Jon Altman and Eva Cox. Credit to: Alfred Deakin Institute (Deakin University, Melbourne)
The Alfred Deakin Institute at Deakin University in Melbourne, Australia, hosted a forum on the 17th and 18th August discussing the concept of a universal basic income.
Workshop co-convenor Jon Altman (Deakin University and ANU) suggested that part of the impetus for the workshop was the sense that discussion of UBI in Australia was not as advanced as it was in other countries. As evidence of this he cited the comment made by Chris Bowen (Shadow Treasurer for the Labor party), who said that UBI was “a terrible idea”. Tim Hollo – Executive Director of the Green Institute – also highlighted the fact that the Greens were the only major party in Australia currently in support of the concept.
Dr Tim Dunlop – author of Why the Future is Workless – gave context to the discussion by talking about the state of work, technology and automation. He said the “salient point” in labour market analysis is that many problems are current. Evidencing this, he summarized some figures from the International Labour Organization, including; global unemployment exceeding 200 million in 2017; stagnation of real wage growth; decline in proportion of wealth going to wages; 760 million men and women worldwide in “vulnerable work”, defined as work unable to bring them above the the world poverty threshold of AUD $3.10 per day; millions in refugee camps and jails; record levels of over and under-employment; and the creation of “increasingly precarious” work.
Looking at future technology, Dr Dunlop said that the consistent finding was that “around 40 to 50% of jobs are at high risk of automation in the next twenty years” (Oxford Martins School Report, 2015) under “currently existing technologies” (McKinzie Report) and that it would be “close to a form of denialism”, therefore, to state, as many do, that “concerns about technological unemployment are overstated”. Associate Professor Karl Widerquist agreed with this point, stating that “people are not interchangeable parts” and often find that their “learn[t] skills” are “not needed any more”. In this regard, he said a UBI could compensate for the continual disruption of technology, and the inherent inability of workers to adapt and provide themselves with income. Phillip Ablett (USC), summarising work by Mullally, added that neo-liberalism’s emphasis “on ‘individual responsibility’ for poverty” contributed to this persecution of workers, where we tend “to blame individuals for their ‘failure’ to succeed in the market economy rather than consider the structural impediments to achievement”.
Professor Widerquist said a shift away from labour prosperity to capital prosperity has led to an “incentive problem” where employers don’t have an incentive to treat their employees appropriately since employees don’t have any power to refuse their conditions. The universal nature of a UBI, as such, would allow for a “voluntary participation economy instead of a mandatory participation economy”. Dr Frances Flanagan agreed that “capital accumulation” was central to the problem of “acute inequality”, however she expressed concerns that discussions around UBI focused too heavily on wage leverage and monetary incentive. Citing “care work” as an example “utterly antithetical” to the taylorisms of tasking and efficiency, Dr Flanagan said we need a more positive definition of ‘work’ since there are always ‘jobs’ that “require empathy, judgement and relationships”. UBI, consequently, needs to be “supportive of the fight for better jobs” and “[be] supportive of the fight against marketisation”. Professor John Quiggin (UQ) echoed Dr Flanagan’s concerns that UBI risks the possibility of replacing social services with a single payment, though he did point out that an unconditional stipend could destigmatise the concept of welfare payments to individuals, undermining the concept of the “deserving and undeserving poor”. Professor Eva Cox (AO) was also critical of UBI as a means to empowering a “protestant, male, Anglo” market system, where humans are economically judged as being good or bad “consumers”. She reiterated the need to revisit the concept of ‘work’ through a lense where humans were considered “social”, “dependent” and “interdependent”, advocating a UBI that was used to redefine “the social contract between the nation state and the individual”, with “reciprocity built into it”.
On the subject of evidence to support a UBI’s practical plausibility, both Professor Widerquist and Professor Greg Marston (University of Queensland) said that trials investigating the effects could be strategically dangerous since the trial conditions are often neither unconditional nor universal. Marston pointed to climate change as an example of where the accumulation of data has brought about, in many cases, confirmation bias in support of inactivity rather than impetus to instigate change. It was generally agreed that the issues of design and implementation were not, therefore, easily separated. Professor Quiggin, Troy Henderson and Dr Ben Spies-Butcher advanced the idea of a staged introduction, a “stepping-stone” approach which would retain the “big idea” excitement for voters and simultaneously satisfy technocrats. Quiggin’s preferred model was to favour the “basic” over the “universal” through various mechanisms and adjustments to tax regimes, introducing a full UBI payment to selected, vulnerable populations, and then gradually increase the number of people covered. The cost of everyone in Australia receiving a full UBI was estimated to be around 5-10% of GDP. Henderson and Spies-Butcher offered modelling that began by universalising the age pension, and by also introducing an “unconditional Youth Basic Income paid to those aged 20-24 based on a negative income tax model.”
In conclusion, the consistent theme of the two days was that UBI cannot be offered as a silver-bullet solution to issues around inequality, welfare, social security and the potential growing precarity of work. So while there is a tendency amongst advocates (worldwide) to present UBI as a single policy response for addressing many of the problems societies have with these issues, the very strong feeling of the workshop was that this could be a dangerous over-reach.
