in it.
Notes
1. This paper was originally submitted at the 13th International Congress of the Basic Income Earth Network in Sao Paulo, Brazil, June 2010. I would like to thank Armando Barrientos, Florence Bonnet, Philippe Marcadent, Nadine Ndeberi and Luis Soares for their assistance, and the ILO’s Social Security Department for financing the original research that features in this paper.
2. The author currently works as the Financial Crisis Monitor for the International Social Security Association.
3. The author of this paper was a member of a team that carried out the research that constituted the content of the ILO matrix. The ILO matrix project was supervised by Philippe Marcadent. The data contained in the matrix is discussed more analytically in the new ILO book: Extending social security for all: a guide through challenges and options (2010a) and in an ILO working paper entitled: Effects of non-contributory social transfers in developing countries: A compendium (2010b).
4. For a more detailed description of the methodology employed to calculate the scoring system that features in the table please see: Orton, I. 2010. Reason to be cheerful: How ILO analysis of social transfers worldwide augurs well for a basic income. www.bien2010brasil.com
5. And this differs from the standard proposed version of a CI in that it is an annual dividend, therefore one wonders how far it can replicate the income smoothing nature of those STs that are paid monthly.
6. A similar discussion for the way many STs are targeted could also be made, but there is not space here.
7. The reason for this acceptability is that conditionality conforms to the social norm of ‘reciprocity’ whereby in social contract type relationship the recipient adjusts his or her behaviour in a way acceptable to the rest of society.
Bibliography
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