You can view some of the contributors speaking here.
The 94-page policy brief surveys the rise in popularity of the idea of universal basic income (UBI), especially in the UK context, and examines its feasibility and possible implementation strategies.
In Chapter 3 of the policy brief, Martinelli applies these simulation studies to the question of the affordability of UBI. Investigating both full and partial UBI schemes, Martinelli investigates the fiscal implications of the policy for the UK government, taking into account potential adjustments to the existing tax and benefit system, as well as their consequences for poverty and inequality. Overall, Martinelli finds that data “appear to suggest” that “it is possible to design a UBI such that it is both affordable and adequate” (emphasis in original), with the most feasible option being a partial UBI on top of existing means-tested benefits (p 48). However, he issues several notes of caution in interpreting this (apparent) consequence.
One cautionary note concerns the fact that the simulation studies use only staticmodels, which do not provide for possible changes in labor market participation resulting from the introduction of UBI. In Chapter 4, however, Martinelli examines the labor market effects of UBI in detail, again drawing upon simulation studies. Here, he considers the results of studies that model the impact of UBI schemes on financial work incentives, concluding that UBI does significantly improve incentives, especially for low-income groups and recipients of means-tested benefits (although, as the author admits, monetary incentives are “by no means the only factor affecting labour supply decisions,” p 63). In this chapter, Martinelli supplements the simulation analysis with empirical findings from previous experiments on unconditional cash benefits (including, especially, from the negative income tax experiments conducted in Manitoba in the late 1970s). He also reviews a range of theoretical considerations, including the prima facie tension between the positions of UBI supporters who see the policy as a way of incentivizing employment (e.g. as contrasted to means-tested benefit schemes) and those who advocate the policy as providing an “exit option” from employment.
In the final chapter of the policy brief, Martinelli scrutinizes implementational challenges facing UBI in the UK, including complications building political coalitions around the idea. As Martinelli stresses, apparent political consensus around UBI is likely to dissolve when specific policy implementations are issue. In concluding the report, he urges supporters of UBI not to demand a full basic income immediately, but instead to consider an incremental approach. As potential first steps, Martinelli mentioned a small universal payment (“partial basic income”) or a basic income restricted to certain age groups (e.g., as suggested by Malcolm Torry, young adults or adults nearing pension age).
Joe Biden, Obama’s ex-vice president, is confident that the reinforcement of the job-centered culture is the answer to the challenges already affecting work marketplaces in the US, as written in his blog at the Biden Institute. He supports this vision instead of the idea increasingly put forward by Silicon Valley moguls: unconditional basic income.
Biden, recalling his father’s words, wrote that he considers jobs to not only be a source of income, but also and foremost about “human dignity and self-respect”. Given that starting position, he is campaigning for an American economy that grows and “put(s) work first”. This, of course, is linked with the educational system and professional retraining, both areas in which Biden calls for profound changes, while maintaining “key workplace benefits and protections (…) in an economy where the nature of work has changed”.
Basic income is given little attention in the cited blog post, summarized only briefly as something that is just boiling up in Silicon Valley due to transformations, present and future, introduced by automation. However, automation concerns have only been one issue among several that can justify introducing an unconditional basic income, such as the elimination of poverty, reducing inequality, solving bureaucratic unemployment and poverty traps and creating more gender equality. Also, as extensive data shows, basic income interest is growing all around the world (e.g.: Canada, UK, Finland, Netherlands, Germany), not only among the Silicon Valley milieu.
Contributors contain a mix of supporters and critics of each of the two policies.
Mariusz Baranowski and Bartosz Mika compare basic income and job guarantee programs with respect to a variety of metrics, including funding and cost, impact on existing social security systems, impact on income inequality, and emancipatory effects, ultimately favoring a job guarantee. Pavlina Tcherneva investigates the relative macroeconomic impacts expected from the two types of policies, arguing that a job guarantee possesses an economic stabilizing effect not possessed by basic income. Further, Tcherneva argues that a job guarantee has a greater potential to contribute to sustainable development and ecological goals.
Angelina Kussy and Félix Talego Vázquez, on the other hand, argue for a basic income as a component in a new understanding of work. The authors use ethnographic research of the communitarian Spanish village of Marinaleda to critique contemporary notions of “work”. Zofia Łapniewska also questions the assumptions that form the foundations of current economic institutions–developing a proposal for an alternative economy based on the ethics of care. She uses this as a basis for further consideration of policies including basic income and employment guarantees.
In addition to original articles, the issue also includes a review of BIEN cofounder Guy Standing’s 2017 book Basic Income: And How Can We Make It Happen, as well as a review of the work of economist Mariana Mazzucato.
The edition was edited by Maciej Szlinder, who is Praktyka Teoretyczna’s political philosophy editor as well as an active participant in Poland’s basic income movement.
Praktyka Teoretyczna is an open-access peer-reviewed journal, with new issues published quarterly. Its content focuses on “continuously question[ing] the relation between theory and practice”, and is especially aimed at fostering the development of young researchers.
The People’s Republic of China has created the largest unconditional cash transfer program in the world. It is called dibao, meaning Minimum Livelihood Guarantee. A recently published book is taking a fresh look at how effective dibao is at improving the livelihoods of impoverished Chinese people.
Dr. Qin Gao is on the faculty of the Columbia University School of Social Work, where she researches poverty, income inequality, and social welfare programs in China.
Gao has done extensive work researching dibao, and has released the book “Welfare, Work, and Poverty: Social Assistance in China,” which evaluates how well dibao has achieved its goals of lowering the amount and intensity of poverty in China.
The UBI Podcast recently interviewed Gao on her new book about the dibao program and asked her to give her thoughts on universalizing dibao.
Dibao is important to understand for basic income researchers because it demonstrates on a large-scale how basic income operates when it is not universal (since it includes a means test).
The dibao program allows each locality to set its own dibao standard (essentially the poverty line). Anyone below that standard is technically eligible for dibao assistance. The assistance in theory gives an individual enough money to reach the dibao standard. Eligibility for dibao is based on individual income, so one individual in a household could qualify, while another may not, Gao said.
For example, a dibao standard in Beijing, China is 900 RMB per person per month. If an individual made 700 RMB per month, dibao would provide 200 RMB in assistance to reach the dibao line of 900.
While some may worry that officials will cut off dibao assistance once an individual goes over the line, Gao said the reality is more complicated.
“In reality, many local officials are very considerate of the fluctuation in people’s incomes and other family situations. For example, education needs, health care needs. So many localities actually have initiatives to not discontinue people’s dibao benefits right away if they have income that’s higher than the local dibao line,” she said.
Some localities may allow a family to stay on dibao for three months after extra income is earned to make sure they have job security and they “do not fall back into poverty right away.”
Once a family receives the cash, it is unconditional, meaning there are no (direct) behavioral conditions to continue receiving the money.
Gao said the evidence that dibao creates a poverty trap, where families remain under the poverty line intentionally to receive assistance, is not strong.
Some localities have families update their income and wealth information every three to six months. Certain villages will even publish the names of recipients to allow for public feedback on whether a family should qualify for dibao. Based on the feedback, localities will randomly select people to verify their income information.
“So it’s a very systematic and stringent process,” Gao said.
For some villages, allowing others to comment on a family’s poverty situation may further stigmatize the dibao and other forms of welfare.
“Because the dibao is an unconditional cash transfer, so by design the policy requires applicants to tell the truth and other community members and neighbors to share the responsibility of monitoring. That is part of the design of this program,” Gao said.
While on paper, the dibao is technically an “unconditional cash transfer,” the way dibao measures wealth creates its own form of conditions.
Depending on the locality, dibao recipients may face a myriad of asset tests that prevent them from owning pets, a larger than average home, a car, or luxury items. Expensive private schools and schools abroad are off-limits. In the past, even a cellphone was a disqualifier.
“I think now, many localities are more lenient on that, especially on the cell phone. But there are certain luxury goods (so-called), that you’re not supposed to have. That also features into the feedback from the neighbors and community members. They would get critical and jealous if you have certain luxury goods that they don’t have but you are getting dibao,” Gao said.
In Gao’s book, she also analyzes the subjective well-being and social participation of dibao recipients. She found dibao recipients “tend to be more isolated, and less active in their social participation” than similar peers.
Dibao recipients may feel stigmatized from participating in these activities, such as going to the movies, since it is not a “culturally acceptable use of the dibao income,” she said.
After China’s transition from a planned economy to a market-based economy, society’s expectations about how families earn their own living changed. Now it is expected that people “earn a living through their own work.” Although, Gao said China is currently going through a debate about who “deserves” welfare.
“Previously people had guaranteed jobs, but many people during the economic transformation were laid off so able-bodied adults couldn’t support themselves through jobs anymore. And that group is making up about half of the dibao population,” Gao said.
One area of concern for policymakers is ensuring the dibao is reaching the “proper recipients;” that is people in poverty. There are reports of targeting errors in administering dibao “because of misreporting or difficulty to capture the real income or assets situation in rural areas.”
“The targeting error is real and local officials are very aware of it, but that will stay with the program because of the variations of family conditions and income,” Gao said.
The dibao standard is often used as a criteria for other welfare as well. This means that qualifying for dibao also gives a family access to a host of other assistance (including education, housing, and medical assistance). However, this could create a “welfare cliff” issue, where if a family exceeds the standard they may lose a lot more assistance than they gain as income.
“I think this is one of the policy design features of dibao that needs to be revised right now,” Gao said of dibao acting as a “gatekeeper” for other social assistance.
Overall, dibao has only reduced the rate of poverty to a “modest degree.” It is more effective at reducing the depth and severity of poverty, Gao said.
When asked about the potential to universalize dibao and remove the means-test, effectively creating a Universal Basic Income for China, Gao said this idea has been “very much on my mind recently.”
“I think the best possibility probably would be for certain more developed localities to experiment with such a program and see how it works,” she said.
As for creating a UBI program in China in the near-term, Gao said this would be challenging for many reasons.
“To make the dibao or a similar cash transfer universal all around China, I don’t think it’s very likely in the short-term, both in terms of fiscal challenges and also political and cultural challenges,” Gao said.
